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PSYCHOLOGIA:
OR, AN
Account of the Nature
OF THE
Rational SOUL.

In Two Parts.

THE FIRST,
Being an ESSAY towards eſtabliſhing the receiv'd Doctrine, of an *Immaterial and conſequently Immortal Subſtance*, united to Human Body, upon ſufficient Grounds of Reaſon.

THE SECOND,
A VINDICATION of that receiv'd and eſtabliſh'd Doctrine, againſt a late Book, call'd, *Second Thoughts*, &c. wherein all the Authors pretended Demonſtrations to the Contrary, as well *Philoſophical* and *Rational*, as *Scriptural*, are fully refuted; together with Occaſional Remarks on his Way of Reaſoning. To which is annex'd, A brief Confutation of his whole *Hypotheſis*.

By *JOHN BROUGHTON*, M. A.
Chaplain to his Grace the Duke of *Marlborough*.

LONDON:
Printed by *W. B.* for *T. Bennet*, at the half *Moon* in St. *Paul*'s Church-yard; and *A. Boſvile*, at the *Dial* and *Bible* againſt the *South-Eaſt* end of St. *Dunſtan*'s Church, in *Fleetſtreet*. 1703.

[illegible]

To His GRACE

JOHN

Duke of *Marlborough*,

Captain General of all Her Majeſty's Forces, Knight of the moſt noble Order of the Garter, and One of Her Majeſty's moſt Honourable Privy Council.

May it pleaſe Your Grace,

THAT *I preſume to affix Your great Name to a* Diſcourſe, *which I am ſenſible* *falls much ſhort of its* Title; *but in hopes that the* Title *will recommend the* Diſcourſe *to Your* Grace's *Countenance and Protection.*

My Lord, *the* Immortality of the Soul, *is not only the Common Principle of natural and reveal'd Religion; but has given Riſe to all thoſe great Actions, which make the moſt agreeable Figure in ancient Hiſtory. Cowardice, or Proſtituted Honour was the evil* Genius *that haunted the* Atheiſtic *Commander, thro' all his Succeſſes: But the* Vertuous *Hero always enterpriz'd upon this noble Principle, which never fail'd him in the laſt Extremity; but where-*

ever entertain'd (eſpecially in a great Mind) added Wiſdom to every Debate, Firmneſs to the beſt Reſolution, and a becoming Regularity to Valour it ſelf. Indeed the Luſtre of it is every where charming to our untaught Reaſon, and we cannot but admire ſomething in the fatal Miſapplications of a Cato *and a* Brutus.

But, my Lord, it muſt be confeſs'd the Principle was ſhamefully deſerted by the greateſt Pretenders to it, amongſt the Grecians *and* Romans. *Their chief Characters were rais'd upon a boundleſs Ambition, ſupported by Oppreſſion and Rapine, and finiſh'd with Blaſphemy.*

Whether this was a miſtaken, *or only a* counterfeit *View of* Immortality *in them, ſure the* Chriſtian *Hero can neither pretend a doubtful Light, nor an uncertain Way. He has plainly before him the ſhorteſt way to Glory, both mark't out and fenc'd by a Divine Hand. And if he is not guided by the Light afforded* Him, *he muſt ſhut his Eyes againſt it.*

Chriſtianity *having laid this ſolid Foundation for* Magnanimity, *as well as all other Vertues, it cannot but occaſion an unuſual Horror in our Minds, when, at the ſame time, we behold ſuch an One, who wou'd be eſteem'd both*

Heroical, and moſt Chriſtian, buſied in the Scene of Injuſtice, Oppreſſion and Murther; and there carrying on a Reſolution as ſtrong, and a Deſire as impetuous, as if the Way lay only through Blood and Deſolation, to that calm and peaceful Happineſs, which is the only Happineſs that can be Immortal.

I am fully perſuaded the Immortality of the Soul *wou'd but ill ſuit the Complexion of ſuch an Hero, if he muſt be ſo ſtil'd; and that nothing cou'd force it to Addreſs to Him, as it does now to Your* Grace, *but the mercenary Pen of a thorough-pac'd ſhameleſs Flatterer, who is equally regard-*

leſs of Truth *and* Merit; *and, as occaſion ſerves, can either faſten upon him a meritorious Action, or make the worſt of Actions meritorious.*

But, my Lord, *as to my ſelf, I know every Engliſhman, who has any Remains of Native Vertue, or the Love of his Country (which no Nation ever wanted, and none can indulge on better Grounds than the Engliſh) will free me from this Imputation. And, if there be any Thing which we will not divide upon, we ſhall never diſpute* Your Grace's *being at the Head of a Righteous Cauſe, and in the very Gap, where Tyranny, puſh'd on by Am-*

bition, and guarded both by Force and Fraud, has made its Inroad upon the Liberties of Europe.

But ſince it has pleas'd the Divine Providence to give, and to continue ſo great Succeſs to the Sword of Juſtice and Honour, in the Hands of Your Grace *(engag'd in the greateſt and beſt Deſign of many Nations, by the wiſe Choice of* Him *who began it, and with the higheſt Approbation of* Her *for whom, we hope, is reſerv'd the Glory of finiſhing it) I ſhou'd expect more than a bare Vindication of this Addreſs, from the true Engliſhman, were I permitted to touch upon that Subject, in a* Dedication, *which* *muſt be reſerv'd as the proper Attempt of* Hiſtory.

But if I muſt not uſe this Plea, becauſe it is ſo much above me, yet give me leave, my Lord, *to mention another, which good Manners will better allow me to Speak to, and which, I know, will have from* Your Grace, *a more favourable Hearing. What I have written upon this Subject, as I believe it perfectly agreeable to* Chriſtianity, *ſo it is in Defence of an avowed Principle and Doctrine of the* Church of England; *whoſe Authority is herein oppos'd, and rejected by One that wou'd be thought of Her Communion: But as it is Her own Vindication*

dication, that ſhe has hitherto met with ſuch Treatment, only from thoſe who make an unworthy Part of Her; ſo it is the Satisfaction and Support of all Her true Sons, that God has bleſs'd and honour'd Her with the beſt Friends upon Earth, in the moſt ſeaſonable Conjuncture, when ſhe wants no ſort of Enemies.

She has a ſolicitous Nurſing Mother, *who has brought to that high Charge the beſt Qualification of having been a faithful Member; and She wants not many ſuch as Your* Grace *at the Helm, who, as true Members, are beſt inclin'd, and as chief Members,* *are beſt fitted to aſſert, and maintain Her primitive Piety, and Her truly Chriſtian Conſtitution.*

This pleaſing Thought, *my Lord, has tranſported me into that* Confidence, *which now appears in my offering to Your* Grace, *the beſt* Tribute *my poor Stock will afford to the preſent Exigency of this combated Church and Religion. I am ſenſible how much the* Mite *will be improv'd, by the Acceptance of* One, *ſo highly concern'd in the Inſeparable Intereſt of Church and State.*

And that He who over-rules all, may long continue Your Grace, *the Life and Spirit of the Confederate Arms; and after a late ap-*

applauded Exit, *reward you with that* Immortal Honour *which* Fame *pretends to give, and* Religion *only can beſtow, in the* true Philoſyphic *and* Chriſtian Senſe, *is the Dutiful and Earneſt Prayer of,*

My moſt Honour'd Lord,

Your *Grace*'s moſt devoted

humble Servant,

JOHN BROUGHTON.

THE

PREFACE.

THE Book and the Deſign, which gave Occaſion to theſe Papers, are ſo well known to thoſe who have troubl'd themſelves to know any thing of them, that I have no Occaſion to prepoſſeſs the Reader with any Opinion concerning them, in Order to his more favourable Acceptance of my own Work.

But I think my ſelf oblig'd to give him ſome Account of what I have attempted, and what I may preſume to have done; the rather becauſe through frequent

Interruptions, it happens that this Diſcourſe appears in the Cauſe after ſeveral others, who may be ſuppos'd to have done ſufficient Execution. And indeed I have no Deſign by this, *to charge* theirs *with Inſufficiency; but of thoſe I have ſeen, which are ſuppos'd the moſt Conſiderable; ſome are only Anſwers to* Second Thoughts, *others but Anſwers in Part, and none of them have endeavour'd to build upon the ſame Foundation of Reaſon, which, I think, is at the Bottom of all the chief Arguments in this Book.*

As to the firſt of theſe, I was very ſenſible that a juſt Anſwer to Second Thoughts, *wou'd not therefore be a juſt Diſcourſe on the Subject: and the Reader will find in the Second Part, that the Author ſeldom leads us to the Merits of the Cauſe; He either plays upon the Out-works of it, and there deſiſts; or when his Objections ſeem to be driven Home, they are indeed only level'd at the*

the Weakneſs of Human Underſtanding, which cannot be ſuppos'd to maintain this Argument, where it fails in all others. And as to thoſe who have only anſwer'd him in Part, viz. *From* Scripture, *and have given up the Cauſe as indefenſible by the Succors of Reaſon, I muſt confeſs I cannot, in this Caſe, approve of the Deſign, tho' I do not deny they have come up to it. If* Eſtibius Pſychalethes, *the* Nominal *Author of* Second Thoughts, *has made any Proſelytes in a* coming *Age, I am of Opinion the greateſt Part of them will be ready to compound at this Rate; and then rejecting the Scripture Authority does the Buſineſs at once. But tho' they always find this a Task too hard for them, then eſpecially when they ſet moſt in earneſt about it; yet I believe they find it the more eaſy of the Two, to deny, and to live by the Denial of the plaineſt Authority, than to ſtifle the Witneſs of their Mind, and to get rid of ſuch* connate *and natural Notions,* *which, as lying nearer to them, will ſometimes preſs harder upon them. But as I think it is evident that God has guarded his Revelation of a Future State, with Expectations Natural, and highly agreeable to what he has Reveal'd; ſo I cannot find upon what Ground this Expectation cou'd be maintain'd, beſides the* Immortality of the Soul, *which, accordingly, I look upon to be of no little Moment, as an Article of Natural Religion; and ſince Natural Religion is founded upon Natural Reaſon, I have made it my Chief Buſineſs, in the Firſt Part, to* give a Reaſon of *this* Hope that is in us.

It is indeed but one Reaſon, that runs thro' the greateſt Part of the Eſſay; but I need not apologize for that, if I have made it concluſive. However, *I may without Vanity ſay I have carry'd it farther than where I found it; and I cannot, upon the moſt deliberate Review, but believe it will conclude at laſt. The Reaſon,*

Reaſon, in ſhort, is the αὐτοκινετον, *or ſelf-moving Power of the Soul; exerting it ſelf in all the Operations of* Thought, *and* Spontaneous Motion. *This, it's true, is an Argument of old Date, and I like it the better for that. It appear'd to me an Advantage to the* Notion, *that all the beſt eſteem'd Philoſophers of old,* Thales, Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, Ariſtotle, Cicero, *and many more, differing amongſt themſelves in all other Notions, and moſt of them whimſical and without Ground, upon the Subject, ſhou'd yet unanimouſly center in this. I cannot but ſuppoſe they were led to it, and dwelt upon it by the ſame Reaſon, which will, I preſume, incline any Man that believes God has created* Spirit *as well as* Body. *For in Conſequence of this, he will find it highly reaſonable, to ſuppoſe that* Spirit *is the Principle of* Life *and* Senſation; *and Body of* Mechaniſm *and* Local Motion. *As therefore* Spirit *is, in its*

Nature, utterly incapable of Local Motion, *either from* Truſion, *or* Suction, *and of any* Mechanical Affection, or Modification; *ſo it is highly reaſonable to conclude that* Body *is as incapable, on the other Hand*, *of* Life *and* Senſation. *For by what other Eſſential Character can we diſtinguiſh theſe two, if they are two diſtinct* Species *of Beings? I grant, what* Mr. Lock *contends for, that 'tis poſſible to conceive a* Spirit *deveſted of the Operation of* Thought, *and barely, in his own* Term, *as an* unſolid Subſtance; *but it is ſufficient that we place the Diſtinction upon the* Capacity, *and* Incapacity *of* Thought; *for the other* [*of* ſolid *and* unſolid] *is no way ſerviceable to us; becauſe we did not come by the Knowledge of* Spirit, *as really exiſting, by our Idea of ſomething* unſolid, *but only by our Idea of ſomething that thinks: So that our Idea of an* unſolid Subſtance, *is not form'd from the Contemplation*

plation of any thing without us, as that of Solidity *is; but is a bare* Hypotheſis *to ſolve the Phænomenon of Thought. But now if a ſolid Subſtance be poſſibly capable of this Faculty of* Thought, *then there is no neceſſity to recur to the* Hypotheſis *of an unſolid Subſtance, to ſolve that Phænomenon; and ſince* entia non ſunt multiplicanda ſine neceſſitate, *what is this but to introduce univerſal* Corporealiſm? *Which is neither better nor worſe than* Atheiſm. *Which Conſideration may ſerve to pull off the Mask this Notion, I do not ſay the Author of it, wears; and to ſhew that he who makes both* Body *and* Spirit Think *and* Live, *does but comply with a Vulgar Mode of Speech, but really deſtroys the Diſtinction, and in effect aſcribes all to Body.*

And this is my Reaſon for dwelling ſo long upon this one Point, *as alſo for ſending my Thoughts into the World after*

after others upon the Subject; but which have only, ſo far as I can judge, tranſiently touch'd upon this Point.

In the Second Part of this Work, I have given Eſtibius *a thorough* Examination*; not omitting any one Conſideration that he himſelf has thought material, and all in his own Method. 'Tis likely the Reader may blame us both for this, and me eſpecially for anſwering an impertinent Objection; but ſome of theſe Objections have given me Occaſion to State ſeveral Controverſies relating to the Subject anew, and to vindicate them from his* Miſrepreſentations,*which, with ſome, do the Work of* Objections.*If there are any that come not under either Denomination, the Reader will believe I have had my ſhare in the Mortification; and he will be more ready to excuſe me, when I have ſhew'd him how this* Controvertiſt *manages himſelf, and where his Play chiefly lies; which is in retreating from Covert to Covert, and back*

back again in a Round. This he will frequently find him doing, when the Subject was only under his own Hands; *and I am perſuaded a Man of this* Kid-*ney will never yield ſo long as he has the leaſt hold. And therefore I was the more willing to ſhew my Reſpects to the leaſt Argument he offer'd, tho' I have been as ſhort as was conſiſtent with my Deſign. This is all I ſhall Preface to the Reader in General.*

But becauſe its poſſible Eſtibius *may be one of my Readers, and what will be ſatisfactory to all others, may not be ſo to him; I muſt beg leave to addreſs my ſelf, in few Words, to him in Particular.*

You ſee, Sir, *I have attempted what You ſay has not been hitherto attempted, a thorough Examination of Your* Second Thoughts. *As to the* Style, *in which I have treated You, I cannot ſay it will be every where grateful: but it's not unlikely I ſhou'd fail in that, when I* *cou'd not poſſibly tell what* Style *You expected; for in an Advertiſement affix'd to Your Book, You forbid Your Anſwerer a* Jeſting Style, *as that which You will* paſs by with Scorn and Contempt; *but when Mr.* Turner, *obſerving Your Directions, plainly and ſeriouſly tells You, of* obtruding on our Saviour a meaning never intended, *all the Anſwer You give him is*, away with your Grave Reprimand; *ſo that I find You are reſolv'd to be in an Oppoſite* Humour, *as well as an Oppoſite* Argument, *with Your Adverſary. If he Jeſts, You are full of ſtiff Scorn; and if he's Grave, You can Laugh at him for it. And therefore not knowing in which Temper theſe Papers may find You, whether Magiſterial or Witty, I have not confin'd my ſelf to either.*

Far. Th. p. 54.

The next thing I am to account to You for, is, that I have ſometimes fall'n in with the common Opinion in charging upon

upon Second Thoughts, Atheiſm, *or ſo. This I muſt confeſs the Courſe of my Argument has led me to, more than once; but, if I have not ſufficiently done it already, I here once for all, diſtinguiſh both between Your Perſon and Your Opinion, and between Your Opinion and the Conſequence of it; ſo long as You diſown the* Conſequence, *I make it none of Your* Opinion, *and when you have not ſeen the Fault of your Opinion, I do not lay the Fault* at Your Door. *But perhaps it may be of uſe, in Order to your Vindication, to lay before You ſome of the Grounds of this Suſpicion, in all of Your Readers, I have ever met with; and they are ſuch as theſe,*

First, they find You maintaining a downright Atheiſtic Principle, when You lay it down for an Axiom, materiale non poteſt agere in immateriale, neque immateriale in materiale. *Whereas on the Contrary all* Theiſts *muſt maintain this for an* Axiom, *That* there is no Motion of Matter in the Univerſe, but what proceeded, as a real Effect, from the Acting of an Immaterial Agent upon it. *They find You endeavouring, but they think ineffectually, to avoid the Conſequence, when You ſay, to the* Fa. Th. p. 134. *Objection, that God acts upon Matter*, We ought here to talk *Philoſophy*, and not *Divinity* to explain our *Philoſophy*. *For they can ſee no Reaſon why this Propoſition*, Motion was originally communicated to Matter by ſomething Immaterial; *or this*, God Acts upon all the Parts of the Material World, *ſhou'd be reckon'd only* Divinity *and not* Philoſophy *too*; *ſo that Your Oppoſing* Philoſophy *and* Divinity *in this Place, does with them rather increaſe, than remove the Suſpicion. Nor are they ſatisfy'd with Your farther Anſwer*, That the Modus of his Omnipotence Acting upon Second Cauſes is Myſterious and Unconceivable, *for the* Axiom *excludes the Poſſibility, which is much more than not conceiving*

ceiving the Modus *of his Acting on Matter. It is, if it be true, an Eternal Truth; and that concludes the Divine Nature it ſelf. It is, if it be an* Axiom, *the Reverſe of a Contradiction or Impoſſibility; and that is no Object of Omnipotent Power. Now as this very* Axiom *of Yours was the Grand Pillar of the* Democratic Atheiſm, *ſo You have inſiſted more upon it, than any one Thing in Your Book; and indeed it is at the Bottom of all Your darling Arguments. Which has left, a ſcurvy Scruple upon the Reader (who knows by what covert-ſteps Athieſtic Tenents always ſtole into the World) which all You have hitherto declar'd of Your Faith, has not clear'd up.*

Others have altogether diſregarded Your aſſurance upon the Faith of a Chriſtian that You write with an Honeſt Deſign, &c. *For they think You have us'd the* Scripture *very unlike one that has* Faith *in it. In-* Ep. Ded.

ſtances of this kind are very numerous, the Reader muſt only taſte of them here. Behold (*ſays our* Saviour *at his appearance to his Diſciples after his Reſurrection*) my Hands and my Feet, that it is I my Self; handle me and ſee, for a Spirit hath not Fleſh and Bones, as ye ſee me have, St. *Luke* 24. 39. Plainly implying (*ſays* Eſtibius) That what was viſible to the Eye, and an Object of the Touch, being two of the Exterior Senſes, was more capable of being underſtood, than a Spirit; whoſe Nature and Eſſence was properly the Object of the Underſtanding only. *I will not put a Comment upon this Paraphraſe; becauſe, as I ſaid, moſt Readers are already perſuaded You are not in Earneſt with the Scripture, tho' they do think You in earneſt when in the ſame Page, You declare an Indifference to any Author, whether he is able or not*, to turn and wreſt the Scriptures.

Pag. 83.

Such another Inſtance is the Difficulty of Diſlodging a Spirit, *if there were any ſuch in Human Body, which You propoſe as an Objection; ſince in fact it is ſo eaſily diſlodg'd. And this Difficulty You prove from the* Diſciples complaining of it [*when they cou'd not eject Evil Spirits*] tho' they had an Immediate Miraculous Power given them to eject Spirits and Devils. *I do not ſay this has convinc'd any that You are* able, *but it has convinc'd ſome that You have* attempted to turn and wreſt the Scriptures. *If this Method of interpreting* Scripture *is allowable, I am ſure there is nothing ſo ridiculous, abſurd or impious, but what the Scripture may be brought to Countenance; and then indeed every Man, of what Opinion ſoever, has juſt Pretenſions to the* Faith of a Chriſtian. Pag. 108.

Next to Your Treatment of Scripture, *the Chriſtian Reader has reſented the Uſage You have given the* Primitive

Fathers; *for finding them unanimouſly againſt You, in believing the Soul ſurvives the Body, Your Buſineſs is, in many Parts of Your Book, to diſgrace their Memory, by a Character of Ignorance below what was ever given to* Monkiſh *Writer, You doubt not but* Pag. 256. *their* Ignorance was equivalent to their Piety. *So that You ſeem reſolv'd we ſhall gain nothing by extolling their Piety; and to prove this, You are bold to make St.* Paul *mean, when he ſays,* the times of this Ignorance God winked at, *the Primitive times ſucceeding our* Saviour. *The beſt* Ibid. *Character you allow them at laſt is, that their* Ignorance was pardonable in nice Points of Religion. *I don't ſuppoſe any one wou'd be offended, if* Eſtibius *did indeed underſtand* the nice Points of Religion, *better than all the Primitive Fathers; but that which cannot but offend the Chriſtian, that knows any thing of the Antiquity* *of Chriſtianity, is the notorious Falſehood of the Imputation: And ſure he can have no great Opinion of the* End, *which ſuch* Means *are imploy'd to gain.*

Theſe, Sir, I believe are ſome Reaſons for the Reception this Honeſt Deſign of Yours has met with in the World; not to inſiſt upon many incidental Occaſions, ſuch as your high Characters of Hobs, Lucretius, *and others of that ſtrain; and Your making an Engliſh Clergyman, and a Prejudic'd Zealot terms convertible; and, as if that were not broad enough, they are declar'd in the* Title *to* Farther Thoughts, *to* have a Zeal, but not according to Knowledge. *I cannot queſtion Your* Knowledge, *or Your* Proſpect *where ſome of this Dirt will light, but methinks its a little unreaſonable You ſhou'd complain that other Men have* Eyes *and* Underſtanding *too.*

Having taken upon me to give Eſtibius *ſome Sentiments of his preſent Work, I ſhall make bold to add a Caution or two with regard to his future Performance, if he deſigns any ſuch, as an Anſwer to this. Not that I pretend to preſcribe Rules to him, who has ſet none, that I can approve of, to himſelf; but I may* offer *Reaſon, where I know I muſt* ſubmit *it.*

Firſt then, I think it high time for him to drop the old Cry of Prejudice, *which is a Battery always ready to be play'd againſt any Opinion, eſpecially if it is held by the generality of Mankind; and I am ſure is as good an Anſwer to* Second Thoughts, *as it is an Argument for them: And yet this, beſides a whole Chapter on Purpoſe, makes no inconſiderable Part of his Work. But I fear he did not conſider, while he ſpent ſo many Words to remove* Prejudice, *what a conſiderable one he created againſt his own Deſign; for ſuch monſtrous* Ex-

creſcencies, in the Off-ſpring *of the Brain, can be no great Credit to the* Parent.

In the next Place, I hope we have done with the Controverſy about Purgatory, Prayers for the Dead, and Invocation of Saints. *Theſe I am ſure are wide of the Mark, and touch not the Merits of the Cauſe, as it lies between him and me, or rather him and a Reform'd Country. I muſt confeſs I cannot ſee what Service he cou'd ever expect from this Argument, unleſs he imagin'd, a Foundation muſt be ruin'd with a Superſtructure; becauſe it does hold* vice verſa.

To as little purpoſe will it be to quote Authorities, eſpecially from Heathens, *againſt this* Heatheniſh Invention; *and from* Poets *in a Metaphyſical Argument, againſt* Philoſophers: *For here at laſt he can only ſhew his Learning, at the Expence of his Judgment; and I doubt not but a larger Collection of* *ancient Authorities might be made, to prove that the* Sun, Moon, *and* Stars *have Souls, than ever he will make to prove that Man has none. However I may demand fair Dealing with Authorities, and that he wou'd not any more bring* Ariſtotle *over by making him ſay* Man *when he ſaid only* Male; *or quote the Authority of* Sennertus *on his ſide, who ſolemnly retracted that very Opinion of the Generation of Human Soul.* Sennert. Hypom. 4. c. 10.

There is another thing which, in Reaſon, I may expect from him; and that is, that he thoroughly acquaint himſelf with the Grounds of his Adverſaries Opinion, before he undertakes to confute it. This is as neceſſary, as it is a Reaſonable Requeſt; for hitherto he has not conceiv'd Cogitation to be a Ground or Foundation of Immateriality; *and yet I have ſhewn it has been* the Foundation of Immateriality, *ever ſince* that *had any Foundation with Philoſophers; and I hope* Pag. 245.

hope I have prov'd it to be a Foundation, which Prejudice *and* Purgatory *will never overturn.*

Here therefore is new Work cut out for him; and this being the chief Argument of my Firſt Part, I expect his Rejoynder *will confute the ſeveral Notions advanc'd in* that; *and tho' I cannot promiſe him ſucceſs in ſuch an Undertaking, yet I will be bold to ſay, for his Encouragement, that following the Train of Thoughts in that Eſſay, he will come nearer, than ever he was yet, to his own Purpoſe. And I requeſt it of him, when he's let into the Merits of the Cauſe, that he wou'd keep there, or be ſilent; and not, as his way is throughout this Book, touch upon an Argument, and immediately fly off; not unlike the Dogs from drinking at the River* Nile, *for fear of being* Caught.

As to the Scripture part of the Controverſy, I am ſure the Laws of Diſpute and juſt Diſcourſe, will require him to reconcile his Tenent with the Doctrine

Doctrine of Rewards and Puniſhments in another World; eſpecially ſince I inſiſt upon it that they are irreconcileable, before he repeats as he has done ſo often, thoſe literal Expreſſions of the Dead not being, not knowing, nor praiſing God; *theſe I can aſſure him will give me no trouble; for I don't think repeating a weak Argument without any Improvement, to be* repeating the Blow; *but only to expoſe the wretched remaining Inclination of a repuls'd Adverſary. When he has attempted to reconcile his Doctrine to Religion in general; I may be inclin'd to conſider again the Expreſſions of Scripture relating to the Point. But I ſhall not be confin'd to the bare* Etymon *of the Words* Soul *and* Spirit; *having ſo fully expos'd the Weakneſs of that pretended Criticiſm, I now expect* Eſtibius *will give the Bible as fair an hearing as he wou'd do* Galen *or* Hypocrates.

This is all I preſume to ſay to Eſtibius; *I have nothing to ſay to* Dr. C——. *For tho' I am as hearty an Enemy as he can wiſh for, to his Opinions, if theſe are his; yet to his Perſon I wiſh no otherwiſe than I do to every Reader,*

——Ut ſit Mens ſana in Corpore ſano.

ERRATA.

EPiſt. Ded. page laſt, line 5. for *Philoſyphic* read *Philoſophic*. Page 21. line 5. for *is* read *in*. p. 90. l. 21. dele. *That*. p. 101. l. 30. for *ſtretch* r. *ſtrength*. p. 183. l. 18. after *was* inſert *not*. Ibid. l. 19. after *ſtate* inſert *the*. p. 220. l. 13. after *as* inſert *the*. p. 253. l. 21. for *Body* r. *Bodies*. p. 263. for *Scornum*. r. *Somnium*. p. 276. l. 22. for *where* r. *when*. p. 277. l. 23. after *to* inſert *be*. p. 298. l. 2. for *in* r. *is*. p. 306. l. 5. for *wherever* r. *whenever*. p. 309. l. 6. after *pray* inſert *God*. p. 312. l. 20. for *when* r. *wherein*. p. 313. l. 28. for *was* r. *were*. p. 329. l. 22. for *ture* r. *true*. p. 365. l. 20. after *that* inſert *of*. p. 371. l. 25. for *ong* r. *long*. p. 378. l. 1. for *Ninth* r. *Tenth*. p. 383. l. 8. for *then* r. *tho'*. p. 393. l. 5. for *Enmities* r. *Enmity*.

PSYCHOLOGIA:
PART I.

BEING AN
ESSAY
Towards Eſtabliſhing the Receiv'd Doctrine
OF AN
Immaterial, and Conſequently
Immortal Spirit,
United to
HUMAN BODY,
Upon ſufficient Grounds of
REASON.

Οὔτοι ἔγωγε ὦ παῖδες, οὐδὲ τοῦτο πώποτε ἐπείσθην, ὡς ἡ ψυχὴ ἕως μὲν ἂν ἐν θνητῷ σώματι ᾖ ζῇ ὅταν δὲ τούτου ἀπαλλαγῇ τέθνηκεν. Ὁρῶ γὰρ ὅτι καὶ τὰ θνητὰ σώματα ὅσον ἂν ἐν αὐτοῖς χρόνον ᾖ ἡ ψυχή, ζῶντα παρέχεται. Ξενοφ. Κύρου παιδ. Bib. η.

ADVERTISEMENT.

ΜΑΞΙΜΟΥ ΤΥΡΙΟΥ λόγοι. Maximi Tyrii Diſſertationes. Ex Interpretatione *Danielis Heinſii*. Recenſuit & Notulis illuſtravit *Joannes Daviſius*, Coll. Regin. apud Cantabr. Socius. *Cantabrigiæ*, Impenſis *Alex. Boſvile* Bibl. Londin. ad inſigne Horologii & Bibliorum in vico vulgo vocato *Fleetſtreet*.

AN ESSAY Concerning the NATURE OF HUMAN SOUL.

SECT. I.

Some Terms *intended to be uſ'd, explain'd.*

THO' I ſhall not affect to expreſs my ſelf in *Terms* unintelligible to any competent Reader of the following Eſſay; yet, to avoid Ambiguity as much as poſſible, I ſhall here *define*, or if you will, *deſcribe* the chief of them.

The firſt is that of *Subſtance*, by which I mean *That, to us, unknown Nature, upon which all that we do know of the Nature of any thing depends, as to its Being; and which is, as to its Eſſence in general, independent on every thing but God.*

The next is *Attribute*, by which is to be underſtood, abſolutely, *all that belongs to a Subſtance, and is not the Subſtance it ſelf*; or, *all of the Subſtance that falls under our Knowledge and Apprehenſion:* but when taken relatively to other things appertaining to a Subſtance, is *that which conſtitutes the ſpecifick Eſſence of it, according to our Denomination of its Eſſence.* Thus by ſome *Extenſion*, by others *impenetrable Extenſion* is call'd the *Attribute of Body*, as diſtinguiſhing it ſpecifically from things *immaterial.* I add *according to our Denomination of its Eſſence*, becauſe, whether that *Attribute* flows immediately from its Eſſence or not, (which perhaps is only known to the Creator) it is ſufficient if to it we can reduce, as to their Fountain-head, all the other ſpecific *Attributes*, which we do apprehend to belong unto it.

Property I underſtand in a larger Senſe than *Attribute relatively conſider'd*, and in a more reſtrain'd Senſe than *Attribute taken abſolutely*; viz. *Any Attribute belonging to the ſpecific Eſſence of a Subſtance, whether deriving from*

from it immediately, or from ſome other Attribute.

And by *Mode*, or *Quality* is meant a *Property, which gives ſome peculiar Denomination to the Subſtance.*

Human Soul, the Subject of our Enquiry, it is ſufficient at preſent to define thus, *a finite Spirit ſo cloſely united by the Will and Power of its Creator, to an organical terreſtrial Body as to compoſe one entire Nature and Perſon.* It is ſufficient here to define the Soul as it is in this State, becauſe our Knowledge of what it is now, is the only Foundation of our Knowledge, (ſo far as the Light of Nature guides) of what it will be in another.

There is yet another Term which needs explication, and that becauſe its different Acceptations has caus'd *Oppoſition*, where there was no *Contradiction:* It is the word *Idea*, which ſome underſtand, according to the *Etimon* of it, barely to ſignifie, *thoſe Impreſſions which by the Preſence of ſenſible Objects, or the Power of Memory, are made on the Imagination.* Others take it in the *Carteſian* Senſe, for *the immediate Object of our Thoughts, while we do think*; let that Object be of what Nature it will, or however it is repreſented to the Mind; and in this ſenſe we have an *Idea* of whatever we can believe poſſibly, or actually true.

I ſhall take it in this laſt Senſe, tho' others have been cenſur'd for ſo uſing it; and juſtly too, if, in the main, they extend it to all *knowable Truths*, and when it ſerves a Turn, confine it only to ſuch as are known by *explicit Evidence*; which is a Fault obvious in a whole Sect of very modern Philoſophers.

From theſe *Terms* thus explain'd, ſeveral Controverſies ariſe, which yet I think it an improper Method to engage in here; it being ſufficient that they are clear and intelligible; and whether they are proper Vehicles of any *Truths*, will beſt appear by the Application of them. This is all I think requiſite to premiſe for the better *underſtanding* of what follows.

SECT. II.

What ſort of Proof is to be expected and inſiſted upon.

I Have ſomething to add for the better *Reception* of it; and that is concerning the Nature of the Proof I intend to inſiſt upon, and it is reaſonable to expect from me.

1*ſt*, I hope no Man expects to meet with what is properly call'd *ſenſible Proof*, in an Argument for the Exiſtence of a Thing altogether remote from *Senſe*; nor therefore,

2*dly*, Muſt he expect *Mathematical Proof* in the common acceptation for *Geometrical*, as it is converſant about Things and the Relations of Things, which fall under our *Senſes*; not but that there are many Propoſitions, and ſome, I hope, in theſe Papers, which are built upon *Axioms*, as properly ſtil'd, and deduc'd as demonſtrably from them, as any *Propoſition* in *Euclid*; but, being of an abſtracted Nature, are not ſo eaſily, nor ſo fully aſſented to, by the generality of Mankind, as thoſe *Sciences* which bring *Reaſon* down to *Senſe*, and ſo are better adapted to the weakneſs of Human Underſtanding; not again that theſe have any Advantage of the other, in point of *Evidence*, with a Capacity ſuſceptible of both.

And therefore, 3*dly*, moſt Readers cannot hope to find ſuch Proof here, be it of what Nature ſoever, as will leave no *Scruple* or *Heſitation* in their Minds.

It is one ill effect of the *Fall*, that our Underſtanding is more deeply immers'd in Senſe, and ſo [naturally] cramp'd when it aims at intellectual Objects, that Men of ſtrong Reaſoning in other Caſes, often think we talk of we know not what, when we are got upon this *Subject*; to conquer this Difficulty, there is requiſite a ſound and piercing *Judgment*, frequent *Exerciſe*, and a very particular *Application:* Thoſe that have not thus employ'd a conſiderable part of their time, I can only deſire to reflect, after they have perus'd this Eſſay, upon what the Proof I ſhall bring amounts to *all together*; and to try if they can bring better, or as good Reaſon to the contrary; and if they cannot, whatever Difficulties they find in the *Apprehenſion*, the *Scale* of Judgment will at laſt turn on our ſide; and, to carry on the Simile, will weigh as far down, tho' not ſo ſwiftly, as if there were no oppoſite Weight.

4thly, As to the *Method* of proceeding in our Proof, it will be the *analitic* or *probatio à poſteriori*, from the Effect to the Cauſe; which, tho' it is not ſo perfect a *Method*, nor conſequently the Reaſoning by it ſo ſtrong as the *ſynthetic*, or *probatio à priori*, from the Cauſe to the Effect; yet it is, in its *kind*, a good and effectual *Method* of Proof; otherwiſe we muſt be ſceptical in the far greateſt part of *ſcientific* Knowledge, which leads us no otherwiſe to the *Cauſe*, than by the *Effect* which lies nearer to us; beſides that all *Relation* is *reciprocal*, and we may ſafely follow the *Chain* of Reaſoning either way; not that, 5*thly*, We pretend to lead, by this *Method*, to a full Comprehenſion of the *Cauſe*; for the *Cauſe* may have *Properties* which bear no *Relation* to that *Effect*; but that hereby we know ſomething certainly of it, which is as full a Proof of its Exiſtence, as if we knew every thing appertaining to it; for *nihili nullæ ſunt proprietates.*

Laſtly, It is allowed by all *Philoſophers* a good Eſtabliſhment of a Principle, how unknown ſoever in its ſelf, if there appear a *Neceſſity* of recurring to it, for the Solution of ſome *real Phænomenon*; provided ſtill, that that *Principle* be not in it ſelf *abſurd*, as well as *unknown*.

In this Senſe I underſtand a thing is well prov'd, when it is prov'd as far as the *Nature* of it will permit; in any other Senſe it ſeems a fallacious Concluſion to ſay, a thing is *really* prov'd, becauſe prov'd as well as the *Nature* of it will bear; for ſtill the Queſtion may lye, whether the Nature of it will admit of ſufficient Proof. If therefore we can firſt clear our Principle from *Abſurdity*, and not only ſo, but bring good Arguments to prove it a Principle *in rerum natura*, and then evince the *Neceſſity* of recurring to it in the *Caſe* before us; the *Concluſion* muſt be admitted; and this leads me to the firſt Step of my intended Proof.

SECT III.

Of Immaterial Subſtance *in general.*

THE *Principle* therefore upon which I build is that of *Immaterial Subſtance*; in which I ſhall diſtinctly conſider the *Subject* and the *Predicate*.

1*ſt*, As to *Subſtance*; there needs no farther Proof of its Exiſtence than the Definition of it already laid down, *i. e.* it is a ſelf-evident Propoſition that an *Attribute*, *Property*, *Mode*, or *Quality*, abſtractedly conſider'd, cannot exiſt of it ſelf; and yet here is an inſuperable Objection againſt the Exiſtence of *Subſtance* to any Man that is reſolv'd to maintain that *Senſation* and *Reflexion* are the Source of all our *Ideas*; that is, of all our Knowledge; for it is certain *Subſtance* became the Object of our Underſtanding, by neither of theſe means.

Eſſay on H. Und. lib. 2. *Cap.* 13. §. 19.

And accordingly, the Author of that Scheme has, very conſiſtently, ridicul'd it; it is with him the *Indian Philoſophers neſcio quid*, *that ſupports the Tortoiſe, that ſupports the Elephant, that ſupports the Earth*; which is plainly to make our Notion of *Subſtance* not only unimaginable, but ungrounded and chymerical. This I know is more than the Author apparently deſigns here, and where he repeats the Simile, which is to ſhew that the old Diviſion of *Subſtance* and *Accident* is uſeleſs in Philoſophy; but granting the Simile was introduc'd for its Elegancy only, and alſo that this Diviſion of Things into *Subſtanae* and *Accident* is uſeleſs in ſuch Inſtances as he produces; which depend, as to their Solution, entirely upon our Knowledge of the *Accidents*; yet is not this general Diviſion neceſſarily to be made in the order of Nature, before we deſcend to theſe Particulars? if not, we muſt allow a Self-ſupport to *Accidents*.

Ch. 27. §. 2.

A profeſs'd Enemy to *immaterial Subſtance* is ſo far from denying the real Exiſtence of *Subſtance in general*, that he lays down *neceſſary Exiſtence*, as an univerſal Property of it: I ſhall have occaſion to undertake this Poſition afterward; only I obſerve at preſent, that this Doctrine was own'd on both ſides, till this Moderator interpos'd, who is ſometimes on one, and ſometimes on the other ſide; and now and then againſt both.

Spinoz. Ethic, pars 1. *prop.* 7.

But do we know nothing of *Subſtance*? Yes, for we can diſtinguiſh one *Subſtance* from another (which cannot be done without ſome Knowledge of both) by their known different *Accidents*, which neceſſarily infer a proportionable difference in the *Subſtances* to which they belong; but perhaps the meaning is, we know nothing of *Subſtance*, taken in Diſtinction from, and Oppoſition to its own *Accidents*; very true, and this Knowledge may not only tranſcend human, but all created Underſtanding; but ſtill, of the *Exiſtence* of that, as to its Eſſence unknown, *Subſtance*, we have ſelf-evident certainty, which, I think, cannot properly be call'd *knowing nothing of it.*

This therefore I venture to lay down as a ſelf-evident Propoſition, That *where ever there are Accidents, there is of neceſſity a Subſtance too*; and *this*, as next to ſelf-evident, that *from the difference we find in the Nature of Accidents, we muſt conclude a like difference in the Nature of thoſe Subſtances to which they belong*; for whereever a thing has its Dependence as to *Being*; there it muſt have its Dependence alſo, as to all the *Modes of Exiſtence.*

2*dly*, *Immaterial Subſtance* is not ſo much without Controverſie. *Spinoza* in the forementioned Propoſition giving the Divine Atribute of *neceſſary Exiſtence* to *Subſtance in general*; and, one Divine Attribute inferring all the reſt, makes but one kind of *Subſtance* in the Univerſe, and all Diverſity to be accidental.

A full Confutation of this Tenet is too tedious an Undertaking here; the Reader may find it to his Satisfaction in Dr. *More*. I only urge, that, according to what is ſaid in the precedent Section, that very accidental Diverſity infers a difference in the Nature of the Subſtances, and according to his own words, *Duæ ſubſtantiæ diverſa attributa habentes, nihil inter ſe commune habent.* So that if there be any ſuch thing as two different *Attributes*, there muſt be two diſtinct *Subſtances.*

Duarum Atheiſmi Spinoziani columnarum ſubverſio. Mori Op. Vol. 1.

Ethic. p. 1. *prop.* 2.

But that there muſt be, or, which is all one, muſt have been an *immaterial Subſtance* in the Univerſe; that is, a Subſtance with Properties diſtinct from, and inconſiſtent with thoſe that belong to *corporeal Subſtance*; I ſhall, waving other Arguments, prove from theſe two Principles, 1ſt, *That ſomething was from Eternity.* 2dly, *That Motion was communicated to Matter.*

The firſt is a Principle that needs no other to confirm it, unleſs by ſhewing the Abſurdity of the contrary, as Dr. *Cudworth* has done with invincible Evidence in this ſhort Sentence, *If ever there was nothing, there never cou'd have been any thing.* But this eternal Being is not Matter conſider'd either in its *ſpecific* or *generical*

Intellect. Syſt.

Nature; not in its ſpecific Nature, for ſolid or fluid Bodies, as ſuch, are not *neceſſarily*, and therefore cou'd not be *eternally* exiſtent. Not in its generical Nature; for, 1*ſt*, This deify'd Matter being in one Part not conſcious of the Thoughts that are in another, as we experience in our ſelves, wou'd not therefore be conſcious of its own Thoughts, that is, wou'd not think at all; and then Man is not only *without*, but *above*, *God in the World*. 2*dly*, An *eternal and neceſſarily exiſtent Subſtance*, is no more ſubject to Alteration in its *Properties*, than it is in its *Nature and Eſſence*; the God of the Deiſt, as well as the Chriſtian, muſt be *the ſame to day, yeſterday and for ever*; which does infer not only Thought, but a Parity of Thought and Reaſon in all Beings, contrary to undoubted Experience; and on the other hand to ſuppoſe the Divine Nature thinking, but weakly in a Man, incoherently in an Ideot, and not at all in a Stone, is to ſuppoſe his *vital* and *moral* Perfections determin'd *ab extra*, which is to ſuppoſe in him an abſolute Imperfection.

The *Second Principle* is, that *Motion was communicated to Matter*; otherwiſe it either mov'd from Eternity, or firſt began to move of its ſelf. The firſt Suppoſition is demonſtrably falſe from the ſucceſſive and *periodical* Nature of all corporeal Motion; for all the Parts of whatever is ſucceſſive, were once *preſent*; that is, there was a *firſt*, or there could have been none *ſucceeding*; and therefore that *firſt* is limitted on both ſides; but Eternity is an unlimitted Duration.

The ſecond Suppoſition, *that Matter began to move it ſelf*, is contrary to that known Law of Matter (which every one that has well conſider'd the Nature of it muſt aſſent to) that it is indifferent to either ſtate of Motion and Reſt; and therefore being once in either, muſt perſevere in it, till interrupted, or diſturb'd by an external Cauſe; ſo that if Matter was ever once altogether quieſcent, it never cou'd have mov'd it ſelf.

And, from theſe two Abſurdities ſhewn, it immediately follows that the *Origin of Motion* ſprings, of neceſſity, from ſome thing *immaterial*.

Having prov'd that there muſt be one *immaterial Subſtance*, *eternal*, and *the firſt Cauſe of Motion*, it is not incumbent upon me to prove, as a farther Confirmation of my *Principle*, that there are likewiſe *finite created immaterial Subſtances*; it is abundantly ſufficient that there is no Contradiction in the thing and that *immaterial*, as well as *material Subſtance* may be conceiv'd the Object and Effect of Divine Power; which it certainly may be, ſince it does not imply in its Idea any thing of abſolute Perfection.

SECT. IV.

Of Extenſion *and* Cogitation, *as the Attributes of Body and Mind, and how far their different Ideas argues different Subſtances.*

HAving found that we come by the Knowledge of *Subſtance* by its *Attributes*, &c. we muſt follow the ſame Guide in our Enquiry after that *Subſtance* which we call *immaterial*; and here the two firſt Properties that offer themſelves to our Conſideration of human Nature, are *Extenſion* and *Cogitation*; that is, that our Nature is made up of a Body, and ſomething endu'd with the Power and Faculty of *Thought*.

We need not therefore enter into the Diſpute about theſe Terms, whether *Extenſion* alone, without the ſpecific Difference of *impenetrable*, conſtitutes the Nature of Body; or whether *Cogitation*, as an *Operation*, can be the Eſſence of any *Subſtance*; for all that I intend is to uſe them as general Terms, to comprehend the ſeveral Modes and Properties of Body and Mind; which uſually, how improperly ſoever, are reduc'd to them. For this Diſpute belongs to them who enquire after the *Nature*, and not, as I do, I do, barely the *Exiſtence* of Spirit and Body.

Suppoſing now, that our Knowledge of *Extenſion* proves the Exiſtence of *corporeal Subſtance*, we are to enquire whether our Knowledge of *Cogitation* proves the ſame of *incorporeal*; and if it does, we muſt conclude theſe two *Subſtances*, becauſe we find theſe two *Attributes*, to be united in human Nature.

Let us then examin our Ideas of *Extenſion* and *Cogitation*; and in the firſt place it is ſelf-evident that there is no Connexion betwixt them; that is, neither *Thought* in general, nor any particular *Thought*, implies, in its Conception, any corporeal Mode, or Quality whatſoever; and ſo *vice verſa*.

This is granted on all hands, even by *Spinoza* himſelf, who lays it down as an *Axiom*, *Nullas res ſingulares, præter corpora & cogitandi modos, ſentimus, nec percipimus:* Where he's plainly compell'd to make two *ſingular*, and therefore *different* things in our Conceptions of *Body* and *Cogitation*.

Eth. p. 2. ax. 5.

The point in queſtion is, whether a difference in the *Attributes* proves a like difference of the *Subſtances*, to which they belong; which *Spinoza*, and ſince him many others deny that it does: And it muſt be granted that all kind of difference in *Pro-*

perties, does not argue different *Subſtances*: For inſtance, our Ideas of *Solidity* and *Colour*, are very different, and we find no immediate Connexion between them; and yet we find them co-exiſtent in the ſame *material Subſtance*; nay, we find contradictory *Qualities*, v. g. *Hardneſs* and *Fluidity* to exiſt, alternately, in the ſame *Subſtance*; and this leads us to conſider where their Connexion lies, if they have any; and we preſently find their Agreement in a third thing; we find *Extenſion* ſuſceptible of *Solidity* and *Colour* at once, of *Hardneſs* and *Fluidity* at different times; and being thus united in one *Attribute*, they reſolve into *one Nature* and *Eſſence*.

But when we find any two Properties which, after a thorough Examination, are neither immediately connected themſelves, nor mediately by any *third thing*; we muſt conclude, by the ſame Rule, (and 'tis the only Rule we have in ſuch caſes) that they do appertain unto *two different Natures and Eſſences*.

Of this latter kind is the difference between our Idea of *Cogitation* and that of *Extenſion*. If we conſider *Thought*, in its utmoſt Latitude, from the firſt to the laſt Degree of it, we have not any one Mode of *Extenſion* offer'd to our Minds in the whole Contemplation; again, if we anatomize *Extenſion*,

Extenſion, as far as our Thoughts can poſſibly carry us, we meet with nothing of *Thought* but find our ſelves as far from it, as when we firſt enter'd upon the Conſideration of Matter, in one groſs extended Bulk: Nor, laſtly, does there reſult, from all the Compariſon we can make of theſe two together, any third Thing [*Subſtance* or *Attribute*] in which they are united, and into which, their different Natures are clearly reſolvable.

If to this it is objected, That in fact we find them united in one common *Subſtance* of Human Nature; I anſwer, beſides that this is to beg the Queſtion of him, that that wou'd prove Human Nature to be made up of Two *Subſtances*; if we conſider Man only as an Organical Body, conſtituted of Particles differing in Bulk, Figure, Situation, *&c.* and then conſider again, Whether this organiz'd Piece of Matter is more capable of connecting, as a third Thing, *Extenſion* and *Thought*, than any other Part of Matter in the Univerſe; we ſhall find it is not, that we can conceive; which is all I aim at here, becauſe (as has been hinted) we are never the nearer *Thought*, for our refining upon *Matter:* By which we are led to one of theſe Concluſions; either that *Human Nature*, as endu'd with the Faculty of *Thought*, is to us an unaccountable, unſolvable Inſtance in the Creation; or elſe another *Principle* muſt be fetch'd in for the Solution of it.

Now let us inquire, What has put the beſt Reaſoners and Philoſophers upon the Neceſſity of multiplying *Subſtances* in the Univerſe, for, *Sine neceſſitate Entia non ſunt multiplicanda*, and we ſhall find this, and only this; That they met with Properties different in themſelves, and not connected by any *Third Thing*, that offer'd it ſelf to their Thoughts.

And therefore *Spinoza*'s Diſtribution of Things into *Corpora*, *&* *Cogitandi Modos*, was illogical and unphiloſophical. If he cou'd not, as he was conſcious he cou'd not, reduce *Cogitation* to *Extenſion*, but was forc'd to place them in diſtinct and coordinate *Claſſes*; why did he mention the *Subſtance* of the one, and but the *Accident* of the other? He ſhou'd have ſaid, *Extenſionis & Cogitationis Modos*, or *Subſtantiam extenſam & cogitantem.* In one Object we perceive nothing but *Extenſion*, and what follows that; in the other nothing but *Cogitation*, and what belongs to that; and therefore theſe equally conclude, if either conclude, for the Exiſtence of their *Subſtances*.

Spinoza wou'd object here, That we know nothing of *Immaterial Subſtance*, conſider'd ſider'd in it ſelf; and I wou'd anſwer, No more do we of Material; and as to their *Properties*, it is granted, That we do perceive *Cogitandi Modos*.

If he ſhou'd farther urge, That we know not ſo much of them, as of thoſe belonging to Body, and ſo make what is *ſenſible*, the higheſt Degree of Certainty; I need not diſpute *that*; becauſe, as I ſaid, any the leaſt Degree of the Knowledge of an Object, is a full Warrant to conclude for its Exiſtence.

But *Spinoza* has plainly betray'd his own Cauſe; for he has unwarily laid down, and proved this Propoſition, *Quæ res nihil commune inter ſe habent, earum una alterius cauſa eſſe non poteſt:* From whence I argue, If there is nothing common between *Extenſion* and *Cogitation*, or, in his Words, between *Body* and the *Modes of Thinking*, then the one cannot be the Cauſe of the other; and conſequently they cannot proceed from one and the ſame *Subſtance*.

Ethic. p. 1. prop. 3.

But a more modern Author has offer'd another Objection againſt the Certainty of this Concluſion; *We have*, ſays he, *the* Ideas *of Matter and Thinking, but poſſibly ſhall never be able to know, whether any meer material Being thinks, or no; it being im-*

poſſible for us, by the Contemplation of our own Ideas, *without Revelation, to diſcover, whether Omnipotence has not given to ſome Syſtems of Matter fitly diſpoſed a power to perceive and think.*

Lock's Eſſay, Book 4. Ch. 3. Sect. 6.

I ſhall have occaſion to examin this Objection thoroughly in the ſequel, but ſhall only conſider it now, as it oppoſes what I aim at in this Section. It ſeems then there is a *fit Diſpoſition* requir'd on Matter's ſide, as well as an omnipotent Power from without, to make it *think*. If I ſhou'd ask this great Thinker, in what Part of Matter, or under what Circumſtances he ever found this Diſpoſition, I cou'd not reaſonably expect a prompt Anſwer. I am ſure, that in his Ideas of *Matter* and *Thinking* there is no ſuch thing to be found: And therefore, if he is Maſter of the Secret, his *Knowledge* is far larger than his *Ideas*; whereas it is true, and the Subject of this very Section, *That our Knowledge is narrower than our Ideas.*

Ibid.

But to let the Intimation of *Matter fitly diſpoſed* paſs; I am ſurpriz'd to find a Philoſopher of no *Intereſt* or *Party*, that never-failing Argument againſt all, that are not of his Opinion, and who pleads ſo hard for

Ibid.

for rational and intelligible Solutions, himſelf to recur to that of, *I know not but it may be*, nay, with a farther Fetch, *I know not but Omnipotence may have made it ſo*; and this is a Caſe that moſt other Philoſophers have thought capable of being reaſon'd upon.

Suppoſe he had been talking of the *Atmoſphere*, and, after ſeveral Experiments and Obſervations, to prove it no where 40 Miles high; ſhou'd come to ſhew how Rain proceeds from the *Condenſation of Vapours* in that *Atmoſphere*; but ſtop here, ſays he; *We have the* Ideas *of Rain and Atmoſphere, but can never be certain, but that the Drops of Rain, as well as the Rays of Light, may ſtream from the Sun; for that Omnipotence may have ſo* fitly diſpoſed them, *that they cannot Gravitate till within ſuch a Diſtance from the Earth.* Wou'd not this Θεὸς ἀπὸ μηχανῆς tend mightily to the Advancement of Science? The Caſe I think is very parallel, and I ſubmit it to Judgment, Whether ſo great a Maſter of Reaſon wou'd not be thought, in the former Part of it, to ſpeak like, what he ſo much deteſts, *A Man of a Party.*

I think however, the Author has here deſerted his own *clear Ideas*; the chief Uſe of which is to diſtinguiſh Things, as *Confuſion*, in our *ſimple Apprehenſion*, is the

Parent of Error in all the other *Operations of the Underſtanding*; but *Things* are only diſtinguiſhable by their *Properties*; and then are we confus'd, and moſt liable to Error, when we miſplace *Properties*; which we certainly do in the Caſe before us, unleſs Omnipotence has actually exerted it ſelf, as this Author ſuppoſes it may have done.

All which will, I hope, be of weight to a thinking Man and a Philoſopher to incline his Aſſent to this Propoſition, that *the Argument drawn from our* Thinking Faculty, *is a truly Rational and Philoſophical, a Juſt and Concluſive Argument to prove an* Immaterial Subſtance *in Human Nature*; ſince it is deduc'd from the cleareſt Ideas we have of things, agreeably to the moſt certain Method of Philoſophizing, and the true Rules of Judging in all other Caſes.

SECT. V.

Of the Repugnancy in our Ideas, between Cogitation *and* Extenſion, *and how far this proves an* Immaterial Subſtance *in Human Nature.*

THIS Repugnancy is a juſt Conſequence from what is prov'd in the preceding Section; *viz.* The Difference between *Extenſion* and *Thought* is ſo wide, that there is no third Idea to unite them in one *Subſtane*; and this muſt render our Endeavours to conceive them as ſo united, for ever fruitleſs; and whatſoever we cannot conceive in created Nature, to be ſo much as poſſible, is a Repugnancy in the Nature of the Thing.

This indeed does not appear upon a firſt and ſuperficial View of our Nature, by which the Generality of Mankind is deceiv'd, chiefly upon theſe three Accounts.

1. Finding themſelves to be both *Thinking* and *Material* Beings, they judge this a good Reaſon, as founded upon Experience, to bring *Thought* and *Matter* into one *Subſtance*; but this is a plain Fallacy put upon themſelves: For the Queſtion not being, Whether they are a *thinking* and *extended*

Being; but, Whether this being of theirs is One, or a Compoſition of Two *Subſtances*; in order to determin that Point, they are firſt to ſuppoſe their *Material Part* alone, as taken for granted on both ſides, and then conceive, if they can, how it *thinks*.

2. They are farther deceiv'd by their Experience, That Corporeal Motions naturally produce *Thought* in them; without attending to this true Obſervation from Nature, That one *Subſtance* may, at leaſt occaſionally, produce an Effect in another, which it cou'd never have produc'd by its proper and ſole Efficiency: For, by this Method, the wiſe Author of Nature has connected the Series and Chain of Cauſes and Effects in the Univerſe.

3. They are ſtill more egregiouſly impos'd upon, when they confound, as they do from their Infancy, *Motion* and *Thought* in themſelves.

This they do in almoſt all their *Senſations*, which they either ſuppoſe to be convey'd from the Object, under the Form of *Real Qualities*; or to be pure Motions and Vellications of their own Organs: Whereas, nothing is more clear in all Philoſophy, than that the *Idea*, ſuppoſe of Pain or Pleaſure,

Vide Malebranch. *de Inquirend. Verit. lib.* 1. *cap.* 10.

ſure, is as really a *Thought*, as the *Idea* of Thinking is.

Theſe Prejudices being remov'd, it is eaſy for any one to experience in his Mind this Repugnancy of conceiving *Extenſion* and *Thought*, as the Properties of one and the ſame Subſtance.

Let him, as Method requires, frame as clear and diſtinct an Idea as he can of each of them ſeparately; and then let him endeavour what he can to conjoyn them; let him try to mark out an *Inch of Reaſon*, or an *Ell of Contemplation*; which wou'd be as eaſy to do, were the two Properties conſiſtent, as to conceive a *reaſoning Inch*, or *contemplating Ell of Matter*; for whereever two Properties are united in one *Subſtance*, they may be *reciprocally predicated*: Thus I can conceive an *extended Whiteneſs*, as well as a *white Extenſion*.

Now this Repugnancy being apparent both to Reaſon and Experience, let us take into Conſideration again Mr. *Lock*'s Refuge to the Power of God. We have already diſgrac'd this Objection, as unphiloſophical, and ſhall now endeavour to prove it abſurd and miſchievous.

Firſt, It is abſurd in this Place to recurr to that Power. Were it only to ſuppoſe the Faculty of *Thinking* preſerv'd in Human Body, while alive, by a perpetual

Miracle, it wou'd not ſound well in the Mouth of a Philoſopher: But this Suppoſition is of a much larger extent; for we can conceive that one *Spirit*, eſpecially the *Spirit of God*, may communicate Thoughts and Words to another; and ſo may teach, in a Moment, what wou'd naturally coſt many Years learning, nay what cou'd never be naturally learnt; as Prophecy: We can alſo imagin the Laws of Gravitation ſuſpended in one Place, by the Power that made them; ſo that, *there*, Iron ſhall ſwim on the Water; and there is no difficulty in ſuppoſing that the Creator can recapacitate *ſenſeleſs Matter* for a reunion with *ſpiritual Subſtance.* In all theſe Caſes we clearly apprehend, that the Subject is *capable*, and the Power *ſufficient*; which two are the only Prerequiſites to any Operation.

But, in the Caſe before us, we have only the bare Notion of Omnipotence to help us out; and, if that may be apply'd without ever attending to the Capacity of the Subject, it may, and ought to be equally apply'd in all Caſes; and ſo wou'd make all, or rather nothing miraculous, and exclude every other Concluſion drawn from our Reaſoning upon the Nature of Things.

Secondly, From this Notion of the Repugnancy, this Refuge will appear to be very miſchievous. I think

I think none but a *Sceptic* will deny the Great Miſchief of *Scepticiſm*, which at once defeats the beſt Means, and the beſt End of Human Nature; and I am of Opinion, this one Notion of Mr. *Lock*'s has no little Tendency that Way.

Des Cartes lays it down for an Axiom, *Nec alia ſunt quæ à Deo fieri non poſſe dicuntur, quam quod repugnantiam involvunt in conceptu, hoc eſt, quæ non ſunt intelligibilia.* So that what is not poſſible any Way to be conceiv'd, argues as much a Repugnancy in Conception, as what is contradictory: Not that this is any Prejudice to the Belief of Things that are above our Conception, upon an Authority which we do conceive to be ſufficient; but that, in our own Reaſoning upon Things, we muſt reject, as Falſhood, what is impoſſible to be underſtood, as Truth: For indeed the very Nature of a Contradiction lyes in this, That it is a thing impoſſible to be conceiv'd.

Ep. Partis primæ, p. 114.

Whoever breaks in upon this Rule, deſtroys the only *Criterion* we have of Truth, which muſt conſiſt in a clear and diſtinct *Perception*, or, with a late Author, *Conception*, of it; that is, it muſt be the Object of our Underſtanding, tho' not

Medicina Ment. Pars 2. *p.* 42.

not of our Imagination; and if this Rule ever fails us in one Inſtance, there can be no Reaſon given why it ſhou'd hold in any: Whereas, if, according to the *Carteſian Principles*, the Veracity of God is concern'd, it can, like that, never fail us: But to wave all circular Proof, as indeed all pretended Proof muſt be in this Caſe, I ſay, That as every particular Science has its *Firſt Principles* and *Axioms* upon which it is built; ſo this is the *Firſt Principle* and *Axiom* of all Sciences, *the Truth of our Faculties*. To deny this, in any one Inſtance, is in effect to deny it in all; which does not indeed lead us to Univerſal Scepticiſm, (for that is Nonſence and Contradiction, to deny *all Truth*, and at the ſame time to believe one's own Aſſertion to be *true*;) but it leaves us nothing of certainty, excepting this one thing, that *God may have deceiv'd us*: A weak Principle, God knows, for the Reaſonable Faculty, the Perfection and Happineſs of Human Nature, to reſt upon. That the Author foreſaw this Conſequence, I am as far from believing, as I am that he can diſprove it.

In the mean time I conclude, that *Cogitation* and *Extenſion* are found, upon the Compariſon, to be inconſiſtent and incompatible in one and the ſame *Subſtance*;

and that this their Inconſiſtency in one, is as full an Evidence of their appertaining to two *Subſtances*, as demonſtrative Knowledge will bear. But for the farther clearing of this Point, we will particularly conſider, Whether *Cogitation* in it ſelf does not require an *Immaterial Subject*; and next, Whether a *Phyſically extended Subſtance* is in it ſelf capable of *Cogitation*. This indeed is already abſolutely determin'd by our comparing the two Properties together; but will receive farther Light, by comparing the Property in diſpute, with each of thoſe Subjects that lay claim to it.

SECT. VI.

Of Cogitation, (*as in Man*) *requiring an* Immaterial Subſtance.

FIRST then, Let us compare our Faculty of *Cogitation* with an *Immaterial Subſtance*, (the Principle eſtabliſh'd *Sect.* III.) and ſee whether it does not properly belong unto it.

'Tis certain, all our *Ideas* are converſant about *Things*, and the *Relations of Things*.

1. As to *Things*, we are ſaid to gain the Idea of them three ſeveral ways: Firſt, By the Operation of our *pure Intellect*; which, without the Mediation of our Senſes, any farther than they are generally requiſite to all our *Thoughts*, receives, or frames the Ideas of *Univerſals*, of *Spiritual Subſtance*, and eſpecially of *the abſolutely Perfect Being*. 2. By the Power of our *Imagination*; which recals the Ideas of Material Objects, that once acted upon us. And, 3. By *Senſation*, when a Material Object acts, as preſent, upon us.

I know the firſt of theſe Ways will be utterly rejected by my Adverſaries, and the ſecond will be reduc'd, by them, to the laſt Head, with the addition only of *Reflexion* to *Senſation*: Therefore, tho' I have mention'd the firſt, as capable of Proof, and worthy of Conſideration; and the ſecond, as believing the Power of *Reflexion* to be an *Immaterial Operation*; yet to be as ſhort, and to prevent Cavil as much as can, I ſhall only inſiſt upon the laſt, viz. *Senſation*, as a ſort of *Thought* belonging to Man; which, if it requires an *Immaterial Subſtance*, does *à fortiori*, conclude for all his other ſuperior *Thoughts*.

That *Senſation* is properly a *Thought*, has been obſerv'd before; and that it cannot be either in the Object, or in the Organ of

Senſe, if any one that has thought upon it can doubt, he may receive abundant Satisfaction from the forementioned Author. *Malbr. l.* 1. *c.* 11, & 12.

It muſt therefore preciſely conſiſt in that *Idea* which is raiſed in us; which *Idea*, tho' it is not to be deſcribed in Words, (ſo far remote is it from any Material Impreſſion) yet it is ſomething real within us; for we can as perfectly diſtinguiſh the ſeveral Kinds of it, as thoſe of any other Nature.

After this conſidered, to ſay that we know nothing of *Thought*, is to ſay we know nothing of any thing; for to be *conſcious* of a Thing, is the higheſt Degree of the Knowledge of that Thing; it is next to, if not the ſame with, *Intuitive* Knowledge. Mr. *Lock* does not ſay this, but he ſays what is tantamount, *We know not wherein Thinking conſiſts.* Eſſay, *lib.* 4. *cap.* 3. *ſect.* 6. I ask then, Wherein Extenſion conſiſts? And all the Anſwer I can expect is, That it conſiſts in having *Partes extra Partes:* But, beſides that, according to this Definition, I can have no *Idea* of the Omnipreſence of God; and ſo it offends againſt that Rule, *Debet cum definito reciprocari*; it offends alſo againſt another, *viz. Debet conſtare ex Attributis prioribus & notioribus natura*; for I can have no clearer Idea of the Part, than I have of the whole of an *extended Maſs*, without the precedent *Idea* of *Extenſion*: And therefore to demand wherein ſuch ſimple Ideas conſiſt, is the ſame thing, as to demand a Proof of Firſt Principles; ſo that this Piece of Ignorance is no Reaſon at all why *God can*, *if he pleaſes*, *ſuperadd to Matter the Faculty of Thinking*; of which, more afterward. Ibid.

But to return, and to prove that this *Idea* of *Senſation* does, of it ſelf, diſcover ſomething *Immaterial* in us; let us obſerve how it is impreſs'd upon us, in that Inſtance of our drawing near a Fire; which by degrees warms us, and ſo gives us the ſenſe of Pleaſure, 'till continu'd, heats us exceſſively, and then gives Pain. It is certain that both theſe, as Mechanical Motions in our Organ, differ only in Degree; and it is as certain that the two *Ideas* differ as Contraries, and do, as the *Logicians* ſpeak, *ſe mutuo tollere*. In this Caſe, when the Idea of Pain begins, that of Pleaſure is utterly extinct. But how Motion communicated from the ſame Object, upon the ſame Organ, and in the ſame manner, excepting only the leaſt Degree of Celerity added, ſhou'd produce *Ideas* ſo perfectly contradictory to each other, as the one to make us happy, the other unhappy, antecedently to our Reaſoning upon them; is a *Mechanical Myſtery* indeed: For, allowing that one Part of Matter can ſtrike an *Idea* into another, becauſe we have not yet directly prov'd the Contrary, yet, according to that Hypotheſis, it ought to be done in a Mechanical Way; and then it wou'd follow, That we ſhou'd live and dye either altogether in Pleaſure, or altogether in Pain. Our Reaſon and Experience might diſtinguiſh the Degrees, and ſo make us avoid what will be finally noxious to us; but the bare *Ideas* of Senſation cou'd give us no Warning, nor be of any Uſe to this Purpoſe.

But now the Suppoſition of an *Immaterial Subſtance* united to our *Material*, and ſo united, as to be affected with all the various Motions the other receives; and ſo affected, as upon a certain Degree of diſorderly Motions in the Body, to be perfectly looſen'd and diſunited from it, will rationally account for the wide Difference of our *Senſations*. No wonder if that which is agreeable to the Natural Motions of our Body cauſes Pleaſure in our Mind, ſo cloſely and perſonally joyn'd with it; and that Motion which, in a higher degree, will cauſe a Separation, cauſes an uneaſy Senſe in a lower; and makes, as it were, a new *Modification* of the Mind, attending always in its inferior Faculties, to its well-being and continuance in this State.

But perhaps Arguments of this nature will not ſeem ſo concluſive to every Reader, (the Mind being not only (as Mr. *Malebranche* obſerves) by the Primitive Fall weakn'd and ſtupify'd as to the Knowledge of Intellectual Beings; but, in conſequence of that, as to the knowledge of it Self too.) We will turn the Proſpect, and argue from what is imaginable and intelligible, even to the Atheiſtic Philoſoper.

SECT. VII.

Of Phyſically extended Subſtance, *as in its Nature utterly incapable of* Thought.

WHETHER the Specific Eſſence of Body (ſo far as we apprehend of it,) conſiſt in *Extenſion generically* underſtood, or in *Extenſion modify'd by impenetrability*, is, (as I have already ſaid) a thing indifferent to the Argument in hand; becauſe our Idea of *Corporeal Extenſion* is nevertheleſs clear, whether we can determin that any thing *incorporeal* is *extended* or not: Our Buſineſs then is to conſult this Idea, and I think it will offer ſomething to us inconſiſtent with the Power of *Thought.*

1. Whereas we do not find either Motion or Reſt, as oppoſite States, included in this Idea, nor one more than the other conſequent upon it; from hence we collect, that it is perfectly indifferent to both; as it is to all other inconſiſtent Qualities, which alternately it is capable of; for inſtance, to a ſquare or round Figure. And from this Indifferency follows this Law of Nature, *Every body will continue in the State it is once put, [whether of Motion or Reſt] 'till diſturb'd by ſome External Cauſe*; for if any Change proceeded from it ſelf, it wou'd have a Tendency, and therefore not an Indifferency, to that State into which it remov'd: Thus it is certain a Body in Reſt, wou'd never move but by an *Impellent Cauſe*; and a Body in Motion wou'd never reſt without an *Interruption.* Now it is plain that all the Changes incident to a Body, proceed from the interchange of theſe States, either Motion for Reſt, or Reſt for Motion; and from hence again it follows that all the Changes, and Qualities ariſing from thence, proceed from External Cauſes; which diſcovers to us the *Paſſive Nature of Matter*; that is, it can exert no Operation, nor any way poſſibly modify it ſelf.

Perhaps this Chain will not appear ſo ſtrong to ſome, it ſeeming to ſuppoſe we know more of the Nature of Matter than really we do; and yet I will venture to ſay, it is form'd of *Axiomatical* and *Self-evident Truth:* For, as all our Knowledge is converſant about Things and their Relations, ſo I conceive thoſe *Axioms*, upon which our Knowledge is built, are of two ſorts; *Axioms of Things*, and *Axioms of their Relations*; or, if you will, *Axioms of Properties*, either *abſolutely*, or *relatively* conſider'd. This will appear to be a good Diviſion, by an Inſtance of each; *Quæ eidem tertio conveniunt, inter ſe conveniunt*, is an *Axiom* which barely concerns the Relation of Things; as all other *Geometrical Axioms* do. But beſides theſe, there are Axioms, as properly ſo call'd, of another kind, *v. g. Corpus extenditur in longum, latum, & profundum*; is an Idea of Body convey'd to us, not by any intermediate Idea, but ariſes from our firſt Contemplation of it; and therefore is a ſelf-evident Truth.

Again, as we frame *Axioms* of the Relations of Things depending on each other, ſo we may of the Things themſelves: Thus, having ſetled our firſt Idea of Matter, this is another *Axiom* concerning it; *Corpus quieſcens non movetur de loco, niſi ab* *alio corpore detrudatur:* And this, depending ſo immediately on our firſt Idea of Matter, is, in its kind, ſelf-evident too; that is, it ſtands in need of no Proof, as that, upon which it depends, neither needs, nor is capable of Proof. Hence it is, that to ſuch *Reductitious Axioms* we give as full, and as ready an Aſſent as to thoſe which I call *Primitive.*

Now tho' the *Relations of Things* make up the greateſt part of our Knowledge, as being more extenſive than the Knowledge of *Things in themſelves*; yet thoſe *Axioms*, or Properties which immediately diſcover themſelves, upon our Contemplation of the *ſimple* Nature of Things, are as infallible, and depend as immediately, as any other, upon that grand *Axiom* of all, that *our Faculties are true.* For I ſhou'd be equally deceiv'd by my Creator, in the very Foundation of my Reaſoning, if a *Property*, which my *firſt* Idea of an Object diſcover'd to me, were not really inherent in that Object; as if thoſe two Things which agree in one third, did yet, in the ſame reſpect, diſagree between themſelves.

And therefore how narrow ſoever our Knowledge may be, or how great our Ignorance of the *Properties* which the Almighty has beſtowed upon Matter; yet our Knowledge muſt of neceſſity be *adequate* to the Object in our *firſt* Idea of it; or otherwiſe we are immediately deceiv'd by the Author of our Nature, who repreſents it to us. And 'tis plain, we may ſufficiently underſtand a Principle in it ſelf, tho' we are ignorant of many juſt Conſequences from it, and tho' we may err in our Deductions; 'tis in this exuberant variety of Relations and Qualities, that our Reaſon is bewilder'd and loſt; but, all this while, our firſt Apprehenſions are as juſt and infallible, as the Author of our Beings.

By ſuch certain Evidence as this, we come to know the *Paſſive Nature of Matter*; and I have dwelt the longer upon it, becauſe it is of very great Moment in the preſent Enquiry: For there needs not much Labour to prove that a *Suſtance*, with this Eſſential Property, is utterly incapable of *Thought*, ſuch as we experience in our ſelves.

As an Effect of our *Thinking Faculty*, we are conſcious of *Spontaneous Motion* in our ſelves, which is a Motion neither rais'd, nor determin'd *Mechanically*; it is not rais'd like the Motion of a Clock or Watch, either by Elaſticity, or Gravity; but we think to move, and immediately upon that Thought we do move, we check or retard that Motion at pleaſure; and, in ſhort, both move and reſt from our ſelves; which neceſſarily inferrs the Power of Motion within our ſelves: And this is a Power abſolutely inconſiſtent with the *Paſſive Nature of Matter*, as before explain'd and prov'd.

So that our Principle of Motion is plainly a Self-active Principle; and if we conſider our *Thoughts* more abſtractedly, we ſhall find all the ſeveral Modes of *Thinking*, ſuch as *apprehending*, *willing*, *deſiring*, and *judging*, independent, in the *Power*; however they may be determin'd in the *Manner*, of exerting themſelves upon any created external Agent; and therefore undoubtedly independent upon Matter and Motion. Therefore ſo long as our *firſt* Idea of Matter includes in it a *Paſſive Nature*, it includes alſo an utter Incapacity of *Thought*.

2. There is another Property of Matter reſulting from our firſt Contemplation of it; which renders it incapable of *Thought*, and that is, *Diviſibility*.

It muſt be granted, That our Idea of Matter came in by our Senſes; and it is certain, our Senſes can offer no Extenſion to our Minds but what is *Figurate*, and therefore *compounded*, and therefore *reſolvable*: So that *Atoms*, ſtrictly and Philoſophically ſpeaking, are inconſiſtent with our *firſt* Idea of Matter; and, for that Reaſon, can never be admitted, whatever more remote Abſurdities attend the contrary Doctrine; which may prove our Idea of Matter incompleat, but not ſelf-contradictory: For it is not clear, that an infinite Diviſion, in the poſitive ſence of the Word, with its Train of Abſurdities, follows from hence, That our Senſes have given us an *Idea* of *Corporeal Extenſion*, to the *Diviſibility* of which we can fix no Bounds.

But among the Corpuſcularian Philoſophers, both Ancient and Modern, ſome have their *Atoms*, ſo call'd, becauſe they terminate *Generation* and *Corruption*; call'd alſo *Minima Phyſica*, ſo ſmall, that they are indiviſible by Natural Agents, tho' not Omnipotent Power.

Let us firſt examin the Nature of Body according to this Hypotheſis: We find then Two Properties belonging to theſe *Atoms*. 1. That all Bodies are *reſolvable* into them, becauſe *compounded* of them. 2. That they are all abſolutely *Homogeneous*; all *Heterogeneity* of Bodies ariſing from a different Phyſical Compoſition, which is not predicable of theſe *laſt* Particles.

From hence it follows, That if any Part of Matter, as ſuch, had in it a *Capacity of Thought*, then all Matter has the ſame: This will be eaſily granted, if we reflect, that theſe *Atoms* are *Homogeneous*, and that there is nothing, really and intrinſically, beſide theſe, in any Phyſical Compoſition: But all the *Diverſity* of it ariſes from the different Texture, Situation and Motion or Reſt of theſe Particles; which clear Notion in Phyſics, has long ſince deſervedly exploded out of the Philoſophic World, all *Real Qualities* and *Subſtantial Forms.* Now I take it for granted that all Matter, as ſuch, does not actually *think*; let us then enquire how it comes to *think*, as compounded in the Body of Man; tho', in its Intrinſic Nature, as we have ſeen, utterly devoid of *Thought.*

'Tis plain, according to this Doctrin, That the *Power of Thought* muſt be lodg'd in one, or more of theſe *Monads.*

If in one, we muſt ſuppoſe this *Monad* to have been created of a different Nature from the reſt; or elſe the reſt wou'd think too, (and whatever Properties are in ſimple and uncompounded Matter, can never be loſt and extinct, in all the Changes it undergoes, ſo that we ſhou'd have a vital and ſelf-conſcious Univerſe) and if this *Monad* was created of ſuch a different Nature from the reſt, as to have the Power or Quality of *Thought*, we muſt affirm of it, as we do of the reſt, that it cou'd never loſe this Power thro' all the poſſible variety and alteration of *Second Matter:* Nothing but Annihilation, or, which is equal, the

Power of the Creator changing its Original Nature and Conſtitution, cou'd diveſt it of *Thought*; and then, in what Part of the Univerſe ſoever, it wou'd *think* and be *ſelf-conſcious*; which, in ſenſe and reality, is the ſame thing with an *Immaterial Subſtance* united to Human Body: Or, however, is to make Man at once *material* and *immortal* in his Individual Nature; whereas all *Corporealiſts* diſown the latter, as inconſiſtent with the former.

Beſides, it is impoſſible to conceive ſuch a fix'd, as well as *thinking*, *Monad* of Matter, in any one Part of Human Body; when all of it, in its moſt Eſſential Parts, is under a perpetual Flux and Alteration.

Again, as to the Motion it muſt be ſuppoſed to communicate to the reſt of the Body, this muſt be done either by moving about its own *Center*, or *progreſſively*: The firſt indeed ſeems the only conceivable Way of its Motion, in order to receive, as we do, the ſame Impreſſions a ſecond time from the ſame Object: But then it is impoſſible to conceive how, by moving in this manner like a Star in its Vortex, it ſhou'd communicate thoſe Motions *quaquaverſum*, which are obvious, and each Moment perform'd in our Bodies; and which require a Principle with a Power in it, at the ſame time, of communicating Motion every Way;

whereas 'tis impoſſible to conceive in Body, a Power of communicating Motion to any more, than one determinate Point at once.

If its Motion be ſuppos'd to be *progreſſive*, ſo that it moves, the Animal Spirits ſuppoſe, by impulſe; being, by unconceivable Degrees leſs than the leaſt Pore in our Body, it wou'd find none, or no effectual Reſiſtance; and ſo, inſtead of communicating Motion to it, wou'd, by its own Rectileal, as its Natural Motion, pervade and deſert the Body.

Theſe are ſome of the Impoſſibilities and Abſurdities attending the Suppoſition of *Thought in one Particle of the Body*; the other Suppoſition, which places it in a Collection or Combination of theſe Monads, in the Brain or ſome Ventricle of it, is attended with theſe, and ſome Conſequences, of the like nature, peculiar to it ſelf.

It makes not One, but a Multitude of Percipient and Intelligent Agents within us; which, like ſo many Senators, muſt debate and propoſe their ſeveral Sentiments, before they can be concluded by one, and that ſhall commence an *Human Thought*: For it is as abſurd to ſuppoſe that one Monad can be conſcious, without Communication, of the Thoughts of another, as to ſuppoſe the ſame in two or more Men. But I need not labour to prove that this is inconſiſtent with the Manner of our receiving Impreſſions, and forming *Ideas*, nor expoſe this ſenceleſs Suppoſition any farther.

But there is another Sort of *Corpuſcularians*, who differ from the former in this, that they own no Phyſically Indiviſible Parts of Matter; but, tho' as *Corpuſcularians*, they differ, in this; yet as *Corporealiſts* they do not: For this Diſpute lyes only between one and a farther Extent of Power confeſſedly *Mechanical*; and therefore they are juſtly chargeable with all the Conſequences that attend the other *Hypotheſis*; adding only this, that their *Thought* muſt be both figurate and diviſible: For, fixing no Limits to the Diviſion of Matter, neither can they limit the Diviſion of its Qualities; for if the leaſt poſſible Body (pardon the abſurdity of the Expreſſion) is diviſible into two leſs Bodies; then, ſo is the leaſt poſſible Quality too: For inſtance the Whiteneſs of it, is, with the Body, diviſible into two leſs Whiteneſſes; and tho' a Circle does not divide into two Circles, nor a Square into two Squares, yet as Figures in general they divide one into two; which ſhews us that there is no Coporeal Property but what is diviſible, with the Body, it belongs to: And therefore 'till the Inſtrument is invented, ſo fine as in reality to ſplit a *Thought*, I think we muſt be forc'd to take up this with Concluſion, that *Phyſically extended Subſtance, is, in its own nature, utterly incapable of Human Thought.*

SECT. VIII.

That Cogitation *cannot be* ſuperadded *to Matter.*

IN the preceding Section we have proved that, according to our firſt, and therefore cleareſt Idea of *Matter*, it is both devoid and incapable of *Thought*; which might, reaſonably, prevent any farther Diſpute upon this Point when 'tis conſider'd that, according to that infallible Maxim, *Quicquid recipitur, recipitur ad modum recipientis*; no external Cauſe can act upon the Subject, beyond the Capacity of it: But, notwithſtanding this, our Idea of Motion, and of the Qualities producible by it in Bodies, is ſo very different from our Idea of Matter, and ſeems to diſcover in it ſuch a vaſt Capacity, beyond what *that* wou'd afford us; and, eſpecially, ſuch is our Venerable Notion of the Creative and Omnipotent Power, that when we conſider theſe abſtractedly from Matter, we are driven back from our Concluſion, and ſtill kept in Doubt, whether there may not be ſome, to us unknown, Capacity of *Thought* in Matter; and whether it has not pleas'd the Almighty to beſtow the *Faculty* of it upon ſome Corporeal Syſtems. If therefore it is poſſible that this *Faculty* ſhou'd be ſuperadded to Matter, it is poſſible to be done but one or other of theſe three Ways: 1. *Motion*; 2. *Generation*; or 3. *Omnipotence*; and a diſtinct Confutation of theſe will anſwer the Title of this Section.

1. Let us conſider, Whether *Perception* and *Cogitation* can ariſe upon Matter, by the help of *Motion* only.

Eſſay, lib. 3. c. 4. §. 4, &c.

I think it, with Mr. *L.* of good uſe in Philoſophy, to know what Words can, and what cannot be defin'd; and I am perſuaded alſo that, of the latter Sort only, are the *Names* of our *Simple Ideas*, of which *Motion* is one: If any Man ſhou'd ask me what *Motion* is, the beſt Anſwer I cou'd give him, wou'd be to bid him conſult a *Moving Body*; not that the Idea of *Motion* is too *obſcure*, but too *perſpicuous* to be illuſtrated by the Intervention of any other.

The Idea of *Motion* being thus clear, and the ſame to every Man, we have the greater Hopes of being able thoroughly to comprehend the Effects of it in Bodies moving; for that *Motion* it ſelf is not *Thought*, every one muſt grant that reflects upon them as two different *Simple Ideas*, and underſtands that the Difference between any *Two Simple Ideas* is Eſſential and Eternal: And as *Motion* it ſelf cannot, ſo neither can the *Communication* of it be, poſſibly, conceiv'd to be *Thought*; Whatever Difficulties to our Apprehenſion this Communication carries, as to the Manner of it, thus much is clear, That every Body operates on another by *Contact* only; and if this Contact were *Thought*, the moſt coherent Bodies wou'd have the greateſt Share of it, and ſo there wou'd be moſt *Thought* where there is leaſt *Motion*.

All we have to do then, is to inquire into the Effects in the Body mov'd, ſubſequent upon the Contact with another, and the *Motion* receiv'd from it. And here, tho' I cannot enumerate all the Effects producible in Bodies by Motion, yet thus much I clearly conceive, that they all depend upon, and are reſolvable into this one, viz. *Change of Place*: Thus if the *Motion* impreſs'd upon a Body moves the *whole* of it, without cauſing any Internal Commotion of its

Parts, the Body receives no Alteration but what a different Situation, that is a different *Place* gives it: If the Internal Parts are put in Motion, all the Alteration the Body then receives, is nothing elſe but their *changing Place* with one another; or *changing Place*, ſo as to leave the Body; or laſtly, forcing other Particles of Matter to *change their Place*, ſo as to come to it.

What other Effects of *Texture*, *Figure*, *Colour*, *Hardneſs*, &c. follow upon this, ſhall be conſider'd by and by; in the mean time *Change of Place* being the immediate, and only proper Effect of *Motion*, I deſire any Man to conceive it barely poſſible, if he can; that a Body ſhou'd *think* becauſe it is in one Place, and be *ſenſeleſs* becauſe it is in another. I deſire this may be well conſider'd; a Body in Motion ſeems indeed to be, ſo far, active; but, upon Examination, all its ſeeming Activity will be found to be nothing elſe but a *Paſſive Removal*; and whatever *New Qualities* it gains, they are all entirely owing to its *New Place*: But now the Notion of *Place*, whether conceiv'd as a Part of the *Infinite Immaterial Extenſion*, (call'd a Part only from the External Denomination of Bodies in it) or only as a *Modus* and Denomination of *Material Extenſion*; is however one of thoſe *Simple Ideas* which, as ſuch, muſt be always the *ſame:* And therefore (not to demand what *Place*, has to do with *Thought*) I only urge this as an impoſſibility, That a Body ſhou'd *Think*, by virtue of being in one Place, and not in *another.*

If we carry this Notion along with us, it will eaſily appear as impoſſible for any particular *Motion*, as for *Motion in general* to graft on Matter this Property: To talk of a *determinate Courſe*, a *peculiarly modified Chanel*, *Action* or *Reaction*, *Percuſſion* or *Repercuſſion* of Animal Spirits, being able to do the Feat, is equal Nonſence as to imagin a Stone tumbling down an Hill, and a Wave Rolling on the Sea, the one in *terrible*, the other in *tumultuous Thoughts*; for what really happens to the former, which is *change of Place*, happens to the latter, and no more; the different Dimenſions of their Parts, with the different Determinations of their *Motions*, is no Exception to this, that they all do nothing really but change Place; and therefore *Motion alone* is not, really, capable of producing *Thought* in a Body moving.

2. The next Refuge is to *Generation*, that is, that *Thought* is *generable*, and ſo *corruptible*, in Bodies, as other Qualities are: We are only concern'd immediately with the ſuppoſed *Generation of Thought*, but

if that be abſurd, ſo muſt be the *Corruption* of it too.

This Notion, together with that already confuted, makes up the two oldeſt *Forms of Atheiſm*, to prove nothing but Matter in the Univerſe; *viz.* the *Hylopathian* or *Anaximandrian*, and *Atomic* or *Democritic*; the former aſſerting that *Thought* has its being, as other Corporeal Qualities have, by *Corporeal Generation*, and ſo is corrupted and deſtroy'd as they are; and the latter, that 'tis nothing elſe but a determinate, tho' they knew not what, *Motion of Atoms*.

Now the Reaſon why theſe two Sects differ'd from each other in Hypotheſis, tho' in Principle they were the ſame, was this; neither cou'd imagin the other's Hypotheſis wou'd ſerve the Deſign; the *Hylopathian*, not being able to conceive that Matter and Motion cou'd *think*, Philoſophiz'd by *Real Qualities*, and plac'd *Thought* amongſt them; the *Atomic*, finding the Abſurdity of that Fiction of *Real Qualities*, recurrs to the Principle of Matter and Motion, more accountable indeed in it ſelf, but never the better fitted to ſolve the *Phænomenon*.

The former is indeed abſurd enough in it ſelf, for the moſt ſtupid Atheiſt to ſtand by; thus to multiply Beings without neceſſity, and contrary to ſenſe; to ſuppoſe a Train of *Abſtracted Qualities* and *Subſtantial*

ſtantial Forms, as it were hovering over a Body, to take poſſeſſion of it, upon ſuch and ſuch Motions; as it was not the Opinion of the oldeſt, ſo it has been rejected by all the modern Atheiſts, and need not be elaborately confuted to the leaſt Proficient, now-a-days, in the School of Science.

But ſtill it muſt be confeſs'd, that our Idea of theſe *Qualities*, reſulting from *Motion* in Bodies, is ſomething very different from our Idea of *Motion* in it ſelf; and therefore, notwithſtanding what has been ſaid upon that Topic, it may, at firſt ſight, be judg'd a Refuge for our Adverſaries.

But let us recollect, that there is nothing really happens to Body, or the Parts of Body, in its alteration, but *change of Place*; and that, conſequently, all the new *Qualities* it puts on, muſt depend upon *that*; and then we ſhall gain the Reaſon why our Idea of theſe *Reſulting Qualities*, is ſo different from that of *Motion* from whence they reſult, *viz.* That one is, in ſome ſenſe, a *real*, the other only a *relative Change*. Change of Place, tho' it makes no Alteration in the Nature of Matter, yet, if we ſuppoſe but one Monad of Matter created, we can frame ſtill a determinate *Idea* of its *Motion*, and the *changing of its Place*; ſo that this Operation upon it is ſo far *real*, that it not depend upon the being of any other Body; whereas all the other *Qualities* of *Texture*, *Figure*, *Colour*, &c. are altogether *relative* to other Bodies; and, tho' *Real Ideas* in our Minds, are nothing real in the Bodies, but owe their Original to the Compariſon of one Body with another. This is a ſufficient Reaſon why their *Ideas* ſhou'd be different from that of *Motion* or *Place*; and if it be ask'd, Why they are ſuch as they are? I anſwer, It is as abſurd to ask a *Reaſon*, as a *Definition* of a *ſimple Idea*.

But whether *Motion* belong to a Claſs ſuperior to all other Corporeal *Qualities*, or not; this is certain, they are all, taken together, *relative*, and as ſuch, are not poſſible Cauſes or Conſtituents of *Thought*: What! That a Fluid ſhou'd rather *think* than a hard, a ſmall than a great, a white than a black Body? This is more abſurd, if any thing can be more abſurd, than to place *Thought* in the Original Frame and Conſtitution of Matter. Beſides, that if this cou'd produce, it cou'd never continue *Thought*, as it is continu'd in Human Nature.

3. I come to conſider the moſt Modern Objection, tho' I confeſs it looks but like an Old-faſhion'd one, which recurrs to the Power of Omnipotence, to evade the Neceſſity of owning an *Immaterial Subſtance* in Human Nature.

'Tis true, this Refuge will not cover the Atheiſt, as deſtroying in Suppoſition, what he advances in Deſign; yet I cannot but think it ſo far an *Apparatus* to Atheiſm, that I ſhou'd be loth to diſpute with an Atheiſt, and maintain, at the ſame time, this as an avowed Principle of mine, That Matter may *think:* For who knows then, but, granting ſomething Eternal, this ſomething may be Matter with *Thought*, tho' not ſuperadded, yet eternally inherent in it. It's true, Mr. *L.* has ſubſtantially prov'd, that the firſt Eternal Being cannot be Matter; but then, as 'tis plain from the Nature of his Argument, and what he expreſly ſays at the Introduction of it, by Matter he means only *incogitative* Matter; and to this purpoſe are his ſecond Thoughts upon this Subject: *Perception and Knowledge in that one Eternal Being where it has its Source,'tis viſible muſt be eſſentially inſeparable from it; therefore the actual want of Perception in ſo great a Part of the particular Parcels of Matter is a Demonſtration, that the Firſt Being, from whom Perception and Knowledge is inſeparable, is not Matter.* Which I humbly conceive, proves not that Perception is not, or may not be eſſential to ſome Parts of Matter; but only that thoſe Parts, to which

Eſſay, *lib.* 4. *cap.* 10.

Ibid. §. 9.

it is not eſſential, as we find it is not to ſome of them, cannot be that one Eternal Being: For I think there is no more Reaſon to conclude that, becauſe it is not eſſential to ſome, it is not therefore eſſential to any Part of Matter; than there is that, becauſe it is not actually in ſome, is not therefore actually in any Parcel of it; which is an Inference he muſt deny, ſince our Ignorance in this Point, may equally defeat our concluding againſt eſſential, as well as actual Properties, for we underſtand the former no otherwiſe, than by our Knowledge of the latter: So that, according this way of arguing, all the *incogitative*, and all the *accidentally cogitative Parts of Matter* in the Univerſe, may poſſibly have been produc'd by another *eternally* and *eſſentially cogitative Material Being*. I muſt not conceal it, that the Author brings ſeveral Arguments to prove that this Eternal Being is not Material; *Firſt, becauſe every Particle of Matter is not cogitative*; and he thinks it wou'd be a hard Task to make out a *Cogitative Being out of Incogitative Particles*: True, but not out of eſſentially *Cogitative Matter*; which by your Objection is become poſſible, as we have ſeen. And beſides this, ſays the Atheiſt, your ſo much extoll'd Ignorance of

Eſſay, B. 4. ch. 10. ſect. 14, &c.

of the Properties of Matter, will never warrant you to aſſert, that all Matter is *Homogeneous*; that is, that the Almighty has conferr'd the ſame Properties upon every Particle in the Univerſe, and that all the Variety there is, depends entirely upon their own Operations; for then he has either conferr'd *Thought* upon all, or no Parts of Matter; and what then becomes of the *Syſtem of Matter fitly diſpoſed* to Think. Thus far the Atheiſt keeps his Hold; and I think it is no Credit to any Argument a Man can bring, that it deſtroys, an otherwiſe unanſwerable Argument of his own. But does not Mr. *L.* drive him from this Hold too, when he proceeds to prove, from manifeſt Abſurdities following, That neither *one Particle alone, nor any Syſtem of Matter, either in motion or reſt, can be conceiv'd to be this Eternal Wiſdom?*

Ibid.

'Tis to be fear'd, that no ſuch Argument is concluſive for him in particular, who holds it poſſible for Matter to Think? For when the Poſſibility of the Thing is once really granted in Principle, theſe Abſurdities following upon it, will quickly reſolve into ſo many unconceivable Ways of Omnipotence exerting it ſelf; eſpecially, when the Atheiſt retorts upon him, as well he may, That it is equally unconceivable and abſurd, which yet he grants poſſible, *That any one Particle, or any Syſtem of Matter* belonging to his own Body ſhou'd Think for one Moment, as his Corporeal Deity, from Eternity. Thus the Atheiſt is furniſh'd with an Argument to maintain the Poſſibility of his Corporeal Deity; which I am confident he will thank any Man to grant him; and this Author in particular, becauſe it diſables his own Arguments; which, had he not done it himſelf, wou'd have been too hard a Task for all his Adverſaries Skill.

But if they ſhou'd gain no real Advantage by this Conceſſion, becauſe ſtill the Suppoſition of a GOD, Eternal, and the Creator of all things, ſeems to remain untouch'd; yet, as Mr. *L.* very well obſerves, they *letting ſlide out of their Minds, or the Diſcourſe, the Demonſtration whereby an eternal knowing Being was proved neceſſary to exiſt; wou'd argue all to be Matter, and ſo deny a GOD*; The Danger of granting theſe Men what, over and above, it is abſurd to grant to any Man, is to me a good Warrant why I ſhou'd, if with Reaſon I can, deny the general Poſſibility of *Matter*'s *Thinking*. Ibid. ſect. 13.

Having endeavour'd to prove, here and elſewhere, what I believe of the Ill Tendency of this Objection, I ſhall, I hope, be excus'd if I beſtow, more than what may ſeem a Proportionable Part of this Diſcourſe, in a thorough Examination of it, with regard to what I have advanc'd on this Argument.

The ſenſe and meaning of the Objection I take to conſiſt in one of theſe two things: Either, 1. *That* Thought *may be one of the many, to us unknown, Properties which Omnipotence has beſtow'd upon Matter.* Or, 2. *That there may be in Matter a Capacity of Thought, when-ever it pleaſes Omnipotence to conferr it; tho' it does not lye within the Compaſs of our Apprehenſion.*

In the firſt Senſe, the Objection is too weak to deſerve that Name; for it is a Weakneſs in an Objection to prove too much, as this does, if it proves any thing; *viz.* That all Matter, as ſuch, does *actually Think:* An Aſſertion too wild in it ſelf to merit a ſober Confutation. Nor will the Old Refuge of an *Occult Quality* ſerve the Turn; as if this wanted only to be excited in the Subſtance of any Body: For *Thought*, and *Self-conſciouſneſs*, and *Perception*, are not Dormant Principles in any Body; unleſs this *Thought* in Matter, be of a quite different kind from what we underſtand by that Word; as indeed Matter it ſelf, when made *Thinking*, muſt be a far different Object from what is repreſented to us by our preſent *Idea* of it.

But the Second is doubtleſs the Senſe of Mr. *L.* and others, *That there may be ſome to us unknown, Capacity of Thought in Matter; by which, when Omnipotence pleaſes, it is ſuſceptible of that Faculty.* I ſay a *Capacity*, tho' I do not remember Mr. *L.* expreſſing himſelf thus, but, in looſer Terms, that *Omnipotence may ſuperadd*, &c. For I cannot ſuppoſe a Man of juſt Thought and Reaſoning, could be content with ſolving an Operation, by an Appeal only to an Omnipotent Agent, without preſuppoſing a *Capacity* in the Subject.

The Objection, as it ſtands here, I have met with in ſeveral Modern Writers; and, ſo far as I have obſerv'd and can recollect, is never urg'd but upon one, or more of theſe Reaſons: 1. *That we do not know all the Properties of Matter, and therefore neither can we ſay that this Capacity is not one of them.* 2. *Whereas we urge, that neither* Thought, *nor the Capacity of it are included in our Idea of Matter, this does not hinder at all but that it may actually belong to ſome Syſtems of it. And,* 3. *Tho' we farther ſuppoſe it impoſſible to conceive how Matter can* think, *yet Omnipotence can act beyond our Conception of things.*

But before I undertake to anſwer the ſeveral Arguments in Confirmation of the Objection, it will be requiſite to premiſe, in what Senſe, and upon what Accounts we maintain, that Omnipotence cannot create *Cogitative Matter.*

Now this we do not aſſert abſolutely, but upon Suppoſition of the Truth of our *Idea* in *contemplating*, and the Truth of our Faculties in *collecting* from that Idea of Matter; that is, We aſſert that God cannot do it, becauſe it appears to us no leſs than a Contradiction that it ſhou'd be done: But a Contradiction being a *Non Ens*, without ſo much as the Poſſibility of Exiſtence, is the Object of no Power, not the Divine. If then it is lawful for us, in any Caſe, to inquire, Whether a Thing be contradictory, or not; it is no Preſumption to determin, upon Satisfaction had, whe- it can be the Object of Divine Power: For he that affirms a thing to be contradictory, does virtually declare that God cannot do it. It is to be obſerv'd therefore, in the Caſe before us, that we do not deny the Power of God in Changing, if he ſees fit, every *Particle of Matter* in the Univerſe, into ſo many *Thinking Immaterial Subſtances*; for that involves no Contradiction, that we know of; but that, ſo long as our Idea of *Phyſical Extenſion* and of *Cogitation* continues the ſame, they muſt remain Properties inconſiſtent in the ſame *Subſtance*, for the Reaſons alledg'd *Sect.* 6, and 7. and this conſider'd, our Aſſertion may not appear ſo preſumptuous or offenſive, as it has done to ſome.

But, in Bar to this Aſſertion, it is pleaded in the firſt Place, *That we are, doubtleſs, ignorant of many Properties of Matter; one of which may be either* Actual Thought, *or at leaſt a* Capacity *of it.*

In anſwer to this, let us conſider upon what Accounts we do, in any Caſe, juſtly exclude ſuch a *Property* from being of the Number belonging to ſuch a *Subject*, and I affirm we can do this but one, or both of theſe Ways, *viz. Induction* and *Inconſiſtency*; as to the firſt, when we do fully underſtand all the Properties of a *Subject*, and find not the *Property* in Diſpute amongſt them; we are oblig'd by virtue of our *Induction* of all the Particulars, to exclude *that* from the Number, tho' it ſhou'd appear to be very conſiſtent with the *Subject*: But then this is not the only Method of thus denying or excluding; For ſecondly, we may as ſafely, and muſt as forcibly do it in the Caſe of *Inconſiſtency*; that is, when we do know one, or more *Properties* actually belonging to the *Subject*, which are inconſiſtent with, and contradictory to the *Property* under Conſideration: For inſtance, we do know that Matter cannot be in its Nature both *Active* and *Paſſive*, in one and the ſame Senſe; that it cannot be endu'd with the Power of Self-Motion, and at the ſame time move only as it is moved. And this a Man will be poſitive in, who is not only ignorant of many real *Properties* of Matter, but of many, that perhaps fall within the Compaſs of better Heads. Thus again I don't know, nor, I think, does any Man, all the Properties of a *Triangle*; yet I will ſay, *It is impoſſible for Omnipotence to make its three Angles equal to three Right ones*; becauſe I am not ignorant of this *Property*, nor to what *Subject* it belongs, that *There are three Angles just equal to two Right ones.* So that the Objection is rais'd upon this falſe Suppoſition, That we muſt have view'd, and been acquainted with the whole *Family* of *Properties* belonging to a Subject, before we can exclude any from being of the Number: This is indeed one, but not the only Way of doing it; ſo far from that, that it may be queſtion'd whether Human Underſtanding is capable of purſuing this Method in any one Inſtance; however, it muſt be own'd that the other, of denying by reaſon of *Inconſiſtency*, is the more uſual, as it is the better adapted Method.

This makes it ſomething wonderful to me, that, of two Ways only, an inquiſitive Philoſopher ſhou'd forget the more obvious and common: Which I judge was forgot, when Mr. *L.* ſaid it *was impoſſible for us, by the Contemplation of our own Ideas to diſcover, whether Omnipotence has not given* Thought *to ſome Syſtems of Matter*, &c. As much as to ſay, I not only find no Inconſiſtency between *Extenſion* and *Thought*; but I pronounce it a thing impoſſible for any Man elſe to find it out: If this be true, this Author does know all the Properties of Matter; for thus far I am ſure, my Ignorance of them is a good Argument to prove that a *Property* given, if I don't find it actually inherent in the *Subject*, may be inconſiſtent with ſome other *Property* belonging to it, which I indeed know not, but which it is poſſible for another Man to diſcover. Therefore nothing but a perfect Knowledge of the *Subject*, and a compleat *Induction* of Particulars, which I have not yet found in that Work, and deſpair to find it in any other, cou'd warrant that Concluſion.

Eſſay, *lib.* 4. *cap.* 3. *ſect.* 6.

To return to the Objection; if we have diſcover'd already, as I think we have done, an Inconſiſtency between ſome known *Properties* of *Material*, and others of *Cogitative*

tive Subſtance; our Ignorance of as many others as the Objector pleaſes, is no hinderance at all from our concluding peremptorily, That a *Thinking Material Subſtance* is a thing *in rerum natura* impoſſible.

2. *Whereas we ſay, that the Capacity of Thought is not included in our Idea of Matter; this, ſays the Objector, does not prove, that no ſort, or Syſtem, of Matter thinks.*

Reply to the B. of Worceſter's *Anſwer to his ſecond Letter*, p. 397.

Anſw. We do aſſert, That the *Capacity of Thought* is not included in our Idea of Matter; and Mr. *L.* ſays, *that to make good our Aſſertion*, viz. That *Thought* in Matter wou'd change the Eſſential *Properties* of it, *we have no more to ſay, but that* Thought *and* Reaſon *are not included in the Eſſence of Matter*: This he ſays is all we have to ſay; tho', in the very next Page, he is pleas'd, to put another, and a farther Objection into our Mouths. But how is *Thought* not included in the Eſſence of Matter? Why, in-as-much as a paſſive and diviſible extended Bulk, gives us no Idea of *Thought*, either as contain'd in, or dependent upon, it. And thus much we both ſay, That *Thought* is not included in that Eſſence; but when we come to conſider, and compare our Idea of *Thought* in ſome of its Eſſential Properties, with our Idea of *Matter*; then, I think, we have ſomething more to ſay, *viz.* That neither is it, nor can it be included in the Eſſence of Matter: For there is this real, and remarkable difference between Firſt and Secondary *Properties*; that, as all theſe depend upon the firſt, ſo the firſt muſt diffuſe it ſelf through them all, and they can have nothing in them but what is, formally or eminently, in the firſt; they muſt agree in this, tho' they may differ from one another, as Contraries. To explain and apply this; if we ſhou'd argue, That becauſe a Stone is paſſive in being broken, it's therefore paſſive in rolling down a Hill; there is no conſequence or connexion at all in it: But he that proves it originally paſſive, with regard to Motion, rightly inferrs it muſt be ſo as well *deſcending*, as in being *divided*, and in every other Inſtance of its Motion: And hence it is, that finding no Activity included in the *firſt Property* of Matter, he concludes, that it cannot aſſume Activity in any *ſubordinate Quality*; and that there is no Motion in any Body, but what is communicated, either from *another Body*, or from an *Immaterial Subſtance*; and therefore, that Matter is abſolutely paſſive. Not again, but that Omnipotence, having put a Parcel of Matter into motion, may continue it in that State eternally; but this is eternally to move it himſelf: And ſo likewiſe he cannot be ſaid to make Matter *think*, in any other ſenſe but this, that he *thinks* in it himſelf; which is not, that I can collect, Mr. *L*'s. Senſe; and thoſe, whoſe Senſe it is, ſhall be conſider'd by and by.

Ibid.

This Conſideration anſwers all that he objects from the Variety of Qualities found in Matter, and the Excellency of ſome above others, as of Vegetation above bare Motion; for theſe are all reconcilable to its firſt Property, and ſo may have a dependence upon it, tho' we know not the Manner how they depend. But when he proceeds to inſtance in Brutes, and then adds, *If one venture to go one Step farther, and ſay God may give to Matter, Thought, Reaſon, and Volition, as well as Senſe, and Spontaneous Motion; there are Men ready to limit the Power of the Omnipotent Creator*, he is a little unfair; for theſe Men deny *Senſe* and *Spontaneous Motion*, as well as *Thought*, *Reaſon*, and *Volition* to Matter; and therefore, inſtead of harkning to his Complaint of being ſtopt here, I muſt complain that he has gone a Step too far.

The ſame Anſwer will ſerve to what he objects from Mr. *Newton*, *The Gravita-*

tion of Matter towards Matter, by Ways unconceivable to me, is not only a Demonſtration that God can, if he pleaſes, put into Bodies Powers, and Ways of Operation, above what can be derived from our Idea of Body, or can be explained by what we know of Matter; but alſo an unqueſtionable, and every where inſtance that he has done ſo. I conceive this *Mutual Gravitation*, however unſolvable, and therefore to be ſuppos'd as a Principle in *Phyſics*, falls much ſhort, not only of *Thought, Reaſon, and Volition*; but of *Senſe and Spontaneous Motion:* It does not come up to Senſe, for then all Matter would be ſenſible, that is in the Viſible World at leaſt; and tho' it is *Motion*, or a tendency to it, yet *that* cannot be call'd *Spontaneous*; for then one Body wou'd have it, without the preſence of another; which is contrary to the Suppoſition: So that if it has this Power given it; it has not, in that, receiv'd the Power of *Thought*. But tho' it is an Operation unaccountable, as proceeding from Matter, yet may it not be accounted for, as proceeding from ſome other Cauſe? I am ſorry to find a Man of ſo good Underſtanding, inclinable to recurr to Unaccountable Powers in Matter, rather than to, what will account for them, an *Immaterial Principle.*

Thus I think I have ſhewn that, *Thought not being included in our Idea of Matter,* when rightly underſtood, proves that it is abſolutely excluded from it, and cannot poſſibly belong unto it, as a Property does to its Subject.

3. *The laſt Support of this Objection is, That tho' we ſuppoſe it impoſſible to conceive how Matter can Think, yet Omnipotence can Act beyond our Conception of Things.*

This is the other Objection, together with his Anſwer, which Mr. *L.* propoſes to himſelf; to which Anſwer I reply, That it is not only above, but contrary to our Conceptions; that we not only cannot conceive how it ſhou'd *think*, but we do conceive that it cannot *think*. *Reply, p.* 398.

If this were indeed, as he propoſes it, the chief Objection againſt him, that we cannot conceive the Manner how Matter *thinks*, I muſt confeſs it wou'd little deſerve that Elaborate Anſwer he gives it, in ſo many Pages; for I ſuppoſe neither can any Man conceive the Manner how an Immaterial Being *thinks*; how it turns, and applys it ſelf from one Object to another, and receives impreſsd *Ideas* from them: This I am as ready to own as he, That Want of Conception is too weak an Argument, (when in weak Underſtandings) to ſtand againſt Fact.

But there is a wide Difference between not conceiving the Manner how a thing is done, and not conceiving that it can be done; we cannot conceive how an Immaterial Being *thinks*, but yet we conceive that it can *think*; tho' perhaps from what we know of ſuch a Being, we ſhou'd never have collected the Power of *Thought* in it; but here is the Point, we are conſcious of our *Thinking*, and have all the Reaſon in the World to believe that many other Beings are endu'd with the ſame Faculty: And hence, that is, from what we do perceive and know of *Thought*, we collect, That it belongs to a Subject *uniform* and *ſelf-active* in its Nature; which is ſufficient to ſatisfy us that ſuch a Being can *think*, or rather is *capable of Thought*: But we are not only at a loſs to conceive how Matter can *think*, but how it is poſſible for it to *think*; we find inſuperable Objections in our way, not only againſt the Manner of the thing, but againſt the thing it ſelf, and the bare Poſſibility of it; and theſe amounting to a Demonſtration, fetch'd from ſuch Properties as we know, inſeparably belong unto Matter. Therefore, to me it looks like an elaborate piece of Trifling, to diſpute hard about the Manner how a thing is done, before we are ſatisfy'd that it can be done; nay, when others ſeem to be ſatisfy'd to the contrary.

But the ſame Author farther explains himſelf by inſtancing in *Solidity*, and argues very artfully from thence; I ſhall endeavour to do his Argument right, tho', to avoid prolixity, I muſt epitomize it.

Reply, p. 402.

It proceeds upon this Suppoſition, That God has created both a ſolid and an unſolid Subſtance, each without the Power of *Self-activity*, or *Thought*; and that this is a Suppoſition to be made, he proves from hence, That God may put an End to any Action, or Power of Action in any of his Creatures, and yet leave that Creature in a State of Exiſtence; and therefore he might have created the ſame Nature, without the Power, of which he can deprive it, without annihilating of it. The Suppoſition being good, he proceeds to demand a Reaſon why God may not ſuperadd the Power of *Self-activity* and *Thought*, as well to the ſolid, as to the unſolid Subſtance; ſince *neither* can have it naturally, and without ſuch a Superaddition, and ſince it is equally unconceivable how *both* enjoy and exert it.

This is the Subſtance of what he urges upon this Argument, and, I muſt think, of what can be urg'd for it; but I have ſeveral things to offer, in order to take off the plauſible Diſguiſe it wears.

1. Let it be conſider'd that God has not created all Natures, or Subſtances ſo, as to be ſuſceptible of all manner of Properties. If he has, all our Reaſoning from the Nature of the Thing, is at an End; and, ſince we can, properly, reaſon no otherwiſe, the Old Principle is eſtabliſh'd, That *God may have deceiv'd us*: But as ſure as our Faculties are true, and as ſure as our Creator has imparted variouſly differing Natures to his Creatures; ſo ſure it is, that he has tied himſelf to that Rule in conferring Properties upon them; that is, has conferr'd ſuch, and only ſuch as are ſuitable to their reſpective Natures; ſo that when I ſay Omnipotence cannot do ſuch a thing, I wou'd be underſtood to mean, and I add it here once for all, *Rebus ſic ſtantibus*, and his own Immutability conſider'd; which, I hope will not appear a preſumptuous leſning of his Power, but rather a juſt Senſe of that adorable Veracity and Goodneſs, which accompany'd his conferring the Rational Faculty upon me.

2. But then, How do we underſtand that ſuch and ſuch Natures are capable of ſuch, and only ſuch Properties? Doubtleſs there is a Reaſon for all that was produc'd by Perfect Wiſdom; but then that Reaſon, in this Caſe, lyes as far beyond our Ken, as does the naked Eſſence of

Things: Very true, and this makes it difficult, if ever poſſible, for us to apprehend all the Properties which any individual Nature is capable of: And therefore, as I ſaid, Inconſiſtency with ſome known Property in the Subject, is the chief Rule, whereby we can exclude any other from being grafted, and nouriſh'd on the ſame Stock.

3. But to come nearer the Point, whereas Mr. *L.* when he comes to draw the Parallel between *ſolid* and *unſolid Subſtance*, inſtances only in *ſpontaneous* or *ſelf-Motion*, tho' in moſt other places he joyns *Thought* with it; I conceive they are, in all Caſes, inſeparable. A ſelf-moving and ſenſeleſs Being are contradictory Epithets. A Body always, and neceſſarily moving, is not ſelf-moving; for all Neceſſity proceeds from External Determination: Therefore this Power, in a Body, muſt be ſuch that, it can move or reſt of it ſelf; but this Power is a Will, properly ſo call'd; and that Will is a *Mode of Thinking*. Therefore if the Almighty has given it ſelf-Motion, he has firſt, in the Order of Nature, given it *Thought*, as the only Foundation to bear it; ſo that the Reaſons which prove Matter incapable of *Thought*, (as we have prov'd it to be, ſo long as it retains its own Eſſential Properties) prove it equally inca-

Reply, p. 403.

incapable of Self-Motion. This will ſerve to put the Queſtion right, which is not Whether he can give Self-Motion; but Whether he can give *Thought*, to a *ſolid*, as well as an *unſolid Subſtance:* But is there any Contradiction in that? I anſwer:

4. That here again is an unfair State of the Caſe; *Solidity* is a reductitious, not a firſt Property of Body; or, however, is not that firſt Property we make uſe of as a Medium, to prove the Inconſiſtency by; but when we trace it up, and find every *ſolid Subſtance* Phyſically extended, and diviſible, and paſſive; then we clearly conceive that *ſuch a ſolid Subſtance* is incapable of *Thought*. The only Evaſion here, that I can imagin, is this; That it does not follow, becauſe God has created one extended diviſible Subſtance of a Paſſive Nature; therefore he has created all the Kind of thoſe Subſtances of the like Nature. Yes, ſay I, it does follow; becauſe the Connexion is founded in the Reaſon of the Thing, which holds univerſally, as well as our Obſervation in Fact, which concludes no farther than it extends: For I have proved it both forward, and backward, from the Cauſe to the Effect, and from the Effect to the Cauſe; which, together, make the moſt compleat Demonſtrative Evidence.

From all which I conclude, according to what I obſerv'd concerning the Regular Exerciſe of the Divine Power upon his Creatures, that to what *Subſtance* ſoever, for I abſolutely deny it to none, Omnipotence has give the Faculty of *Thought*; he has either never given to that *Subſtance*, or actually taken away from it *Phyſical Extenſion*; and let the Objector take which he pleaſes, he comes up to all I aim at, which is the Truth of this Propoſition, *Every Thinking Being is Immaterial.*

What I have ſaid I take to be a Foundation for a full Anſwer, to all that Mr. *L.* has objected, upon this Head, to the late great Biſhop of *Worceſter*; which I ſhou'd not preſume to do, had the World enjoy'd the Biſhop longer, to have had his own more perfect Anſwer; or had not Mr. *L.* more avowedly and laboriouſly maintain'd the Objection I propoſe to anſwer, than any other Writer I know of; ſo that by taking the Objection from him, I have ſet in its beſt Light; and ſo far as I have anſwer'd him, I may preſume to have ſilenc'd the Objection.

And having now proved at large, the Incapacity of Matter, either to produce, or ſuſtain the Property of *Thought*; and alſo ſhewn the Weakneſs, and Inſufficiency of all the beſt Attempts that have been made, to ſuperinduce this Property to any *Material Subſtance*; I paſs by a whole Train of other, both Modern and Ancient Objections, as being of leſs Moment than thoſe already mention'd, and ſuch as muſt ſtand and fall with them.

SECT. IX.

That it is not GOD *the Supreme Spirit, that Thinks in Human Nature.*

IT is not then, we find, our Body, or any Part of it, or any Thing belonging to it that *thinks* within us: But what if it be God himſelf, who contains all poſſible Ideas in his own Eternal Mind, that makes uſe of our Bodies, but as ſo many different Inſtruments, variouſly to diſplay his own Intellectual, Incommunicable Faculty; and ſo he himſelf properly *thinks* in thoſe, we ſuppoſe Cogitative Subſtances?

There are but very few, if any, amongſt the Oppoſers of the Doctrin of a Human Spirit, who plainly and expreſly hold this; for there are but few of that Sect, that are willing to build upon the Suppoſition of an Immaterial God: And yet, I think, almoſt all of them aſſert and maintain what, in the Reſult and Conſequence, amounts to thus much. If we will believe Mr. *Blount*, *The general Opinion of the moſt Inquiſitive amongſt the Heathens was what* Bernier *ſays the Inhabitants of* Indoſtan *believe, of the Souls Eternal Condition, that it wou'd mix with the Soul of the World again: Like Water taken out of the Ocean in a Bottle, and ſwims therein for a while; till, by ſome Accident or other, being broke, it returns back to the Sea from whence it was taken.* He might as well have ſaid the Inhabitants of *Indoſtan*, *are the General, and the moſt Inquiſitive Part of Mankind.* However, this is propos'd as an Opinion fit to be receiv'd; and if, as ſome are apt to believe, the Soul of the World be that Author's God; it is the ſame Opinion we are now conſidering. And for others who of late have aſſerted the Soul to be barely Life, and Life to be a Ray of the Divinity; theſe do ſay the very ſame thing.

Anima Mundi, *p.* 105.

Second Thoughts, paſſim.

That I may not ſeem to trifle with the Reader, in beſtowing much Pains upon ſo trifling an Objection; I ſhall only offer theſe two inſeparable Qualities of Human Thought, which no Man, that knows what we mean by the Word GOD, can fix upon him. 1. *That they are finite, and limited:* 2. *That they are morally Peccable.*

1. That the Faculty of *Thought* in Man is finite and limited, I preſume I need not prove; he muſt be of a very narrow Capacity that denys it. We are conſcious that it is the inevitable Condition of our Nature, not only ſo long as we are ty'd down to Senſe, but ſo long as we *think*; how far ſoever our Intellectual Capacity may be enlarg'd, and extended in another State, perhaps to know adequately, and fully to comprehend many Objects: Yet this we are ſure of, that it can never comprehend all Objects at once; and for this, among other Reaſons, that ſuch a Capacity cou'd never lye dormant in our Nature, but wou'd be actually exerted, at all times, and upon all Objects; in as much as a Capacity of Comprehending all Objects, can meet with no Obſtruction from any. And therefore, tho' it may be ſuppos'd (as we ſhall endeavour to ſhew) that the Laws of Union with Matter, may terminate, and bring to a narrower Compaſs, an Underſtanding finite and limited by Nature; yet as to that *Firſt Infinite Mind*, how cloſely ſoever we ſuppoſe it united to Matter, it cannot poſſibly be ſo determin'd in its own Thoughts, as to loſe its own Eſſential Perfection. This

wou'd be a God communicating to his Creatures, not only Himſelf, but a Power over Himſelf; and ſuch a Power as wou'd deſtroy the Foundation, both of his Knowledge and Happineſs; by diſabling him ſo far, in that Part of Matter, to which he's more intimately preſent, that *there* he does not comprehend his own moſt Perfect Fulneſs: So blaſphemouſly abſurd it is to imagin, *That his Thoughts are as our Thoughts*, or that *ours* are *his*. But,

2. That which renders this Notion ſtill more impious, is, That our *Thoughts are Morally Peccable.* I might ſay moſt of them, the Tendency of our Nature conſider'd, will be found *Morally Evil.* And, upon this Account, the Notion of *God thinking in us*, ſeems to me to be the laſt, and that but a poor Refuge of Infidel-Immorality.

For, as the Principles and Duties of Morality are perfectly agreeable to unbiaſs'd Reaſon, and are deeply, and apparently engrav'd on the Minds of Men; ſo the Connexion between Sin and Puniſhment, in Free Agents, becomes natural and neceſſary: When therefore, as in this Caſe, the Law is plain and poſitive, the Sanction juſt, and the Fact notorious; what Hope of Eſcaping has the Criminal, that cannot fly from Juſtice, unleſs this, to impeach the Judge himſelf of the Crime?

But this, as it is the true Reaſon of advancing this Notion; ſo, being a very bad Reaſon, it is the Confutation of it. For, not to urge that this quite vacates a Future State of Puniſhments, unleſs it may be ſuppos'd that the Deity will finally condemn, and puniſh Himſelf; to offer Proof of that State, wou'd be too great a Digreſſion, and I know it will not be admitted in this Argument, as a Suppoſition; I only deſire it may be conſider'd, what is obvious to Obſervation, That there is a great Deal of Puniſhment naturally conſequent upon Immorality in this State: Is there not a Natural Dread, Guilt, and Self-Condemnation attending the Crime of wilful and deliberate Murther? Or are the Effects of it, upon the Mind, the ſame with thoſe ariſing from the Reflexion, that I have ſav'd another Man's Life? Sure no Man ever committed the one, that cou'd entertain himſelf with the Remembrance of it; and few, that have been ſo happy, ever forgot the other. Now the Conſequence upon all Immorality, muſt be, proportionably, the ſame, as it ſtands aggravated, in the *Circumſtances*, and oppos'd, in the *Matter* of it, to the Fundamental Maxims of Truth and Juſtice. For which Reaſon the Deity, as he thinks, according to this Scheme, in all Men; ſo he is, in every Man more or leſs, the obſtinate Author of his own Puniſhment and Miſery: And as his Knowledge, Wiſdom, and Righteouſneſs muſt be ſuppos'd, originally, the moſt perfect; ſo the Debaſing of them all in Sinful Man, is the more inexcuſable, the Folly more unaccountable, the Puniſhment greater, and the Sufferer pitileſs. Theſe are Notions of a Deity, ſo abominable to a Sober Underſtanding; and the Authors of them have ſo far degraded God, that it muſt be confeſs'd they do not much aſpire in Deifying themſelves.

But enough has been ſaid to explode this wild Notion, and to demonſtrate that, Whatever it be that *thinks* in us, it is not the Moſt Perfect, and Ever-Bleſſed Author of our *Being*.

SECT. X.

How far the preceding Proof gives the Soul of Man a Nature, and Eſſence diſtinct from Matter.

BUT ſtill our Senſes are a great Hinderance to our apprehending what it is that *thinks* in us; and ſo long as we harken entirely to them, we ſhall be utter Infidels, as to *Immaterial Subſtance:* Let us conſider therefore, Whether theſe (in themſelves) are our only, and our infallible Guide to the Truth, and Exiſtence of Things.

In the firſt Place, we miſapply our *Ideas of Senſation*, when, from them, we paſs an *immediate* Judgment on the Nature even of ſenſible things without us. The only *immediate* Judgment we can ſafely paſs, in this Caſe, is on our own *Senſations*; for there is no farther Scrutiny requiſite, in order to judge whether an Object of Senſe gives me Pleaſure or Pain, than barely to attend to the Impreſſion it makes upon me: But when I wou'd judge of the Qualities of that Object, which do not thus affect and concern my Body, if I paſs my

Judgment only from my *Senſation*, I ſhall be deceiv'd; as is plain in the Inſtances of a ſtreight Stick, appearing crooked in the Water; and a ſquare Tower round at a diſtance.

Not but that the Teſtimony of Senſe is infallible, in its proper Place; but what I now aſſert is, concerning the Manner of our forming a Judgment from that Teſtimony; which I ſay is not done by bare attending to the Impreſſion, as in the Caſe of Pleaſure and Pain; but by the Intervention of Ideas, rais'd by *Reflexion*; or, if you will, ſuch as are Operations of our *Pure Intellect*: For Example, I can certainly judge of the Qualities of Bread, when the Object is at a due Diſtance, the Medium (ſuppoſe I am to judge of it by Sight) rightly temper'd, and my Organ well diſpos'd; but then it is by Reaſon only, that I can adjuſt all this: For a Man in a *Jaundies*, to whom white Bread appears yellow, is not owing to his Senſes for the Diſtinction; as he is, when he judges that ſuch a thing gives him Pain or Pleaſure; which muſt be concluded Real, and diſtinct Senſations, for this Reaſon only, that he feels them ſo; even tho' there ſhou'd be no ſuch thing exiſtent as that Body, which he ſuppoſes gave him that Senſation. We find then that our Senſes alone, wou'd bring us no

Notice, that can certainly be depended upon, even of a Senſible Object, any farther than it concerns, and affects our own Body; and that, properly ſpeaking, is only an Information that we have ſuch a Senſation; ſo that our Abſtracted Reaſon is the true Ground, and Foundation of the certainty even of our Senſible Evidence.

And this Conſideration may ſerve to wean us thus far from *Senſual Credulity*, that we may be ſure our Reaſoning about Things is nevertheleſs certain, even tho' we have no Senſible Ideas of them: For if the ſame Operation, upon which we depend in our Reaſoning about theſe, conclude as ſtrongly for the Exiſtence of Things remote from Senſe, we may with equal Aſſurance depend upon it.

Having, therefore, evinc'd the Neceſſity of *Incorporeal Subſtance in General*, and prov'd, at large, that ſuch only can be a *Thinking Subſtance*; this demonſtrates that there is ſuch a *Subſtance* in Human Nature: And as the Paſſive Qualities which we find in Matter, aſſure our Reaſon that there is a Material Subſtance exiſting without us; ſo the Active Powers of *Thought* do as neceſſarily inferr an *Immaterial Subſtance* within us.

The Word *Immaterial* is indeed a Negative Term; but conſider it as expreſſing ſomething that *thinks*, which Matter cannot do, and you will be convinc'd that, as perfect Unity, or Indiviſibility of Eſſence is, in the Divine Nature, a greater Perfection than Diviſibility wou'd be; ſo it muſt be a proportionable Perfection in that, which is not liable to Phyſical Diviſion: But *Negatives* are no Perfections, tho' we may be forc'd to expreſs ſome Perfections by Negative Terms. I conclude therefore, That we have as evidently diſcover'd *Two diſtinct Subſtances* in our Nature, as every Man diſcovers *One*, which is the *Material*.

SECT. XI.

Of the Union *of Soul and Body.*

BUT ſome Philoſophers have not been ſo much perplex'd to find *Two diſtinct Subſtances* in Human Nature, as to find out the Reaſon why they make but One Nature and Perſon; and this, I think, is the laſt Obſtacle in our Way to our main Concluſion.

And here I frankly own, That when all the Philoſophic Attempts that have been, or can be made, have had their utmoſt

Effect; the Reaſon of this *Union* will reſolve entirely into the ſole Power, and Will of the Creator.

But do we not now recurr to Omnipotence to ſolve, what others eſteem a Contradiction; and ſo we are not guilty of the ſame Abſurdity we charg'd upon them? For they eſteem it a thing in its own Nature impoſſible to be done, That Two Natures not only ſo diſtinct, but ſo contradictory, as Material and Immaterial, ſhou'd be thus *United*, unleſs by Virtue of ſome *Tertium quid* as a Cement; which, they clearly conceive, there cannot be *in Rerum Natura.*

In order to ſtate this Matter aright, we muſt explain, ſo far as it is explicable, what we mean by the *Union* of Soul and Body, in the one Perſon of Man.

1. By this we do not underſtand ſuch a confounding or blending of theſe two Subſtances, whereby they become as it were one Subſtance; but we maintain that, Tho' there is a reciprocal *Action* and *Paſſion* between them, yet each hath preſerv'd its chief Properties, naturally independent on the other, and incommunicable to it. From which it follows:

2. That this is not ſuch an Union as is indiſſoluble; for ſo long as the Subſtances, and their chief Properties continue, in

their reſpective Natures ſeparate, and diſtinct; they are ſeparable in all other Reſpects: The diſannulling of that Law, whereinſoever it conſiſts, whereby they are *united*; can affect the Properties of neither, ſo far as to diſplace it from that Rank of Being, in which it was, before the *Union* commenc'd.

3. We find that this Diſſolution is brought about by Natural and Phyſical Cauſes; and therefore, that the *Union* is not ſuch as can reſiſt them; nay, it is in every ſuch Diſſolution, a diſorder of the Corporeal Syſtem, that immediately precedes, and is the Efficient Cauſe of it. Notwithſtanding which,

4. A farther Inſtance or Effect of the *Union* is this; that the Action and Paſſion is reciprocal; it is the Soul that moves the Body in Life, and takes her flight from it at Death: On the other hand, the Body conveys Motion to, and as variouſly moving, cauſes various Senſations in the Soul: Nor have we reaſon to think that the Soul can exert, during the *Union*, her moſt abſtracted Powers, without ſome Uſe, and Influence of the Body.

5. And laſtly, the higheſt Inſtance or Effect of this *Union*, is the *Vital Congruity*; by which the *Adherence* and *Sympathy* becomes *Natural*; ſo that a Body in reſt

will as ſoon move of it ſelf, as a Soul and Body *diſunite*, but by External Force and Compulſion. I call it External, notwithſtanding that ſuch Motions as cauſe the Diſſolution, may be rais'd within the Body; for ſo it is, with regard to that Part of the Body, be what it will, to which the Soul is immediately *united*. Thus far I hope we do not offend, in endeavouring to explain the *Union* of Soul and Body, in ſuch Inſtances and Effects of it, as fall within our Knowledge. As to the *Union*, conſider'd ſimply in it ſelf, we confeſs our perfect Ignorance in the Manner of it; and, as to the Cauſe of it, we freely own we are able to conceive none, but the Firſt Cauſe of all Things. Now we are to conſider, Whether there is to be found any Contradiction; either, Firſt, In what I have explain'd: Or, Secondly, In what I have confeſs'd inexplicable in this *Union*.

Firſt, As to what I have explain'd, there is no Contradiction in any Part of it: not,

1. In this, That the *Union* does not deſtroy the *Diſtinction* of Natures. To do this might, poſſibly, be a Contradiction; but not to do it can be none: And ſo long as we maintain, That the Soul is not turn'd into Matter, nor the Body into Spirit; there is hitherto no more Contra-

diction in this *Union*, than in ſuppoſing the Immaterial Nature of God, to be intimately, and eſſentially preſent, with all the Parts of the Material World. Nor,

2. Is it repugnant, to ſuppoſe this *Union* diſſoluble; for we ſuppoſe alſo it had a Beginning; and, what was once effected, (the Matter continuing the ſame) may be undone again, by the ſame Power: For, as *Des Cartes* juſtly argues upon another Occaſion; *Jam conjungat, & uniat illas* [*rem cogitantem & extenſam*] *Deus quantum poteſt, non ideo poteſt ſe omnipotentia ſua exuere, nec ideo ſibi facultatem adimere ipſas ſejungendi.*

Ep. p. 1. p. 348.

3. Nor is it contradictory to give the Power of this Diſſolution, to Natural and Phyſical Cauſes. I think it very abſurd, if not contradictory to ſay, That Matter, as ſuch, can act upon any thing, but Matter. But this is not the Point in Queſtion; it is ſufficient, that it can act upon our Bodies; and where God is ſuppos'd, as in this Caſe he is, to have united Two *Subſtances* with Conditions, on both ſides requiſite to continue that *Union*, let theſe Conditions be either Natural, or purely Arbitrary, the Breach of them, on either ſide, breaks the *Union*. But,

4. It is not perhaps ſo eaſy, to clear from Contradiction, the reciprocal Action and Paſſion. *Sect. 3.* First, As to the Soul's moving the Body, I have evinc'd that Matter was once mov'd by ſomething Immaterial; and I think there needs no other Argument to clear this from Contradiction, than the Old one, *What has been, may be:* Our want of Conception is ſo far from proving the thing impoſſible, that it is no Objection at all when level'd againſt Fact. But the Difficulty lyes chiefly in the ſecond thing, which is, the Power of the Body to act upon the Soul; and this may indeed ſeem inconſiſtent with our own Principle, of the *Paſſive Nature of Matter:* But let it be conſider'd, firſt, That we do not ſay the Body acts upon the Soul by a Spontaneous Motion; we ſay it can communicate nothing but what it receives, and that is, only Motion; all beyond this is produc'd in the Mind: Now we confeſs, as we have already aſſerted, that we can find no Natural Connexion between Corporeal Motion, and any Operation of the Mind. (For, by the way, we ſuppoſe it more immediately united to the ſubtileſt, and moſt ſpirituous Parts of the Body; not becauſe they are better fitted to make Impreſſions on the Soul, but to convey the Motion ſhe imparts, in the moſt expeditious

and effectual Manner, to the groſſer Parts.) Yet all this while, as there is nothing done in the Body that is unconceivable, ſo there is nothing done in the Soul that is impoſſible; for the Creator, who gave to the Soul a Power of moving Matter by exerting its own Will, can doubtleſs give it a Power to attend to Corporeal Motions; and, while it attends, can, according to the Variety of theſe Motions, either immediately himſelf, or by a Natural Power communicated to the Soul, repreſent to it various Ideas of Things. So that here can be no Contradiction to the *Paſſive Nature of Matter*, ſo long as we aſcribe nothing of the Effect in the Soul to it, as a truly Efficient Cauſe; but only as an Occaſion or Inſtrument of *Thinking.*

But why, upon ſuch Motions, ſuch Thoughts ſhou'd neceſſarily enſue, this we reſolve entirely into the inexplicable Manner of their *Union*; ſtill maintaining, That it is no Contradiction for a Creature to be, in ſome Reſpects, a Free Agent, and in others, under a Neceſſity of Nature: He that ſaid to the Ocean, *Hither ſhalt thou go, and no farther*; cou'd doubtleſs give this Law to any of his Offspring, *Hitherto ſhalt thou act independently on thy Fellow-Creatures, and no farther.*

And if there be no Contradiction in this; then neither is there,

5. In the *Vital Congruity* which is perfectly agreeable to the Wiſdom of the Creator, that whatever is made *Neceſſary*, ſhou'd be made *Natural* too; and that no Law of his Creation ſhou'd be broken, by any other Power of the Creature, beſides that of its Free Will; which alone is accountable to him, for ſo doing: Hence that Natural Propenſion, which God himſelf has fix'd upon the Soul to adhere to the Body, is not conquerable by the moſt obſtinate and eager Will.

But it muſt be confeſs'd all this is accountable no otherwiſe, than upon Suppoſition of the *Union*, which in it ſelf we acknowledge to be altogether unaccountable. And how imperfect ſoever this Method may ſeem, it is the beſt we have, nay and is ſufficient to clear our Suppoſition from the Charge of Contradiction; which I ſuppoſe runs thus; That there is no *Union* of Things, but by *Contact*; a Body and Spirit cannot touch together:

> *Tangere enim, & tangi, niſi Corpus, nulla poteſt res.*
> Lucret.

Ergo, A Body and Spirit cannot be united. When I have ſhewn this Argument inconcluſive, I ſhall have prov'd the Inexplicable Part of this *Union*, to be yet within the Power of the Creator.

The Major Propoſition, *That there is no Union, but by Contact*, I might diſtinguiſh; and own this to be true in the *Union* between Bodies, but not between Body and Spirit: But that I may not ſeem to avoid the Force of the Argument, I abſolutely deny it, and will prove the Contradictory Propoſition to be true, *That there is no Union by Contact.* If this hold in the *Union* of Bodies, I ſuppoſe it will hold univerſally: This, therefore, is what I ſhall prove.

Thus much I grant, that where-ever there is *Union* of Bodies, there is *Contact*; but I aſſert they are not united by this *Contact*; that thoſe Operations they exert as *united*, they cou'd not poſſibly exert only as *touching*; and therefore *Contact* is not the Cauſe of *Union.*

The Operation I inſtance in is, That of a Body in Motion, moving another larger than it ſelf, in Surface and Bulk, and putting it into a Rectilineal Motion; which we ſee the Body A (ſuppoſing the Degrees of its Celerity more than compenſating for the Exceſs of Bulk



in B quieſcent) may effect upon B. Upon which, I aſſert, 1. That the whole Body B moves as an *united* Body: But, 2. That it cou'd not [all of it] move by virtue of the *Contact* of its Parts; therefore *Contact* does not *unite* the Parts of it.

In order to demonſtrate theſe Two Propoſitions, I lay down Four Axioms with regard to Corporeal Motion, which, upon very little Conſideration muſt be admitted as ſuch.

1. That every Body in Motion, had an Impellent Cauſe from without.

2. That every Body, or Aggregate of Bodies, impelling another, communicates Motion by Contact only.

3. That all Motion is naturally Rectilineal. And,

4. That all Motion is continu'd in the ſame Line in which it is receiv'd.

A, moving towards *pq*, and finding B in its Way, moves it to *pi*; communicating of its own Motion to B, by Contact, according to *Ax.* 2. from the Line *cd* to *ef*; and ſo thro' all the intermediate Lines to *no*, according to *Ax.* 3, and 4. whereby we conceive how that Part of B call'd *enof*, moves towards *pq*. But here's another Part of B call'd *fogh* which moves towards *qi*, or elſe the whole wou'd not move towards *pi*. But whence has this Part *fogh* its Motion? Not from it ſelf, *Ax.* 1. not immediately from A, which



touches it no where, *Ax.* 2. Therefore it muſt have it from *enof*, which has it firſt from A; and by virtue of its Union with which, *fohg* moves towards *qi*. This is the firſt Thing I aſſerted we are to conſider. 2. Whether this Motion can be effected by Contact only. And I will demonſtrate, 1. That the Part *enof*, can communicate by its Contact no Motion to *fohg*. 2. If it cou'd, yet this Part wou'd not move to *qi*, as we find it does. Firſt, *enof* can communicate by its Contact no Motion in this Caſe to *fohg*. For being able to communicate nothing but what it receiv'd from A, *Ax.* 1. and receiving that only at the Line *ef*; and *ef* preſſing directly thro' all the intermediate Lines upon *n o*, Ax. 3, and 4. there cannot be the leaſt Degree of Motion communicated from



e n o f to *f o h g*; for this wou'd be a tendency in *e n o f* to *m l*, according to *Ax.* 4. which yet it cou'd not have from A, according to the ſame *Axiom*. Secondly, If there cou'd be a Communication of Motion this Way, yet the Part *f o h g* wou'd not move, as it does, to *q i*; for it cou'd receive no Motion from *e n o f*, but by the Line *fo*, *Ax.* 2. and that cou'd be communicated no other Ways, than to *g h*, *Ax.* 4. and that cou'd tend no otherwiſe, than to *m l*, by the ſame *Axiom*. Therefore the Part *f o h g* cou'd not move at all; or if it cou'd, yet not to *q i*. *Q. E. D.*

From the preceding Demonſtration it appears, That if *Contact* caus'd the *Union* of the Parts of Matter, no Part of it cou'd move, as we plainly ſee, it does; only by adhering to the reſt, when 'tis no way impell'd by the Mover: So that here is ſomething in this *Union*, not only above, but contrary to the Laws of *Motion*; that Part of the Body moves, which, according to the Firſt Part of the Demonſtration, ſhou'd reſt.

But here I muſt not forget the Old Objection. Here's an Operation in Fact, contradictory to what we apprehend of ſome, known Properties of Matter: Why then muſt *Thinking Matter* be a Contradiction, becauſe it is contrary to what we apprehend of others? The Fallacy of this Argument will appear, by diſtinguiſhing the Word *Union*: If, by it, is meant *Mechanical Union*, or *Union* from a *Mechanical Cauſe*, I own it may be as impoſſible, as that Matter can *think*: But if we underſtand it as a Fact only, from ſome Cauſe or other, there's no Conſequence in it to the Power of *Thinking* in Matter; but, as an *Immaterial Being* only *thinks*; ſo an *Immaterial Being* may be the only ſufficient Cauſe to *unite* (as they are united) the Parts of Matter.

To return; I have fully prov'd, That *Contact* does not unite, in a proper Senſe, the Parts that are united in any Body; and altho' we cannot conceive them *united*, without conceiving them, at the ſame time, *touching* each other; yet their *Contiguity* or *Juxta-poſition*, and their *Continuity* or *Union*, muſt be two different Effects; as proceeding from different Cauſes; the one from Motion, the other from ſomething above the Power of Motion. And, therefore, it is very poſſible that ſome Subſtances (I don't ſay Corporeal) may be *united* without touching one another in this Senſe: For, whereever the one acts *dependently* on the other, there is an *Union*; ſo that if we own the Power of moving Matter inherent in ſome *Immaterial Subſtance*, (as I have prov'd we muſt of neceſſity own) we have, in Fact, an *Union*, in ſome Degree, of theſe *Two Subſtances*: And, as to that Inſtance of the *Union* between Human Soul and Body, in which the Soul it ſelf is affected, I ſay the Application is, on both ſides equally, unimaginable; we can no more conceive the Manner how an *Immaterial Agent* moves a *Body*, than we can how, upon *Corporeal Motion*, *Thoughts* ariſe in the *Soul*; and if the one has been actually done, the other, for ought we know of it, cannot be impoſſible.

Thus I have clearly diſproved the Propoſition which I deny'd, *viz. That there is no Union of Things, but by Contact*; having demonſtrated that, Even that particular

Union, which gives Umbrage to the Objection, is not made by *Contact*.

But perhaps the *Union of Bodies* is ſtill Mechanically ſolvable, tho' not by *Contact* only, yet by *Reſt* ſuperadded to it; as ſome; or the *Preſſure of the Atmoſphere*, as others contend.

But granting that either, or both of theſe come up to a full Solution; nevertheleſs the Senſual Prejudice of *Contact* is remov'd; which theſe Additional Suppoſitions prove, is not able to ſolve the *Phænomenon*: And indeed if *Contact* alone were ſufficient, there cou'd be no Reaſon given, why all Bodies, of what Superficies ſoever, did not in ſome degree *unite* upon Touch, as Iron doth with the *Magnet*.

But the Addition of *Reſt* and *Preſſure* may, perhaps, ſeem to be only ſubſervient to *Contact* in this *Union*; the latter to bring the Parts together, and the former to continue their *Juxta-poſition*: Let us therefore examin their Capacity, as Cauſes to produce this Effect: And of them both I may pronounce, That they are already demonſtrated equally incapable, with *Contact*; as will eaſily appear by recollecting, that That Part of the Body *B* in Reſt, which has no Motion communicated to it by *A*, according to this Suppoſition, moves of it ſelf: And as to the *Preſſure of the*

Atmoſphere: Is it poſſible, for that to make a Body move, without being it ſelf the Impellent Cauſe? Which it cannot be in the Progreſſive Motion of Bodies, becauſe it is ſuppos'd to *unite* the Parts of them by an equal Preſſure on all ſides; and it is clear, that this *Preſſure* muſt move that Part of the Body *B* which is not mov'd by *A*, if it *unites* the Parts of *B*; for by virtue of *Union* they move together: Or can the *Preſſure* be ſuch an Impellent Cauſe, as to make a Body continue Motion in a different Line from that, in which it was receiv'd?

Again, as to *Reſt* uniting the Parts of Matter, *Des Cartes* very dexterouſly avoids the inſuperable Difficulty attending it, by telling us we can imagin no other *Cement* but *Reſt*; and then putting the Queſtion, *Quid enim eſt Glutinum illud? non Subſtantia, quia cum Particulæ iſtæ ſint Subſtantiæ, nulla ratio eſt cur per aliam Subſtantiam potius, quam per ſeipſas jungerentur, &c.* For it may be very difficult to imagin what *Subſtance*, beſides themſelves, can *unite* them; (tho' by the way, the Power of *Uniting* is involv'd in the Power of *Moving* Matter, and therefore we are not ſo much at a Loſs for another *Subſtance*) and yet it may be impoſſible to conceive, that they can *unite* them-

Princ. Phil. l. 2. §. 55.

themſelves by *Reſt*. An heap of Sand may be as perfectly at *Reſt*, as a piece of Marble; but the Parts do not alike cohere: It's true, the Air may be always in Motion, in the Interſtices left by the Globules of Sand; but ſo is that, or ſubtler Matter, in the Pores of Marble; and while there is no ſuch Motion in the other, as to change the Place and Situation of one Grain, with reſpect to another, the Sand is as much at Reſt, and ought to be as *coherent*, as the Marble.

The *Preſſure of the Atmoſphere*, is ſtill a weaker Subterfuge: For what is it that ſo *unites* the Parts of this *Elaſtical Fluid*? Are all Bodies in the Univerſe that are *united*, ſurrounded with an Atmoſphere? And what then ſurrounds *that*, to make its Particles act with united Force upon them? Or is this only deſign'd for a Piece of Sublunary Philoſophy? Truly it will not bear carrying any farther.

And now I think it appears, that this *Union* is above all *Mechanical Solution*. I deſire the Conſequence of this may be conſider'd: If we cannot conceive how *Material Subſtances*, which lye neareſt to our Underſtanding, tho' not level with it, are *united*; in vain do we endeavour to conceive, or complain for want of Conception, how an *Immaterial Subſtance* is *united* to *Material*. There are but Three Sorts of *Union* we can ſuppoſe of *Subſtances*; that of *Two Material*, that of *Two Immaterial Subſtances*, or laſtly the *Union between both*; and if we do not comprehend the firſt, which yet we find to be Matter of Fact; our not being able to comprehend either of the other, is no Objection to Arguments in themſelves concluſive for their *Union*. We have ſome Idea of *Subſtances ſeparately* in Action; of Material, in the Action of *Motion*; and of Immaterial, in the Action of *Thought*; but we have no Idea of any *Subſtance* in Action, purely by its Dependence on another *Created Subſtance*. Our Faculties, in their utmoſt Extent, fall ſhort of this Knowledge; our Creator having conceal'd from us the Dependence of *Subſtances* on each other, as much as he has done the Dependence of them all on Himſelf.

By conſidering this, we are prepar'd to anſwer that Objection, ſo much in the Mouth of our Adverſaries: Material *cannot obſtruct the Operations of* Immaterial *Subſtance*; *how then comes it to paſs, that our* Thoughts *depend ſo much upon the Temperament of our Bodies?* That the Soul, as other things Immaterial, can move and penetrate the Body, we grant; but that it ſhou'd, therefore, exert its Operations, without any Obſtruction from the Body, we ſee no Reaſon: For this is the ſame thing as to ſay, it *thinks*, without any Inſtrumental Aſſiſtance of the Body, which we do not ſuppoſe it does in this State; and if ſuch *determinate Corporeal Motions*, do neceſſarily precede, or accompany ſuch *determinate Thoughts*, no wonder there is a fit Diſpoſition requir'd, in thoſe Parts of the Body, in order to perform their own Motions. The Soul may very poſſibly have an Original Power in it ſelf to *think*, independently on all Matter; tho' many of the moſt conſiderable Ancient Philoſophers held a *Corporeal Vehicle*, neceſſary to the Operations of all *Created Spirits*; ſo far were they from eſteeming the *Union* of Soul and Body an Abſurdity: But be that as it has pleas'd God; we are ſure that our ſelves do not *Think*, as *Immaterial* Beings only; but as *Immaterial* Beings, *united* to a Part of the Material World: And therefore a Quality, which belongs only to one Part of our Nature, and cou'd never affect the other, ſeparately conſider'd, may affect our whole Nature; which is now become *One*, ſo far as it is conſtituted and compounded of them both.

And now I hope we have, without venturing beyond our Stretch, which wou'd have render'd our Endeavours ineffectual to this Purpoſe, remov'd this laſt Obſtacle in our Way to the Concluſion we aim at, which is this; That *Human Nature is, and muſt be conſtituted of an* Immaterial, *together with a* Material *Subſtance.*

SECT. XII.

Of the Immortal *Nature of the Soul, as a Conſequence of its* Immaterial *and* Subſtantial *Nature.*

THE *Immortality* of the Soul of Man, is a Subject that will admit of great Variety of Proof; but I ſhall confine my ſelf to that Argument, which has been the Subject of the preceding *Sections*; having deſign'd to keep, as cloſe as I cou'd, to this one Point; and being thus limited to one Argument, I muſt uſe the Word *Immortal* in a limited Senſe.

By the Soul's *Immortality* then, I do not underſtand, 1. A Future State of Rewards and Puniſhments, as the laſt Determination of Providence upon Mankind. For this is properly the *Immortality brought to Light by the Goſpel*; and what the glimmering Light of Nature diſcover'd of this State, was by Conſiderations remote, from the Argument in hand. Nor, 2. Do I underſtand here by *Immortality*, a State of Eternal Duration, in the ſame Individual Eſſence; which State depends, as well upon the Preſerving Power of the Creator, as, what we are now upon, the Nature of the Soul. But I underſtand *Immortality* in this Place, as oppos'd to, and excluſive of what we now call *Mortality*, by which our Bodies loſe their Individual Eſſence, and mix with the common Parent of Terreſtrial Bodies: Whereas we aſſert, That the Soul, whatever Change it undergoes by Death, with regard to the State and Condition of it, will continue the ſame *Individual Self-conſcious Suſtance*. And,

1. We may be ſure it does not undergo *Annihilation*, as all Corporeal Properties, which cannot ſhift and change their Subject, may be ſaid to undergo, when they leave the Body: But we have prov'd the Soul to be a *Subſtance*, and we find no Annihilation even of Corporeal *Subſtance*, by Death: And in this Senſe, both Soul and Body may be ſaid to be *Immortal*; as all *Firſt* Matter, or Matter in its *Generical Nature*, muſt be; in Oppoſition to the Power of Created Agents. But,

2. They differ in this, That the Soul, and not the Body, will ſubſiſt in its

Individual and *Specific* Nature; that it will continue after Death the *ſame*, tho' not properly an *Human Soul*: And this a very little Reflexion will make plain to us: For, whereas all Corruption, or Change of Identity in Bodies, muſt ariſe from *Diviſibility*, and that again from *Local Motion*; neither of theſe can fall upon an *Immaterial Subſtance*: Had it been capable of *Diviſibility*, it had been, according to our Argument, incapable of *Thought*; and it is equally incapable of *Local Motion*, as that is a Conſequent of Solidity: And therefore, in what Senſe ſoever it may be ſaid to Move, it can in no Senſe be ſaid to be Moved, or Thruſt out of its Place, by the Intervention of Bodies.

3. They farther differ in this, That the Soul only after the Diſſolution ſhall retain the Faculty of *Thought*: For if by being conſcious of this Faculty in our ſelves, and by perceiving it incompatible with Matter, we come to know thus much of the Nature of our Souls: Then this Faculty, as it does not belong to our Body, ſo neither can it be the Reſult of *Union* between our Body and Soul; however, it may be determin'd by that Union, and the Will of him that caus'd it, in the Manner of its Operation; becauſe it has its Foundation altogether in the Separate Nature of the

Soul. So that the Body may be call'd an Occaſion of the Soul's *Thinking*, after a Determinate Manner; but cannot in the leaſt contribute towards, or diminiſh from its Inherent and Original Faculty of *Thought*: Which we ſhall be farther aſſur'd of, by conſidering our Spontaneous Motion, as it is not only owing to our Souls, but is the ſole and proper Operation of them; the Parts of our Body being no more able to contribute any thing as an Efficient Cauſe towards their own Motion, than thoſe of any other Body in the Univerſe. Our Soul therefore cou'd not move the Body, now they are *united*, unleſs it had in it ſelf a Power to move Matter, antecedent to that *Union*; and this Power being not communicated as Bodies communicate Motion to each other, by a neceſſary Impulſe on the one Part, and Reſiſtance on the other; but by an Act of Volition, which is an Act of *Thinking*: It is a demonſtrative Argument that the Soul, after the departure out of this, is naturally capacitated to inform another *Vehicle*; or to be *reunited* to this, upon reſtoring thoſe Laws and Conditions in it, which being broken, cauſed the Diſſolution.

But here let us ſtop; for our Argument will carry us no farther: What ſhall become of our Souls in the next State, entirely depends upon the Appointment of him that plac'd them in *this*; and how far that Appointment has been made known to us, we do not propoſe to conſider in this Place; but have now carry'd our Enquiry as far as we aim'd, which was to follow the Soul in a State of *Numerical Exiſtence*, and *Self-conſciouſneſs*, beyond the Grave.

SECT. XIII.

That the Immaterial *and* Subſtantial *Nature of the Soul, is the beſt Foundation for the* Moral *and* Chriſtian Immortality *of it; together with a ſhort Account of the Conſiſtency of theſe Doctrins with Reaſon, and each other.*

I HAVE now finiſh'd, in as ſmall a compaſs as I cou'd, my principal Deſign, in this Eſſay; but it may not be improper to add to it, by way of Concluſion, ſomething concerning the Connexion between Reaſon and Religion in this Point; or, how far what has been ſaid, will be a good Foundation, whereon to build the *Moral*

Moral and *Chriſtian Immortality* of the Soul; and having attempted to carry the Argument ſo far, there I ſhall leave it.

1. As to the *Moral Immortality*, by which I mean that Expectation of a Future State of Rewards and Puniſhments in general, which many had from the Light of unaſſiſted Reaſon; this was doubtleſs rais'd upon an antecedent Belief of an *Immaterial* and *Subſtantial* Soul: And, accordingly, both *Plato* and *Ariſtotle*, and all the greateſt Philoſophers, who diſputed for the Reality of that State, diſputed for this Doctrin too, and went upon the Suppoſition of it.

Nor it it eaſy to imagin how they cou'd account for the former, without the latter; for ſeeing Life utterly extinct, and the Body turn'd to Duſt; and knowing nothing of the Reſurrection, and Revivification of it; they were oblig'd to aſſert a Surviving Part of Man, and not only that, but, in order to be puniſh'd or rewarded, a Part, moſt properly, Himſelf; which cou'd be no other Part but that, which had been the Seat of all his *Thoughts*, in which they knew the Morality of all his Actions conſiſted; and that muſt be an Immaterial Part of him; they not being able to conceive any Part of his Body, but what, by Death, loſt its Numerical Nature, and ceas'd to be the Part of a Man.

And as this Doctrin is highly agreeable to the Belief of thoſe, who upon other Conſiderations, expected a Future State of Retribution; ſo is it to the Chriſtian Faith; for this, making the *Reſurrection* to be *a Reunion of the Soul and Body*, and the Soul (which is the Seat of Life, when united to it) to have ſurviv'd in the Intermediate State; makes the *Immortality*, *brought to Light by the Goſpel*, clear and intelligible; whereas the Suppoſition that our Body *thinks* and *lives*, &c. makes the Intermediate State, a State of perfect *Annihilation*, Death making a full End of the Perſon; But I think this State of *Annihilation* is ſuch an *Hiatus*, in the Syſtem of the Creation, as cou'd never be left unfil'd-up by Him that made all Things in *Number*, *Weight*, and *Meaſure*; and whoſe Attributes of *Juſtice* and *Mercy*, as they have their *Proper Objects*, ſo it can never be ſuppos'd that *Omnipotence* will ſuffer them to loſe their *Due Objects*, in ſuch a Senſe, that they cannot be recover'd without a new Creation of the Perſon, (for as ſuch, he has undergone Annihilation) which I cannot poſſibly conceive to be the *ſame* Perſon; but another Perſon (as well as another Creation ſuperinduc'd) to ſuffer for the Crimes, or be rewarded for the Obedience of one that, by Death, eſcap'd Juſtice, or loſt his Title to Mercy.

So that an Heathen Philoſopher might admit the *Propoſition*, That *Matter Thinks*, with more Colour than the Chriſtian can; for he might, poſſibly, tho' not rationally, have ſuppos'd a Spirituous and Self-conſcious Part ſeparated by Death, from the groſſer Parts of the Body: But this is not conſonant to the Chriſtian Doctrin, which teaches us, That our Body, without exception of any Volatil Parts of it, ſhall lye in the Grave and Rottenneſs, until the *Laſt Day*; and, accordingly, terms it our *Mortal Body*; which, if it *thinks*, draws this Conſequence immediately after it, That Man is *wholly Mortal*: And if a Chriſtian cannot, as we have ſeen he cannot conſiſtently, admit of *this*, neither can he of *the other*.

And yet it muſt not be deny'd, That ſome of the Fathers of the Chriſtian Church, held our Souls to be *Material*, and of themſelves corruptible, but made Immortal by the Will of GOD; but neither were there any Number that held this, nor is their Error chargeable, as it is in ſome Moderns; for ſtill they all of them held the Immortality of the Soul, and the Reſurrection of the Body, as two diſtinct Articles: For which Reaſon, a late Adverſary to Chriſtianity wou'd ſeem to throw all his

Second Thoughts, Ep. Ded. &c.

Dirt upon them, doubtleſs foreſeeing where ſome of it will light.

This therefore is an Argument of great Moment, and ſhou'd have been well conſider'd by all the Patrons and Abettors of that Principle, *the Poſſibility of thinking Matter*: But yet I ſhall not urge it farther here, becauſe I ſhall have Occaſion to ſay what I can, in Vindication of Man's *Immortality* in another Part.

This is ſufficient to ſhew with what Reaſon we contend, as Chriſtians, ſo earneſtly for an *Immaterial Subſtance* united to our Body; as alſo how firm and ſolid a Foundation the Belief of this lays, for the Belief of a Future State, as it ſtands reveal'd to us in the Goſpel. But I cannot diſmiſs my Subject, without officiouſly beſpeaking the Reader's farther Conſideration, of what the Light of Reaſon ſuggeſts to him, in Proof of the *Moral*, and in Confirmation of the *Chriſtian Immortality*. And I ſhall only offer ſuch Hints as may deſerve, and will need his own Thoughts upon them.

As to the Belief of *A Future State of Retribution in General*, I ſuppoſe him (that I may not go too far out of my Way) to believe both a GOD, and the Relation he ſtands in to Him, as his Creator and Preſerver: Let him then reflect and conſider, 1. Whether he is not conſcious to himſelf, that he is a *Free-Agent*; and withal, Whether this Internal and Self-conſciouſneſs, is not an Invincible Proof of the Thing; tho' he may not be able to reconcile it with more remote, and obſcure Conſiderations, to prove him determin'd *ab Extra*. 2. He may reflect alſo, That he is a *Moral Agent*; that is, a Being endu'd with the Knowledge of Good and Evil, as they are immutably and eternally ſo; and that, he having a Power to act according to the Meaſures either of Good or Evil, his Actions, relating to thoſe Meaſures, receive the Denomination of being *Morally Good* or *Evil*. 3. He will find himſelf, in Conſequence of this, an *Accountable Agent*; being not only, in common with all Creatures, under the Preſerving Power of the Creator; but having a Rule of Action, deriv'd from the very Nature of God, who is Eſſential Righteouſneſs; and laſtly, having a Natural Power of Conformity or Diſobedience to that Rule; from whence it is that, upon his doing Evil, *Sin lies at his Door*, and Guilt naturally cleaves to him. And indeed, had not the Creator deſign'd that the Happineſs or Miſery of Human Nature, ſhou'd have a Retroſpect upon our Actions, and depend, in great Meaſure, on the Quality of them, there cou'd be no Account given of the Reflexion of our Conſcience, as being an Effect of Reaſon ſo natural to us, that very few Men can quite rid themſelves of it, by the moſt Unnatural Force. 4. I propoſe it to his Conſideration, Whether it is not highly Reaſonable to ſuppoſe, that a Creature, thus naturally Accountable, ſhall be *Actually call'd to an Account*, by his Omnipotent, and All-wiſe Governour; and whether he will not ſo Account with him, that every Accountable Action from his Creation, ſhall have its due Influence on his State and Condition. If we cannot ſuppoſe this, we muſt ſuppoſe that Omniſcient Wiſdom and Power has made Man, quite otherwiſe, in the very Frame and Conſtitution of his Nature, than God intends to deal with him. 5. And laſtly, let him then look abroad into his whole *Kind*, or but *in Se deſcendere*, and conſider whether Mankind, is in the general, accounted with in this State; or whether the Happineſs or Miſery incident to him here, appears to his Reaſon like the Sentence of *The Searcher of Hearts.* I dare ſay no Man that conſiders well the Courſe of Things amongſt Men, and at the ſame time believes a watchful and impartial Providence over them, can believe that ever any Man receiv'd from the Hands of Providence, his *laſt* Retribution in this Life: For, whatever Connexion may be found between that Good or Evil which is *Moral*, and that which is *Natural*; which doubtleſs is much greater than what is obvious to ordinary Obſervation; yet if the Chain is broken in any one Link, and there is the leaſt Deviation, in any the leaſt Inſtance, from the Eternal Rule of Juſtice; then, to him that believes a God, and has right Apprehenſions of his Nature, this brings a Neceſſity of inferring *A Future State of Retribution*, to that Perſon who has not had it in this; and (ſince it falls out ſo, in many Inſtances, with every Man) to all Mankind.

I ſee nothing in theſe Particulars but what might have been, nay and what has been diſcover'd by the Light of Nature only; which ſometimes puts me to a Stand for a Reaſon, why this State was not ſo univerſally believ'd, or poſitively aſſerted, by thoſe of the Heathens, that held the Being of a GOD, and had bright Notions of Morality: And I know no Reaſon for it but this; That, whereas this Argument depends upon an Antecedent Knowledge, firſt of the Divine Nature, next of our own, and laſtly of the Chief Happineſs belonging to our Nature; Religion, as generally taught amongſt them, was overrun with Errors and Miſapprehenſions, in all theſe Reſpects. And it muſt be confeſs'd, that the Notions of a lazy or licentious Deity, an haughty and ſelf-ſufficient Virtue, or of an imaginary and chymerical Happineſs, where entertain'd, will effectually deſtroy the Belief of a Future State. But as to the Modern Diſciples of Natural Religion, who ſeldom venture to maintain any of theſe Abſurdities of their Predeceſſors, how many ſoever they advance of their own; I never expect to hear from them, the true Reaſon why they reject, as many of them do, the Doctrin of a *Future State of Retribution.*

Next we are to enquire, Whether Reaſon will afford us any thing, in Confirmation of the *Chriſtian Immortality* of the *Soul*; that is, how far it is agreeable to Reaſon ſince diſcover'd, tho' it cou'd never have been diſcover'd by Reaſon.

As to the *Nature* of the Happineſs or Miſery belonging to that State, I only make this general Remark upon it: That, as we find all that is Morally Good or Evil in us, while in this State of *Probation*, to conſiſt in a Conformity, or Averſation to the Divine Nature, and Life; ſo it is highly reaſonable to ſuppoſe that, what can be naturally good or evil to us in the State of *Retribution*, conſiſts, as to the Foundation of it, in perfectly enjoying, or utterly abandoning of God; which, if there were no other, is a ſufficient Account of *Heaven* and *Hell.*

But beſides this, there are two other things conſiderable in the *Chriſtian Immortality*; they are, *Our Entrance upon it*, and *Our Continuance in it.*

1. The Scripture-account of our *Entrance on that State* makes it wholly Miraculous, and ſo *above Reaſon*; but yet with an apparent Tendency, *in Reaſon*, to promote the chief Deſign, and ſerve the beſt Purpoſes of *this Immortality.* It begins, we are told, with a *Reſurrection of our Bodies*, in order, [ſay we] to be *reunited to our Souls:* And, if we conſider what Connexion the Goſpel has made between the two States; (it has made this a Probation for the other, and that the Conſummation of our Labour in this; in ſo much, that they are expreſs'd by one and the ſame Phraſe, *The Kingdom of God*) nothing can be more agreeable to this Connexion of Two Worlds, than that the Inhabitant of both, (*of a Reaſonable Soul, and Human Fleſh ſubſiſting*) ſhou'd be remov'd the ſame *entire Perſon*, from one, to the other.

S. Mark, *c.* 1. *v.* 15. *compar'd with* 2 Theſ. *c.* 1. *v.* 5.

Had Men always gone out of the World by a *Tranſlation*; tho' it had not been known whither, nor to what Purpoſe they went; there had been no Objection left to the Arguments that Reaſon offer'd the Heathens, for the Reality of a Future State; which therefore, had the Caſe been ſo, wou'd have gain'd a much more general Belief than we find it did amongſt them: Whereas, to us, the Breach that Death makes upon our Nature, is perfectly heal'd, by our Reſurrection and Revivification: So that Chriſtianity comes to confirm, and heighten our Rational Expectation of that State; which therefore does, reciprocally, confirm the Chriſtian Doctrin concerning it.

We are told indeed, that *Fleſh and Blood* (ſuch as it is now) *cannot inherit the Kingdom of God*; but we underſtand, from the Tenor of the Promiſe, in that and other Places, That, however our Bodies will be *glorify'd*, to become capable of *Celeſtial Glory*; they ſhall not be ſo far chang'd as to loſe their *Identity*, but our Souls ſhall have the ſame, tho' refin'd Vehicles or Inſtruments of Thought and Senſation: Not that the Body, which of it ſelf is no *Agent*, can be dealt with as a *Free Agent*; but that the Soul, having been, by Union with it, determin'd and modify'd in its own Operations, is moſt capable of an

1 *Ep.* Cor. *c.* 15. *v.* 50.

Exact Retribution, when plac'd, as near as poſſible, *in Statu quo:* For, poſſibly, we cannot conceive how widely different an *Unbodied Spirit*, if any ſuch were created, muſt be, in its Faculties and Operations, from a *Spirit Incorporate.* However, we cannot well conceive it endu'd with Memory and Recollection, ſuch as extends to a Former State; (for Memory is not ſolvable, either by Corporeal Impreſſions only, or without theſe, but is a proper Reſult of the *Union*) and yet it is very agreeable to Reaſon that a Moral Agent, under the Senſe of Happineſs or Miſery, ſhou'd be conſcious of thoſe Facts, at leaſt in general, upon which the Preſent Condition of it depends: And, accordingly, we find *Dives* bid to *Remember* (as an Addition to his Puniſhment, as well as a Vindication of the Sentence) *that in his life time he had received his good things, and likewiſe Lazarus evil things*; which we cannot diſpute but that *Lazarus* alſo, to his *greater comfort in Abraham's boſom*, cou'd remember himſelf. *St.*Luke,*c.*16. *v.*25.

But the *Reunion* will ſtill appear more reaſonable, if we reflect that, How far ſo ever the Rewards of Virtue may tranſcend the Pleaſures of Senſe, (ſuch Souls being capable of much higher Pleaſures; and this is a good Reaſon for the Promiſe and Appointment of their Celeſtial Body) yet it is a Piece of Natural Juſtice, that Corporeal Pleaſures in Exceſs, ſhou'd be rewarded with Corporeal Pain; that the ſame Inſtruments Men us'd in their Crimes, ſhou'd become the Inſtruments of their Puniſhment; and that, in which they vitiouſly delighted, be made the Efficient Cauſe of their Grief and Miſery.

Laſtly, it is no inſignificant Reaſon, in Confirmation of this Doctrin, that it is moſt admirably fitted to ſerve the Purpoſe of God, in the Revelation of it; for by this the Promiſes and Threatnings of the Goſpel are render'd as effectual, as by any Motives they can be; the Completion of them being made perfectly intelligible, and moſt ſenſibly affecting to every Capacity. Thus is the Doctrin of a Reſurrection of our Bodies, and Reunion of Body and Soul, highly agreeable to the Natural Notions and Apprehenſions we have of a Future State.

Upon the Reſurrection follows, in the Chriſtian Account, *A General Judgment, and Sentence on Mankind*; which is a Doctrin that eſtabliſhes and improves, to the higheſt Degree, that Natural Notion, upon which is founded our Expectation of a Future State; *viz.* Of the Impartial Juſtice and Equity of Providence. If the General Suppoſition of this State, will account for the ſeeming Irregularities in the Preſent: It muſt be more ſatisfactory to have an Aſſurance from himſelf, that *The Judge of all the Earth will do Right*; and not only ſo, but that Heaven and Earth ſhall be made ſenſible of, and bear Teſtimony to *His doing Right*. The Beauty of Providence muſt then appear in its Native Luſtre, when the Laſt Determination of it, ſhall be given in the Face of the World; when there will be no more Room for Faith, as there will be no farther Uſe of it; when all the Anxious Scruples that have exercis'd Good Men, and all Vain Hopes that have deluded the Wicked, ſhall be blown off at once, and every individual Perſon ſhall carry with him, into his Unchangeable State, (as a Proper Ingredient either of his Happineſs or Miſery there) a full Conviction, and a juſt Senſe of an Unerring and Impartial Juſtice and Righteouſneſs, extended to every proper Object of the Divine Providence. And thus we find the Firſt Thing conſiderable in the Chriſtian Immortality is clearly accountable to our Reaſon, and falls in exactly with our Natural Notions of a GOD, a Providence, and a Future State.

2. The other Thing we are to conſider, is *our Continuance* in that State; which, we are told, will be to all Eternity.

That it is reaſonable to ſuppoſe a Creature made capable of Eternal Duration, by the Frame and Conſtitution of its Nature, as is the Human Soul, ſhou'd be dealt with accordingly, and enjoy the preſerving Power of the Creator for ever, in its individual Subſiſtency; will I preſume be eaſily granted me, by thoſe that believe *Nature*, or rather, *the God of Nature never did any thing in vain*; nor, therefore gave a *Capacity*, but what he will *fill*.

But that which is moſt conſiderable here, and peculiar to the Chriſtian Immortality, is the Great Deſign of our Creator to make all Mankind *eternally happy*; of which none ſhall fall ſhort, but thoſe who have obſtinately incapacitated themſelves for the Enjoyment of it. How far this is agreeable to our *Reaſon*, as well as our *Intereſt*, will appear when we have conſider'd,

1. *What is the Proper and Adequate Happineſs of Human Nature.*

2. *What Ground of Reaſon we have to hope for this Happineſs.*

I. In order to determin, what is *the Proper and Adequate Happineſs of Human Nature*; we muſt conſider, 1. What *Faculty* of it is to be gratify'd; and,

2. What *Gratification* that Faculty requires.

I. The *Faculty* to be gratify'd, when we ſpeak of *the Proper and Adequate Happineſs of our Nature*, is doubtleſs the higheſt and moſt excellent *Faculty*, whatever that be, belonging to it. For I conſider that our *Faculties* riſe proportionably, and as they riſe, are enlarg'd for the Reception of Happineſs, ſomewhat like, tho' much beyond what is call'd *Geometrical Progreſſion increas'd*; as 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, *&c.* in which the laſt Number exceeds all the reſt put together, ſo that we may ſuppoſe all the reſt gratify'd to the laſt Degree; yet if we ſuppoſe the Higheſt left with a craving Emptineſs, we may pronounce the Creature miſerable in the main: It remains then, that we point out that which is the *higheſt and moſt excellent Faculty* of Human Nature; and it is, very obviouſly, the *Rational Faculty*; not only as the Seat and Center of all Human Happineſs is *Thought* and *Reaſon*, ſtill, even when miſapply'd; but as it is the *Supreme Faculty*, and that which plac'd us in the Rank of Beings which we poſſeſs. Thus ſuppoſing, tho' not approving the uſual Diviſion of *Life*, into *Vigetative*, *Senſitive* and *Rational*; if a Brute is in all the Perfection of *Vigetation*, but has loſt his *Senſe*, or is affected with *Senſible*

Senſible Pain; he wants the proper *Good* of his Nature, and is as far miſerable, as the *Evil* of it can make him: And thus again, if a Man has both *Vigetation*, as his Body requires it, and a whole Life of the moſt exquiſite *ſenſible* Happineſs; yet if his *Reaſon* is left ungratify'd; that is, unſatisfy'd with the Senſe of his Preſent Condition, or the Proſpect of his Future; in him, it muſt be own'd the *Brute* is happy, but the *Man is miſerable*; and therefore, the Creature is miſerable in the main.

From hence I confeſs it follows, That a Man is really happy, while he thinks himſelf ſo, tho' in the Condition which a ſound Judgment wou'd eſteem and feel to be miſerable: But notwithſtanding this, we have reaſon to pronounce him miſerable in it, becauſe we have reaſon to believe he will be finally of another Judgment, and for ever condemn himſelf, or ſo long at leaſt as to out-balance his ſhort-liv'd Self-applauſe. To which we may add, That he cannot, however, be ſo happy as that Man, who has form'd his Judgment of Happineſs upon more Rational Grounds; for he has the *higheſt Faculty*, gratify'd in an *higher Degree*, which makes his Happineſs more compleat; and in this, as I conceive, conſiſts all Moral Good or Evil, as it regards the Condition of Human Nature,

Nature. Underſtanding now what *Faculty* is to be gratify'd by the Adequate Happineſs of Human Nature, we are to conſider,

2. What *Gratification* that Faculty requires. And this Conſideration might lead us to inquire into the *Nature* and *Kind*, of the Adequate Happineſs of Man: Which Enquiry wou'd ſoon be at an End, when we conſider'd that every Faculty is beſt *gratify'd* with thoſe Pleaſures and Satisfactions which are naturally moſt agreeable to it; and, therefore, that the Rational Faculty can properly be ſaid to receive no *Gratification*, but what will ſtand the ſevereſt Teſt of unbiaſs'd Reaſon; ſo that he who makes his *Inclination* only, the *Reaſon* of his Actions, is ſo far an *Irrational* Agent. And this one Notion, if cloſely follow'd, wou'd be of no ſmall Uſe, to diſcover *the Proper and Adequate Happineſs of Human Nature*, thro' all the Variety of Objects, in which we aim at it; as alſo to give us ſome Light into our more perfect Happineſs in Reverſion.

But we are at preſent only conſidering the *Duration* of our Happineſs in that State, with regard to which I aſſert that, Whereinſoever *the Adequate Happineſs of Man* conſiſts, it cannot be ſo call'd, without the Addition of *Eternal Duration*. And to make this Aſſertion Good, I deſire but Two Things to be granted me, for the Conceſſion of which, I need not be oblig'd to any Man: The Firſt is, That we are conſcious of a Capacity in our Nature to enjoy an Happineſs without End: The Second, That our Nature craves, and our Reaſon aſpires after, all the Happineſs we are capable of Enjoying: And from theſe Two it is as eaſy, as it is a juſt Conſequence, That we cannot be *Compleatly*, without being *Eternally* Happy.

Suppoſe there were as much Happineſs in this Life, as we Chriſtians ſay there might have been, but Death were ſtill our Fate; Wou'd not this one Abatement of it, draw a diſmal Veil over the whole Scene? Wou'd not Reaſon proclaim our want of the Crown and Conſummation of Happineſs? Which concluding, at what Diſtance ſoever, wou'd upbraid our Reaſon in the Fruition of it; and cauſe the Fear of Death to increaſe, in Proportion with the Happineſs of Life.

If it be objected, We ſhou'd then never be compleatly happy, ſince our Happineſs muſt, with our Being, be ſucceſſive; and therefore can never be properly *eternal*. I own the Conſequence as to This Life, (and that I think is no weak Preſumption for another;) but, as to the Future Life, tho'

God only, in the ſtricteſt Senſe, *inhabiteth Eternity*; yet our Happineſs ſhall be commenſurate to our Capacity, and then we are compleatly happy; which we cannot be without an infallible Aſſurance, that our Condition is *unchangeable*, as that it is *happy*. This is the *laſt* Effort of the Rational Nature, which can never be at perfect Reſt, or fix the whole Weight of its Deſires and Propenſions, but on an *Eternal Good*.

We now underſtand, in ſome Meaſure, what is the *Proper and Adequate Happineſs of Human Nature*, by being directed to the right Faculty, and the proper Gratification of it. We are to inquire, in order to be convinc'd that the Chriſtian Immortality is agreeable to Reaſon.

II. What Ground of Reaſon we have to hope for the Attainment of this Happineſs. And here again I ſuppoſe, as I have done all along, our Belief of a God; and I am ſure it follows from the true Belief of him, that he is our moſt Powerful, Wiſe, and Beneficent Creator; who, conſider'd only as our Creator, will place us in no State, but for our Advantage; and who is diſpos'd to impart to us, finally, all the Good he has made us capable of receiving, and that muſt be of *Eternal Duration*.

Without this Proſpect, it is certain the *Span* of our Lives here, wou'd be ſo far from affording us all the Good we want, that it cou'd not properly be ſaid to afford us any, when balanc'd, as it muſt be, with the Evil brought along with it. And as for a Future State with a full End to it, tho' Men are very inclinable to take up with a preſent Enjoyment in this State, (as an Effect of an Impair'd Underſtanding, to the Eyes of which, the Truth of Things leſſens by *Diſtance of Time,* as other Objects do to their bodily Eyes, by *Diſtance of Place*) yet in that other State we muſt ſuppoſe their Proſpect will inlarge with their Faculties; and as they will be ſenſible of more exquiſite Happineſs, ſo they muſt be more exquiſitely ſenſible of their Loſs in the Concluſion of it; which wou'd not only impair, but, I am apt to think, deſtroy the Happineſs of Heaven it ſelf.

To conclude this Argument, that Eternal Happineſs is deſign'd for us, we find an Aſſurance, beſides that of God's own Word, built upon the Contemplation of his own Nature and Attributes, which is, to me, the moſt convincing of all our Reaſoning; for if he has given us any certain Knowledge, by duly employing our Faculty of Reaſon, ſurely he has not deceiv'd us in (that which, as it is of the higheſt Importance, ſo a Failure in it wou'd prove the moſt egregious Deceit) the Knowldge of Himſelf. So juſt and convincing to Gentile as well as Jew, is the Argument urg'd, by our Bleſſed Redeemer, (underſtanding it with a particular Regard to the *Life and Immortality* which He *brought to Light*) *Ye believe in God, believe alſo in Me.*

As to *Eternal Death* or *Miſery*, which we alſo find threatned in the Goſpel, it muſt be own'd, That there have been hot Diſputes about That, and great and good Men engag'd on both Sides, and alſo that the Controverſy has turn'd upon the ſame Principle we make Uſe of in the Argument of *Eternal Happineſs*, viz. *The Divine Nature and Attributes*; with which one Party contends that *Eternal Miſery* (in the ſtrict and Scholaſtic Senſe of the Word *Eternal*, which the other holds to be Scripture-Doctrin) is utterly inconſtent.

But we are not concern'd here to enter on the Retail of this Diſpute. Both Sides take for granted, and urge as their own Principle, the Juſtice, and Righteouſneſs of the Divine Nature; and both, in conſequence, muſt own that no Man ſhall be more miſerable in Another State, than he has render'd himſelf, by his Demeanure, in This: For this is the Character of God, ingraven on our Souls by Himſelf; and ſtill more legible in the Revelation he has vouchſaf'd us, the whole Deſign of which, falls in with that Expreſſion of the Prophet, deliver'd with the higheſt Aſſeveration, and in the moſt Pathetic Manner; *As I live, ſaith the Lord God, I have no pleaſure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live; turn ye, turn ye from your evil ways: for why will ye dye, O houſe of Iſrael?* With ſuch Tenderneſs and Solicitude, does he endeavour to remove from the Minds of Men, thoſe Fatal Miſapprehenſions, which repreſent him only in the *Act*, and not the *Deſign* of his Creation; and which render himſelf *Implacable*, or his Government *Arbitrary*.

Ezek. c. 23. v. 11.

The Queſtion then coming to this, Whether a State of Final Impenitence here, ſhall juſtly expoſe the Sinner to Eternal Miſery? (Which, by the way, I take to be a Queſtion that Natural Reaſon cou'd never have determin'd on either Side; and therefore no Reaſon from the Nature of the Thing, ought to be of weight in Oppoſition to the Scripture-Determination, if that is once clear and poſitive) we are no farther oblig'd to anſwer it in this Place, than to ſay, That the Divine Mercy will be extended as far as is poſſible; which is, to all Capable Objects: And that all thoſe who ſhall, upon Tryal be found to be Objects of Juſtice only, and not of Mercy, cannot be reach'd by it; but have deſtroy'd themſelves, even while they were daily forewarn'd of their Danger and Deſtruction; with this Merciful Intention in God, that they ſhou'd *Work out their Salvation, with Fear and Trembling.*

All which is a Demonſtration, to thoſe that believe the Scripture, of the Falſhood of Two very Dangerous Poſitions: 1. That GOD devotes any Man, or Part of Mankind, to Deſtruction, for the meer Completion of his own Will, or the Exerciſe of his Unbounded Power: 2. That he ſuffers any Sinner, for want of neceſſary Precaution and Aſſiſtance, to run headlong into his Deſtruction. Both which Tenents are not only attended with this intolerable Conſequence, That they deface the true, and moſt amiable Character of *Reveal'd Religion*; but they ſtrike at the Foundation of all *Natural Religion*, while they render the *Chriſtian Immortality* diſagreeable, nay abominable to our beſt Apprehenſions of GOD, our Selves, and the Relation we ſtand in to Him.

But I think the Hints already given, are ſufficient to convince a ſincere Inquirer, That the Chriſtian Revelation of a Future

State, however miſunderſtood by Weak and Prejudic'd Minds, is in its ſelf highly becoming, and worthy of the Character and Authority it bears with all Believers. And this ſhews us the perfect Harmony of Reaſon and Religion, ſo far as we are capable of carrying on the Compariſon; and to demand farther Satisfaction, is to anticipate our Expectations of what ſhall be reveal'd to us there, and is indeed an unprofitable piece of Preſumption.

Here therefore I ſhall, as I promis'd, leave the Argument; having follow'd, as cloſely as I cou'd, and without multiplying Topicks, that Train of Thoughts which induc'd me to believe,

1. That Human Nature is a *Conſtitution*, ariſing from the *Union* of a *Spiritual*, with a *Material Subſtance*.

2. That this *Spiritual Subſtance* muſt remain *numerically* the ſame, notwithſtanding the Diſſolution; which, in the Courſe of Nature, deſtroys the *Numerical Eſſence* of the *Body*.

3. That at the End of This, our Human Soul enters upon a *New State* of *Activity* and *Vital Perception*.

4. That it is moſt agreeable to Reaſon, and our beſt Notions of a Deity, that this Succeeding State ſhall have regard to the Preſent; and be our Conſummate Happineſs

or Miſery; eſpecially as it ſtands reveal'd to us, in the Goſpel of our Bleſſed Redeemer.

If what I have ſaid, upon each of theſe Propoſitions, amounts to Proof; I ſhall not think it any great Omiſſion, that I have paſs'd by ſeveral other Concluſive Arguments: All that I aim at is, to gain my Point with an impartial and competent Judge; and, in order to that, having advanc'd my Plea by the beſt Arguments I was furniſh'd with; I think it Deference to the Judgment of thoſe I appeal to, and no Prejudice to my Cauſe, here to ſubmit it.

But poſſibly it may be expected I ſhou'd now turn my ſelf to anſwer the Objections, and obviate the Cavils of my Adverſaries; and this I muſt confeſs opens a large Field of Controverſy, ſtill to be beaten over. For this Doctrin of Human Soul has had, and now has I find, more Enemies than any one Principle of Philoſophy or Religion. The *Atheiſtic Tribe*, tho' differing with it ſelf in many Particulars, is intirely engag'd with its utmoſt Force againſt us in this Point: And theſe, tho' inconſiderable in themſelves, become more formidable when joyn'd by a very large Body of the *Deiſts*; who, admitting a God, but not his Judgments, are but too nearly concern'd to ſubvert, if poſſible, the true Foundation of Rewards, and Puniſhments: And theſe again are reinforc'd by all that labour under the Prejudice of a *Senſual Credulity*, who are no contemptible Number. And, beſides all theſe, I cannot look upon them otherwiſe, than as Enemies to the Cauſe; who, (with what Intention, I will not preſume to determin) give it up as indefenſable by all the Succors that Reaſon can poſſibly afford. And laſtly, they wou'd be eſteem'd conſiderable Enemies to it, who begin to Fight under Chriſtian Colours, and endeavour to turn our beſt Weapons upon our ſelves; ſo that we are attach'd on all Sides, and no hopeful Method againſt us is left unattempted.

Some of theſe Objectors have been examin'd in the Courſe of this Argument; and as for the reſt, they are all put together (as well as the Skill of the Compiler wou'd ſuffer) by the chief Patron of the laſt Sort of Adverſaries; and therefore, tho' we may not have much reaſon to be diſmay'd with the Appearance of this Champion; no not when he pretends to come to us, *In the Name of the Lord of Hoſts:* Yet if we are ſo happy as to repell thoſe Forces he has been pleas'd to put himſelf at the Head of, (for they are almoſt at any Man's Command) we may preſume to have done Execution. But to do this effectually, wou'd make a very unnatural Excreſcence in this; on which Account, I have reſerv'd it for an entire Diſcourſe.

But that this may not appear ſo very imperfect, for want of ſomething of that Nature, I only add, That there is this double Advantage, ariſing from a Thing once ſubſtantially prov'd. 1. That when well examin'd and apply'd, a Maſter of the Proof will find himſelf ready furniſh'd with an appoſite Anſwer to moſt Objections that can be fairly level'd againſt him. 2. That it will command the Continuance of his Aſſent, notwithſtanding ſome Objections, which may be really to him inſuperable; eſpecially in that Caſe, where a *Difficulty of Conception*, is miſtaken for a *Direct Objection.* Which is the Caſe of moſt Arguments on the wrong Side of the Queſtion; for it is egregiouſly abſurd, for a Man to with-hold his Aſſent from what he does apprehend, for the ſake of what he does not apprehend; the former is all he has to depend upon, for his Knowledge and his Happineſs too; and it is undoubtedly what he may depend upon, That whatever is True, is, to a competent Underſtanding, moſt *evidently* and *unqueſtionably* ſo: And therefore he reſolves the latter into his own

Inability of Apprehenſion, not into any real *Want of Evidence in the Subject*; and, ſo long as he finds himſelf groping in the Dark, in his beſt Reſearches; he reſts ſatisfy'd, as becomes him, where-ever he can lay hold of it, with the *preponderating* Evidence.

THE END.

PSYCHOLOGIA:

PART II.

BEING A

VINDICATION

OF

The receiv'd and eſtabiſh'd Doctrin concerning

Human Soul,

That it is of an *Immaterial* and *Subſtantial* Nature;

AGAINST

A Late Book, call'd

Second Thoughts, &c.

WHEREIN

All the Author's Pretended Demonſtrations to the contrary, as well *Philoſophical* and *Rational*, as *Scriptural*, are fully refuted; together with Occaſional Remarks on his Way of Reaſoning. To which is annex'd, a brief Confutation of his whole *Hypotheſis*.

It is an aſſured Truth, and a Concluſion of Experience, That a little or ſuperficial Knowledge of Philoſophy *may incline the Mind of Man to* Atheiſm; *but a farther proceeding therein, doth bring the Mind back again to* Religion. *Lord* Bacon, Adv. of Learning, *Book* 1.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

Human Soul

[illegible]

A VINDICATION Of the Nature of HUMAN SOUL: AGAINST A Book call'd *Second Thoughts*, &c.

CHAP. I.

Obſervations on his two firſt Chapters; the one, concerning the Prejudices of Education in Matters of Religion; *the other, of the* True Grounds and Foundation of Belief.

A Large Porch becomes only a proportionable Building, and a long *Apparatus* a great Work. Our Author therefore, having threaten'd us with *Demonſtration* in the Title-Page, and happily begun it in the Epiſtle Dedicatory; (in which New Method, he ſeems to have appropriated to himſelf the Character of *Juvenal*, Sat. 1.

Scriptus & in tergo, nec dum finitus Oreſtes.)

After this we have a very ſolemn and pompous Introduction, of above Fifty Pages; and divided into Two Chapters, both which may I think, be call'd Introductory; unleſs either *Prejudice of Education*, or the *Grounds of Belief*, are immediately concern'd in the Diſpute about Human Soul; which they being not, in my humble Conception, I have not honour'd my Obſervations upon them with the Title of Two diſtinct Chapters.

The firſt thing he conceives neceſſary to be done, before he treats of *Human Soul*, is to remove *Innate Prejudice*; that is, *Pag.* 1. as he explains, or rather confounds *Pag.* 2. himſelf, *Prejudice contracted by Education*, from a *Parent*, *Tutor* or *Maſter*, nay perhaps a *Nurſe*. Now I, (who am reſolv'd to grant him all I can, apprehending I cannot grant him much) do declare that one quarter of what he has Learnedly urged upon this Head, wou'd have convinc'd me, that the removing of *Prejudice* againſt a Deſign, is often the more difficult Part of the Undertaking; and I farther acknowledge, That an Introduction of this Nature, fits his

Deſign very well; there being no contemptible Part of Mankind, beſides the Old Fathers, ſtrongly prejudic'd againſt his Opinion; and, had it been penn'd with more exactneſs, wou'd have ſerv'd as a General Introduction to all the Learned Works of *Spinoza*, *Hobbs*, *Blount*, *Le Clerc*, *L--k*, and *Toland*.

Prejudice, or the General Senſe of Mankind, is a ſort of Rubbiſh, which ſuch Architects muſt remove, before they can build altogether upon their own Foundation; our Author therefore has begun at the right End, and 'tis Pity he cou'd not make clean Work of it.

He ſets down Two Principal Cauſes of Prejudice: 1. *The ſtrong Impreſſions of Education*: 2. *The Opinion every Man covets to be eſteem'd Wiſe*, &c. As to the Firſt, I think no Man will have the Face to deny, that the *ſtrong Impreſſions, made by Education*, cauſe the *Prejudice contracted by Education*; for that is what was to be accounted for in this Chapter. *Pag.* 3.

But the Second is not ſo very evident, much leſs is it *Identically* evident; for I find the *Opinion Men covet of being Wiſe*, no Friend to the Principles of their Education; but on the contrary inclines them to By-Paths, purely becauſe *Pag.* 10.

becauſe the Road is beaten; and gives them a *Prejudice* to many Opinions, for no other Reaſon, but becauſe they were not firſt their *own.* It's true an Opinion, eſpecially an extravagant Opinion of a Man's own Wiſdom, is apt to make him ſtiff and tenacious in all his other Opinions, and ſometimes Proof againſt Demonſtration: But theſe are not the Opinions imbib'd during his Infancy and Education; or however are not conſider'd by him as ſuch, but as the Work of his mature and deliberate Reaſoning, as the Effects of his extraordinary Skill and Judgment; and in ſhort, as his *Second Thoughts.* So that all the Pains beſtow'd upon this Topic, are not only to no Purpoſe, but to what the Laborer muſt judge, a very bad one. For this Conſideration wou'd be apt to make a ſingular Man in his Opinions, reflect, Whether his great Strength has really carry'd him beyond the reſt of Mankind; or his greater Weakneſs bewilder'd him.

Having laid down theſe Two Cauſes of *the Prejudice of Education*, he proceeds to apply them to Matters of Religion. *Pag.* 15. But ſure he cannot imagin theſe are the only Cauſes of *Religious Prejudice* in Mankind, that is, of all their Miſapprehenſions and Errors in Religion: If he does, I am content to inform him of

Two others, which he may uſe as he thinks proper; and they are, *Luſt* and *Pride.*

As for *Luſt*, or a Depravity in Morals, that is not always owing to a Bad Education, but ſometimes to a Temper that will abuſe the Beſt: And need I tell him, This is one Cauſe of the Prejudices Men entertain in Matters of Religion? Poſſibly it did not eſcape Obſervation, but was let ſlip in Point of Prudence. I don't ſay our Doctor preſcribes only to thoſe that have taken the *Preparatory Doſe*; but he muſt give me leave to reckon amongſt the Number of thoſe that *think they have no Souls*, thoſe that think they have *none to be ſav'd*: Such Men, I'm confident, will not diſown their Obligations to him: They have ſometimes perhaps, in a Melancholy Mood, lookt upon themſelves as Criminals under Sentence, and not knowing how ſoon they may Suffer; and therefore he can at no time be an unacceptable Meſſenger, that brings them ſo long a Reprieve, tho' it be not *Sine Die*; for who knows, but the next kind Friend may come fraught with a full Pardon. I muſt confeſs, the Spreading of ſome Opinions of late wou'd be very unaccountable, if it were not obſerv'd what had ſpread it ſelf before, to make Way for them.

I make bold to add to our Author's Reaſons of *Religious Prejudice*, another, and that is *Pride*, when it ſwells the Underſtanding beyond its Natural Stretch. Repeated Offers of Relief, under their naked and deplorable Condition, are Affronts to Men of this Complexion: If theſe are the *old*, they have Senſe and Skill enough to coyn *new* Articles of Religion, to ſhew you that their Knowledge actually reaches to Heaven; as well as others have done New Doctrins of Practice, that they might the more eaſily get thither.

If he will accept of this Supplement, I will freely own, That Prejudice has a very bad Senſe, even as bad as that which he puts upon it, in the Inſtance of the Martyrdom of King *Charles* the Firſt. I cannot tell whether King-killing was Taught, at that Time o'Day, by *Fathers*, *Tutors*, and *Nurſes*; but this I am confident of, That *the Deſire of being thought wiſe*, wou'd have put no Man upon that Execrable Attempt; unleſs Worldly Wiſdom is included in our Author's Notion of Wiſdom. But poſſibly this Inſtance was pickt out to compliment his *Patrons*, to whom he Dedicates, the Clergy of the Church of *England*: And doubtleſs they can offer no leſs than their *Protection*

Pag. 20.

in Return; which I dare venture to promiſe him, as ſoon as the Church of *England* has reform'd all thoſe Solemn Offices of her Liturgy, in which the Reverſe of his Doctrin is expreſly taught and aſſerted; for 'till then he's without the *Pale* of this Church, and muſt, I doubt, ſeek for Protection elſewhere.

However I don't wonder that, having this Inſtance in his Eye, he ſhou'd firſt make *Prejudice* the ſame Thing with Sin. *A Prejudice*, ſays he, *ſo nurtur'd*, &c. *cannot probably ever be remov'd, but by the ſame Means as our Saviour ſaid Mountains may be*, viz. *by Faith; I mean, Faith infus'd*, &c. This I grant is true, of the Prejudices from *Luſt* and *Pride*; but I hope we have ſome Impreſſions from our *Fathers*, *Tutors* and *Nurſes*; nay and from *our Deſire of being thought Wiſe too*, which the Chriſtian Faith is not concern'd to remove. Pag. 18.

But if the *Prejudices* he deſires *the unbiaſs'd Reader to ſet aſide*, be only ſuch as are Oppoſite to Chriſtianity; for ſuch only the Chriſtian Faith is concern'd to remove; and if, when they are *ſet aſide*, his Doctrin ſhall be, as he propheſies of it, *univerſally own'd and taught, by the moſt Learned Part of Mankind*: Then have our *Fathers*, Pag. 23. Pag. 24.

Tutors, *Nurſe* and *Church*, been all hitherto Antichriſtian, and the Time is certainly come, when the *Son of Man ſhall not find Faith upon Earth*, unleſs it be to be found amongſt Infidels; for of thoſe that deny the Immortality of the Soul, there are yet I underſtand, but few that believe the Goſpel.

A Charge that runs thus high, had need be back'd with *Demonſtration*; but if he does believe the Main of his Reaſoning in this Book, to be demonſtrative, I am not ſurpriz'd at the *Boldneſs* of the Charge, for that is a Natural Conſequence of *Blindneſs*.

Having thus cenſur'd and condemn'd all his Adverſaries, as Men that believe, in the moſt Important Articles, upon the falſe Foundation of *Prejudice*; it is reaſonable to expect from ſuch a Reformer, the true Ground and Foundation of Belief; and in order to that, we have this Ch. 2. p. 25. Propoſition laid down, *and no way to be deny'd; that a due Repreſentation of the Object, or Thing rightly circumſtantiated, to the Senſes and Underſtanding, is the true Ground or Foundation of Belief.* I ſhou'd be ſo very glad to meet with a full Anſwer to *Pilate*'s Queſtion, *What is Truth?* that I muſt inquire of this Undertaker to anſwer it, What he means by *Senſes?* If he means by them the *Perceptive Faculty*, as when we ſay a thing is agreeable to *Senſe* and *Reaſon*; then the Term is redundant, being the ſame with *Underſtanding*; and the whole amounts to this Diſcovery, That our Knowledge of Truth, conſiſts in our Underſtanding of it: But if he takes *Senſes* in the common Acceptation, for the Inſtruments and Conveyancers of our Senſations, then, How is this Propoſition *no ways to be deny'd?* A Man of Skill in his Argument will never take a Thing for granted, that every one that knows any thing of the Matter, knows to be a controverted Point; for if all Truth muſt be repreſented to our *Senſes*, before it is repreſented to the *Underſtanding*, as he explains himſelf; then we have no Ideas, but what came in by our *Senſes*. *Pag.* 32. We are told in Scripture, *He that cometh to God*, that is, becomes a Chriſtian, *muſt believe that he is*; but according to our Author's Account of Truth, it will be impoſſible for any Man believe this Truth, that *God is:* For nothing of the Idea of God ever came in by the *Senſes*, or was by them convey'd to the *Underſtanding*, as it repreſents him to be an *Immaterial*, and *an abſolutely perfect Being*. The *Senſes* are undoubtedly paſſive, *Heb.* 11. 6.

and therefore can convey nothing but what they receive; but there is nothing, beſides Figurate and Finite Body, the proper Object of our Senſes; nor therefore can they convey to the Underſtanding, any other than Senſible Impreſſions. I muſt confeſs this General Account of Truth, ſuits well with what our Author intends to deliver as ſuch; but I fear it carries him too far, even to exclude out of the Number of the Objects of our Underſtanding, the Being of God. Nor will his quitting Reaſon, and ſubmitting to Revelation for the Knowledge of God's Exiſtence, (tho' I cannot give up ſo much of that Cauſe) be any Refuge; for by this Account, it is impoſſible for God to reveal this Truth to us, that *He is*; *Conſidering*, ſays our Author, *the bare Philoſophical Reaſon, and Connexion of Thoughts, I do not ſee how it is poſſible to obtrude a forcible Belief on the Underſtanding.* Pag. 33. Which is not only a true Conſequence upon what he had ſaid, but it is moreover an indiſputable Truth, that *a Man cannot believe what he will*; for then the Underſtanding wou'd follow the Dictate of the Will, contrary to what we are conſcious of in the forming our Judgment of Things. But now here is nothing of the Idea of God impreſs'd upon our *Senſes*, nor by them convey'd to the *Underſtanding*, nor therefore, in his Words, *that Connexion of Thoughts*, without which it is impoſſible to believe any thing. This I cou'd not paſs by unobſerv'd, becauſe, tho' *it is not poſſible to obtrude a Forcible Belief on the Underſtanding*, yet it is very poſſible to obtrude upon it *Falſhood*, under the Diſguiſe of *Truth*; and poſſible it is, that ſome Readers may believe that Propoſition *no ways to be deny'd*, which is indeed no ways to be admitted.

After this Stumble in the Threſhold, he ſtumbles ſtrangely on Two Reaſons (for I am ſure they lay not in his Way) of Mens diſputing about Truth, and being unable to comprehend it: They are, *our Want of an Adequate Notion of Infinity*, and the *thick Veil which the School-Men have drawn over it by their obſcure Words*. He brings an Inſtance of the former, in the Diſpute about *Diſcrete Quantity*, or Numbers, whether *Infinite*, or *not*; and both ſides of the Queſtion, he ſays, are prov'd by the ſame *Medium*, *viz.* The *Perpetual Addition* that Number is capable of. But this is only a little Spurt of *Scepticiſm*; for both Parts are not prov'd by the ſame *Medium*, nor is Human Reaſon reduc'd to a *quidlibet ex quolibet*, as this Notion ſuppoſes it is: The

Pag. 27.

Pag. 26.

Capacity of Addition ſubſtantially proves the Subject to be Finite; but the *Perpetuity of this Capacity* does not prove it to be Infinite, in the proper and poſitive Senſe of the Word; unleſs I muſt judge every thing Infinite, that I know no End of. So that there is no Proof at all on this ſide of the Queſtion; but on the other ſide, if *the Capacity of Addition* proves a Thing Finite, then *the Perpetuity of that Capacity* proves it *perpetually* Finite.

This, I think, is an Anſwer to the *Philoſophical Riddle*; for it ſurpaſſes my Imagination, for what other Reaſon it was propos'd, but to ſhew the Author's Dexterity in Diſpute, that he can puzle, as well as convince his Reader. For my part, I eſteem our being *unable to comprehend Infinity*, as no Cauſe of our Errors, in Subjects of a Finite Nature; ſuch as is, I muſt tell him, the Subject we ought to be upon.

But I muſt confeſs it is juſt ſuch a Reaſon, as that which is coupl'd with it, *the obſcure Words of the School-Men*: Is their Authority ſo Univerſal at this Time o' Day, that their Obſcure Words muſt make one, out of two General Reaſons, of all the Errors incident to Mankind? I am of Opinion, they rather want an Advocate to defend what they have truly advanc'd, than an

Enemy to their Errors. But they were of *Romiſh* Church, and the *Romiſh* Church believes the Separate-Exiſtence of the Soul; and this is reaſon enough to reject all they have ſaid in the Groſs; as if a Man that is erroneous in this, muſt forfeit his Title to Truth upon all Subjects.

What he ſays here againſt the Practice of the Church of *Rome*, I paſs by, as being unconcern'd in that Controverſy, any farther than to vindicate our Doctrin from thoſe Ill Conſequences they have drawn from it; and theſe I ſhall conſider as they fall in my Way; but for all the other Reflexions he has occaſionally made upon that Church, I muſt intreat him to accept this one general Acknowledgment for his Zeal in the Proteſtant Cauſe, and that I may have Leave to paſs them by, as unconcerning the Matter in debate between him and me. *Pa.*30, &c.

As little am I concern'd to oppoſe what is advanc'd to *Pag*. 46. in order to prove, that Morality and Divinity are Subjects of ſuch Difficulty, that Men have been Erroneous in their Tenents relating to them; if the Reader has Patience to conſult and reflect upon all he has ſaid; eſpecially as his Tenent is ſurprizingly prov'd from an Addreſs of the Univerſity of *Oxford* to King *Charles* the Second; in which it ſeems they rejected this Principle, *Suiipſius conſervatio, eſt primaria lex naturæ*: Becauſe they declar'd it unlawful, under the Pretence of that, to Murther the King, and Subvert the Government: He will, I am confident, think I have ſaid all I am oblig'd to ſay on that Subject, when I have ſaid,

> *Non equidem hoc ſtudeo, bullatis ut mihi nugis*
> *Pagina turgeſcat, dare pondus idonea fumo.*
> Perſ. Sat. 5.

But I am concern'd to conſider, Whether the Doctrin of Human Soul be one of the Vulgar Errors that have crept into Divinity; and all the Proof offer'd in this Place, is, 1. *That it is an Heatheniſh Notion*; and, 2. *Continu'd in the Church of* Rome, *for Intereſt and Gain.* *Pag.* 47.

I ſuppoſe he looks upon *Heatheniſh*, as a very frightful Word; and ſo it may prove to ſome ſort of Readers, thoſe that have been frighted out of the plaineſt Duties of Morality, by that Scare-Crow, *an Heatheniſh Religion*: And I am very ſure, the Argument is equally cogent in both Caſes; and therefore, 'till the Author thinks fit to level it againſt *both*; it will do Execution on *neither*.

The Cry of *Popiſh and Superſtitious*, is calculated for the very ſame *Meridian*; and by the way, if *Second Thoughts* will admit of *better*, I adviſe him, in the next Edition of his Book to leave out that Inſtance of Prejudice, in the *Martyrdom of our King*; which is, I can tell him, no obliging Inſtance, to thoſe that are moſt likely to be taken with theſe Arguments. I know *Purgatory* cannot ſtand without the *Separate Exiſtence* of the Soul; and I am perſuaded that Church has abus'd, for the very ſame End and Purpoſe, the Merits of my Redeemer too; but I thank God, that does not ſhake my Belief and Truſt in them.

In order to prove it an *Heatheniſh Invention*, we have one Quotation out of *Seneca*, *Epiſt.* 89. *Vere mihi perſuadeo, Animam in Cœlum, è quo erat, rediiſſe.* And I muſt needs ſay, had he ſtopt here, he had fully prov'd his Point, That this Doctrin was then *Heatheniſh*: But he cannot forbear his Learned Criticiſms and Comments, whatever Miſchief they do him, *Which Opinion or Belief is much to be admir'd*, (ſays he) *that* Seneca, *by the meer Light of Nature, ſhou'd comprehend ſuch a Notion of the Soul.* Why? I thought it had been an Heatheniſh Notion, and that it ſprang from their Obſervation, That *Good Men dy'd oft unrewarded in this Life, and Bad Men unpuniſh'd*: What is *Heatheniſh*, and what is *the Light of Nature*, if this *Saying*, and this *Reaſoning* be

Ibid.

Ibid.

be not, I confeſs, I am yet to learn. It follows, *Tho' perhaps he might, and 'tis believ'd he did read the Bible, and from thence have that Idea of the Soul's being ſeparate, and exiſting in Heaven.* Ibid. What? Is the Soul's *Separate Exiſtence* a Doctrin ſo conſonant to the Scripture, that ſuch an unprejudic'd Interpreter of the Senſe of it, as *Seneca* muſt be ſuppos'd to be, ſhou'd find it there, tho' he had no Antecedent Idea of it? The Argument then amounts to this Demonſtration, *It is not a Scripture-Doctrin, but an Heatheniſh Invention; for the Heathens borrow'd it from the Scripture.* Thus ſome Good-natur'd Diſputants will grant you any one Point, in order to gain another, and ſo *vice verſa*; 'till they have both granted, and deny'd all you ſay.

One wou'd imagin ſuch an Argument makes no wonderful Progreſs in a Subject; and yet, to our Aſtoniſhment, in the very next *Page* we are got to the End of our Work: *Wherefore upon the Whole, I make theſe following Inferences*, are his Words; *Pag.* 48. Inferences! From what Premiſſes, I beſeech you? Why, *The Premiſſes are contain'd in the following Papers, and in the Interim, I conclude: 1. That the Philoſophers Account of the* Soul, *is not clear enough to convince us of its Exiſtence; for* Ariſtotle's *Definition is not; and you are bound, at leaſt* *in one* Univerſity, *to ſtand to that.* 2. *From what* ſhall *be ſaid, it* now *follows, That our Notion of* Life *and* Soul *being the ſame, is ſo clearly and undeniably prov'd, that you cannot, if you wou'd, diſbelieve it.* 3. *From the Arguments* hereafter *urg'd, it is a Conſequence* at preſent, *That ſince the Heathens, and* Plato *the chief of them, held an* Immaterial Soul of Man; *and that their Doctrin was tranſmitted, no body knew how, to the Primitive Church, which was ignorant enough to be guided, in ſuch an Important Article, by the Heathen Philoſophers; and laſtly, ſince the Church of* Rome *gets* God *knows what by it; it is demonſtratively falſe:* This is the Senſe of his Inferences, and ſure an ordinary Reader muſt be out of Breath with following an Author, that can leap over all his Premiſſes at one Jump, and *begin* with *Concluſions.* Pag. 49.

CHAP. II.

Obſervations on his Third Chapter; wherein he pretends to Prove, that The Notion of Human Soul, as held by the greateſt Philoſophers, and their Opinions of its Original, are unſatisfactory: *Together with an Anſwer to all that is here objected to our Doctrin.*

WE are now advanc'd 51 *Pages* in my Author's Book, but not one Step in the Argument; this Chapter indeed begins with mentioning *the Nature of the Soul*, which might put us in ſome Hopes of being now at laſt let into the Subject; but the very next Paragraph diſcovers a large Heap of Rubbiſh ſtill in our Way. The Deſign of this Chapter was, to expoſe the Account, which the Philoſophers on our Side, have given of the *Nature* and *Original* of the *Soul*: In order to which, it had been but common Prudence to have conceal'd the moſt Ridiculous Opinions on his own Side; ſuch as the *Stoic*'s Notion, that the *Soul is an hot fiery Blaſt*; *Cleanthes* making

Pag. 52.

Ibid.

making it *an hot Complexion*; Dinarchus's *Harmony of the Four Elements*; and laſtly, Democritus, (*that ancient and excellent Philoſopher*; Pag. 53. Pag. 54. yes doubtleſs! for he gives Name to a whole Clan of Atheiſts) *compounding it of round Atoms.* I dare ſay, no Reader of this Chapter can forbear ranking theſe amongſt the inſufficient Accounts he meets with in it; or can imagin, at firſt ſight, they are propos'd by the Author with any other Deſign; and yet they all center in his own Tenent of the *Materiality of the Soul*; and we are told he cou'd make it appear, *to be very conſonant to the Principles of Reaſon and Philoſophy, that ſome of the forementión'd Definitions or Deſcriptions of Human Soul, are not ſo frivolous and idle, as our* Pſycomuthiſts *imagin*; Pag. 55. but it ſeems, he has *reſerv'd that Work for ſome other Chapters*; Ibid. he ſhou'd have ſaid, for ſome other *Book*, for I don't find in this, which of theſe Opinions are his; and tho' he inſiſts but on *ſome of them*, yet he prudently forbears being particular: And now if you ſhou'd imagin it conſiſtent with *Reaſon* and *Philoſophy*, that the Suppoſition of an *hot fiery Blaſt*, or *hot Complexion*, cou'd not withſtand a good Gale of Wind; or however, cou'd never laſt an Hundred Years: Theſe, it may be reply'd, are not *the ſome of them* we are bound to defend; but we can ſtill retire to the *Harmony of the Four Elements*; and if you preſs us hard for an Explication of our Meaning in that Expreſſion, imagining nothing that has no Meaning to be agreeable to *Reaſon* and *Philoſophy*; rather than be at that trouble, we'll offer you the *round Atoms:* And if you ſhou'd demonſtrate, that the power of *Thought* cannot be lodg'd either in one or more of theſe *Atoms*; we can retire decently to *ſome* of the former Opinions. Here therefore I muſt confeſs my ſelf unable to confute this Author's *Reaſon* and *Philoſophy*; for,

Vide Eſſay, *ſect.* 7.

Quo teneam nodo mutantem Protea vultum?

However, he's willing to declare in general, That the Soul is a *Power*, not *Subſtance*; and all the Proof offer'd at here, is from *Juvenal* and *Virgil*; the firſt in theſe Lines,

Pag. 56.

——— Separat hoc nos
A grege mutuorum, atque adeo venerabile ſoli
Sortiti ingenium, divinorumque capaces;
Atque exercendis, capiendiſque artibus apti,
Senſum à cœleſti demiſſum traximus arce,
Cujus egent prona, & terram ſpectantia. Mundi
Principio indulſit communis conditor illis
Tantum animas. Nobis animum quoque.—

Juv. Sat. 15.

He might have taken ſome other Occaſion to let us know he had read *Juvenal*, for that is all the Service this Quotation can do him: The Poet indeed does not aſſert the *Soul* to be a *Subſtance*, nor do I remember that he any where diſtinguiſhes between *Subſtance* and *Accident*, and ſo far he's agreeable to our Author's *Poetical Philoſophy*; but is not his Account of its *Celeſtial Original*, as conſiſtent with the Suppoſition of its being a *Subſtance*, as that of its being a *Power*? I know this Philoſopher ſometimes terms the Soul to be a *Ray of the Divinity*, that our Lives come from, and center in God: But muſt therefore all that ſay, *the Soul comes from God*, be of his Opinion as to the Nature of it? If ſo, I hope we are all agreed. But it were well if this Paſſage from *Juvenal* wou'd do him neither good nor harm. It is a Conſequence of his Opinion, and what he frequently owns, That *Life and Soul are the ſame thing*: I ask then, Are the Brutes alive? If they are, they have a Soul too, how comes it to paſs then, that,

> *Senſum à cœleſti demiſſum traximus arce,*
> *Cujus egent prona.* ———

and again,

> ——— *Indulſit communis conditor illis*
> *Tantum animas, nobis animum quoque.* —

Here in my Judgment, is a Diſtinction inconſiſtent with our Author's Hypotheſis: God has not only given us, according to this Account, a more perfect Life and Reaſon than he has done to Brutes, which is this Author's Account of it; but he has given us ſomething, of which they are not in the leaſt Partakers; *Senſum cujus egent prona*; he has given us quite another Principle of Action, and, as plainly as Words can expreſs it, another Subſtance too, *Illis tantum Animas, nobis Animum quoque.* I know not whether he deſpiſes Commentators on Poetry, as much as he does thoſe on Philoſophy and Divinity; but one of theſe wou'd have told him on the Place, *Anima ergo eſt qua vivimus & ſentimus; Animus autem, quo intelligimus, ſapimuſque.* A Man that quotes this for himſelf, can never after call himſelf a *Vitanimiſt*, without quitting the Character of *Intelligimus, ſapimuſque*; and far be it from me, to think the Author is willing to do this.

Britan. in loc.

Farther Thoughts of H. Soul.

The next Proof he fetches is from *Virgil*, in theſe known Lines:

> *Principio cœlum, ac terras, campoſque liquentes,*
> *Lucentemque globum lunæ, titaniaque aſtra.*
> *Spiritus intus alit, totamque infuſa per artus,*
> *Mens agitat molem, & magno ſe corpore miſcet:*
> *Inde hominum, pecudumque genus.*———
>
> Virg. Æneid. lib. 6.

Whether *Virgil* in theſe Lines deſign'd any Diſtinction between *Spiritus* and *Mens*, is no way Material; this is certain, he alludes either to the *Pythagoric* or *Platonic* Doctrin, concerning the Original of the World. The former ſuppos'd *God himſelf*, intimately preſent with, and operating upon all the Parts of Matter, in the Univerſal Frame; and that the *Souls* of Men and Beaſts were a *Part*, or *Particle* taken from his own Subſtance: The latter thought the *Anima Mundi* an *Immaterial created Subſtance*, ſubſervient to God as a *Plaſtic* Principle of Nature; whereby all Bodies have their Formation; and that of the Subſtance of this *Spiritus* or *Mens*, were form'd the Human and Brutal *Souls*. I think it plain, by this Account of the *Pythagoric* and *Platonic* Doctrin, that they both held the *Soul* of Man to be of a *Subſtantial Nature*. And till I meet with a better Account than this, I can never believe that *Virgil*, who ſo plainly alludes to, and copies from theſe Philoſophers, cou'd be any Friend to our Author's Opinion; nor becauſe *Virgil* deſcribes the *Soul* (as indeed Poets deſcribe every thing elſe) by the *Powers* and *Operations* of it; that therefore *Virgil*, much leſs *Plato*, or *Pythagoras*, believ'd the *Soul* of Man to be only a *Power*.

Vide Rueum in loc.

But our Author ſeems never to have dreamt of this Account of that Paſſage, and I know he cannot agree to it; for he has a peculiar Talent, in commenting upon Authors, ſuch as never Commentator before him was bleſs'd with. Spiritus *here,* (ſays he) *cannot poſſibly be apply'd to* Subſtantial Soul, *becauſe it relates to Inanimate Beings.* (I ſuppoſe he means, *Hominum, pecudumque genus, vitæque volantum; & quæ marmoreo fert monſtra ſub æquore pontus;* for they are all the Beings it relates to) *but as it is explain'd, Gen.* chap. 1. and the *Spirit* of the Lord moved upon the face of the deep; made the Sun, Moon, and Stars, and great Whales, *&c. which are actuated by the Power,* or Spirit, *of God implanted in them, call'd by* Eſdras, *chap.* 6. *verſ.* 41. *the Spirit of the Firmament,* &c. Now this I muſt confeſs, is a new way of interpreting Authors; and may fetch a Senſe out of them, that was never yet heard or thought of; when *Virgil* is interpreted by the *Scripture,* and the *Scripture* by the *Apochrypha.*

Pag. 56.

To crown all, he adds, *From which, Learned and Ancient Poets we may collect a Doctrin, better than any the latter* School-Men *have afforded us;* viz. *That the Notion of* Human Soul, *as I define it in the follow-*

following Chapter to be a Power, *not* Subſtance, *is moſt conſonant to the Opinion of our Forefathers.*

What if we ſhou'd make bold to change this Term, *our Forefathers*, for one of the ſame Signification in another Place; let us ſee how it will run in the Title-Page: ------- *Demonſtrating the Notion of* Human Soul, *as believ'd to be* a Spiritual Immortal Subſtance, *united to Human Body; to be a plain Invention of our* Forefathers. This I fear in the *Title*, wou'd be of no great Service to the *Book*. And now take the Term *Heatheniſh* from the Title, and place it here, it runs thus, *This Doctrin of ours, is moſt conſonant to the Opinion of* Heatheniſh Authors; and this I fear in the *Book*, wou'd not very well anſwer the *Title*. But this is no ſuch Inconſiſtency in him, for he does but treat them, as he thinks they treat his Subject, with variety of Sentiments; ſometimes they are abominable *Heathens*, and at another time, they muſt be (with Reverence be it ſpoken) our Forefathers.

We come now to the Buſineſs of this Chapter, which was to ſhew, How unſatisfactory the Reaſons of the greateſt Philoſophers are, concerning the Nature of the *Soul*; that is, how unſatisfactory *Ariſtotle*'s Definition of it is: For that is the *Ground and Foundation, on* *Pag.* 57.

Ibid. *which the Notion or Doctrin of the Soul of Man, as it is now generally receiv'd by all the Divines in the World, is built.* Well then, he has put us on the Bear's Skin, and we muſt expect to be baited in it; let us try what Defence we can make in ſo hard a Caſe. We have two dangerous Poſts to maintain; the one, *Anima eſt Actus Corporis Organici, Vitam habentis in potentia*; the other, *Id quo vivimus, ſentimus, & intelligimus primo.* It is to be obſerv'd, we give neither of theſe for Definitions of a *Spirit*, in any other State but that of Union with a Body; and alſo, that the latter is not different from the former, but explanatory of it. The firſt Attack he makes is upon *Actus*; it is it ſeems the ſame Word *Ariſtotle* uſes in his Definition of *Motion*; which is, *Actus Entis in potentia, quatenus in potentia.* But what! Are *all the Divines in the World* bound to ſtand by *Ariſtotle*'s Definition of Motion too? Remember my Duty to the Old Gentleman; but he muſt excuſe me, that I am of Opinion, Motion is one of thoſe *Simple Ideas*, that ought not to be defin'd, becauſe it cannot be illuſtrated by any Notion clearer than it ſelf: And if he will but give me ſo much fair Play as this, I will venture to act the *Ariſtotelian*, and ſtand by my Diſtinction of *Actus ſubſtantialis*, and *accidentalis*; meaning by the former, that which has the Power of Action lodg'd in it; and by the latter, the bare Action it ſelf: But he objects, This is not *Ariſtotle*'s, but his Commentators *new-fangl'd Diſtinction, to bring the Philoſopher over to his Party:* Pag. 58. What then? Was *Ariſtotle* of another Party before? I thought *all the Divines in the World* had built upon him, and I ſhall have occaſion elſewhere to ſhew, that he needs no bringing over. But I muſt confeſs theſe Definitions, like all the reſt of *Ariſtotle*'s, run in too looſe and general Terms; yet ſtill they plainly enough declare his Opinion, That Life, and Senſation, and Underſtanding, were to be accounted for, upon no other beſides an *Immaterial Principle*; and then it was no Strain in his Commentators, to underſtand him of a *Subſtantial Principle*. But ſtill the Objector ſtrives hard to prove, That *Actus Corporis Organici* muſt be a Corporeal Quality; and conſequently corruptible with the Body, and no otherwiſe diſtinguiſh'd from other Corporeal Qualities, but by being the *firſt* or *chiefeſt*. To which I anſwer, whatever was *Ariſtotle*'s Senſe of *Actus Corporis Organici*, it cou'd not poſſibly be this; for in the ſame Diſcourſe, he has many Arguments to prove that Matter cannot think, and this amongſt the reſt:

Διόπερ οὐδὲ νοῦς οὕτο συνεχὴς ἀλλ᾽ ἤτοι ἀμερὴς, ἢ οὐχ᾽ ὡς τὸ μέγεθος τὶ συνεχής· πῶς γὰρ δὴ καὶ νοήσει μέγεθος ὢν, ὅτο οὖν τῶν μορίων αὐτοῦ, De Anima, lib.1.cap.3. μορίων δὲ ἤτοι κατὰ μέγεθος, ἢ κατὰ στιγμήν· εἰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ στιγμὴν, αὗται δὲ ἄπειροι, δῆλον ὡς οὐδέποτε διέξεισιν· εἰ δὲ κατὰ μέγεθος πολλάκις ἢ ἀπειράκις νοήσει τὸ αὐτό.

The ſenſe and meaning of which is this; *Therefore the* Mind *or* Intellect *is not a* continuous Subſtance; *but either without Parts, or has not ſuch as belong to* Magnitude; *for how, if it be* Magnitude, *can it underſtand with ſuch Parts, whether conceived as* Magnitudes *or* Points? *If as* Points, *they are infinite, and there will be no end of multiplying* Underſtandings; *if as* Magnitudes, *each Part of that* Magnitude *will receive a different Impreſſion of the ſame Thing.*

From which convincing Argument, it is clear that *Ariſtotle*, by his *Actus* cou'd not underſtand a Corporeal Quality; but he muſt underſtand that indiviſible, and immaterial Part of us, which *actuates* the Body, and is the Seat of *Senſation* and *Intellect*. By which I am ſatisfy'd, had this Author come by *Ariſtotle*'s Definition at firſt hand, *Pag. 62.* he wou'd not have faln ſo unreaſonably foul upon the Philoſopher, as to trump up this abſurd Meaning for his, That the *Soul is the Eſſence of the Body, and that, without which it wou'd have no being at all.* If this does not appear to the Reader abſurd enough at firſt ſight, he may find it elaborately exploded by our Author, with no leſs than Four Demonſtrations. And I will farther venture to remit him thither, if he is not yet convinc'd that a *Subſtantial Form*, and *Forma mixti* and the *Potentia paſſiva*, are unſerviceable Principles in *Phyſics*; I doubt not but when he has read from *Pag.* 57, to *Pag.* 70, upon this Subject, he will make the Author's Remark, with ſomewhat a different Application: *What a troubleſom trifling Fatigue is here!* But by the way Pag. 67. we meet with ſomething that looks as if it were deſign'd for an Argument, and we muſt not neglect any thing of that kind. We own, that the Soul has no Ibid. Principles of Corruption in it; *but* Eſtibius *cannot conceive how Man, upon this Suppoſition, ſhou'd ever become corruptible.* I hope *Eſtibius* does not mean (for I do not) the ſame thing by *Soul*, and by *Man*; and if not, *Man*, as ſuch, may be liable to *Corruption*, tho' he has an *incorruptible Soul*; So that here's no Contradiction in *Terms*: But we have this farther Reaſon offer'd for his want of Conception in this Matter; *If an Incorruptible Being endu'd with Reaſon, Free-Will, and Power to act, or not to act; can bind or lock up the Principles of Corruption, ſo as they do not; or can-*

cannot act; What can force that Rational Incorruptible Being to let go its Power? &c. Truly nothing but this; that it never had ſuch a Power, ſince we were conſcious it had any Power over our Bodies: I ſuppoſe the Power of moving Matter was given it by God, and I ſuppoſe alſo that God may limit and conditionate any Power he communicates, as he ſees fit: Nor is it of weight with me, to prove my Soul *Material*, that I find it has not all the Power which I can conceive an *Immaterial* Being capable of.

But the Objector is reſolv'd, we ſhall not anſwer thus; we ſhall only affirm, That Pag. 68. *God ordains the Soul of every Man before Death, immediately to let thoſe turbulent Principles looſe, in order to Man's Diſſolution*; which he remarks, *Is a pretty Notion for any whimſical Philoſopher to* broach; and truly to me, *Eſtibius* is the Man.

The next thing to be conſider'd after the Definition, is the Properties of the Soul; and this Method is chalk'd out for the ſake of that one Expreſſion of ſome Philoſophers, Pag. 70. *Tota in toto, & tota in qualibet parte.* He immediately ſets himſelf to confute this, as if it were the avow'd Principle of all his Adverſaries; whereas many, I may ſay the moſt and the beſt of them, both Ancient and Modern, have charg'd it as an Abſurdity, upon others. But to ſet this Matter in its true Light, I will briefly ſtate the *Nullibiſts Hypotheſis*, as it is call'd, from which this Expreſſion had its riſe; and then ſhew how they that maintain it are able to anſwer all that this Objector has to urge.

Amongſt thoſe that held an Immaterial Human Soul, ſome conceiving all Extenſion diviſible, and conſequently, every thing extended to be material; cou'd give the Soul no *determinate* and *circumſcrib'd Place* in the Body; imagining *that*, as a Mode of Extenſion; but yet they did not hold the Soul to be, properly ſpeaking, *no where*; for they own'd its Influence and Operation to be confin'd to the Body, and therefore to the Place in which the Body is: Now the Subſtance being indiviſible from its own Operations, they did not therefore thruſt out of the Rank of Being, Things Immaterial; but maintain'd their Real Preſence, tho' according to them, they cou'd be no otherwiſe Preſent in any *circumſcrib'd* and *determinate Place* than by their Operations. But finding the Human Soul preſent by its Operation, to every Part of the Body; and at the ſame time judging it incapable of being coextended with the Body, they ſaid the Soul was *tota in toto, & tota in qualibet parte.*

Againſt this Opinion no Argument can properly be level'd, but what tends to prove that created Immaterial Subſtances, are capable of *Amplitude* and Extenſion; but then ſuch an Argument can have no tendency to diſprove their *Exiſtence.* I am ſenſible he that can prove, 1. That whatever *is*, is extended; and 2. That whatever is *extended*, is Matter, will gain his Point. But amongſt the Incorporealiſts, ſome deny the one, and ſome the other Propoſition; therefore 'till both are prov'd, no Arguments againſt either can be concluſive againſt that Doctrin: Thoſe Arguments eſpecially can never gain any Ground upon it, which as far forth as they diſprove the one, do confirm and eſtabliſh the other.

Eſtibius, in order to gain his Point, argues; 1. *This Poſition makes the Part as big as the Whole, (as I cou'd prove) contrary to a Mathematical Axiom,* Ibid. *Totum eſt majus ſua Parte.* To this the *Nullibiſt* is ready to anſwer, What you cou'd prove, is not to the Purpoſe, but what you have prov'd; the Whole in this Axiom ſuppoſes Parts, and therefore if you ſuppoſe the Axiom applicable to the Soul, (and if it is not, you prove nothing) you ſuppoſe the Queſtion in Diſpute, and to allow you that, wou'd be as large a

Conceſſion, as to take your Word for your Proof. 2. He referrs this Sentence, *to the Judgment of any conſidering Man, Whether the Whole can be in the Whole, and in every Part at the ſame time.* Ibid. He ſhou'd have added, *in the ſame Reſpect and Manner*; and then it is impoſſible, but is none of their Tenent. Tho' they do ſay the Soul is *tota in toto Corpore*, yet they do not ſay that it is immediately, and in the ſame manner, united to every Part of the Body; but their meaning is, the Soul does not fill the Body, as the Body does a Space, by a *Coagulum* of diviſible Parts: And again, tho' they do aſſert the Soul to be *tota in qualibet Parte*, yet not ſo as to be confin'd to that Part, nor ſo as to ſhift from one, to another; yet ſtill ſo as to inform every Part of the Body, it ſelf continuing one uniform undivided Subſtance.

But this *Eſtibius* interprets to be only a *Virtual Preſence*, and that is *really no Preſence at all.* Pag. 71. But in anſwer to this, I have ſhewn, according to their account, that my Soul is as really *preſent* in this Room, as my Body; only not preſent *modo corporeo*; and if nothing be *really preſent* that is not ſo, I deſire his Opinion of the *Omnipreſence* of GOD.

The next Philoſophical Saying about the Soul, he propoſes to overturn, (and thereby the Being of the Soul) is *infundendo creatur, & creando infunditur*; he need not be ſo much at a loſs for the Senſe of this, which is no more than what we term *Immediate Creation*; and therefore I paſs by all he objects to any other Senſe of it, as altogether foreign. The firſt thing he ſays, is, *Becauſe then every* Generation *muſt be a* New Creation; *which is abſurd.* If he he means, it's abſurd to ſuppoſe the Soul created immediately upon, or before its Union with the Body; he ſhou'd have left out the *becauſe*, and only have ſaid, The Thing is abſurd; which is making ſhort work of it. If he ſuppoſes the *Generation* of the Body to be the ſame thing with the *Creation* of the Soul, as he does in this and the following Page: I grant the Abſurdity of it; but it did not become him to expoſe a Notion that borders ſo nearly upon his own *Hypotheſis*. The next thing he urges, is, *That Abortives* Pag. 71. *totally periſh, as to Body and Soul too; which is unaccountable, according to this Doctrin.* And truly I think it wou'd be a very unaccountable thing, if the Author had any better Argument to prove it in fact true, than that of *Job*, *Why dyed I not in the Womb?* &c. *As an untimely birth, I had not been.* Which ſo plainly relates to another Subject, that I ſhall not preſume ſo far upon the Reader's Judgment, as to anſwer it out of Place; for I ſhall reduce the Scriptures he ſcatters throughout his Book, to their proper Chapter.

The next, and the only thing he farther urges upon this Topic, is, *If the Soul be infus'd after Conception perfected*, &c. *then the* Fœtus *lives before the Infuſion of the Soul, which is contrary to our own Hypotheſis.* Ibid. So that by *Conception perfected*, he means the *Fœtus* being alive; and to imagin that we hold this to be antecedent to the *Union*, is a meer Dream, or ſomething worſe, of his own.

As to the *Seat of the Soul*, which he next undertakes to confute, the Difference amongſt Philoſophers about that (which is the only thing he urges againſt the Reality of it) is no better an Argument, than the Difference about the *Seat of Life*, or in what Part of the Body *Life* properly conſiſts, is to prove a Man *not alive*: And this Controverſy, I fear *Eſtibius* himſelf cannot poſſibly determin.

He is now come to the Hypotheſis of *the Præexiſtence of Human Soul*, which he calls, a *Repoſitory of Souls, conceiv'd by ſome whimſical Philoſophers*; Pag. 75. ſuch, I ſuppoſe, as *Pythagoras* and *Plato*; and againſt this he brings Three Objections:

The

Pag. 76. The Firſt, *That it is not to be found either in Scripture, Orthodox Fathers*, or *Church-Hiſtorians*; and this, I ſuppoſe proves the Whimſicalneſs of thoſe Philoſophers, who never heard of any of them. But if the *Scriptures* are as unconcern'd in this Doctrin, (as he ſuppoſes they are, without conſidering one Word of what has been alledg'd from thence in favour of it, both by Ancients and Moderns) yet is there is no abſolute Neceſſity for an Appeal to *Scripture* in this Diſpute; without which, this Negative Argument from Scripture proves juſt nothing; for doubtleſs the chief Deſign of *Scripture* is to give us right Apprehenſions of our Preſent and Future State, which is the true *Saving Knowledge*, as our Final Happineſs depends not upon (the Preſent Conſtitution of Things conſider'd) what we *were*, but what we *are*. As to *Orthodox Fathers*, from whom he ſays *it does not appear there was any ſuch Belief*, I am really aſham'd to find their *Silence* an Argument to a Man that is deaf to all they *ſay*; and he that does but read *Eſtibius*'s Epiſtle before this Book, will have no Reaſon to expect any Arguments built on their Authority in the Body of it. But I am really more ſurpriz'd to find the Silence of *Church-Hiſtorians* an Argument againſt ſuch a Repoſitory; having not yet been inform'd of any *Church-Hiſtorain* from the other World; nor of any relating to this, that extends his Narration beyond the Fall, to which our Souls are ſuppoſed præexiſtent.

2. The next Objection runs thus: *Becauſe ſuch a Place or Repoſitory of Souls præexiſtent, ſeems to reſtrain or limit the Power of an Omnipotent Creator;* Ibid. *as if at the firſt Creation God had exhauſted his Power at once, and laid up the Stores of Souls*, &c. I muſt crave leave to let him know, what I ſuppoſe they that believe ſuch *Stores of Souls*, wou'd ſay to this Argument.

Firſt, I believe it wou'd ſurpaſs their Conception, how the Creation of all Souls at once, *reſtrains the Power of the Creator*, any more than a repeated Creation of them; unleſs whatever God has not done, *limits and reſtrains his Power*, in not doing of it; and then an *immediate Creation* wou'd have *limited his Power* in not creating them *præexiſtent*. Secondly, Had ſuch an one read *Second Thoughts*, he wou'd have found there an Argument againſt *Immediate Creation*, *that the firſt Creation of all things by God Almighty, mention'd* Geneſ. *chap.* 2. *verſ.* 2. *terminated the whole Buſineſs of the Creation*; and it wou'd be natural for him to inferr, either that the

Account we have from *Geneſis, reſtrains the Power of the Creator*; or that the Hypotheſis of *Præexiſtence does not*, which *Eſtibius* will chooſe of theſe two, I know not, for there is ſelf-contradiction in both.

3. The laſt Objection is drawn *ex abſurdo: If they did præexiſt, they muſt be actual ſubſiſting Forms* (notably inferr'd!) *as free, and as independent as we conceive Angels to be:* (I ſuppoſe he means as independent on theſe Earthly Bodies; for as to any other Independency, it muſt proceed only from his own *independent* Thought and Imagination:) But this can never be admitted: For, 1. *They muſt have had the ſame Office with Angels, and we don't read that God made them Miniſtring Spirits*; no ſure, for we read he made Man *a little lower than the Angels:* But is there any neceſſity, ſays the Reſpondent, for all *Unimbodied* Spirits, to be *Miniſtring* Spirits? Yes, ſays *Eſtibius*; Or elſe, 2. *They are ſo many idle uſeleſs Beings in the Univerſe, waiting we know not why or wherefore, to be introduc'd into the Receptacle of the Body.* Not ſo neither, will he return: Demonſtration is very eaſy, if one may take for granted what he pleaſes; and you may as well ſuppoſe they are Idle here, becauſe they are not in Heaven; as Pag. 77.

that they were Idle there, becauſe they were not on Earth. 3. *Becauſe the Hypotheſis makes the Body a Priſon to the Soul, and this State her Puniſhment* (but Pag. 78. not excluding her Probation for the State ſucceeding) *for Crimes committed in the præexiſtent State; and what an idle Suppoſition this is, he leaves all ſober Men to judge.* This is all he objects; and here I doubt not but his Adverſary will joyn iſſue with him: But 'till ſober Men have brought in their Verdict, *Eſtibius*'s Appeal to them, will be no Prejudice to the Cauſe he appeals againſt; much leſs to the main Cauſe, which does not ſtand and fall, either with *Præexiſtence*, or *immediate Creation:* For, if there be a Soul in Man, it is certain to Demonſtration, it had a Beginning; tho' it be never ſo uncertain when it began to be.

Eſtibius has now done with his Argument, but to ſhew his Reading as *great*, as his Reaſoning is *ſtrong*, *he* Pag. 79. *cannot paſs by in Silence the Opinion of ſome Learned Men of later Ages, which is concerning the Aſtral Spirit*; or, as he expreſſes it, *the Senſitive Soul:* But in the Date of this Opinion, he's a little unfortunate, unleſs his *later Ages* extend to the Reign of *Auguſtus*; for *Ovid*, hiſtorically relating the Opinions of Men in his, and many preceding Ages, tells us,

Terra tegit carnem, tumulum circumvolat umbra.

And beſides this, it's ſomething unlucky, that he ſhou'd forget his own Quotation from the Poet, who ſo juſtly has *deliver'd to us the Opinion of our Forefathers:* For there we are told,

——— *Indulſit communis conditor illis*
Tantum animas, *nobis* animum *quoque*. ——

However, the Moderns have refined upon the Notion, and *aſſign'd abundance of Properties to this Senſitive Soul*; and ſome of them I muſt confeſs whimſical enough, in *Paracelſus*, *Jacob Behmen*, and Mr. *Webſter:* Here at laſt, 'tis odds our Author's in the right, and all I can ſay to him is, that I have long ſince learnt this Obſervation from *Tully*, and have had a very late Inſtance of the Truth of it, that *There's nothing ſo abſurd, which ſome Philoſophers will not maintain.*

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

Wherein is ſhewn the Inſufficiency of all that he advances in his Fourth Chapter, to prove his own to be the True Notion of Human Soul.

A MAN that walks altogether out of the Way, had need tread with a little Caution, and not be regardleſs of the Opinion of others, who are apt to give over ſuch Wanderers for quite loſt: *Eſtibius* is very ſenſible, that *if he concurrs with the Learned Mr.* Hobbs, *in this Opinion, that it is a very odd Notion to call any Created Being an* Immaterial Subſtance, *he ſhall be receiv'd with Cenſure and Prejudice*; as if all the Cenſures that have been made on Mr. *Hobbs*, were attended with Prejudice in the Cenſurers: Whether this is concurring with him or not I cannot tell; but I am ſure it is declaring for the Juſtice of his Cauſe; if Prejudice be ſo very ill a thing as we have been given to underſtand it is. But *Eſtibius* is content to ſay, that *the Parts of Spiritual Beings are very difficult to be comprehended by our weak Underſtandings*; and of this *he makes no more doubt*, *than that*

Pag. 82.

Chap. 1.

Ibid.

that there is a Sun and Moon in the Firmament.

But ſince he has not been pleas'd to tell us what Parts they are of a Spiritual Being, that are thus difficult to be comprehended, I muſt confeſs I am not able to gueſs at them: Nor has he given me any Light into that Matter, by telling me the Difficulty of them appears to his uncommon Apprehenſion, like the *Sun and Moon in the Firmament.* However, he can by no Means concurr with Dr. *More*, who ſays, *the Notion of a Spirit is as eaſy to be comprehended, as that of Matter*; which, ſays my Author, *is not at all to the Purpoſe: For our Enquiry is not of the* Facility, *but of the* Verity *of this Notion.* Theſe therefore, as I ſaid, are very unaccountable *Difficulties* attending a Notion, with reſpect to which, it is nothing to the Purpoſe to make out the *Facility* of it.

Ibid.

Pag. 83.

I was fully perſuaded by the Title of this Chapter, [*Of the True Notion of Human Soul*, &c.] that my Author wou'd have inquir'd chiefly into the *Facility* of his, and the *Difficulty* of the contrary Notion; and I was alſo convinc'd that, to make the Notion of Spirit as intelligible to our Underſtanding, as that of a Body, which he calls here the *Facility* of it; wou'd be very much to the Purpoſe; in Anſwer to the *Difficulty of comprehending the Parts of it*, when that is made an Objection: Nor can I believe Mr. *Hobbs* wou'd ever have call'd this an Impertinent Anſwer, but have prov'd it, as well as he cou'd, an Inſufficient One. But what will not *Eſtibius* do, to get rid of a troubleſom Objection? He will fly from the Buſineſs in Hand; nay rather than be foil'd with it, he will deny that it is the Buſineſs in Hand, when his Hand is upon it. But if it be *Eſtibius*'s Method of maintaining *Difficulties in Comprehenſion*, to maintain that the clearing, and making the Notions intelligible, or as far as others that are ſuppos'd to be comprehended, is nothing to the Purpoſe: Truly I think his Enquiry is neither of the *Facility*, nor of the *Verity* of the Notion. But tho', to avoid the Force of what Dr. *More* has ſaid, he pitches upon the *Verity* of the Notion; yet having thus clearly got rid of his Adverſary, he returns within ſix Lines to the *Facility* of it; and objects that of our Saviour, *Luke* 24. 29. *Behold my hands and my feet, that it is I my ſelf, handle me and ſee me, for a ſpirit hath not fleſh and bones, as ye ſee me have; plainly implying* (ſays he) *that what was viſible to the Eye, and an* Ibid.

Object of the Touch, being two of the exterior Senſes, was more capable of being underſtood, than a Spirit, whoſe Nature and Eſſence was properly the Object of the Underſtanding. A Comment, literally ſpeaking; for 'tis altogether of his own deviſing; that our Bleſſed Lord ſhou'd, in this Appearance of his, to eſtabliſh the Faith of his Diſciples, Philoſophically diſtinguiſh between the Evidence of *Senſe* and that of *Reaſon*; and not offer himſelf to their Eyes and Hands, purely to convince them that his Promiſe of Riſing from the Dead was fulfilled by him; (with regard to which Promiſe, his Bodily Preſence was requiſite, even tho' his Appearance in a Spiritual Manner ſhou'd be ſuppos'd an Argument more convincing in it ſelf.) But I forbear, --- *Eſtibius*, I fear, will ſmile at this, that I ſhou'd argue with him as one that ſeriouſly ſet himſelf to underſtand the Scriptures; for he is reſolv'd, I find, to carry it very even between thoſe that do ſo, and thoſe that *turn and wreſt the Senſe of it: Had any other ſaid what he* [Hobbs] ſays our Author, *did, tho' perhaps not ſo learned, nor ſo able* to turn, and wreſt the Senſe and Meaning of the Scripture, *as he was, I ſhou'd as ſoon* (and therefore I preſume no ſooner) *have aſſented to his Opinion, as to Mr.* Hobbs. Ibid.

Here, at laſt, is the finiſh'd Character of the Man that *has laid aſide Prejudice.* Men of all Religions, beware only of the Papiſts; nay Men of no Religion, that have neither Chriſtian nor Moral Principles, (for ſuch they are that employ their Learning to *turn and wreſt the Scriptures)* ſtand upon a Level with him, and have an equal Claim to his Aſſent. This it ſeems is *not to owe a Man's Religion to his Font*, nor indeed to his *God.*

That of the *Druids* teaching the *Immortality of the Soul*, to make better Soldiers; which is juſt ſuch another Objection to that Doctrin, as it is to Chriſtianity; that it's the Beſt State-Principle: And that of *Mahomet*'s Senſual Paradiſe; which to do the Argument right, he ſhou'd have level'd againſt the Reſurrection, I am content only to mention, becauſe *Eſtibius*, tho' he propoſes them as uſeful and improvable Hints, does not lay much Streſs upon them; but fixes upon another Origin of our Doctrin, which he ſuppoſes was from the Philoſophers, who invented it as a Solution of the preſent unequal Diſpenſations of Providence. It ſeems then it had this Good Foundation in Mens Obſervations, and their Reaſoning on the Appearances of Providence; nay it is granted to be farther ſerviceable; to *Pag. 85.*

Pag. 88. to be *a very good Motive, or Incentive to the Obedience of Chriſt:* But ſeeing it is not conſonant to the Scripture, and ſuch wicked Advantages are made of it, it is to be rejected. This is the Senſe of what follows; by which I underſtand that the Gentlemen of the New Religion, are not ſo perfectly deliver'd from that hateful Monſter *Prejudice*, but that now and then, they are willing to *prejudge* their own Cauſe; for here's a mighty Buſtle and a Shew of Argument, and all depending at laſt on Scripture-Proof; tho' that is the intire Subject of a ſubſequent Chapter.

We have it's true this farther Account of the Matter, that *the Primitive Chriſtians* Pag. 87. *had it from the Heathens*; by which if he means that, tho' a Principle amongſt the Heathens, they retain'd it as agreeable to Chriſtianity: This may be an Objection to ſome Underſtandings; but St. *Paul* I judge was of another Mind, *Acts* 17. c. 22. v. &c. when he turn'd the Worſhip of the *Athenians*, at their Altar dedicated ἀγνώστῳ Θεῷ, into Chriſtian: He it ſeems, tho' he had never been an Heathen, was not ſo terribly frighted as *Eſtibius* is, at any thing he found amongſt the Heathens agreeable to Chriſtianity, or even conſiſtent with it: But if he means that, ſo far as they held this Doctrin, they were ſtill unconverted Heathens; this brings the Matter to the Old Iſſue, and leaves it there too: for he has advanc'd his Notion without any the leaſt Guard of Proof, unleſs that Parentheſis (*a plain plain Philoſophical Term*) will paſs Muſter; which it will do with none but thoſe who take the Apoſtle without Reſtriction, *Beware leſt any Man ſpoil you thro' Philoſophy.* And indeed, I'm apt to think this Text eſcap'd *Eſtibius*'s Obſervation in this Place, for it wou'd have made an Argument of the firſt Rank in his Book.

Ibid.

Coloſſ. 2. c. 8. v.

All this is but introductory to the Deſign of this Chapter, which by the Contents of it I gueſs'd, was to explode the falſe, but ſtate *true Notion of the Soul*: However, *Eſtibius*'s Adverſaries are never out of his Way, tho' he goes backward in his Subject to attack them. But now to proceed, he propoſes, 1. *To ſhew what he means by Human Soul.* 2. *What is meant by Life; and to inquire whether they are not meant the ſame, according to the true Intent of the Scriptures.* 3. *What is imply'd in the Word Underſtanding, or* Mens, *with the particular and principal Operation thereunto belonging; that is, Reaſon, or Ratiocination.* To ſhew what he means by the

From P. 82. to P. 89.

Pag. 89.

Soul, he defines it three ſeveral Ways; and this the firſt: *Afflatus originaliter inſenſili Materia Divinitus infuſus; quo eadem vivit, ſentit, & ratiocinatur.* Pag. 89. *The Soul*, ſays he, *is a Breath originally infus'd by God into inſenſible Matter; by which it lives, and exerts Senſe and Reaſon.* Now that the Soul of Man is, *originaliter inſenſili Materia Divinitus infuſa; qua eadem vivit, ſentit, & ratiocinatur:* All this I grant, and therefore ſhall paſs by all he ſays upon it, tho' not ſo eaſily to be granted, as when he defines Reaſoning to be, *Impetus quo unumquodque Animal, &c. ad finem obtinendum ſtimulatur;* thus taking it for granted that Brutes have *Reaſon*, tho' I fear it wou'd puzzle him to demonſtrate that they have *Senſe*; yet this he tells us he *will make appear in in its proper Place.* Pag. 97. And within twenty Lines of that, *preſumes he has ſufficiently prov'd* the very ſame thing. Pag. 98. But our only Difference in the Definition, is about the Word *Afflatus* Breath; and I ſuppoſe we differ in this, becauſe I preſume *Eſtibius* will grant it to be inconſiſtent with that *Perſpicuity* requiſite in every Definition, to uſe a *figurative*, and conſequently *ambiguous* Word, as *explanatory.* The Queſtion then is, in which Senſe the Word *Afflatus* ought to be apply'd to the

Human Soul; he ſeems to have been ignorant of this Diſtinction, or to have knowingly dropt it; and in the room of it has ſubſtituted this wiſe one, that *the Soul is not that Breath which belongs to the Lungs.* Pag. 90. And having premis'd thus much as explanatory, proceeds to prove his Senſe of it from *Scripture*, how impertinently, in this Place we have already noted, but ſhall attend a little to it; *Job* 33. *v.* 4. *The ſpirit of God hath made me, and the breath of the Almighty hath given me life.* Our Soul therefore owes its Original to the *Breath of God.* But is this any Reaſon why the Soul ſhou'd be call'd in a ſtrict Senſe, *Breath?* Or if it muſt be ſtrictly ſo call'd, becauſe ſometimes figuratively ſo call'd; I conceive *Breath* is taken figuratively when apply'd to God; and why it muſt not be taken ſo, when apply'd to the Soul, *Eſtibius* may perhaps conceive, but has not expreſs'd. I was recollecting the Uſe of the Word in Scripture, in order to prove that it muſt be underſtood here in a Figurative Senſe: When lo *Eſtibius* preventing me with two to one againſt himſelf, *Job* 4. 9. *The breath of the noſtrils of the Lord ſhall conſume the wicked*; which in my Bible is, *By the blaſt of God they periſh, and by the breath of his noſtrils they are conſumed.* Which plainly relates to their Death; and from hence we may form this Definition of Death, *Mors eſt Afflatus ſenſili Materia Divinitus infuſus, quo eadem inſenſilis redditur.* And is not here a moſt perfect Definition, when that which ſhou'd conſtitute the *Differentia* of it, or diſtinguiſh it from all other things, ſuits as well with the contrary and reverſe of it? The other Text he has unluckily hit upon, is, *Pſal.* 33. 6. *By the word of God were the heavens made, and all the hoſt of them by the breath of his mouth.* So that the Heavens alſo ought to be defin'd *Breath*; whereupon, (not to conſider how clearly this explains to us the Nature of the Heavens, and what Diſcoveries *Eſtibius* might have made thereby, had he bent his Head to *Aſtronomy* or *Phyſics*) I only crave leave to be inform'd, whether the Heavens are a *Subſtance* or Power; and let him reſolve me which way he pleaſes, I am ready to grant that the Soul is as much a *Power* as the Sun, Moon, and Stars are. In ſhort, *Eſtibius* will make nothing of all the Texts he can produce to this Purpoſe, 'till he has inſerted this amongſt his other Demonſtrations, That *Whatſoever is the Effect of Divine Power,* (for that is the plain Senſe of *the Breath of GOD*) *is it ſelf*, in Oppoſition to Subſtance, a *Power*. Thus I have conſider'd all that is in Diſpute between him and me, in his Firſt Definition of the Soul.

The Second Grand Definition, as he calls it, is that of Life; *Actus primarius Materiæ Seminalis, originaliter afflatæ, continuatus*. Which being only a *Continuation* of the ſame ill-grounded and miſtaken Notion of *Breath*. I ſhall have the Reader's leave in paſſing it over unobſerv'd, to ſtand and fall by the former; but perhaps he has advanc'd ſomething farther towards Proof in the Explication of this Definition, and that muſt not be neglected. The firſt Step he takes, is to ſhew that his Adverſary's is the more intelligible Doctrin, and therefore does leſſen the Power of God, in giving and preſerving Life, and therefore is to be rejected; whereas his, which makes *Accidents* do ſuch Feats, as no one cou'd imagin to be done without a *Subſtance*, magnifies his Power, even beyond Conception; and therefore ought to be embrac'd. This is truly the Senſe of that Argument; which perhaps may ſtartle the Reader a little, but is not ſo amazing, as that the Author of it ſhou'd elſewhere *appeal to the Judgment of ſober Men*.

In the next place, he aims to prove, That *Man propagates* his *Species*, or in his Words, *this original* Afflatus *or Power in Seminal Matter*, Pag.78. Pag.104.

from one Generation to another: This ought to have been a little better explain'd, if it were only to ſalve a Contradiction to it, which we had in the preceding Page; there 'tis ſaid, *Life is, and can only be the Product of Omnipotent Power:* I ask therefore, Does Man propagate Life with the *Materia Seminalis*, and is the *Homunculus deliteſcens* therein, alive from the firſt Communication of it? This I ſuppoſe *Eſtibius* will be aſham'd to own, tho' it is the very ſame thing with *Propagating the Original* Afflatus: Or does the Author mean, that Man only communicates Matter fitly diſpos'd to be rais'd, by Nutrimental Accretions, into an Organical Body; and God enlivens it. This is conſiſtent Senſe; but this does not determin whether the *Fœtus* is enliven'd from the Almighty, by a *Power* or a *Subſtance:* Yes, ſays *Eſtibius*, Pag.102. by a *Power*; for in the Caſe of *Abortions, a Man cannot but be ſtruck into a ſtrange Amazement, to think what becomes of that* Subſtantial Spiritual Being, *call'd Soul, that once actuated this little Organical Maſs of Matter, now it is caſt out from the Womb dead; why it did not ſeem too importunate to actuate ſuch a minute Maſs, being a Noble* Spiritual Subſtance. This indeed wou'd look ſomething like an Objection in the Mouth of an Atheiſt, and has in it much of that bold Spirit, which will admit of a Reaſon for nothing, without a Reaſon for every thing: But I am only oblig'd to anſwer *Eſtibius*, and to him I ſay, that as it is his Objection, it gives no Preference to his *Hypotheſis*; but is equally concluſive, if at all concluſive, againſt *Life* and *Soul*, *Power* and *Subſtance*. The Query, as he puts it, is this, What becomes of the Rational Soul, and how came it hither on ſo trifling an Errand? Let us turn it upon himſelf; What becomes of the Life of this Abortive; and why did God exert his Omnipotence upon it to ſo little Purpoſe? If he anſwers, *The Life of it centers again in God*; ſo ſay we, *The Spirit returns to God that gave it*; and we have no more reaſon to conclude any Creature of God's to be *uſeleſs*, for being remov'd from any one *State of Activity*, than we have to believe his Power *vacated*, when in any one Inſtance it is *ſuſpended*. And as for the little Purpoſe to which ſuch a Creature liv'd, our Caſe is the ſame; ſince he attributes all the Noble Properties to Life, which we do to a Living Soul; but with this Difference, that whereas the Objection wou'd make us bring down an Immaterial Being, to too little Purpoſe; it charges him with making God himſelf as it were weaving *Penelope*'s

Web with his own Hand; working, and immediately undoing his own Work. The Truth is, whether as a *Power* or a *Subſtance*, the Abortive liv'd and dy'd by Divine Appointment; and he that will not believe a Providence, until he's able to trace thro' all its Windings; muſt for ever want one Eſſential Qualification of a true Believer in God, which is *Implicit Faith*; and therefore if it were *poſſible*, it wou'd be *in vain* to give ſuch a Man Satisfaction. But I muſt needs ſay, the Objection ill becomes him that owns either *Life*, or *Soul* to proceed from God.

The next thing offer'd for Argument, (for I ſuppoſe the Diſcourſe about *Blood*, *Serum* and *Lympha* is not) is, the Power of the Soul; which according to us, might *Operate as freely and rationally in Mad-Men and Fools.* But to this I think I have fully anſwer'd, *Part* 1. *Sect.* 9. and ſhall not repeat. Of kin to this, is the next Difficulty he ſtarts, *That this* Immaterial Subſtance *ſhou'd be driven out of its* Ancient Habitation, *by ſo many little, trivial and inconſiderable Cauſes*, &c. Under Favour, I ſuppoſe inſtead of *Ancient Habitation*, he ſhou'd have ſaid, *Ancient Title to inhabit there*; for a *Title* I judge is better, and more tenable for being *Ancient*, but not an *Habitation*:

Pag. 107.

Ibid.

But then what Real Title the Soul has, how Ancient ſoever her Poſſeſſion may have been, I know not; I take her to be a Tenant at Will, and thoſe we know very trivial Cauſes ſometimes turn out. But to give ſome Colour to this faint Argument, he urges farther, *When a Spirit has taken Poſſeſſion a long time in other Caſes, we find it a great Difficulty to diſpoſſeſs him; inſomuch that our Saviour's Diſciples complain'd of it; tho' they had an immediate Miraculous Power given them, to eject Spirits and Devils.* Pag. 108. Here, all the Charity I have, will not ſuffer me to think *Eſtibius* ſo indifferent, as to any Author's *turning and wreſting the Scripture*, as he lately profeſs'd to be: But if he was really, tho' I cannot imagin it, ſerious in the Application of this Scripture, I deſire his Farther Thoughts upon it, in Anſwer to Two ſhort Queries; 1. Whether the Diſciples did really exert a *Miraculous Power*; and yet by reaſon of the Deficiency of that, were not able to caſt out the Devil? 2. Whether, in Caſe this *Demoniac* had been ſtruck with a *Sulphureous Blaſt of Lightning*, which is one of *Eſtibius*'s trivial Cauſes, it wou'd not have drove out *Life* and *Devil* together? And if it wou'd, then is it not more difficult to diſpoſſeſs an Evil Spirit, than the Spirit of a Man;

and the ſame trivial Cauſe diſlodging the former, makes the Wonder ceaſe, as to the Departure of the latter.

This is all I can find ſaid upon this Second Definition, that will bear Examination, without leaving our Subject; unleſs we will hearken to the Old Cry, Immaterial Subſtance *may pierce thro' and actuate any incapable Matter, without any Hindrance or Obſtacle: For what ſhou'd hinder a Spirit's penetrating Matter?* And again, *What Obſtruction can Matter make to an* Immaterial Being, *which can penetrate it?* If the Repetition of this Objection, ſo many times, as the Reader will meet with it, throughout *Second Thoughts*, be ſomewhat nauſeous to him, *Eſtibius* is excuſable; for it is the Sting of moſt of his Objections, and he ſeems to uſe it like a reviving Cordial, to any Argument, that is expiring upon his Hands; or elſe he wou'd not methinks uſe it upon Arguments that have ſcarce any Relation to each other.

Pag.111.

Pag.116.

I ſhall not quarrel with him about his Third *Grand Definition* of *Mens* or Mind, which he calls, *Facultas cogitativa ratiocinans*; he may uſe the Word *Mens*, or any other Word, in what Senſe he pleaſes, provided he does but give Warning; upon which Condition, I am

Pag.118.

not deſirous to confine him to the *Jus & norma loquendi*, (which if, as *Horace* tells us, *Uſe* commands, *Mens* ought to have the ſame Acceptation with *Anima*) my chief Buſineſs is to correct his Method of Reaſoning: But when he falls foul upon *De la Forge* and others, for *confounding the Notion of* Mens *and* Anima, he puts me in mind of the *Greek* Proverb, Δίκην ὑφέξει κἂν ὄνος δάκη κύνα· and the *Latin* that anſwers to it, *Rixatur de lana caprina.*

Now let us take a ſhort Review of theſe *Grand Definitions*, and find out if we can, to what Grand End or Purpoſe they ſerve. *The Ancients*, *Eſtibius* tells us, *ſeem to be guilty of great Dotage, as to take no more Notice of* Life, *than to de-* Pag. 114. *fine it to be*, Id *or* Principium, quo vivimus; *which Explication*, he adds, *what Inſtruction it affords to the Inquiſitive Reader, I leave all the World to judge:* And truly for one, I give Judgment on *Eſtibius*'s Side, That no Inſtruction is afforded from this Definition. But then methinks *Eſtibius*, who had with ſuch a piercing Judgment obſerv'd, and diſcover'd the Flaw in this Definition, ſhou'd himſelf have been able, in the Compaſs of 30 or 40 *Pages* ſpent in explaining his own Definitions, to afford us abundance of *Inſtruction* in this Matter: And yet I fear, upon Examination, we ſhall find, we have only been a little amus'd with various Proſpects; but *Eſtibius* has really left us juſt where the Ancients did, which is I can aſſure him much worſe than he found us. When he ſays the *Soul is Life*, we underſtand his Meaning; which in plain *Engliſh* is, *We live without a Soul:* But then, in order to give us a true Notion of the Soul in his Senſe of it, he ought above all things, to have explain'd to us his Notion of *Life*. In the firſt Definition it is ſtil'd *Afflatus*, Breath; which as it ſtands there, is I am ſure not in the leaſt *inſtructive:* For what Connexion there is between the Ideas of *Breath* and *Life*; or what Notion *Breath*, taken in what Senſe you will, gives us of *Life*, I borrow *Eſtibius*'s Words, and *leave all the World to judge:* Nor has he explain'd this, in it ſelf inſignificant Term, by any other beſides *Power*; but ſure *Life* and *Power* are not Terms convertible; for then all *Power*, the *Power* of one Body to move another, wou'd be *Life:* Well then, it muſt be ſome determinate *Power*; and thus *Eſtibius* has determin'd it, *Qua eadem vivit, ſentit, & ratiocinatur.* Now it is certain, and moreover *Eſtibius*'s Opinion, that Senſe, or Senſation is an Effect, or Operation of Life; and, I don't ſay it is certain, but it is his Judg-

Pag. 90.

Pag. 96.

Judgment; that Reaſon is the ſame; for he affirms it to belong, in ſome Degree, to every thing that has Life: So that in ſhort, the Soul, according to him, is in effect defin'd to be, *A Power to Live*; and then the Reſult of all that has been ſaid in this Explanatory Chapter, will amount to this Syllogiſm; *The Soul is a Power to Live; but Life and Soul. are the ſame thing*; Ergo, *Life is a Power to Live.* Now upon Compariſon of theſe two Definitions, *Life is the Principle by which we Live*, and *Life is a Power to Live*, I muſt leave my Reader to chooſe which he will ſtick to, for I muſt confeſs, I cannot chooſe for him: But if he ſhou'd happen to be as indifferent as I am, let him not however recriminate upon *Eſtibius*, *great Dotage*; for I am confident he has explain'd his Notion as far as it wou'd bear. Pag. 97.

And now that we have gone thro' this Chapter, we ſhall hardly make any thing of it, unleſs we look back upon the Contents; where we ſhall find, the Deſign was to have ſet the Author's Hypotheſis *in its true Light*; and that I confeſs the Chapter anſwers. If Difficulties and Perplexities are to his Reader, as they are to *Eſtibius*, as clear and queſtionleſs, as *the Sun and the Moon in the Firmament*. Pag. 82.

After all, we find this Pompous Chapter ſhrunk in the Peruſal, into Three Definitions; which I dare averr, in *Eſtibius*'s his Language, neither make out the *Facility*, nor the *Verity* of his Notion. But, *implenda erat Pagina*, his Friend *Hobbs* ſhew'd him the Way; many Words, and an empty Shew of Learning and Elaborateneſs, as they are fitted for the Uſe of Men of that Perſuaſion, ſo they will keep them in Countenance; and perhaps gain ſome few Proſelytes, tho' the Author may not have ſufficiently conſider'd his own Strength, when he propheſy'd, *It ſhou'd be univerſally entertain'd and taught.*

CHAP. IV.

Containing a full Anſwer to all that he has objected in his Fifth Chapter, to the Receiv'd Doctrin of Human Soul, from Philoſophy.

IT is ſomething of a Difficulty upon a Man, to be oblig'd to conſider, as well what an Objector has not ſaid, as what he has ſaid to the Purpoſe; and yet this Drudgery they muſt undergo, that propoſe to anſwer Men of *Eſtibius*'s Character; for it is not to be ſuppos'd they wou'd deal ſo very much as they do in Foreign and Sophiſticated Ware, without Experience, or ſome reaſonable Hopes at leaſt, that they will paſs with one ſort of Men for ſound Argument. This is all the Apology I have to make to my Reader, for detaining him ſo long from the Merits of the Cauſe; and for following, I hope at a good Diſtance, the Dance that *Eſtibius* has led me, thro' 124 Pages of his Book. But the Contents of this Chapter give us now ſome Hopes, that we have done trifling about the Queſtion; and from nibling at it, are come to argue in good earneſt. *Philoſophy* muſt be own'd to be a very proper Topic to argue from, upon this Subject; but to our Mortification, *Eſtibius* is too great a Genius to be confin'd to Topics; unleſs it may be judg'd a Piece of Philoſophy, to ſet forth the Difficulty of conquering Receiv'd Opinions; and the great Prejudice, with which the Author is apprehenſive he and his Work ſhall be receiv'd. Sure *Prejudice* ſits very ill upon his Stomach, it is ſo often uppermoſt; and by his venting it in ſuch general Terms, I can imagin nothing leſs than this to be his Meaning, That we muſt lay aſide all we ever yet be-

Pa. 126, & 127.

believ'd or underſtood, in order to our underſtanding and believing this Author's Diſcoveries: And if that be the Caſe, it may well ſit uneaſy upon him; and I am perſuaded, after never ſo many Concoctions, will prove his *Crambe* ſtill.

From this Excurſion, he leaps into another about *Ariſtotle*'s Definition of the Soul; tho' as he ſays, it had been diſcuſs'd, *Chap.* 3. and from that, to a moſt elaborate Confutation, in the Compaſs of four Pages, of thoſe that hold Three Souls; [*Vegetative, Senſitive,* and *Rational,*] *All diſtinct, as to Eſſence and Subſtance.* O rem ridiculam, *Cato*, & jocoſam! *Pag.*127. *Pag.*129.

Eſtibius having now diverted himſelf a while with running down a ſmall Number of Philoſophers, proceeds to attack the main Body of them, with the formidable Arms of *Syllogiſm.*

That Being whoſe Eſſential Parts are periſhable, is mortal and corruptible; But the Eſſential Parts of the Soul, viz. *Underſtanding, is periſhable:* Ergo, *The Soul it ſelf is mortal, or corruptible.* Pag.133.

The *Major* Propoſition I grant, nothing can ſubſiſt without its Eſſentials; that is, without that by which it ſubſiſts: So that *Eſtibius* need not have been at the Pains to illuſtrate it, by Fires periſhing when the Heat is deſtroy'd. But the *Minor* I deny, as conſiſting of Two Propoſitions, both which muſt be true, to ſupport it: 1. *That the Underſtanding is an Eſſential to Human Soul:* And, 2. *That it is periſhable either with, or before the Body.*

I. I deny, *That the Underſtanding is Eſſential to the Soul*; conſider'd either in a Proper Senſe, or in *Eſtibius*'s Senſe.

1. Not conſider'd in a Proper Senſe, as it is us'd to ſignifie that Paſſive Faculty of the Soul, which receives Impreſſions and Ideas from Objects; for as ſuch, it is only a Mode of Cogitation; and if Cogitation it ſelf be not Eſſential to the Soul, then neither is any Mode of it.

I know *Des Cartes* places the *Eſſence* of the Soul in *Actual Cogitation*; for this Reaſon I ſuppoſe, That the firſt Notice we have of our Souls, is from a Conſciouſneſs of Cogitation in us, as the Idea of ſomething extended without us, is the firſt Notice we have of the Exiſtence of Matter; in which Attribute of *Extenſion*, he accordingly places the *Eſſence* of Body. I am not concern'd in this latter Controverſy; but granting him his Cauſe in this, he will never gain it in the other; for Extenſion is an *Attribute*, and therefore may be the *Firſt Attribute*; but Actual Cogitation is no more than an *Operation*, which neceſſarily preſuppoſes an *Attribute*, and therefore cannot be one it ſelf: Granting the Philoſopher farther, what he aſſerts, in conſequence of this Principle, That the Soul perpetually Thinks, this does not give it the Character of an *Eſſential Attribute*, any more than Perpetual Motion of the Body, cou'd be call'd the Eſſence of *that*. From which Conſideration, we are oblig'd to take up with one of theſe Concluſions: Either, 1. That the *Eſſence* of the Soul does not conſiſt in *Actual Thought*, but in the *Faculty of it*; and this will do the Objector but little Service, ſince a Faculty may be obſtructed, or ſuſpended in its Operation, without being deſtroy'd: Or we muſt conclude, and I think with greater Probability; 2. That this Faculty of Thinking was *ſuperadded* to the already conſtituted Eſſence of an Immaterial Being, as the only Subſtance capable of that Faculty: And then doubtleſs, on whatever Subſtance the Almighty has conferr'd a Power or Operation, he, or ſufficient Cauſes acting under him, can withdraw the ſame, leaving the Subſtance ſtill in a State of *Numerical Exiſtence*.

This Conſideration proves by the way, That all our Reaſoning is not from *Ideas*, when the Word is us'd in that reſtrain'd Senſe, for the Impreſſions [ſenſible or not] which we receive from the Object: For 'tis plain we have no *Idea* of our Soul, as an immediate Object, beſides that of *Cogitation*; and yet our Reaſon forces us to ſuppoſe and believe a *Subſtratum* or *Subſtance*, in which this Faculty muſt exiſt; and therefore our having no *Idea*, in the forementioned Senſe of the Word, of any Subſtance, is no Objection againſt the Reality of its Exiſtence.

To return, if the Underſtanding in this large Senſe, be not ſo Eſſential, that the Soul muſt periſh with it, much leſs can it be ſo. 2. In that vulgar, but improper Senſe here, in which *Eſtibius* uſes it, *for right Reaſon, or acting rationally*: I wonder who ever maintain'd, Pag. 133. That to Think rationally and conſiſtently, was Eſſential to the Soul in this State; but I humbly conceive, that *Irregular Thoughts*, are *Thoughts* ſtill, even in Mad-Men, or Natural Fools. And ſuppoſing that there are Inſtances of ſuch, who act in no Degree above Brutes, yet *Eſtibius* had before contended, that *Brutes have Reaſon and Underſtanding*, in the ſame Degree in which they have Life: Pag. 97. So that Mad-Men and Fools are either dead, or their Underſtanding is not periſh'd; or laſtly, *Eſtibius* is inconſiſtent with himſelf. And this plainly ſhews, that he has not prov'd his

II. *Prop.* Upon which alſo the Truth of his *Minor* depends, *viz.* That the Underſtanding is periſhable. I am ſure his Ibid. Inſtances of *a Fracture or Contuſion in the Scull*, &c. fall ſhort of Proof; for Men under *Stupor's* or *Delirium's*, have often recover'd to their Senſes; and what then? Did their old Underſtanding periſh, and Nature or the Phyſician infuſe a new one? I do not think it in the Power of either; and *Eſtibius* himſelf often ſays, it is in the Power of none but God. To this Purpoſe, I remember a remarkable Story, which was well atteſted to me, of a Perſon that ſuddenly fell diſtracted, and continu'd ſo for ſome Years; at length coming to himſelf again, he cou'd remember many Paſſages of his Life before his Diſtraction; but the whole time of his Continuance in it ſeem'd to him then, like a great *Blank* or *Hiatus* in his Life; and he had not the leaſt Image of any thing particular in it left on his Memory. I am apt to think it wou'd puzzle *Eſtibius* to prove, upon this Occaſion, that Memory in Man, is ſolvable by Traces in his Brain alone; or to account for it, why the ſtronger, as well as later Impreſſions, in this Man's delirious State, were perfectly eraz'd, and others recover'd. But not to put him upon Solutions we can never expect from him, I think however we may joyn Iſſue with him, in his Appeal *to the common Experience of Mankind, both Phyſicians and Philoſophers eſpecially*; Whether according to their Obſervation in ſuch Caſes, the Underſtanding ſeems to be utterly periſh'd and extinct, while the Perſon is alive; or only obſtructed in its Operations. *Eſtibius* has not offer'd the leaſt Argument for his Side of the Queſtion; and there are ſuch plain Indications to confirm the other, that I wonder a Man ſo tenacious of his own Opinions, ſhou'd ever yield to ſubmit it to Reference.

But this Obſtruction it ſeems, is granting our Cauſe; as thus he proves: *Pag.*134.

That which depends on Matter in Eſſe, Fieri, & Operari, *is corruptible or mortal: But the Soul of Man (whoſe Eſſential Part is own'd to periſh, or decay with its Material Organs) depends on Matter* in Eſſe, &c. Ergo, *The Soul of Man is periſhable or corruptible.*

Here again I deny the *Minor* Propoſition, tho' it is that which he pretends we have before granted; I appeal to all the Phyſicians and Philoſophers in the World, whether to grant that one thing is capable of obſtructing the Operations of another, proves the Dependence of the latter upon the former, both *in Eſſe, Fieri, & Operari*;

but Truth I find is the beſt Vehicle of Falſhood; and a dextrous Mixture often prevents the Diſtinction. Nay I think we do not ſo much as grant it depends on the Body *in Operari*, as he underſtands it, for all the Operations the Soul is capable of exerting. This I take to be his Senſe, when he ſays, there is but one poor Refuge left, *That the Soul of Man has a particular Immateriality, which neceſſarily requires Material Organs to aſſiſt it in its Operations; but what is all this*, ſays he, *but ſtill allowing its Dependency on Matter, as before aſſerted.* Here's a Piece of very groſs Ignorance, or Prevarication; thoſe that maintain ſuch a *particular Immateriality*, do not ſay the Soul is periſhable; but on the contrary, aſſert a *Neceſſity* upon it, as well as a *Capacity* in it, to inform *another Vehicle*, after its Departure out of *this*; and thus it's true they ſuppoſe the Soul depends, in its Operation, upon the Inſtrumental Aſſiſtance of ſome organiz'd Matter: But if this be the *Dependence before aſſerted* by *Eſtibius*, he aſſerted nothing to prove the Soul's Mortality: For ſurely there is a wide Difference between the Aſſertion of thoſe, who hold a Dependence of the Soul (in its Intellectual Operations) on *ſome Material Vehicle*; and that of thoſe, who hold its Dependence on *this Body.* I cannot think *Eſtibius* drop'd the Diſtinction, with any Hopes his Reader wou'd take it up.

Thus we find the Dependence of the Soul, in its Operations, on this, or any Body, when rightly underſtood, does not at all invalidate the Exiſtence of it, in a State of Separation from this Body.

Yes, ſays *Eſtibius*, for *Operation* Ibid. *being the Eſſence of an active Being, (as no Man knows another to have a Soul, but by its Operations) it does depend likewiſe, Quoad Eſſe.* Which Argument, we may obſerve, takes it for granted, that the Soul is an *Operation*, and not a *Subſtance*; and then indeed it is a true Philoſophical Inference, its Dependence upon Matter *in Eſſe*, as well as *Operari*: But how does he prove it to be only an Operation? *Becauſe no Man knows another to have a Soul, but by its Operations.* I have already ſaid enough to this Argument, in my Anſwer to the firſt Syllogiſm: But let me ask *Eſtibius* a Queſtion, for Information's ſake, in his own Way; I ſuppoſe no Phyſician is ſo ignorant, as to doubt there is ſuch a Fluid in Human Body, as we call *Animal Spirits*, or ſo credulous as to think he ever felt, heard, or ſaw them; How then does he know they exiſt? By their Operations only? By the Conveyance of Senſation, and thoſe Fermentations which they raiſe in the Body? Why then they are only an Operation, and not a Part of our Material Subſtance; they are not made, as *Eſtibius* from the old Philoſophers phraſes it, *ex Materia tanquam Principio conſtitutivo*; but, *ex Materiæ Gremio*. And when I have had his *Second Thoughts* concerning *Animal Spirits*, demonſtrating the receiv'd Notion of their being purer Parts of the Blood ſeparated, to be a plain Heatheniſh Invention, *&c.* I ſhall give up this Anſwer, and endeavour to anſwer him ſome other Way.

But after all, we find both theſe Arguments, that of the Underſtanding periſhing, and this Subtile Metaphyſical Notion of Dependence *in Eſſe, Fieri, & Operari*, are but New Dreſſes put upon the Old Objection: The Firſt is clos'd with this Obſervation; *The Underſtanding, or Reaſoning Faculty, the Eſſence of a Spiritual Soul, capable undoubtedly of penetrating Matter*, &c. And he puts the chief Streſs of the Second upon this: *For Material (as I have oft had Occaſion to mention it as an* Axiom *of undoubted Truth) cannot hinder or controll Immaterial.* But having as oft had Occaſion to ſay, that I have fully anſwer'd this Objection in my Firſt Part; and clearly prov'd

Ibid.

Ibid.

prov'd, that whatever Difficulties may attend the conceiving Soul and Body ſo united, that there ſhall be a Reciprocal Action and Paſſion; they are not greater than thoſe that attend our Conception, of another ſort of unqueſtionable Union; and therefore they can be no Objection againſt other concluſive Arguments; unleſs we will reject what we do apprehend, only for the ſake of what we do not: Having fully clear'd this great Point before, I have nothing to add to it here, or for the future, but only to point to the Reader where *Eſtibius*'s Argument turns upon it; and I am confident he neither has, nor ever can prove ſuch a Dependence of Human Soul on the Body, as he pretends to prove, by any *Argument* from Reaſon; but which depends entirely on this one miſtaken Notion, of its *Eſſe*, *Fieri*, *& Operari*.

But this muſt not prevent our Examination of the next Objection, to prove the Dependence of the Soul upon the Body *in Fieri*, as well as *Eſſe & Operari*; which my Author has put into this Form: *That which is generated from the Seminal Principle of the Parent, depends on Matter* in Fieri, *as to its Make and Original; but the Soul of Man is generated from the Seminal Principle of the Parent, therefore the*

Pag. 137.

the Soul of Man depends on Matter, &c. The *Minor* being the *Propoſition* to be deny'd, he proceeds to prove it thus; *If a Parent from a Seminal Principle generate Man, then he generates the Soul, as well as Body of Man; for neither Soul nor Body ſeparately are Man; but a Parent from*, &c. *generates Man:* Ergo, *&c.*

I muſt confeſs there is ſcarce a *Novice* in Philoſophy, but who is furniſh'd with a prompt Anſwer to this thredbare Objection, if his Opponent ſhou'd fall ſo low as to urge it; and yet, as it is manag'd by *Eſtibius*, there is ſomething in it not unworthy our Obſervation. But for our better underſtanding of this Matter, it will be requiſite to premiſe what we mean by *Generation*, taken both *abſolutely* as to all Animals, and *relatively* to Mankind; *a due Repreſentation of the Object*, being not only, as *Eſtibius* has diſcover'd to the World, *the Foundation of Belief*, but a Foundation for an Anſwer to almoſt all his own Objections.

All that we know of *Generation*, may be thus defin'd; *Ea Animalis actio, qua ex ſemine maris & fœminæ concurrentium, ſimile producitur Animal.* But this it muſt be own'd is only a *Nominal* Definition; and however it explains the Action, yet it leaves the *Effect* or *Product* (which was the chief thing to be explain'd) as unintelligible as before; for the Queſtion is not how ſuch an Organical Body was rais'd out of Seminal Matter, (in that it differs not from Vegetation,) but how it came to be enliven'd; and this I am confident it is impoſſible, not only to explain to our Imagination, but to convince our Reaſon that it cou'd ever be the Effect of any *Animal Action*: For firſt, it is not conceivable that the Male or Female ſhou'd communicate Part of their Life, with that Part of their Body call'd *Semen*; or that this *Semen* or *Animalculum deliteſcens* in it, is any more alive than *Plantula deliteſcens* in the Seed of an Herb: This I ſuppoſe is equally agreeable to Experiments, and the Reaſon of the Thing. Next, I ſay it is utterly impoſſible, that by the Coition of Senſeleſs Particles, of what determinate Texture, and in what Motion ſoever, *Senſation* and *Life* ſhou'd be produc'd; we may as well ſuppoſe that a Sound ſhou'd raiſe the Senſe of Hearing, in a Sonorous Body; or that Flowers ſhou'd be affected with their own Fragrancy: And therefore as the producing of *Senſation* and *Life* in ſtupid and inſenſible Matter, is really the bringing ſomething out of nothing, and as ſuch, is properly and only the Object of Creative Power; ſo thoſe that believe all Animals to be indu'd with Senſe, muſt recur to this Principle in the *Generation* of them. *Eſtibius* therefore, who takes it for granted that Brutes are not Machins, has overſhot himſelf a little in his *Comparative Generations*; *We ſhall find*, ſays he, *without any Contradiction of Philoſophers, that an Horſe generates an Horſe, a Dog his likeneſs*; he adds indeed, *as to Matter and Form*; in which latter Term I ſuppoſe he includes Life, which I am ſo far from finding, that I find it impoſſible: But if by Form he means only the Texture, and Configuration of Material Parts, then I confeſs the Compariſon holds, and thus far Man and Beaſt *generate* alike; and farther than this, neither can Act, or produce any Effect. Pag.138.

Next we muſt explain what we mean by the *Generation* of Man; and that is in ſhort, when underſtood with regard to the Parent, the ſame with the *Generation* of all other Animals; which is, *An Organical Body, rais'd from a Seminal Principle, and enliven'd*: But when underſtood at large, implies the *Union of his Soul and Body.*

Now I aſſert, and have prov'd, that *Generation*, whether of Man or any other Animal, ought properly and Philoſophically, to be underſtood only of the *raiſing*, not *enlivening* the Organical Body; being us'd relatively to the Parent, as an Effect to its Efficient Cauſe; and therefore when either *Life* or *Soul* are included, ought to be term'd *Propagation*; to which the Parent concurs no farther than as an Occaſional Cauſe.

So that *Eſtibius* himſelf muſt be forc'd to quit that Vulgar Senſe, in which he uſes the Word in his Syllogiſm, unleſs he can firſt prove that Man has a Power of communicating Life to his Offspring: I know he has aſſerted, that *according to the Courſe of Second Cauſes, Man propagates this Original* Afflatus *or Power in Seminal Matter, from one Generation to another.* Pag. 104. And again, that *the Power of Life is in all Seminal Matter, and that that Matter wou'd always become a living Creature, did not ſome occaſional Impediment or Obſtruction intervene, which hindred the production of the ſame into an Animal.* Which latter Part of the Sentence, if understood conſiſtently with the former; Pag. 116, & 117. muſt imply, that all Seminal Matter will of it ſelf, and by Mechanical Power enliven, when brought to Maturity. To this Purpoſe, *Eſtibius* indeed has aſſerted in many Places of his Book; but he muſt excuſe me, if the Rules of Diſpute will not ſuffer me to be ſo mannerly, as to take his Word for an Argument; and I am ſure he has not offer'd, throughout his large Performance, at the leaſt Proof of this Poſition. But this is not all, he has advanc'd a bold, and yet bare Aſſertion, againſt very ſtrong Reaſon, and Preſumption to the contrary. Cou'd he make it appear, that God did enliven the dead Maſs of *Adam*'s Body, without uniting the Active Principle of a Soul to it, he ought not, for this Reaſon, to have given *Adam* the Power of propagating this *Afflatus* to his Offspring; I have already ſhewn, that neither is the *Semen* alive, nor can Life poſſibly reſult from any *Coition* or *Fermentation of it:* How then did *Adam* communicate this Power? Not by his own *Semen*. Did he then Literally blow Life into *Cain*, thro' his Noſtrils; as *Eſtibius* ſuppoſes God to have done into the Noſtrils of *Adam?* It's true, he may as reaſonably ſuppoſe the one as the other: But then, How will he account for the Continuance of Human Race, ſince that Way of getting Children has been left off? *Pag. 91.*

Beſides, if Man *be ſuch a curious Piece of Mechaniſm, as ſhews only an Almighty Power cou'd be the firſt and ſole Artificer*; viz. *To make a Reaſoning Engin out of dead Matter*, &c. then, if the *Semen* be dead Matter at the Inſtance of its *Pag.123.*

Communication or Commixture, here is ſtill the ſame Almighty Power neceſſarily requir'd for the enlivening this *Semen*, that there was for the enlivening that Part of Matter which conſtituted *Adam*'s Body; for the *Semen* is no nearer Life, for having an Human Shape lurking in it, than was the *Duſt* from which *Adam* was taken.

Laſtly, If *Adam* had the Power of Life communicated from God alone in a Supernatural Manner, it is impoſſible to conceive how he cou'd recommunicate the ſame, without loſing it himſelf, and ſo dying; as 'tis fabulouſly related of the *Eagle* and *Pelican*, in the Production and Nouriſhment of his own Offspring; and this not for want of Power in God, but Capacity in *Adam*; for the Power is no leſs than *Creative*, or which is the ſame, *Miraculous*; and juſt thus I find it expreſs'd by *Eſtibius* himſelf; *He that cou'd make Man, nay this whole viſible World out of nothing, and make Iron ſwim, contrary to its nature, cou'd by his Word give Life to dead, ſtupid, and inſenſible Matter.* Pag.163. I ſuppoſe *Eſtibius* will not diſpute it, whether the Creative Power be communicable to a Creature; and I can aſſure him the ſame is true of the Miraculous Power. In Scripture we find, that God often uſes a Creature as the Inſtrument, or rather Sign and Token of a Miracle; but in all ſuch Caſes the Efficiency is peculiarly his own, and nothing can unfix the Laws of the Creation, but the Immediate Power, that enacted and ratify'd them.

By all which it appears, that had *Eſtibius* underſtood the true Meaning and Extent of his own *Hypotheſis*, he wou'd not have made the Objection of *Generation*; for that wou'd have led him to aſſert that *Life* can no more be a *Seminal Product*, than an *Immaterial Subſtance* can; but that the ſame Power which firſt enliven'd *Adam*'s Body, muſt go along with all his Seminal Communications, in order to enliven every ſucceeding *Fœtus*: And conſequently upon this, had the Syllogiſm been objected to him, he muſt have ſaid, that Man's *generating* Man is a Figurative Expreſſion, of the Part for the Whole. He might have farther alledg'd, that in a Controverſy of this Nature, whether Life is produced immediately by God or the Parent, in which the Senſes are not Judges, and much leſs is the Generality of Mankind; that it is highly ridiculous, and unbecoming a Philoſopher, to appeal to a vulgar Expreſſion, intended to denote no more than what is ſenſible in the Caſe: *viz.* That upon Coition of Male and Female, Man is begotten. But I am at a perfect Loſs for a Plea, for *Eſtibius*'s uſing the Argument on his own behalf; and this in a Chapter of Philoſophy, where he ſhou'd not have acted either the *Pedant*, or *Sophiſt*, in playing upon Words, and perverting the Senſe of a vulgar and harmleſs Expreſſion, *the Father begets the Son*, which I dare ſay was never calculated for a *Maxim* in Controverſy. *Eſtibius* ſeems not to have ſmelt out any thing of this Matter, or elſe ſure, of all his Arguments he wou'd not have honour'd this *poor Quibble*, ſo much beyond its deſerts, as to give it the Character of being *built on a ſolid Foundation*. Pag.138.

By this time I preſume I may truſt any Man to anſwer this mighty Syllogiſm to himſelf, and proceed to conſider *Eſtibius*'s Paraphraſe and Illuſtration upon it: Firſt, he ſays Man cannot be ſaid to *generate Firſt Matter*; and for this moſt profound, as well as unanſwerable Reaſon, that it is *ingenerable*: In the next Place, inquiring into the *Generation of Second Matter*, he deals a little diſhonourably with us, in forcing us to hold Three diſtinct Souls; one extinct upon the ſupervening of another; or rather he deals not at all with us, unleſs that be a Confutation of our Opinion, to joyn with us in confuting another. *Pag.*139. *Ibid.*

But in the next Paragraph he ſeems to aim at ſomething; to thoſe who ſay a Man generates a Man, by cauſing the Union of Soul and Body; *What Reaſoning is this*, Pag. 140. in the name of Wonder! replys *Eſtibius, to generate an Union, which is an Accident*, &c. But ſoftly, Sir: Are not all the Changes that Matter is ſuſceptible of, accidental to it? And reflect, I beſeech you, if not in too much haſte, What is *Life* according to You, but a *Power*, and what is a *Power* but an *Accident*; and how is this Accident produc'd in Human Body, in the ordinary Courſe, but by *Generation?* If this Reaſoning be ſo very ſtrange and amazing, you however ought to be no Stranger to it.

Other *Pſychomuthiſts* ſay, that Man in *Generation* ſupplys *Materia proxima*; to Ibid. which you reply, that *a New Form, as well as Matter, is requiſite*; and to which I rejoyn, that no Matter is ſupply'd without Form; and in the Human Seed, ſome People talk of an *Homunculus deliteſcens*.

Here *Eſtibius* thinks fit to interrupt the Chain of his Reaſoning, with an Authority or two; the firſt is from *Ariſtotle*, in Pag. 141. theſe words; Τὸ μὲν ἄῤῥην παρέχεται τότε εἶδος, καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς κινήσεως, τὸ δὲ θῆλυ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ὕλην· *That is to ſay,* ſays my Author, *Man in Generation gives the Form, Image, or Beginning of Motion,* [or Life;] *the Female ſupplys Body, or Matter; plainly intimating, that between both Matter and Form, call'd Soul and Body, are ſupply'd.* I cannot charge *Eſtibius* with the Fault that *Horace* found in ſome Tranſlators, who were ſo over-faithful to the Original, as to render word for word; for he, I muſt own, has taken the Liberty which *Horace* wou'd not, I conceive, allow to Tranſlators, *quidlibet audendi*; for I can call it no leſs, to make *Ariſtotle* ſpeak what he never meant, nay contrary to his own Meaning in abundance of Places: And to prove this, it is ſufficient to obſerve, that *Ariſtotle* never ſpeaks, throughout his Works, of the *Generation of Human Soul*; but ſuppoſing, and proving it to be of a ſimple uncompounded Nature, as I have clearly prov'd from him, muſt of neceſſity except the Human Soul, from being generated in common with Bodies. But to this *Eſtibius* replys, If *Ariſtotle* will contradict himſelf, who can help it? Are not his Words expreſs and particular? *Man in Generation gives the Form*, &c. Very true, *Eſtibius*, your Words, are indeed expreſs and particular of Human Generation. But who taught you to tranſlate ἄῤῥην, *Man*; not your *Lexicon* I am ſure, nor any approved Author; and I believe, every ordinary *Lexicon* you can conſult, will tell you that it ſignifies the *Male,* not only of Brutes as well as Men, but, as ſome uſe it, is apply'd to Vegetables too: I think I have very good reaſon to ſend you back to School upon this Occaſion, for otherwiſe I muſt call in Queſtion your Sincerity: Had this Paſſage been tranſlated, *the Male in Generation gives the Form,* the *Engliſh* Reader wou'd have quickly diſcover'd the Impertinence of the Quotation, and in all likelihood have gueſs'd right, that *Ariſtotle* was not ſpeaking a word of Man or Woman in that Place. The other Quotation is out of *Sennertus, Literæ Sacræ teſtantur Deum juſſiſſe, ut non ſolum Animalia alia, ſed & Homo, ſibi ſimile generaret.* Whatever was *Sennertus*'s Notion of it; it is certain, that Man's propagating his Kind, in the Language of Scripture, does not imply his Generating the Soul; for he may poſſibly have as much to do in this, as any other Animal has, and yet the Product of both may be enliven'd, after a different Manner, by a Superior Principle. And as to the Meaning of *Sennertus*, whether he intended hereby to derive the Human Soul *ex Traduce*, or not; for the Words are plainly open to another Conſtruction, I am not ſo ſolicitous, as to conſult him: For I cannot pay that Veneration to the Authority of any one Phyſician in the Interpretation of Scripture, as to turn my Judgment againſt the almoſt unanimous Senſe of Divines; tho' *Sennertus* was a Man of that comprehenſive Knowledge, that his Practice ought not to countenance others, to go ſo very far *beyond their Laſt.* If *Eſtibius* has no better Vouchers than theſe two, it had been more to his Advantage to have gone ſmoothly on with Reaſons; unleſs perhaps he imagin'd, that thoſe who cou'd be convinc'd by his Reaſons, were proper Perſons to be guided by ſuch Authorities as his. But to proceed.

If Man did not generate Form [Rational Soul] *at the very Inſtant of Conception, then the Husband dying before Organization perfected, for the Reception of the Rational Soul, doth not leave his Wife impregnated with Man, but only* Animal *or* Animalculum; *and conſequently, ſhe cou'd not bear or bring forth a Rational Creature:* Ergo. Pag. 142. This Argument, ſo far as I can judge, may be good, 'till we come to, *and conſequently*; then indeed it ſeems to fail: But to ſupply that Defect, *Eſtibius* ſays, it forces his Adverſaries to recur to that abſurd Opinion before confuted, of

Infundendo creatur Anima, & creando Infunditur; or, *makes the Dead Generate by ſome Aſtral Spirit*, &c. As to Ibid. thoſe that hold this latter Opinion, whether they are *Eſtibius*'s Enemies or not, I cannot judge, nor whether any Two, to me Unintelligible Notions, are oppoſite or conſiſtent: But this I obſerve, that *Eſtibius* ſtill plays upon the Word *Generation*; as if we ſuppos'd the Father had not done his Part in it, till the Union of Soul and Body commences.

As to other Recourſe to *Infundendo creatur, &c.* here *Eſtibius* has vindicated his Title-Page; for if each Member of his Argument may be allow'd to take all the reſt for granted; and who ſhall hinder it, ſo long as the *Preſs* is open? the whole will amount to *Demoſtration. Eſtibius* ſends his Reader back to *Chap.* 3. But I preſume my Reader to be fully ſatisfy'd in this Point.

The next, and laſt Philoſophical Argument, is juſt ſuch another Philoſophical Sham upon his Reader; there are but Three *Hypotheſes* of the Origin of Human Soul, *Immediate Creation, Præexiſtence*, and *Traduction*: The Firſt, as he has told us before, that he had confuted it before, Pag.143. muſt be abſurd; beſides, the Firſt *Creation terminated the whole Buſineſs* *of the Creation*; which as I ſhew'd, *Chap.* 2. may be alledg'd againſt *Immediate Creation*, but not for *Traduction*; and as to *Præexiſtence* or *Infuſion*, as *Eſtibius* terms it, that alſo he had confuted before; ſo that there remains only *Generation* or *Traduction* to be embrac'd. Thus we find *Eſtibius*'s *prolific* Way of Reaſoning; one Argument with him, as well as one Man can beget another; and without loſing any thing of its own, impart Life and Soul to it. But not to reiterate Old Arguments, without ſome little Improvement, we have this farther Conſideration, That either of the foremention'd *Hypotheſes center the whole* Ibid. *Buſineſs of Generation, in the immediate Power of an Omnipotent Being, without any Reference had to Second Cauſes*: But truly I think the Argument wou'd have appear'd as well in the Old Dreſs; for I cannot but eſteem it a very great *Reference had to Second Cauſes*, that Human Body ſhou'd be form'd by a Seminal Coition; and that upon ſuch a Formation perfected, God ſhou'd always pleaſe to unite a Soul to it. Well, *but it does not appear* Pag.144. *that God has done ſo*; and if it be demanded of *Eſtibius*, how far that proves he has not done it, he has a Reference at hand; *rather the contrary, as I* Ibid. *will prove in the following Chapters*:

So that the whole Streſs of the preſent Argument lyes, partly on what has been, and partly on what ſhall be prov'd; and that I take to be a Demonſtration, that it has no Foundation of its own.

CHAP. V.

Containing a full Anſwer to all that he has advanc'd to prove his Point from Right Reaſon.

IF Beginnings are ominous, and a Man might judge of the *Furniture* by the *Front* of a Treatiſe, we cou'd look for no leſs than an intire *Syſtem of Demonſtrations* in our Author's Sixth Chapter, wherein he is to make good his Poſition from Right Reaſon: For it is introduc'd with a general and pompous Preface, concerning *the Dictates of Right Reaſon,* Pag.145. (I ſhou'd have call'd them the Principles of Science) ſuch as that, *Two contradictory Propoſitions cannot be true*, &c. But let us carry this comfortable Reflexion along with us; we have felt, without much hurt, the weight and Force of his *Philoſophic* Arguments, and that is no ſmall Preſumption, that all his Force of Reaſon is reſiſtible: For methinks *Philoſophy* and *Reaſon*, in a Subject of this Nature, are ſo near a-kin, that I cannot underſtand by what Rules of Method, *Eſtibius* diſtinguiſh'd them, as Two Heads of Argument; unleſs indeed they do lye diſtinguiſh'd in his Head; that is, unleſs his Philoſophy is *irrational*, and his Reaſon *unphiloſophical*. However, we muſt not ſlight any thing he produces for Argument, eſpecially in the *Axiomatical* Way; for *Axioms* are of common *Right*, as well as *Truth*; and any Man that thinks he has a ſufficient Fund, may build upon them: Far be it therefore from me, to diſpute *Eſtibius*'s Right, in his *Dictates of Reaſon*; or in what he quotes from *Grotius*, in Three Propoſitions: 1. That the Right of Nature (as to Man) conſiſts in the Agreeableneſs or Diſagreeableneſs of a Thing to the Rational Nature; with regard, he means, to the Moral Neceſſity, or Turpitude of it. 2. That ſome things there are ſo circumſtantiated, as to become of Natural Right, becauſe not repugnant to it; by the ſame Reaſon that an Action is call'd juſt, becauſe not unjuſt. And laſtly, That thoſe Things alſo are of Natural Right, which in Reaſon have the Preference to their Oppoſites: And to theſe he adds, as a Truth of equal Clearneſs and Moment, his own Definition of Right Reaſon; which we have conſider'd already, and ſhewn it to be ill-grounded, *Chap.* 3.

But our Buſineſs in this Place, is to examin the Proof, that *Eſtibius* has rear'd upon theſe Foundations, as to the Point in Hand: And the firſt thing he has attempted is, the *Agreeableneſs of the Mortality of Human Soul to a Rational Nature:* which *Propoſition* he endeavours to ſupport by this Syllogiſm, Pag. 150. *That Doctrin or Belief is moſt agreeable to a Rational Nature, which is moſt eaſy to be comprehended and underſtood, as having in it more probable Grounds of Truth: But the Doctrin of the Mortality of Human Soul is more eaſy to be comprehended; and has in it more probable Grounds of Truth, than the Immortality: Ergo.* The *Minor Prop.* which we deny, is compounded of Two others; which in *Eſtibius*'s Language, may be term'd the *Facility*, and the *Verity* of the Notion. The only Proof offer'd at upon the Firſt, is this; *For it is more eaſy to be comprehended, that a Mortal Principle ſhou'd be joyn'd to a Mortal,* Pag. 151. *and both equally periſhable; than that an Immortal one ſhou'd be joyn'd to a Mortal one,* &c. *according to that Notion of Union*

Union amongſt the Heathens, Simile gaudet ſibi ſimili; Angl. *Birds of a Feather, flock together.* But this will not ſtand the Teſt, unleſs he will be content to pull down another Demonſtration of his own erecting; for ſpeaking of the Honour and Power that his *Hypotheſis* aſcrib'd to God, it was agreeable to his *Rational Nature* to argue thus; *For to make an Immaterial Spiritual Being*, *whoſe very Notion implies Activity, to be the Principal of all Operations in Man*, *is far more eaſily conceivable to be done, than to create an Active Power in dull*, *heavy*, *unactive Matter*; *by which it is enabled to perform all thoſe Noble Operations it doth. Thus, inſtead of a Reflexion or Derogation to an Omnipotent Agent*, &c. Pag. 101. 'Tis true, he has taken Care that theſe Contradictory Arguments keep a good Diſtance from each other; but they cannot be at ſo great a Diſtance, as not to claſh. Here are two contradictory *Propoſitions* laid down, about the Origin of Human Life and Reaſon; the one, That *God has infus'd that Power into ſtupid Matter*; the other, That *He has joyn'd an Active Immaterial Principle to it.* Now to plead for the Firſt of theſe, becauſe more unintelligible, and above our Apprehenſion, and therefore more magnifying of the Power of the Creator; and again, to

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plead for the ſame *Propoſition* becauſe more intelligible, and eaſy to be conceiv'd, and ſo more agreeable to the Belief of a Rational Nature, is a full Contradiction *ad idem:* For it is the ſame *Medium*, *viz.* the Nature of the Thing, tho' directed to different Ends, *viz.* the Power of GOD, and Human Capacity; that is made both *more*, and *leſs* conceivable. My Advice therefore to *Eſtibius* is, to give up both Arguments for the future, and not to bewilder himſelf farther in a fruitleſs Reconciliation: He had better ſtick to his laſt Vindication, that in Works of ſuch Bulk Contradictions may eſcape an Author; tho' I muſt confeſs it ſeldom happens, that ſo very flat and palpable Contradictions fall from the ſame Pen, that is employ'd only in the Proſecution of Truth, in the moſt prolix Work.

It is not to upbraid him with this Contradiction, which others have obſerv'd before me, that I have mention'd it; but for this good Purpoſe, to convince *Eſtibius*, that ſince both Parts of it appear'd to him with the Face of an Argument, or I charitably ſuppoſe he wou'd not have made uſe of both, tho' it be impoſſible that both ſhou'd be true, as we are told at the Entrance of this Chapter; Therefore, as ſome things are more credible for being more *intelligible*; ſo others may be more credible, not becauſe they are more *unintelligible*, but notwithſtanding that they are ſo; for they may appear in different Lights, that of *Internal*, and that of *External* Evidence; and if the Light of *External* Evidence ſhines brighter upon one Part, than that of *Internal* Evidence does upon the Contradictory Part of the Queſtion; the Underſtanding muſt follow the greater Light, if another of his own *Axioms* be true, that *a Man cannot believe what he will.*

But tho' this Argument is too weak to ſupport it ſelf, yet it may do Service, if that which is joyn'd with it prove a ſound ſubſtantial Argument; for it is added, in the *Minor Propoſition*, that this Doctrin of his *has in it more probable Grounds of Truth*: And I ſhou'd willingly ſubſcribe, if *Eſtibius*'s whole Work cou'd make out this one *Propoſition.* But here I confine my Anſwer to what is here urg'd. I ſuppoſe he will not lay much Streſs upon the foremention'd Proverb, *Simile gaudet ſibi ſimili*; which he ſays was the Heathens Notion of Union; for that they did not make this as a Report of Fact, in the Productions of Nature, is evident from hence, that it was their Opinion, and no leſs generally receiv'd, that all Bodies reſulted from the Compoſition of jarring and contradictory Elements. But this Proverbial Argument of my Author's, undoubtedly took its riſe from the Obſervation of a Ferment and Conflict, attending the Mixture of Heterogeneous Bodies; but ſtill *Nature*, as well as *Art*, preſcribes by a *Miſce*, *fiat*; tho' *Eſtibius*, for Argument's ſake, is content to be reduc'd to *Simples*.

However, Reaſon failing, he has the ſame Refuge of Scripture, which ſupports his Reaſons, juſt as his Reaſons do that. He has furniſh'd himſelf with ſeven or eight Texts to prove, what I will never deny, that *Life*, meaning Future and Immortal, *is promis'd to the Righteous*; his Inference is, *Now what wou'd that ſignify to a good Chriſtian, who has already his better Part, the Soul, alive*, &c. *it wou'd be no Gift to him, nor an Obligation*, &c. To which I anſwer: 1. An Immortal Soul is, in it ſelf, a Superlative Gift of God to Mankind. 2. The Gift is more eſpecially owing to that Scripture-Revelation, as it was deliver'd by the Son of God, with a Miraculous Atteſtation to the Truth of his Miſſion. 3. Life, as it is oppos'd in Scripture to Eternal Death or Miſery, muſt chiefly relate to the Happineſs of it; and that Gift, as it was not ſufficiently underſtood, or generally be-

Pag.152.

believ'd by the Power of Natural Reaſon, which GOD had given, and Man had impair'd; ſo it was by a *new* and full *Aſſurance*, become a *new Gift*: And eſpecially if we conſider: 4. That the forfeited Title to this Happineſs, was by the Goſpel, and the Author of it, reſtor'd and renew'd to Mankind. If *Eſtibius* is a Stranger to all this, he has read the Bible over to very little, if any good Purpoſe.

His Second Argument is to this Senſe, that his Doctrin contains in it no Moral Turpitude, becauſe it is not repugnant to the Law of God; that is, as he explains himſelf, to Scripture; but this, ſays he, *I ſhall not pretend to urge by farther Proof in this Place:* And I hope, where he has not anticipated his Proof, the Reader will excuſe me for poſtponing his Objection. Pag. 153.

His next is this: *That Belief which leads us to Superſtition, we cannot lawfully follow; but the Belief of a Spiritual Soul in Man leads us to Superſtition, as being the true Grounds of Praying for the Dead, feigning a Purgatory*, &c. Ergo. Juſt, ſay I, as the Tranſlation of the Bible has made ſome, that cou'd not otherwiſe have *read over the whole Bible*, nor have been ſuch Heretics as they are; and juſt, as the Pag. 154.

Goſpel is to be rejected, becauſe others, as well as the *Romaniſts*, have built upon it *Straw* and *Stubble.*

It follows, tho' it has gone before, as a new Argument, that that his Doctrin contains neither *Contradiction, Impoſſibility*, nor *Improbability:* We have conſider'd the two firſt of theſe in a former Part; and to thoſe who alledge his Doctrin is improbable, he returns this, and only this Anſwer; *Contrary to this, I prove, becauſe it is grounded on Philoſophy, Reaſon and Scripture*; and conſequently, a *Rational Man ought to embrace this Belief.* Ibid.

Et ſic redit labor actus in orbem.

But the next Argument is inſiſted upon at large, from *Pag.* 156, to *Pag.* 173. which therefore I ſuppoſe he depends upon, as his ſtrongeſt Reaſon; and even to ſupport this, he's forc'd to encroach upon his Scripture-Proof. It is taken from the Parity, he is pleas'd to make between Man Beaſt in their Death; tho' he pretends to ground it on the Divine Appointment, and that on Scripture. I ſhall conſider the particular Texts, where they ought to have been urg'd. In the interim I remark, That if there be any Scripture, which ought to be abſolutely and literally underſtood, that Death makes as full an End of Man as of Brutes, (to prove which, is the full Deſign of his Appeal to Scripture) then they equally exclude a *Reſurrection of the Body*, with the *Surviving of the Soul*: This I ſay is an inevitable Conſequence, if they are to be underſtood, as they are propos'd by him, without any Reſtriction at all; and if he return, that they muſt be reſtrain'd in their Senſe, by thoſe other Texts which promiſe a Reſurrection; then ſo muſt they be reſtrain'd by thoſe, which either promiſe or ſuppoſe, the Intermediate State. By which, and many more Inſtances already obſerv'd, the Reader plainly ſees in what Method *Eſtibius*'s Arguments are drawn up: Not to *follow*, but (by a new Way of Reaſoning) to *recoil* and *turn back* upon each other; and this muſt convince him at laſt, that, altogether, they *turn* upon nothing.

But *Eſtibius* returns to his Reaſon again, and argues, that the Parity of Ratiocination in them and us, concludes a Parity of Immortality; which yet we deny. *Pag.* 159. But, 1. How does he prove that they have Ratiocination? Why from his own Definition of Reaſon, which the great Maſter of Philoſophy *Eſtibius* (to whoſe Authority all the Divines in the World are as much oblig'd to ſubmit, as they were to *Ariſtotle*'s Authority) has extended to *unumquodque Animal.* But to wave all the trifling-work about the *Specific Difference between Man and Beaſt*; as if the Nature of Things were ty'd to Terms of Science, and not on the contrary; and to leave theſe fine-ſpun Arguments, to prove that Brutes have *Reflex Operations* of their Mind, and do apprehend *Singularia & Materialia,* and have a Will, ſometimes an obſtinate one: Leaving all this to the Reader's Diverſion, if he wants it, in *Second Thoughts*, I ſhall endeavour to give a ſatisfactory Anſwer, in few Words, to this Objection; which, I know not why, has been look'd upon by ſome, as the moſt conſiderable.

It is well known, that thoſe who maintain the Immortality of Human Soul, are divided in their Opinion of the Soul of Brutes: Some thinking it purely Material, and Mechanically acted; others that they have Senſation, and in ſome degree, Thought; and conſequently are acted by ſome Immaterial Subſtance. I think either Party may main their Ground againſt this Opinion: The firſt ſort confeſs it to be a wonderful Inſtance of the Divine Workmanſhip, that ſuch curious Machins, and Mimics of Human Nature, ſhou'd be the Reſult of Matter and Motion only: Nay they may grant farther, that no Man is ſo well skill'd in the Laws of Mechaniſm, as to account tolerably for their Actions; but then they and the Objector being agreed in this, that they are only Material Beings, the only thing remaining in diſpute between them is, Whether God has made Matter think, or Brutes act ſo very like Thinking Beings: The one have ſtrong Arguments on their Side, built upon the firſt and ſureſt Ideas of the Subject in hand; the other have at beſt but what *Eſtibius* call, a *Conjecture of the Divine Will*, drawn from an Obſervation of the Actions, but no certain Knowledge of the Principle they depend upon; which is an Argument that, neither in Senſe nor Manners, can ſtand againſt the former.

The other Opinion of Brutal Souls, is, that they act by a Degree of Conſciouſneſs and Thought: And to the Objection theſe anſwer firſt, That they can have no Title to an Immortality, as Free and Moral Agents; being entirely govern'd by one predominant Appetite of Senſe; and they preſume that, tho' *Eſtibius* has given them their Freedom, he has not made them accountable for their Talent: The Queſtion then turns upon their Souls ſurviving the Body, in a State of Numerical Exiſtence; and as to this, the Philoſopher thinks where God has been ſilent, he ſhou'd not ſay much; but he conceives it no Derogation to his Underſtanding, to profeſs his Ignorance; 1. Of their Creator's Intention towards them, as to the Continuance or Deſtruction of their whole Nature: And, 2. What Proviſion perfect Wiſdom can make, or what Purpoſes a Creature ſhall ſerve, while continu'd in a State of Exiſtence by Almighty Power. But this he can be poſitive in, That the Moral and Chriſtian Immortality is no way concern'd in the Argument: And he is not more afraid of dying like the Beaſt, tho' their Souls ſhou'd ſurvive the Body; than he will live like them, becauſe they inhabit the Earth in common with him.

In ſhort, if Brutes are Machins, the Caſe will admit of no Parallel; if they are not, the Parallel cannot be carry'd on to the Detriment of Man's Immortality. The firſt Step we follow them beyond their Death, we are out of our Depth; and, as the Light we have from Reaſon and Scripture, to guide us to our own Immortality, gives us not the leaſt Proſpect of theirs, but on the contrary; ſo neither can it be eclips'd by the Darkneſs of their Condition, which ought not to be interpos'd, where it is not concern'd: Beſides, that every Abſurdity fix'd on a Notion, requires the Objector to proceed upon as evident and unconteſtable a *Medium* or *Principle*, as if he were to demonſtrate the Truth of any *Propoſition*; but he that draws an Inference from the Vital Perfections of Brutes to thoſe of Men, infers from he knows not what Premiſſes. This I conceive to be a ſufficient Anſwer to the Objection, as it ought to be propos'd, and as it bears the moſt colourable Pretence of an Argument; to make it appear thus, I have been forc'd to ſtrip it of that Philoſophic *Farrago*, and thoſe ridiculous Colours *Eſtibius* has put upon it; for, as appearing in them, it did not ſeem to me to deſerve a ſerious, or indeed, an articulate Anſwer. *From Pag.* 164, *to* 173.

I am ſure the Reader will not ſuffer me to dwell upon the next Argument, taken from Dreams; *Which*, ſays he, *all Philoſophers conclude to proceed from the Animal Part, or Senſitive Soul of Man*; and therefore this Philoſopher *concludes*, That there is confeſſedly on all hands, ſomething beſides the Rational Soul, that thinks in Man: And I beg leave of *Eſtibius*, to throw in my *Concluſion* too; which is, That not the groſſeſt Ignorance, but moſt ſhameleſs Reſolution to ſay what a Man pleaſes, nay and to make his Adverſary ſay what he pleaſes, cou'd have ſuffer'd this Aſſertion to take Pag. 173.

its Fate in the World. I am ſure all the beſt of the Modern Philoſophers ſuppoſe it the ſame Soul, thinking in Dreams, and awake: However, I am glad to find the Clergy are not the only Tools, but that an old Peripatetic Notion ſhall, in ſpite of all they have ſo voluminuoſly ſaid againſt it, govern *all the Philoſophers*, as well as all the *Divines in the World.*

But *Eſtibius* proceeds to urge, That his Notion prevents many idle and frivolous Diſputes about the Union of Body and Soul; and therefore is more probable, *&c.* To make this out, he chooſes to inſtance in the *Hypoſtatic Union* of the Human and Divine Nature, in the Perſon of our Bleſſed Saviour. *Now if the* Modus *of that Union be unconceivable and unintelligible, by our weak Underſtanding, as unqueſtionably it is; I preſume the Grounds of it is from the inadequate Conception we have, or can form to our ſelves, of the Conjunction of Finite with Infinite, Material with Immaterial: But now by the Doctrin of the* Pſychomuthiſts, *that Difficulty ſeems to be taken away, and it ceaſes to be a Myſtery, if we allow this Conjunction of Body and Soul to be the Union of an Immortal-Immaterial Spirit to a Mortal-Material Body: Where is then the Myſtery of the Hypoſtatic Union? The Union of the Soul and Body, no Man ever*

Pag.176.

yet allow'd to be a Myſtery of Religion; therefore either both muſt be reputed ſo, or neither; which God forbid he former ſhou'd not, &c. ----- Theſe, to do him no Wrong in an Argument he ſeems to ſet a Value upon, are his own Words: To which I anſwer directly, 1. Admitting we do pretend to frame an adequate Idea of the *Modus* of Union between Material and Immaterial, yet in the Union of God and Man, here is beſides *that*, Infinite and Finite become one Perſon; which, as it is not parallel'd in the other Caſe, ſo I take it to be the τὸ βάθος of this Myſtery. But, 2. Here again is an *Ignoratio Elenchi*, or ſomething worſe. The Union of the Soul and Body is, in a proper Senſe, Myſterious; that is, above our Conception, as to the *Modus* of it. Our Sophiſt inſinuates, that 'tis *no Myſtery of Religion*; but here he has unawares thrown himſelf into his own Nooſe: I ask, Is it an *Article* of Religion, or not? If it is, then all the reſt of the Book muſt be ſacrific'd to the Intereſt of this one Argument: If it is no *Article of Religion*, what Senſe is there in ſaying, 'tis no *Myſtery of Religion*; for that includes an *Article*, and ſomething more: And again, To what Purpoſe can a Man urge, where he ſhou'd urge Reaſon, that *either both or neither, muſt be allow'd a*

Myſtery of Religion, without a Preſuppoſition that both are Articles of Religion. I know ſome have thought the Union of Soul and Body, the fitteſt Inſtance to explain, not the Thing, but their own Meaning, in the *Hypoſtatic Union*; and, to carry on the Compariſon thus far, that they are both, tho' not alike, *Myſterious*: But whether both are Articles of Religion or not, is not material to this Explication. So that this unfortunate Objection wants all the Strength that a good Argument ſhou'd have, and is as weak as 'tis poſſible for a bad one to be; ſome Arguments are *true*, but not *to the Purpoſe*; others again are *to the Purpoſe*, but not *true*; but this is neither *true*, nor *to the Purpoſe*.

But ſince this is his own Objection, he will give me leave to add a Remark (which he may if he will, improve) upon it: It is this, the *Hypoſtatic Union* is in part explain'd, and render'd poſſible to thoſe that believe the Union of an Immaterial Soul and Body: And therefore, ſay I, to thoſe that believe the *Hypoſtatic Union*, and believe it to be a *Conjunction of Material and Immaterial*; the Union of both in Human Nature, is within the compaſs of Divine Power at leaſt; which blows off at once

Ibid.

all *Eſtibius*'s Demonſtrations to the contrary, from Reaſon and Philoſophy.

The remaining Part of this *Chapter*, I muſt confeſs I am not able to make an Objection of it begins with a Cavil at the Old Definition of *Animal Rationale*, which my Author thinks ſhou'd be chang'd for *Rationabile*; I ſay I cannot make an Objection of this, becauſe I am as much at liberty to embrace the Notion, as *Eſtibius* is; and I dare ſay he borrow'd it from thoſe that maintain the ſame Nature of Human Soul, that I do. And as to what he wou'd puzzle us with, Promiſcuous Copulations of Man and Beaſt; *What Souls ſuch Productions are, whether Material or Immaterial, Rational or Brutal, or a Mixture of both:* When *Eſtibius* has done his Part, and inform'd me whether the Production *lives the Life* of a Man or a Brute, or between both; I may deviate ſo far from my Subject, as to give him my Sentiments concerning the *Soul of it*; and endeavour to vindicate, againſt all he can ſay, the Wiſdom of the Creation.

CHAP. VI.

The Immortality, *and* Separate Exiſtence *of the Soul, conſiſtent with other Chriſtian Doctrins; not repugnant to any* Expreſſions *of* Scripture, *but plainly* countenanc'd, *and neceſſarily* ſuppos'd *in ſeveral important Texts; and as clearly* deliver'd *as was* requiſite, *or* reaſonable *to expect: In anſwer to all that is objected, in his Seventh Chapter, from the Tenour of the Holy Scriptures.*

IT'S an Old Obſervation, that *Heretics* have always pretended to learn their Errors from *Scripture*, even thoſe that were apparently oppoſite to the true Deſign, and plaineſt Expreſſions of it: But the Practice is not ſo common, for Men to eſpouſe *Atheiſtic* or *Deiſtic* Principles, and turn *Textuaries* to ſupport them. Either therefore we are miſtaken in *Eſtibius*'s Principles, or he in his Plea from Scripture: This we dare to averr, that the Immateriality of Human Soul, and of the Divine Nature went hand in hand of Old; were equally impugn'd by *Atheiſts*, and defended by *Theiſts*: And this we are ſure of, that every *Atheiſt* muſt be on *Eſtibius*'s Side of the Queſtion; for admitting Finite created *Spirits*, he will certainly be driven to the Acknowledgment of Him who, and who only muſt be the *Father* of them. And this Tendency was ſo clearly diſcern'd by Mr. *Blount*, and thoſe that writ with him; (Authors whom *Eſtibius* muſt reverence; becauſe from them he has copy'd his beſt Arguments from Reaſon and Philoſophy, particularly thoſe to prove the Human Soul to be from Seminal Traduction) that they mention not the Scripture, as of any Authority with them; but, reverſing the Decrees of *that*, give the Cauſe another hearing at the Bar of their own Reaſon. Had it ever enter'd into their Heads, that the Scripture favour'd this their darling Notion of Human Soul, ſo much as *Eſtibius* has oblig'd himſelf to make out in this Chapter, I am confident they wou'd have entertain'd a more favourable Opinion of the Scripture; and have concurr'd, at leaſt in this Point, with the *moſt ſcornful and prejudic'd Opiniators*, that is, thoſe who believe the Divine Authority of Scripture; Pag. 178.

for this is the Character of thoſe, with whom *Eſtibius*, much like a Chriſtian, ſuppoſes his *Scripture-Arguments will have weight.*

But whether he deſign'd to uſe, or abuſe the Scripture in his Argument, he has been at the Pains to amaſs together abundance of what, I am ſenſible, will appear Proof to ſome Underſtandings; all which deſerves to be as carefully conſider'd, it has been collected: For if the Scripture does really countenance his Interpretation, as much as it has done that of all the beſt qualify'd Interpreters, for ſo many Hundred Years; I fear that Weakneſs and Deceit, wou'd but too juſtly be imputed to the *Lively Oracles*, which was true of the *Heathen*; that they were, in Matters of the greateſt Importance, ambiguouſly pen'd, and capable of a double Senſe. This is a Diſhonour that wou'd be reflected upon the Scriptures at firſt Sight, by him that is brought over by *Eſtibius*'s Arguments from thence; but when he comes to examin Particulars, he muſt either believe this no Authentic Interpretation, or the Text to be a meer Noſe of Wax; and which, like much of the Old Philoſophy, tho' it had obtain'd an Univerſal Authority, yet ſerv'd to little better Purpoſe, than to exerciſe the Commentator's Skill.

To take off this Stain as clearly as I am able, I ſhall here reduce my wandring Adverſary to ſuch a Method, as will contain all that he has objected, and give Room for a full Anſwer to it. What he has objected to ours, and endeavour'd to build his own Notion upon, is reſolvable into theſe Three Particulars.

1. *The Uſual, and the Grammatical Significations of the Words* Soul *and* Spirit, *in the Scriptures.*

2. *The Arguments which the Scripture-Doctrins afford us, towards a Determination in this Point*; *and*,

3. *The ſeveral Expreſſions, and Texts of Scripture, relating to it.*

I. He begins with the *Uſual Significations of the Words*, Soul *and* Spirit; both which, he has prov'd at large, have, in Scripture, the ſeveral Significations of *Life*, *Living Creature*, *Perſon*, *Breath*, *Mind and Conſcience*, with others more remote: And all this I muſt grant him, becauſe my *Concordance*, with a ſmall Application of Senſe, wou'd convince me of it. Thus far, and no farther, his Criticiſms upon the Uſe of the Words reach; but if Criticiſm be a thing ſubject to the Rules that Example has preſcrib'd, tho' I muſt confeſs it is

From Pag. 178, to Pag. 198.

not ſo in every Man's keeping, he muſt alſo grant me ſomething, which, as I take it, is to the Purpoſe; 1. That no one Signification of a Word excludes another, tho' never ſo remote, or even contradictory to it; of which I will not ſo far diſparage my Critic's Skill in Words, as to give him Inſtances in *Hebrew*, *Greek* and *Latin*. 2. That not every Senſe, ſometimes not the moſt uſual Senſe of a Word, is the Proper and Primary Signification of it. Therefore if *Eſtibius* has prov'd any thing upon this Head, he has prov'd that thoſe enumerated by him, are all the Significations of the Words *Soul* and *Spirit*, occurring in Scripture; and alſo that *Life*, which he pitches upon, is the *Proper* and *Primary*, as well as *Uſual* Signification of *Soul*. As to the Firſt, he has pretended Pag. 177. *to ſelect and explain the various Significations of thoſe two Words*; but whether he has ſelected or explain'd the moſt material, depends upon ſuch Proof, as he has not attempted upon this Head. And without that, a Man that has conſider'd the various Signification of Words, will be no more affected with this Argument, than he wou'd be, with juſt ſuch another to prove, that God is not of a Subſtantial Spiritual Nature; and this from the various Significations of the

Word *God* in Scripture, which he finds taken for a Being that has Eyes, Hands, Feet, Heart, *&c.* for Men, and other viſible Beings upon Earth, even inſenſible Stocks and Stones. If the former ſucceeds, I dare promiſe *Eſtibius*, that he may ſafely ſpeak out in the latter, and turn his doubtful Phraſe *the reputed Immateriality of God*, into that of *a plain Heatheniſh Invention.*

As to the ſecond Query, Whether *Life* be the *Proper and Primary* Signification of *Soul*, he has advanc'd nothing to prove that, but this, and ſuch Texts; *God formed Man out of the Duſt of the Ground, and breathed into his Noſtrils the Breath of Life, and Man became a Living Soul.* I ſuppoſe the Streſs of the Argument lyes in this, that *Life* and *Soul* muſt be conjoyn'd in Signification, becauſe *Living* and *Soul* are ſo in Conſtruction; which, to my Apprehenſion, does not ſo much as prove that Life is *any*, much leſs the *Proper and Primary* Signification of the Word *Soul*; but *that*, I am ſure, is the utmoſt that can be deduc'd from any Text he has quoted; and therefore while *this*, I mean the *Proper and Primary* Signification, is left altogether undetermin'd, the *bare* Signification can have no Weight at all, with any Man of common Reading; and who thinks the Words of Scripture are of *Human*, as he be-

believes the Senſe to be of *Divine* Authority.

But granting that *Life* is the *Proper, and Primary* Signification of Soul in Scripture, yet may it not ſignify there an Immaterial Subſtance, in a *ſecondary*, or more remote Senſe? Yes ſure; or elſe it cou'd never be apply'd to God himſelf, as every body knows, and *Eſtibius* has had the Misfortune to ſhew, it is apply'd in Scripture. Pag. 179. And may not an Author's Meaning be very plain, tho' he expreſſes himſelf in a borrow'd and alluſive Word? It is the Stile of Scripture, and of every intelligible Writer, to expreſs things, in themſelves remote from Senſe and the common Capacity, by others more obvious, and level with it; eſpecially when the Subject is directed to ſuch, as well as better Capacities: Theſe can find the Proper and Philoſophic Meaning in ſuch Expreſſions, and the other find what is ſufficient for them; ſo that the whole is rendred intelligible to every Capacity. Whereas had they been adapted only to the *Philoſophic*, they had, in great meaſure, fal'n ſhort of their Deſign with the *Vulgar* Reader. From which Conſideration it appears, that the Scripture cou'd not have expreſs'd it ſelf in more proper or inſtructive Words, with Regard to the great

Deſign of it, (upon Suppoſition that it meant by the Soul of Man an Immaterial Subſtance) than it actually has done; which is no ſmall Confirmation of our Interpretation, and expoſes all the Stir *Eſtibius* makes about *Genuin Notions* and *Primary Significations*, as a perverſe Piece of Hypercriticiſm.

Eſtibius upon theſe Significations, makes Four Obſervations in Favour, as he imagins, of his own *Hypotheſis*. The Firſt is, *That the introducing of ſuch a Spirit* (as we ſuppoſe to be introduc'd at the Reſurrection) *is not properly the quickning a Mortal Body, no more than a Tortoiſe quickning his Shell.* The Queſtion therefore is, Whether the Scripture, by quickning our Mortal Body, ſpeaks in the ſtricteſt Senſe, excluſive of our Souls; for that they will be as much quickned, as they are now quick, is agreed on both Sides: And if Scripture be a better Interpreter of Scripture, than *Eſtibius* is, the Union of the Tortoiſe with his Shell, tho' it falls ſhort, is not ſo abſurd a Compariſon as he imagins; for that is ſometimes call'd the Tortoiſe's Houſe: And St. *Paul* ſpeaking of the Reſurrection, ſays, *For we know that if our earthly houſe of this tabernacle were diſſolv'd, we have a building of God, an houſe not made with hands, eternal in the heavens; for in this* *we groan earneſtly, deſiring to be cloathed upon with our houſe which is from heaven.* 2 *Cor.* 5. 1, 2. Now I am really of Opinion that the Body being call'd, both now and at the Reſurrection, *our Houſe*, and the Expreſſions of *our being cloathed upon with it*, and *our groaning in it*, do explain to us in what Senſe our Mortal Body is, and ſhall be quickned; with more Perſpicuity, as well as better Authority, than *Eſtibius* has done.

Pag. 184.

1 *Ep.* Pet. 1. 9.

The Second Obſervation is this; *The Words Immortal Soul, are never found in the whole Scripture, and Salvation of Souls but once; and there it plainly denotes Perſons, or their Lives to be deliver'd from Perſecution:* Which I ſuppoſe he thinks wou'd be ſtrange, if the Doctrin were true. But ſuppoſe the Words *Immortal Soul* had been found never ſo often in Scripture; why then *Eſtibius* wou'd have obſerv'd upon them, that nothing more is intended than *Immortal Life:* So that true or falſe, the Obſervation muſt have made againſt us; and right or wrong, the Scripture ſhall ſpeak for him, if it does not ſpeak againſt him in the very Words that ſome other Books do: Nay let it aſſure him of *Man's Immortality* never ſo often, and mention *Human Soul* as often, yet ſince his *Concordance* does not ſhew them conjoyn'd in any one place; they ſhall be of no more Authority with *Eſtibius*, than if they had not been mention'd at all. 'Till now I have been in doubt, upon what Reaſon *Eſtibius* cou'd expect the Completion of that Prophecy of his, *That his Doctrin ſhou'd be univerſally own'd and taught by the moſt Learned :* Chap. 1. But now the Caſe is clear; for no Man is ſo Learned in any Language, as to cloath an Argument in the very Words that another can think of; and then it is *Eſtibius*'s Obſervation, that *he owns and teaches* his *Doctrin*. That of *Salvation of Souls* being mention'd but once in Scripture, is very properly joyn'd with that of *Immortal Soul*. Is it not very remarkable, that the Scripture mentions *Salvation of Souls* but once, tho' of *Believing to the Saving of the Soul*, Heb.10.39. of *Saving a Soul from Death*, Jam.5. 20. of *the engrafted Word which is able to ſave your Souls*; *Ibid.* 1. 21. alſo of *the Soul that ſinneth*, Eze.18.20. of *the Sin of a Soul*, in Oppoſition to the *Body*, Micah 6. 7. and of *Loſing* and *Deſtroying the Soul* in another World, Mark 8.36. &c. the Mention is ſomewhat more frequent? If our Author's *Remarks* carry ſuch Weight in them, what may we expect from his *Reaſons*? But as to the Obſervation that, in that one Place where *Salvation of Souls* is us'd, *it plainly denotes Perſons, or their Lives, to be deliver'd from Perſecution*; *as appears by the Context, begotten us, reſerved in* Heaven *for us* : I muſt confeſs, I do not feel the Weight of this; nor am I convinc'd, that our being *Begotten of God*, or having *Heaven* in Reverſion, carries in it the Promiſe of any Temporal Deliverance: On the other hand, it is plain to me that the *Salvation of our Souls*, when it is ſaid, as there it is ſaid, to be the *End of our Faith*, can import no Salvation on this ſide Heaven, where, and where only, Faith ſhall have an End.

The Third Obſervation begins thus, Pag. 185. *Where our Saviour or the Apoſtles raiſed any Perſon from the Dead, they never invocated or commanded the Soul to return back into the Body of the deceaſed; but always uſed ſuch Expreſſions as ſignify'd*, Thou Dead Perſon, Live again; *or tantamount*, &c. Well then, I hope it wou'd have been an Obſervation on our Side, had our Saviour and his Apoſtles uſed *Eſtibius*'s Form: And if all Scripture be given by Divine Inſpiration, and the ſame Miraculous Power was employ'd in the Raiſing of one, as well as another Dead Perſon; I deſire *Eſtibius* to carry on this Obſervation, to that Miracle recorded of *Elija*, 1 Kings, *ch.* 17. *ver.* 21, 21. who *ſtretch'd*

ſtretch'd himſelf upon the dead child three times; and cried unto the Lord, and ſaid O Lord my God, I pray thee let this child's ſoul *come into him again:* Here I think is *Invocating; and the Lord heard the voice of Elijah, and the ſoul of the child came into him again, and he revived;* and this, I ſuppoſe, was done by *Command.* I know *Eſtibius* will interpret *Soul* by *Life* in this, as well as all other Places; tho' here the Soul's coming again, is plainly intimated to be the Cauſe of the Child's Reviving; which, according to my *Logic*, intimates a Difference between *Life* and *Soul:* But if we ſhou'd give up the Senſe of the Text, the very Letter of it confounds the Obſervation, which *Eſtibius* has himſelf confin'd to the *Expreſſions uſed.* To *Ibid.*
the Inſtance of *Lazarus* annex'd to this Obſervation, in which our Lord did not indeed tell *Martha*, that he wou'd recal the Soul; *Certainly*, ſays *Eſtibius*, Ibid.
this wou'd have been a neceſſary Doctrin to all the World, and a juſt Reproof to her of her Error, if ſuch, when ſhe believ'd that whole Lazarus, viz. *Body and Soul wou'd lye dead in the Grave, until the Grand Reſurrection.* And how is it certain that *Martha* held *Eſtibius*'s *Hypotheſis*, and believ'd that the Soul, as well as Body of her Brother, ſhou'd lye dead in the Grave until

the Reſurrection? Where is this choice Piece of Hiſtory to be found? Not in St. *John*'s Goſpel I am ſure; all that is recorded of her Belief in that Relation, is, that *Whatſoever our Saviour wou'd ask of God, God wou'd give him*, ch. 11. ver. 22. and that her Brother *Lazarus* ſhou'd *riſe again at the laſt day*, ver. 24. I preſume this latter Expreſſion gave the Hint to *Eſtibius*; and if ſo, then the Obſervation, and all the Conſequence of it, depends entirely upon the Truth of this Suppoſition, That the Doctrin of the Reſurrection, is inconſiſtent with ours of the Immortality of the Soul; and whether this is not a warrantable Suppoſition, (when a Man muſt ſay ſomething againſt his Adverſaries, and finds that, without the help of ſuch Suppoſitions, he can never come at his Concluſion) the Reader muſt be left to judge: And tho' it may appear to him, that the Intermediate State had nothing to do in the whole Relation; yet it is to be hop'd he will not rigidly deny an Author a large Suppoſition, when it is but to get over one Woman to his Opinion.

The Fourth and laſt Obſervation equals, for Wiſdom and Sagacity, any of the reſt, as a ſhort View will convince us. *Where any one*, ſays our Obſervator, *was immediately tranſlated to Heaven,* Pag. 186.

or dyed, and according to Divine Revelation, went to Heaven; the Scripture always ſpeaks by the Word Perſon, *and not* Soul, *as if diveſted of the Body, to be receiv'd into thoſe Heavenly Manſions; as* Elijah, Enoch, *and our* Saviour *to the Thief on the Croſs;* thou, *not* thy abſtracted Soul, *&c.* Here are Two Caſes inſtanc'd in; the one the Caſe of thoſe that went to Heaven without Death; the other of thoſe that, by Divine Appointment, were receiv'd into it, between Death and the Reſurrection. As to the Firſt Caſe; Is it not a ſhrewd Obſervation towards demonſtrating the Falſity of this Heatheniſh Notion, That the Scripture, making Mention of ſome that went, Body and Soul together, to Heaven; ſhou'd, at the ſame time, make no Mention of the Soul, as *diveſted of the Body?* It's true, the Souls of *Enoch* and *Elijah* were not actually diveſted of their Body, but nevertheleſs the Scripture might have us'd the Expreſſion, tho' inconſiſtent with the Fact, had it deſign'd to eſtabliſh the *Pſychomuthiſts* Doctrin. This is the true Senſe of the Obſervation, and how it will reliſh with ſome Readers, I cannot tell; but truly I am of Opinion, that cou'd any thing eſcape ſo comprehenſive an Obſerver as *Eſtibius* is, this Caſe had full as well been left unobſerv'd. To the other Caſe, of our Lord's ſaying *thou*, *not thy abſtracted Soul, ſhalt be with me in Paradiſe*; I anſwer, that the *Soul* chiefly ſignifies *Perſon*, I have been inform'd by *Eſtibius* already, Pag.178. and why therefore *Perſon* ſhou'd not ſometimes ſignifie *Soul*, I am yet to learn; for there are two ſorts of *Synecdoche's* in my *Rhetoric:* Or if this Anſwer be not ſatisfactory, let it be conſider'd, that in the Soul we place the Seat of *Happineſs*, of *Underſtanding*, and of *Life*; and then it will appear, that he who ſpeaks to the *Perſon*, does, in the moſt ſtrict and proper Senſe, ſpeak to the *Soul*. I cannot here forbear putting in my Obſervation too, that *Eſtibius*, juſt after mentioning this Promiſe of our Saviour to the Thief; and that other Text, *God is not the God of the dead, but of the living, for all live unto him*, ſhou'd let the following Words ſo unſeaſonably drop from his Pen; *Now ſurely it is wonderful ſtrange, that in all theſe Caſes, there is no mention of the Separate State of Exiſtence of the Soul of Man, no not the least* glimmering *of it, that I can find in the whole Scripture.* For theſe very Texts, which were juſt faln from his Pen, and full in his Sight, do ſtrike a very conſiderable *Light*, as I ſhall ſhew by and by, into the Subject; tho' it ſeems the whole Scripture cou'd not afford him the *leaſt Glimmering* of it: But we know who found Fault with the Sun, and where the Fault lay.

Whatever the Reader may think of theſe Obſervations, I doubt not but they took the Author of them ſo very much, that, for fear of loſing them when they might come in with ſome ſort of Coherence, they are here inſerted, where they have nothing to do, amongſt the uſual Significations of the Words *Soul* and *Spirit*.

We paſs on to the Grammatical Signification, or *Etymon* of theſe Words, which he propoſes to *unfold* in the *Hebrew*, *Greek*, and *Latin Tongues:* Pag.198. But I always thought *Unfoldings* of this Kind, made no great *Diſcoveries*, ſince I found the beſt Critics of my Acquaintance, lay ſo little Streſs upon bare Grammatical Derivations; finding, as I preſume, that a Word has but one *Etymon*, tho' it may be diſputed which; but often has many Significations: But let us ſee whether *Eſtibius*, by better Management, can make more of his *Etymons*.

He tells us, *the firſt, and moſt proper Word, according to the Rabbins, that ſignifies Soul, and more particularly Human Soul, is* Neſhamah, *mention'd principally in the Production of Man*, Gen. 2. 7. Ibid. *Man became a Living Soul.* But Tranſcripts, and Second-hand Quotations, are very liable to Miſtakes; the word נשמה is not us'd there for Soul, or Living Soul; but נפש: for it is לנפש חיה in that Place; altho' before, in the ſame *Verſe*, נשמה is us'd; but to ſignifie God's breathing into Man the Breath of Life; and indeed, the Radix of it נשם properly ſignifies *to Breathe*; but is not in that Place put for Human Soul. I do not take notice of this Miſtake for its own ſake, but becauſe the rectifying of it is of Uſe here: For as we may obſerve, that נשמה properly ſignifies *Breath* (and therefore from that Figurative Expreſſion of the Action of God upon Man, when he gave his *Soul*, the *Soul* is alſo figuratively call'd *Breath*; which utterly defeats *Eſtibius*'s whole Deſign in this Place) ſo alſo I obſerve, that the word נפש does properly and primarily ſignifie only *Human Soul*. I will not conceal it from my Adverſary, that ſome Grammarians have endeavour'd to make it originally ſignifie *Breath* too, by deriving it from נשב by a Tranſpoſition of Letters, which ſignifies *to Breathe*, or נשפ *to Blow*; but this is altogether a groundleſs, and impertinent Piece of *Etymology*: It has no other Ground imaginable, but this, that נפש is us'd in Scripture for *Breath*, which is no Ground at all for that Account;

but the Uſe of it muſt be accounted for thus: As נשמה ſignifies originally *Breath*, and is borrow'd to ſignify *Human Soul*, ſo נפש which originally ſignifies *Human Soul*, is borrow'd in another Place to ſignify *Breath*; ſuch a mutual Change of Words being very frequent in the *Hebrew*, by reaſon it has ſo few Original Words, and not uncommon in any other Language. And the ſame Account is the only true one, why the word נפש is afterwards us'd for the *Soul of a Brute*, for *Life*; and by a *Catachreſis*, for a *Dead Body*: Which laſt *Eſtibius* has lit of; and finding it the moſt remote Senſe from that of a Rational Soul, has let it paſs amongſt his Genuin Significations, to take its Fate with the Reader; without hinting, that it was there Figuratively us'd.

Now if any the leaſt Weight, is to be fix'd on the Grammatical Senſe of Words, it is not unworthy our Obſervation, that in the firſt Formation of Man, a Word is us'd to denote his *Soul*; which properly denotes nothing elſe, and has no Alluſive Signification to any thing Material.

The other Word us'd for the Soul in Scripture, is: רוח which undoubtedly derives from the Radix רוח *to Breath*, &c. The only Difference between *Eſtibius* and me, in this Word is, whether or no it muſt be reſtrain'd to ſuch a Senſe, as will Literally agree with the *Etymon* of it: He muſt hold the Affirmative, or he ſays nothing for himſelf; and I am confident, he that ſays that, will bluſh at nothing. For it is frequently us'd to ſignify God himſelf, or the Third Perſon of the Bleſſed Trinity, and that with the Incommunicable יהוה annext to it: And what then, is GOD himſelf a Breath or Blaſt? I deſire *Eſtibius* to *unfold* to me, from what Quarter he came; for hitherto, *Jovis omnia plena*, (*a plain Heatheniſh Invention*) has been an Article of my Belief. Shall I fill my Page with the Places where it ſignifies Angels and Infernal Spirits: Or need I ſhew him that, in Scripture, it ſignifies ſeveral other things, which tho' Material, have no Affinity with *Breath* or *Air*; for this muſt be in a Language, where there are not much above 500 radical Words? I think what I have mention'd already abundantly ſufficient, and I can aſſure him, ſo long as God and Angels are (as he confeſſes) *reputed Spirits*, this Argument of his will not be in much *Reputation*.

Tit. of Sec. Thoughts.

These three are the only Words he takes notice of in Scripture to ſignifie *Human Soul*; omitting, I ſuppoſe, the word לב if ever he met with it; which from לבב properly ſignifies the *Heart*, but is ſometimes metaphorically put for the *Soul*; for this might make *Heart* (the fleſhy Subſtance on his left ſide) and *Soul* the ſame according to him: And indeed it is not leſs juſt or true, tho' it looks more abſurd, than the Conſequence that attends all the reſt. The word חיה ſignifying *Life*, and not *Soul*, methinks might have ſuggeſted to a Man ſome Diſtinction between *Life* and *Soul*, in the Author that ſo us'd them; and therefore might have been fit to be conceal'd by ſuch a *Grammar-Critic* as *Eſtibius*; but taking no notice of this, he quotes the word only to ſhew that נפש is join'd with it, when both are apply'd to *Brutes*; which he ſays, *plainly* Pag. 200. *intimates that living Soul there, cannot ſignifie a ſpiritual immortal Subſtance; becauſe living Soul is attributed to Beaſts, as well as Man:* Which is as much as to ſay, it muſt, and ſhall ſignifie the ſame thing in every place, that it does in one of my chuſing; let your Grammars, your Lexicons, your Linguiſts, and your Scripture it ſelf, ſay what they will to the contrary.

But not to let any thing paſs without a wiſe Obſervation upon it, it follows, *From theſe Significations of the Hebrew Words for* Soul, Spirit, Mind, Ibid. Breath, Living Soul, *I only make this Obſervation, that not one of them can, by the moſt* *extorted Interpretation poſſible, that I can ſee, be apply'd to denote a ſpiritual Subſtance in Man, as I will demonſtrate in its proper Place.* Now I am ſure, if this could have been demonſtrated, from the Signification of the Words, the *preſent* had been the *proper place* to do it in; but I make this Obſervation, that the *preſent* is never the *proper Place* for *Eſtibius*'s Demonſtrations; they are always either done to his Hand, or referr'd to another Place,

As to the Greek Words ψυχὴ and πνεῦμα I own, for ſo my *Lexicon* told me at School, that they both in their Themes ſignifie *Breath*, *Blowing*, *&c.* But let me ask him one civil Queſtion, do they ſignifie an *immaterial Subſtance* amongſt Heathen Writers, or not? I ſuppoſe he will not deny the *Grecians* a Share in the *Heatheniſh Invention*, and if another Queſtion be not too *troubleſom*, as Mr. *Bays* complains, I muſt alſo deſire to know what is the Reaſon for reſtraining the Senſe of the Words, to their *Etymon* only, when they are us'd in Scripture, tho' they were confeſſedly of much greater Latitude, before the Scripture made uſe of them: And when I have a ſufficient Reaſon for that, I will believe my Soul to be *Breath*, and, which is more, the *very Breath of my Mouth.*

Eſtibius leaves this Topic, with another of his Obſervations, *Had that Text, mention'd* Gen. 2. 7. *deſign'd* Anima *to ſignifie a ſubſtantial Spirit, it is very probable that the* Septuagint *wou'd have expreſs'd it by* πνεῦμα, *and not* ψυχὴ, *as being a Word of more eminent Signification to denote Spirituality.* Well, I am reſolv'd to believe at laſt, for I find both ſides are agreed upon it, that there is one Word us'd in Scripture for *Human Soul*, Heb. 4. 12. &c. which *is of eminent Signification to denote Spirituality*; tho' I may have ſhortly an Opportunity of enquiring more ſtrictly in the uſe of this Word. Pag. 203.

We come laſtly to the Latin *Etymon* of *Anima*, and *Spiritus*, which are much the ſame with ψυχὴ and πνεῦμα; and to prove this, we have ſeveral Quotations out of *Horace*, *Virgil*, *Perſius*, and *Terence*. But what is it that he would prove? why, *That all Latin Authors generally* (or if you will, *generally all* Latin Authors) *cou'd not fix the primary, and ſole genuine Signification of the word* Anima, *to make it denote a ſpiritual Subſtance in Man, but rather the contrary.* In which Sentence thoſe ſpruce Epithets *Primary*, *ſole*, *genuine*, are worth our Obſervation. As to *ſole* Signification of the word *Anima*, he muſt be a *Pſycomathiſt* indeed, Ibid. Pag. 206.

deed, that reſtrains it wholly to immaterial Subſtance; but I find *Eſtibius* takes leave to feign unheard of *Opinions*, as well as *Names* for his Adverſaries; and both together muſt make them look very frightful. If by *primary* and *genuine* the etymological Signification is meant, I leave the Grammarians to contend which is the borrow'd Signification of *Anima*, *Breath*, or *Soul*; neither ſide, I preſume, will deny that it is us'd for both; but if *primary* and *genuine* mean honeſtly the firſt and proper uſe of the Word, I am of *Eſtibius*'s Opinion, that not the word *Anima* but *Animus* was us'd among the beſt Latiniſts, to ſignifie the *rational Soul* of Man, as is plainly intimated by *Juvenal* in that Expreſſion already quoted,

——— illis
Tantum animas nobis animum quoque —

tho' the modern Uſe of them is ſomewhat different; but I am not apprehenſive that he gains the leaſt Ground by this, unleſs he cou'd prove that no word amongſt them, was us'd to denote a *ſpiritual Subſtance*; and if he cou'd prove that, which is the thing he ought to prove, both in *Latin* and *Greek*, I ſhou'd wonder much, how the ſame Perſon came to find out this *Spiritual Subſtance*, to be a plain *Heatheniſh Invention*; or what ſecret Correſpondence he maintains with the ancient Heathens, beſides the Words they have left behind them; for he will not allow their *Words* to import as much, and yet it ſeems the *Thing* is their Invention.

But the word *Animus* was not fit to be mention'd, for a very good Reaſon; the Poet had too plainly diſtinguiſh'd it before, and if one of the beſt Proſe Writers, and the greateſt Philoſopher amongſt the ancient Latins, had been fit to be conſulted, inſtead of Poets, for the proper and philoſophic Senſe of the Word; the Paſſage I am going to cite, might have ſtar'd a little too hard in his Face, it is in *Cicero*'s *Scomnum Scipionis*; *Animus eſt qui viget, qui ſentit, qui meminit, qui prævidet & moderatur, & movet id Corpus cui præpoſitus eſt.* Methinks this looks more like a *primary* and *genuine* Signification, than the whole *Index* to *Horace* or *Virgil* is likely to furniſh out.

There is a well-meaning Obſervation he makes on this Head, with reſpect to the word *Manes, which the Heathens call'd Ghoſts, and Souls of Men departed*; and this muſt needs *give the Grounds for ſeveral Chriſtians to believe, that every one had a good and bad Genius to attend him, which were his Guardian Angels*, &c. not I hope to inſinuate, that the Bible is of *Heatheniſh Invention*; for thoſe that be- Pag. 204.

lieve it as Chriſtians, ground their Belief upon that Paſſage of our *Saviour's*, *Their Angels always behold the Face of my Father, which is in Heaven*, Matth. 18. 10. ſo that they are not all *Heatheniſh* in this Opinion, whether juſtly drawn from Scripture or not, unleſs farther *Grounds* be ſearch'd into, and the *Text* prove *Heatheniſh* at laſt.

I have now conſider'd (too much at large, I fear,) all that he has advanc'd upon his *various* and *etymological* Significations of the Words *Soul* and *Spirit*. The Reader may think all this might have been done in two Words; for if they have various Significations, they cannot be confin'd to the *etymological*; or if they are ſo confin'd, they can poſſibly admit of no *Variety* in their Signification; but being reſolv'd to undergo the Drudgery of a thorough Examination of his Thoughts, we muſt be content to take them as they riſe, tho' it muſt be confeſs'd they riſe but very ſlowly on our Hands; for now that we ſhould have done trifling about Words, and are upon the

II. Part of our Undertaking, which was to urge the Arguments that the Scripture affords us for the Mortality of the Soul, we relapſe into our Criticiſm, and the moſt miſtaken Part of it; as is plain from our Words, *If it appear by the*

Pag. 206.

the whole Current of Scripture, that Life *is properly the* Soul *of Man, and no Text gives us a ſufficient Ground to call it an* immaterial Subſtance, *then the Soul of Man will ceaſe to be when the Body dies*; *but it appears*, &c. He ſays his Adverſaries deny the *minor* Propoſition of the *Syllogiſm, by ſaying* Life *is but a Conſequence of the* Soul, *and not the* Soul *it ſelf.* That his Adverſaries deny the *minor* is without Diſpute, but that they give this Reaſon for their Denial, is to make theſe give *non cauſa pro cauſa.* A trifling Objection may deſerve a ſuitable Anſwer, but they do not uſually anſwer with a philoſophical Diſtinction, when Scripture, tho' after a trifling manner, is objected: They ſay that *Life* and *Soul* being in any part of Scripture diſtinguiſhed from each other, in their Nature and Properties, proves effectually that they are not the ſame; and on the other Hand they maintain, that the promiſcuous Uſe of any Word for both, proves nothing to the contrary. Againſt the firſt of theſe nothing is ſaid, but enough, I ſuppoſe, preſum'd to be ſaid before; but not to look back too far, we find πνεῦμα compar'd with ψυχὴ acknowledg'd to be *a a Word of more eminent Signification, and to denote Spirituality.* Pag. 203. This he has granted, and that it is no ſuch exorbitant Grant, as to give him any Pretence for a Reſumption, appears from what I have ſaid concerning the frequent uſe of it to denote God himſelf, the moſt eminent Spirit. And as to created Spirits, it is apply'd to them expreſly by the *Septuagint*, 1 *Kings* 22. 21. and 2 *Chron.* 18. 20. in both which Places we have an Account of *Ahab*'s Deluſion by falſe Prophets, and theirs by a deluding Spirit: The Context tells us, *The Lord ſaid, who ſhall go out and tempt* Ahab? *and one ſaid on this manner, and another ſaid on that manner*; and then it follows in both places, ϗ ἐξῆλθε πνεῦμα, ϗ ἔστη ἐνώπιον κυρίου, ϗ εἶπεν, *&c.* all which are as properly perſonal Acts, and do as neceſſarily ſuppoſe a real Perſon to perſuade the Prophets, as they are ſuppos'd to be that perſuaded *Ahab*. But the Application of this Word to created *Spirits*, is ſtill more expreſs in the New Teſtament, *Luke* 24. 39. *Behold*, ſays our Saviour, *my Hands and my Feet, that it is I my ſelf; handle me, and ſee*, ὅτι πνεῦμα σάρκα ϗ ὀστέα οὐκ ἔχει, *for a Spirit hath not Fleſh and Bones.* Which Words, as they ſuppoſe that both our Saviour and his Diſciples did believe the Exiſtence of ſeparate Spirits, ſo they plainly determin the word πνεῦμα to that ſenſe; and ſhew that it cannot properly denote any thing material. And, to mention no more, *Acts* 23. 8, 9. It is co-ſignificant, as to Immateriality, with Angel, ſo that when the *Phariſees* urg'd in behalf of St. *Paul*, that *if an Angel or Spirit hath ſpoken unto him, let us not fight againſt God*; we find the *Sadducees* in the next Verſe made a *Diſſention*, not upon the *Word*, I preſume, but the *Thing*; and therefore let never *Sadducee* for the future, attempt to get over ϖνεῦμα to his ſide.

If then this Word, according to both the Bible and *Eſtibius*, *be of ſuch eminent Signification, as to denote Spirituality*; it will be of Moment to enquire whether it is ever, and in a proper Senſe, applied to the *Soul* of Man: And to mention but one for all from the *Septuagint*, Zach. 12. 1. *Saith the Lord, which ſtretcheth out the Heavens, and layeth the Foundation of the Earth*, ϗ ϖλάσσων ϖνεῦμα ἀνθρώπȣ ἐν αὐτῷ, *and formeth the Spirit of Man within him.* This Text plainly ſhews in what Senſe God is ſaid to be the *Father of Spirits*, Heb. 12. 9. Mr. *Vitanimiſt* anſwers to an Objection urg'd againſt him, *That his* Hypotheſis *robs God of being the* Father of Spirits; *If I deny Man to have a* Spirit, *is not God the Father of Angels, who are ſo often call'd* Spirits? This is all he returns to the Objection; and therefore whether he denies the Exiſtence of *Human Spirit*, or not, he does maintain it reaſonable to interpret God's being

Farth. Th. p. 117.

being the *Father of Spirits*, of the *angelical*, excluſive of *Human Spirit.* The Text already quoted is the only place of Scripture that I can find this Expreſſion in, ſo that this Interpretation muſt refer to it, as it ſtands there; the whole Verſe runs thus, *Farthermore we have had Fathers of our* Fleſh, *which corrected us, and we gave them Reverence; ſhall we not much rather be in Subjection unto the* Father of Spirits, *and live?* *For*, as it follows, *they* [the Fathers of our Fleſh] *verily for a few Days chaſten'd us after their own Pleaſure; but he* [the Father of our Spirits] *for our Profit*, &c. I deſire him but to read this plain Text once more without *Critic* or *Commentator*; and then tell me in what Senſe he owns, and in what Senſe he diſowns God to be his *Father which is in Heaven.* To return to the fore-mention'd Text, it admits of no poſſible Evaſion, as to the purpoſe it is brought to ſerve; but clearly expoſes the Weakneſs of that critical Remark, *had the Text, mention'd* Gen. 2. 7. *deſign'd* Anima *to ſignifie a* ſubſtantial Spirit, *it is very probable that the* Septuagint *wou'd have expreſs'd it by* πνεῦμα and not ψυχὴ, &c. For we find the *Septuagint* expreſſing the very ſame thing by πνεῦμα, which wounds *Eſtibius* with his own Weapon, and puts the Recovery beyond his Skill. And as the Original of Human Soul in Scripture proves it to be of a *ſpiritual* Nature, ſo does the Conſummation of it in Glory, *Heb.* 12. 23. when we come to the heavenly *Jeruſalem*, we ſhall alſo come to the *Spirits* ϖνεῦμασι of juſt Men made perfect. Accordingly the *Proto-martyr*, in view of Heaven, prays *Lord Jeſus, receive* τὸ ϖνεῦμά μȣ, *my Spirit*, Acts 7. 59. juſt as his expiring Lord, who ſhew'd him the way thither, cry'd with a loud Voice, *Father, into thy Hands I commend my* Spirit, *Luke* 23. 46. I hope *Eſtibius* will not ſay that *Stephen*, and the reſt of the primitive Saints had a Soul, which the generality of Mankind have not; tho' he may as well make that Diſtinction, as ſay they had a peculiar Immortality; but to obviate this, St. *Paul* adviſes, in the Caſe of thoſe that were at a much greater diſtance from Heaven, *to deliver ſuch an one up to Satan, for the Deſtruction of the Fleſh; that the Spirit* ἵνα τὸ ϖνεῦμα *may be ſaved in the Day of the Lord*, 1 Cor. 5. 5. beſides this plain and poſitive Account, that there was at firſt, and ſhall be finally, to all Eternity, an *Human Spirit*; the preſent Diſtinction between that and the Body, carries with it the Divine Authority of Scripture, not only as a juſt Conſequence from hence, but as the expreſs Declaration of Scripture it ſelf. It is made the Seat of Underſtanding, which the Body is incapable of; *there is a* Spirit *in Man*, ſays *Job*, *and the Inſpiration of the Almighty giveth them Underſtanding*, Job 32. 8. And again, 1 *Cor.* 2. 11. *What Man knoweth the Things of a Man, ſave the* Spirit *of Man which is in him*; *even ſo the Things of God knoweth no Man, but the* Spirit *of God.* Where alſo this *Spirit* of Man, is compar'd, for the Reality and Truth both of its Knowledge and Perſonality, with the *Spirit* of God; and let me tell *Eſtibius*, it wou'd be a blaſphemous Derogation from the *Spirit* of God, to define him only *Afflatus Dei*, or a *Power*. The *Spirit* of Man is alſo diſtinguiſh'd from his Body as a different Object of the ſanctifying Power of God; 1 *Theſſ.* 1. 23. where, after St. *Paul* had implor'd *the very God of Peace to ſanctifie them wholly*, ὁλοτελεῖς, their perfect, integral Nature, reiterates his Petition in Particulars; *And I pray God your whole* Spirit, *and* Soul, *and* Body *be preſerved blameleſs, unto the coming of our Lord Jeſus Chriſt.* Why *Soul*, as well as *Spirit*, is enumerated, I ſhall have occaſion to enquire anon; it is ſufficient that the *Spirit* is diſtinguiſh'd here, as the ſupreme Faculty of Human Nature, and a part of him under the *firſt* Care of Almighty God: And laſtly, that each Part being under a particular Influence of the Divine Grace, ſhou'd in return, be particularly devoted to the Service of God, St. *Paul* makes the Diſtinction, if poſſible, clearer ſtill; *for ye are bought with a Price, therefore glorifie God in your* Body, *and in your* Spirit, *which are God's*, 1 Cor. 6. 20. *Eſtibius*, ſhould we give him up ϖνεῦμα, as he, with greater Reaſon, has given it up to us, muſt make St. *Paul* ſpeak in this Text but very mean, if any Senſe; *Glorifie God in your Body, and in your Life*, is his reading; but if the Body be *alive*, the Term, *Life*, is redundant, and there is but very little meaning in all the latter part of the Verſe, *in your Body, and in your Spirit, which are God's.* But do's not the Scripture often expreſs the ſame thing by Variety of Words? Yes; but never makes at the ſame time a Contradiſtinction, in the things, which the plain Senſe of theſe Words does: *Ye* [your whole Nature] *are bought with a Price*, [the Blood of our Saviour] *therefore glorifie God, in* [each part of you] *your Body, and in your Spirit, which* [the one as well as the other] *are God's.*

Theſe are abundantly ſufficient, tho' they are not all the Texts that might be alledged to this purpoſe; and this I think is no ſmall Point gain'd, that a Word apparently, and in the Judgment of both ſides, *of eminent Signification, to denote Spirituality*, ſhou'd be apply'd to the Soul of Man by the Scripture, where it is moſt properly and literally ſpeaking of the Soul, and can be underſtood of nothing elſe; eſpecially not of that which is neareſt to it, the Body; when the Creator is declaring its *Original*, ſetting forth its *Faculties* and *Operations*, propoſing the true *End* and *Deſign*, and foretelling the *Duration* of it.

To return to the Objector's *Syllogiſm*, of which this is the *minor* Propoſition, *It appears by the whole Current of Scripture, that* Life *is properly the* Soul *of Man, and no Text gives us a ſufficient Ground to call it an* immaterial Subſtance. Pag.207. This Propoſition I deny'd, and in order to make good my Denial, that there are ſome Texts to give us this Ground, I have prov'd by ſuch an Evidence, as my Adverſary can by no poſſible means avoid the Force of, unleſs by denying and retracting a plain Truth, and one of his own aſſerting; and having carry'd him ſo far, it's high time to leave him to the Reader's Judgment.

As to the *Current of Scripture*, I have alſo hinted to this purpoſe, that the promiſcuous Uſe of Words (ſuppoſe *Life* and *Soul*) how often ſoever in any one Author, does not declare his Judgment, (nor therefore can his Authority be urg'd to prove) that the Thing is the ſame: but on the contrary, if in any one or more pertinent and remarkable Paſſages, he does plainly and induſtriouſly diſtinguiſh the Things, this proves that they are diſtinct in his Judgment; and the promiſcuous Uſe of the Words, tho' it ſhould be thro' the whole *Current* of his Writing, proves nothing at all to the contrary; nor argues any Inconſiſtency in the Author; no nor ſo much as Impropriety of Speech; if the Language he writes in will account for it. And this alſo I take to be ſo evident, that, without more Words, I ſubmit it.

By what I have ſaid in anſwer to this Propoſition, I wou'd perſuade *Eſtibius* to believe, that as ſtrong as his Reaſoning is, he is not always Maſter of his Adverſary's Senſe; for he ſeems not to have foreſeen any thing like ſuch an Anſwer, when he puts into our Mouths only this Diſtinction for our full Anſwer, *That Life is not the* Soul, *but the conſequent of it.* Pag. 207. Let us ſee what he ſays to this Diſtinction; and, tho' it muſt be confeſs'd that he's but a very weak Diſputant, that falters when he has both *Ob.* and *Sol.* of his own managing; yet we ſhall find that *Eſtibius* has not ſaid enough to invalidate this Solution. *Firſt*, he ſays, *that ſuch an Aſſertion is not reaſonable to be granted, becauſe the* Pſycomuthiſt *ſuppoſes, and not proves the Exiſtence of ſuch a* ſpiritual Subſtance. Ibid. This is ſaid purely in Ignorance of the Laws and Method of Diſpute, which allow the Reſpondent to *ſuppoſe*, and oblige the Ob-

jector

jector to *prove* all along; however one of theſe I hope has done more than ſuppoſe the Diſtinction, before he undertook to defend it. 2*dly*, Says he, *Becauſe the very Words ſignifying* Soul, *do not, in the Senſe of three Languages, denote any thing more than* Life; *nor give the leaſt Umbrage to call it a* ſpiritual Subſtance. From whence I conclude, if I may preſume to conclude any thing from it, that never any Man who wrote in theſe three Languages, cou'd by *Soul* mean a *ſpiritual Subſtance*; let the *Scripture*, *Ariſtotle*, and *Tully* explain themſelves (which I have ſhewn they have done) as clearly for ſuch a meaning, as an intelligible Writer need to do to an intelligent Reader. 3*dly*, He ſays, *becauſe if* Life *were only a conſequent, or neceſſary effect of the* Soul, *then* Knowledge, *as its inſeparable Attribute, wou'd attend that* Soul *to its place of Exiſtence; and conſequently even dead Men wou'd* know, *or* have Knowledge; *but we never heard, or read of any* Lazarus *rais'd from the Dead, that ever pretended to give us the leaſt account from the other World; which methinks is very ſtrange, ſuch an intelligent Being as our* Soul *is call'd, ſhou'd not in ſome Caſes be able to do.* I do not intend, throughout this Diſcourſe, to meddle with the *Prophane* Hiſtory of Apparitions. For, tho' I am as fully perſuaded of the Truth of ſome of theſe Relations, as I am that there were ſuch Perſons in the World as thoſe of whom they are related; yet I am not willing my ſuppoſed Credulity ſhou'd be made a Plea for any Man's Infidelity; and I am entirely of this Opinion, that they, eſpecially they who after an Examination, reject all the other Evidence there is for the ſeparate, as well as future State, are far from deſerving, and wou'd be as far from making a right Uſe of ſuch Conviction: but the Sight, as well as the Story, wou'd with them, as ſurely, tho' perhaps not ſo ſoon, turn into a Jeſt.

But to the Objection. It's true we read of but one *Lazarus* actually rais'd from the Dead; and he gives no Account of the ſeparate State, in which he had been four Days (for he that rais'd him was better able to do that, and had another End in raiſing of him;) but we read of another *Lazarus*, that was ſolicited to come from that State, and give an Account of it in this. To come, I ſay, from the intermediate State, for ſuch muſt be the State *Dives* was in, while his Brethren were alive upon Earth; therefore his Requeſt proves the thing at leaſt barely poſſible, tho' we make a Parable of the whole Relation: For I believe none of our Bleſſed Saviour's Parables proceed upon impoſſible *Suppoſitions*. And if it be poſſible for a *Lazarus* to come from ſuch a State, then there is actually ſuch a State; and that's as full Proof as if he did actually come from it. I know not what *Eſtibius* will ſay to this, unleſs it be that God might revive *Lazarus* to work the Repentance of thoſe Sinners; and that this wou'd more effectually do it, than his ordinary Diſpenſation: But then I ask, where was *Dives* all this while? I am ſure *Knowledge*, a ſad experimental Knowledge, was his *inſeparable Attribute* in that State; and I wou'd deſire to know, what Argument *Lazarus*, on Suppoſition he had gone the Errand, cou'd make uſe of, beſides the Frightfulneſs of his own Appearance (and that was to convince them of the ſeparate State,) or what ſort of an Account his wou'd have been of a State of Annihilation. But I think *Abraham*'s Anſwer confirms the Reality of the ſeparate State, by giving ſo juſt a Reaſon why *Lazarus* does not appear from it; and not telling him, as before, where he pray'd that *Lazarus* might be ſent for ſome time to his Place of Torment, that the Gulph was fix'd, and the Way impaſſable.

This was the Caſe of one of the two *Lazarus*'s we read of in Scripture; and had the mention of the other brought this to mind, it ſhou'd have ſtop'd, methinks, that *Rant* that follows; *No, no, it is all a Popiſh Fable; and the Return* Pag.208.

of the Souls from the Dead, or any Purgatory, nought but an advantageous Fiction. All a Popiſh Fable! I am ſorry to hear the Primitive Fathers were Papiſts: For they, as *Eſtibius* often tells us, thro' great Ignorance held the ſeparate Exiſtence of the Soul. He brings it as an Objection againſt the *Pre-exiſtence* of Human Souls, that it is not to be found in *Church-Hiſtorians*; and his Reading muſt not be diſputed as to that Point; but in what *Church-Hiſtorian* he found Popery and Purgatory as old as Chriſtianity, or the firſt Centuries of it, I cannot, nor I hope can he himſelf tell. *Pag.* 76.

From hence to *Pag.* 213 he takes occaſion to explain his meaning of Life and Soul being the ſame; particularly by the *Parallel of Light*; in which Notion he ſeems to be wonderfully delighted, and to expatiate in expreſſing it for a Page and half. It is too tedious to tranſcribe, and too metaphorical to ſet down as an Objection; but here is the Senſe, and doubtleſs the Original of this elegant Simile. *As when the Sun Beams ſhine into a dark Room, and enlighten it, you may eaſily exclude it from ſhining into the Room, but can never intercept, or cut thoſe Beams off from their Original, the Sun: The like Relation they* [the Heathens] Pag.211. Blount Anima Mundi, p. 27.

thens] *conceived the Soul of Man had to the Soul of the World, whereunto it ever hath an inſeparable Conjunction.* Now I wou'd not have *Eſtibius* over-rate his *Fancy* or *Invention* in this Simile; for Mr. *Blount*, who embrac'd it as eagerly, confeſſes nevertheleſs that it was *a plain Heatheniſh Invention.* And this, in *Eſtibius*'s own Stile, is, I fear, *piercing him with an Arrow out of his own Quiver.* This pretty way of Argumentation may paſs with ſome Gentlemen however; eſpecially if what went before, has gone down with them; for it is much at one to uſe *Similes* inſtead of *Arguments*, and to quote *Poets* for *Philoſophers.*

The ſecond grand Argument is this, *What was to have been immortal in a State of Innocence, became mortal by Tranſgreſſion: But whole Man was to have been immortal in a ſtate of Innocence*; Ergo *Whole Man*, &c. He calls this *a grand Argument*, but in truth it is at beſt but *a grand Sophiſm*; that is, *a grand Cheat* put upon thoſe that are convinc'd by it. *Death*, in our Notion, is *Diſſolution*; now is there any thing in the *Fall* that contradicts this Notion? Wou'd not Human Nature, had it continu'd for ever *undiſſolv'd*, have been properly ſtil'd *Immortal?* Again, had this *Diſſolution* been threatned expreſly, and in that very Word to lapſable Man, might not this

Pag. 213.

this have properly been call'd dying of the Perſon; tho' his Soul, a part of him, ſurviv'd? If not, the only Queſtion is about the Propriety of the word *Death*; and I leave him to beſtow his next learned Pains upon that.

But let us try to point out the Fallacy of this Sophiſm, as we have prov'd it muſt be fallacious; the Threat runs in theſe Words, *In the Day that* thou *eateſt thereof*, thou *ſhalt ſurely die*. The Queſtion is, what is to be underſtood by *thou?* which ſtrictly taken implies the whole Man, or more properly, the Perſon of Man; that Being, as reſulting from the Union of Soul and Body, ſay we, of Body and Life, ſays *Eſtibius*. In the firſt Place, whole Man may as well be underſtood for a part of him, as a part muſt be underſtood for the whole: but waving that, and ſuppoſing that the Perſon of Man does properly die, or undergo Death, his Soul is not thereby involv'd in the ſame Fate with his Body; for what is Death, in *Eſtibius*'s Notion, but a Separation of Life from the Body? does then Life die? *That*, he ſays, *is a* Solæciſm *to affirm*, p. 211. but it returns to God, as the excluded Ray to the Sun. Well then *Life* muſt go to make up the whole Man; but the whole Man, in this Senſe, cannot die without a *Solæciſm*: Therefore *Eſtibius* muſt interpret the Threatning to extend to the *taking away*, not *killing* his Life; and then may not this as well ſignifie the *taking away*, not *killing* his Soul? If he will but ſtand to this meaning of his own, which is not only his but Mr. *Blount's*, and all theirs that hold the ſame Opinion, I will admit the whole *Syllogiſm*, as unconcerning the Argument; ſince *whole Man's becoming mortal by Tranſgreſſion*, which is his Concluſion, cannot be ſo underſtood as to exclude a ſurviving Part of him. But then let him not vainly imagine his *Syllogiſm* the more perfect, becauſe I have deny'd no Propoſition of it; for *admitting* the whole, in the Senſe that I have done, is in a true and proper Senſe, *rejecting* the whole.

He urges farther upon this Head, *If the Body by the Curſe only became mortal, then the Bodies only of the Reprobate, not Souls, can be liable to Damnation, becauſe that only is puniſhable which ſinned, as the* Civilians *ſay,* Pæna ſequitur Culpam; *and that only ſinned which ſuffered the Puniſhment, that is the Body only, if the Soul be immortal, and was not doom'd to bear its Share in the Puniſhment, Death.* I anſwer, 1*ſt*, The Body, underſtood in Contradiſtinction from the Soul, is, as I have often ſaid, neither concern'd in Sin nor Puniſhment. 2*dly*, The Soul does bear *its Share*, as he Pag. 214.

calls it, in the Puniſhment, Death; which are the Pains and Terrors, at leaſt preceding Death; the inevitable Conſequence of its Union, and Sympathy with the Body. *3dly*, There is, in the Scripture Language, beſides a *temporal* Death, both a *ſpiritual*, and an *eternal* Death; in the *ſpiritual* Death, the reprobate Soul has its Share in Puniſhment, even while united with the Body; in the *eternal* Death it has ſo large a Share, that it cannot bear it, which is ſufficient to clear up this Scruple, and that which follows it, *If nothing died but Man's Body, the Denunciation of the Curſe was but a meer Bugbear*, &c. Pag. 216. To which he makes his Adverſary reply, *That by his Tranſgreſſion once, he became afterward ſubject to Sin; and ſo to final Condemnation.* To which his Anſwer is, *Before he ſinned he was ſubject to Sin.* And who, I wonder, is his Adverſary in this? but what's this to eternal Miſery being included in the Threatning? which is one thing, tho' not all his Adverſaries have to ſay. But whether God made Death intelligible to *Adam*, in this large Senſe, or not; and whether or no he underſtood his Nature to be compounded as we do; yet, methinks, the threatning of Death cou'd, upon no imaginable Suppoſition, be a *meer Bugbear* to one in the higheſt Enjoyment, and Perfection of Life.

The only thing he farther urges, as a Confirmation of this Argument, is the Unſuitableneſs to Divine Juſtice, *that the Body* Ibid. *ſhou'd ſuffer, more than the Soul which eſcapes the firſt Death*; being grounded, as I have juſt ſhewn, on a falſe Notion both of the ſuffering of the Body, and eſcaping of the Soul, I need only mention, and paſs on to his.

Third Argument, drawn from the Nature of the Reſurrection, which it Pag.217. ſeems our Opinion perplexes, if not totally ſubverts. This is what one wou'd not eaſily find out at firſt Sight, but wou'd rather be apt to ask himſelf, if he can doubt of it, ſuch Queſtions as theſe; Why may not my Body be rais'd, by the Power of God, as well to be re-united to my Soul, as to be re-impower'd with Life; Does not the Reſurrection relate wholly to my Body, and the material Parts of it? how then can I expect to find out by that, *no medium*, whether Life and Soul is the ſame thing? But theſe are only *firſt Thoughts*, and *Eſtibius* has done with all ſuch, tho' in reality his *Second Thoughts* upon this Argument are only the *ſame*, a *ſecond*, or rather many times repeated; for all the Support of this Objection is the old Miſtake, if I may ſo call it, that the Body properly ſpeaking, ſuffers in another Life. I ſay, if I may call it a Miſtake, without adding *wilful*; for it follows, and at a ſmall diſtance, another Notion that cou'd not but diſcover it to the Objector, *viz. The Body is only a pure paſſive Lump and Inſtrument of the Soul*; tho' a little before it is taken for granted, as an avow'd Tenent of ours, that this paſſive Lump ſhall have its Share in Puniſhment, diſtinct from that of the Soul in the future World. But then, ſays he, *this is not reviving the Body, but only joining a living Soul to it.* As much reviving, ſay I, as the Body is now alive; and that's a full Anſwer to all that he objects in five Pages. Pag.217.

But he urges the Reſurrection againſt us from *the end of it*; which we are agreed is *the bringing Men to Account for the Deeds done in the Fleſh.* And how do we make this Judgment *vain* and *needleſs, by making the Souls go immediately to Heaven or Hell; and ſo having their ultimate End and Reward?* I thank God I did not learn the Doctrines of my Religion from *Eſtibius*, for then I ſhould certainly have been on his ſide. He can bring a Doctrine to his Opinion, when he cannot reconcile his Opinion to *that*: For my part I eſteem the Condition of a Priſoner in order to his Trial, conſcious to himſelf of the capital Crime he is accus'd of, to be miſerable, and *Pag.*222.

a part of his Puniſhment; and yet the ſober part of Mankind will not think his following Sentence *vain* and *needleſs*; tho' *Eſtibius* muſt think ſo, and alſo that the Angels being *reſerv'd in everlaſting Chains under Darkneſs, unto the Judgment of the great Day*, is *vain* and *needleſs*. This is a ſufficient Anſwer if I had not farther accounted for a general Judgment, as I have done *Part* I. §. 13. But it ſeems he knows, tho' I do not, *ſome Divines that urge the Neceſſity of a general Judgment, notwithſtanding Mens being glorify'd or condemn'd before hand: That Sinners may, in the Face of the World, be convict and brought to publick Shame for their Offences; and that the righteous may, in like manner, be publickly commended and rewarded. This*, he ſays, *is a very pretty Notion indeed, to pleaſe vulgar Heads, and cozen a ruſtick Underſtanding into the Obedience of Religion, and Belief of a Reſurrection; and ſo far I like it well.* I hope he does not like it well that there ſhou'd be *cozening* Arguments in Religion, but only that Divines ſhould uſe ſuch. What Divines they are that place the *Neceſſity* of a general Judgment in this, I know not; I am ſure tho' they differ from him in this, they are juſt of his Size, in another reſpect. But *Divines indeed*, do aſſign this as one good Uſe of a general Judgment, and therefore

Jude 6.

Pag. 225.

fore as a Reaſon for it. Againſt this Reaſon he urges the Caſe of thoſe that die hard, as they call it, at *Tyburn*; who will therefore, according to him, out-brave the Terrors of the Lord. Such are *Eſtibius*'s Notions of Human Nature, and Eternal Miſery, that thoſe who can look a deſerved *Death*, ſhall be able to look *Hell* in the Face with Courage. *Pag*.225. & 226.

His fourth Argument is drawn from the Nature of our Redemption, *That which fell by Tranſgreſſion, requir'd, by Chriſt's Blood, Redemption: But* Adam, *or the whole Man fell by Tranſgreſſion*; Ergo, *The whole Man requir'd, by Chriſt's Blood, Redemption*. The Reader I am ſure is already furniſh'd with a pertinent Anſwer, to this impertinent *Syllogiſm*; they are ſuch, and only ſuch Divines as he lately mention'd, who hold that the Soul did not fall; tho' it was by an Act of the Will that Man fell. And the Argument is founded upon a *Petitio Principii*, that the Perſon dying, as to this World, cannot have a ſurviving Part in another. And ſo I haſten to the Pag. 227.

III. And chief Part of our Undertaking in this Chapter; which was to conſider the ſeveral Expreſſions and Texts of Scripture, quoted by *Eſtibius*, to prove *that the Soul of Man, or Life, as he calls it, will not be renewed*

newed until the Day of the Reſurrection; and on the other hand to enquire whether there is any Proof to be fetch'd from thence, for a ſurviving part of Human Nature. As to the Texts quoted by *Eſtibius*, to do him all the Juſtice I can, I ſhall here take notice of thoſe he has ſcatter'd throughout his Book, as well as thoſe he has urg'd in this Chapter; and to do all this with as much Clearneſs and Brevity as I can, I ſhall reduce all that he has urg'd, together with ſome other Texts I ſhall mention, to theſe four Heads. 1*ſt*, Thoſe that are quite beſide the Point, and altogether foreign to the Purpoſe. 2*dly*, Thoſe that do in ſome Degree relate to the point in hand; but leave it altogether undecided, and are equally interpretable on our *Hypotheſis*. 3*dly*, Thoſe that plainly incline to our ſide of the Queſtion, and are, with more Clearneſs and Conſiſtency, to be interpreted on ours, than the contrary *Hypotheſis*. 4*thly*, Thoſe that neceſſarily ſuppoſe our *Hypotheſis*, and cannot be interpreted either with Clearneſs or Conſiſtency, without taking it for granted.

1*ſt*, *Eſtibius* muſt not take it ill, that there are ſome Texts quoted in *Second Thoughts*, altogether beſide the Point, and foreign to the Purpoſe; and many of theſe out of that one Book of *Job*.

Pag. 73. *As an hidden untimely Birth I had not been,*

been, as Infants which never ſaw Light, Job 3.16.
and again, *Wherefore then haſt thou brought
me forth out of the Womb; oh! that I had
given up the Ghoſt, and no Eye had ſeen me*,
Chap. 10. 18. *As the Cloud is conſu-*
med and vaniſheth away; ſo he that Pag. 104.
*goeth down to the Grave ſhall come up no
more*, Chap. 7. 9. Again, *For vain Man
wou'd be wiſe, tho' Man be born like a wild
Aſs's Colt*, Chap. 11. 12. *All Fleſh*
ſhall periſh together, and Man ſhall turn Pag. 157.
again unto Duſt, Chap. 34. 15. *Why died I
not from the Womb? why did I not give up
the Ghoſt when I came out of the Belly?
why did the Knees prevent me*, &c. Pag. 229.
Chap. 3. 11. & 12. Once more,
And why doeſt thou not pardon my Pag. 233.
*Tranſgreſſion, and take away mine Iniquity?
for now ſhall I ſleep in the Duſt, and thou
ſhalt ſeek me in the Morning, but I ſhall not
be*, Chap. 7. 21. And laſtly, *So Man lieth
down, and riſeth not till the Heavens be no
more; they ſhall not awake, nor be raiſed out of
their Sleep*, Chap. 14. 12. Theſe, with ſeveral
others already anſwer'd out of *Job*, were they
pertinent Quotations, a Stranger to the Book
of *Job*, wou'd certainly believe it was wrote
againſt the Immortality of the Soul; but if
he came once to look into it, he wou'd
diſcover, with a running Eye, that there
is not one Word, throughout the whole,
relating

relating to this Controverſie, whether the Soul be a *Subſtance* or *Power.* Cou'd any Man, that gave the leaſt Attention to the Senſe and Deſign of the Author, interpret, *not being as an hidden untimely Birth,* to imply a State of *non Exiſtence,* philoſophically ſpeaking; and not barely a State of Freedom, from the Calamities he then labour'd under? or that *Job* ſhou'd think *that* a *non ens,* which *no Eye ſees*; or *the Man that goeth down to the Grave, and cometh up no more,* ſhou'd exclude the Soul from a ſeparate Exiſtence? when in the very next Verſe he explains himſelf, *he ſhall return no more to his Houſe,* &c. Chap. 7. 10. At this rate, if a Man does but ſtir out of his Doors, he's in danger of loſing his Being; or that one of *Job*'s Comforters ſhou'd intend to throw this mortifying Propoſition in his Teeth, *Brutes think and reaſon in ſome Degree*; and when he ſays, *Man is born like a wild Aſs's Colt*; that he makes a Parity, not of *Ignorance,* but of *Souls*; and is, proleptically, an Anti-Carteſian, enquiring into the Principle of Life, Senſation, and Reaſoning in Man and Beaſt. Or that another of them, where he ſays, *Man ſhall turn again into Duſt,* muſt be underſtood to include the Soul of Man, even tho' he join'd it with this Expreſſion, *all Fleſh ſhall periſh together,* Job 34. 15. or that this miſerable

Man, wiſhing he had *given up the Ghoſt when he came out of the Belly, and that the Knees had prevented him*; is not reflecting at all upon his preſent Condition, but teaching the World this, for a Divine Truth, that the Soul does not ſurvive the Body. Or that complaining Almighty Vengeance found him out Day and Night, and imploring that God wou'd releaſe him from his Affliction, and his Life together; *for then*, ſays he, *he ſhou'd ſeek me in the Morning, but I ſhou'd not be*; I ſay, that this *be* ſhou'd be taken in the ſtricteſt Senſe, in the *Tranſlation*; altho' it is not at all in the Original; and that *Job* thought nothing leſs than Annihilation cou'd put an end to his Miſery. Or laſtly, that *Man's riſing not till the Heavens be no more*, proves that he does not live in another World; and *not being raiſed out of their Sleep*, muſt include a Sleep of the Soul, and intellectual Faculties, as well as a Sleep from the Wearineſs and Vexations of Life; tho' in the next Verſe but one he is clear, *If a Man die, ſhall he live again?* And elſewhere plainly declares what he means by calling Death a Sleep, *for there the weary be at reſt*, Chap. 3. 17. Theſe and many more ſuch Suppoſitions *Eſtibius* muſt make, before he can bring one pertinent Text out of *Job*; and till he ſhews it reaſonable that ſuch Suppoſitions ſhou'd be made, which hitherto he has diſcreetly wav'd, his Texts are here referr'd to their proper Head.

But theſe are not the only foreign Texts in his Book; for to omit all thoſe he has brought in Confirmation of the foreign Meaning, he has pickt out of the Words Soul and Spirit, which can appertain to the Subject, no more than we have ſhewn thoſe Significations do; what elſe are all thoſe Places to prove a Reſurrection, or to determin ſomething about the manner of it? Pag. 152. Such as, *The Hour is coming, in which all that are in the Grave ſhall hear his Voice, and ſhall come forth; they that have done good unto the Reſurrection of Life,* John 5. ver. 25. For all ſuch are plainly unconcern'd in the Diſpute; which, tho' *Eſtibius* often forgets it, is confin'd to the intermediate State, antecedent to the Re-union of Soul and Body.

To the ſame Head belong all thoſe Texts in Scripture, which compare, and parallel Man and Beaſt: I inſtance only in that of *Eccleſiaſtes,* which *Eſtibius* produces in this Chapter, as a Pattern of all the reſt he had ſo often urg'd upon his good natur'd Reader, Pag. 229. *That which befalleth the Sons of Men, befalleth Beaſts; as one dieth, ſo doth the other; yea they have all one Breath, ſo that a Man hath no Pre-eminence above a Beaſt,* Eccles. 3. 19. It is plain this

Compariſon is not made to run of all four, nor the Parallel to reach the whole Condition of Man and Beaſt; for this the Scripture contradicts when it expreſly gives *Adam*, and in him all his Poſterity, the Dominion and Superiority over Brutes: but how then hath Man *no Pre-eminence above the Beaſt?* In *Death* and the *Conſequences* of it, *Eſtibius* muſt ſay, or his Interpretation belongs to the ſame Head with his Text. That it relates to *Death* (their equal Neceſſity, and their like manner of dying) the Text is expreſs; but that it takes in the *Conſequences* of Death, nothing is intimated in the Text, nor can poſſibly be drawn from it, if *Solomon* may be ſuppos'd leſs liable than *Eſtibius* is, to contradict himſelf; for if the Caſe is the ſame in *any*, why not in *all* the *Conſequences* of their reſpective Deaths; and then a future Judgment falls in with the reſt; but I am perſuaded *Solomon* cou'd not have forgot in this, what he had ſaid but two Verſes before; *I ſaid in mine Heart God ſhall judge the righteous and the wicked.* Nor will *Eſtibius's* uſual Force upon Scripture ſtand him in ſtead here. I ſuppoſe he wou'd be bold to ſay upon the Place, that *Solomon* deſign'd to carry on the Parallel to the Day of Judgment, and break it off there; but I ſhall undeniably prove upon him, before we part, that *Solomon*, in this Book, makes a wide Difference in their *Exit*, as to the immediate Conſequences of it. Now the Reader muſt judge whether ſuch Quotations are not foreign, which found a Parallel upon that, which is no way the Subject of our Diſpute. Even God and his Creatures agree in ſomething; but I ſhould call it an impertinent Argument, if it were made uſe of either to deify them, or mortalize him.

Of Kin to this Argument, but of no Relation to the Subject, are thoſe Texts that Pag. 239. compare Death with *Sleep*, and *Reſt*; *Bleſſed are the Dead which die in the Lord, for they reſt from their Labours*, Rev. 14. 13. This, he ſays, proves againſt *Purgatory*; but I muſt ſay, that is not againſt us. *Job* has admirably paraphras'd all the Texts of this kind, *There the wicked ceaſe from troubling, and there the weary be at reſt; there the Priſoners reſt together; they hear not the Voice of the Oppreſſor: the ſmall and great is there, and the Servant is free from his Maſter*, Job 3. 17, 18, 19. Now I deſire to know who diſputes againſt this Notion of Death, that it removes us entirely from the Concerns of this World, and ſweeps away all Diſtinction belonging to it. But there is a farther Senſe in theſe Places which mention Saints ſleeping in *Jeſus*, &c. And this ſeems to imply their Hope and Aſſurance of a Reſurrection; but whether ſuch Expreſſions look back upon this State, or forward to the Reſurrection, they are out of the Sphere of our Controverſie, becauſe they ſay nothing of the intermediate State. *Eſtibius* illuſtrates his Notion, by the Greek and Latin Words for a Church Yard, or burying Place, κοιμητήριον, *Cæmiterium*, and in the Latin *Dormitorium*; becauſe, Pag. 232. ſays he, *there all Men reſt from their Labours*; to let us underſtand, I ſuppoſe, that his *Argument* and his *Etymon* are equally concern'd in the Diſpute; for who knows not the meaning of the *Etymon?* and as to a future Judgment, we have already excluded that from the Point in Hand. After all I cannot find what he drives at, or can expect to his Advantage, if the Compariſon were literally to be underſtood; for *Eſtibius* is to me the ſame Man alive, ſleeping, and waking; his animal Functions, I preſume, are carry'd on perpetually in both States; and it does not appear that Life and Soul, as well as Senſe, has left him aſleep; ſo that literally the Simile cannot be brought to do him Service; and if he will ſtrain it ſo far as to ſay, that as Men aſleep here forget the World; ſo thoſe that die are annihilated, he's as impertinent in his Gloſs, as in his Quotation; for to ſuppoſe the Queſtion in Diſpute, is really to ſpeak nothing to it.

But we have not yet done with foreign Matter from the Scripture; Death in ſeveral Places there *is call'd ſimply a not being*; *thus* Joſeph *is not*, Simeon *is not*, Gen. 42. 36. *Thou ſhalt ſeek me in the Morning, and I ſhall not be*, Job 7. 21. *O ſpare me a little, that I may recover my Strength, before I go hence, and be no more*, Pſal. 39. 13, &c. From whence he concludes thus; *All which Places muſt imply, by* not being, *a total Diſſolution; or otherwiſe the Expreſſions wou'd be very improper*: And yet notwithſtanding this *muſt imply*, I have ventur'd to rank them amongſt thoſe that imply nothing to the purpoſe; the Reaſon of this *muſt imply* lies in this, *the Expreſſions otherwiſe will be very improper*; but hold a little, then all Words muſt be examin'd according to their ſtrict and philoſophical Meaning; and their Propriety muſt depend not upon their *Uſe*, but their grammatical Conſtruction; this *muſt imply therefore*, I ſay again, was a little too forward, all things conſider'd; but we ſhall find it a little unfortunate too; for if *Eſtibius* will ſtand to it, that this is a *very improper Expreſſion*, upon our Suppoſition; the next Step he takes ſhall be to maintain, that the Scripture ſpeaks improperly. He ſays he's got through the Bible, but I muſt ſend him back to *Gen.* 5. 24. where are theſe Words, Enoch *walked with God*,

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God, *and was not*; *for God took him*: Let me here inform *Eſtibius*, that the ſame Word איננו is us'd for *Enoch*'s, and for the ſuppos'd *not being*, of *Joſeph* and *Simeon*; how then did *Enoch not be?* Did he undergo *a total Diſſolution*, when *God took him?* that's contrary to the Relation. Or is the Fault in the Sons of the Prophets, whoſe Tranſlation of the Bible, *Eſtibius* ſays, is *abominably abſurd in many Places?* that is not the Caſe here; for, whether *Eſtibius* knew a word of the Matter or not, he has quoted the ſame Word on his own ſide. Or is indeed the Stile of Scripture in it ſelf improper and *abominably abſurd?* this he muſt come to at laſt, or quit the Objection. But God be thanked the Propriety of the ſacred Text, will never be impugn'd by ſuch half, or rather half quarter Critics: Every ordinary *Lexicon* will ſhew him that אין the Radix of this Word, which properly ſignifies *nihil*, is as frequently us'd, by an *Ellipſis*, for *tanquam*, *ſicut*, *quaſi nihil*: And if ſo, then in all the reſt of the Texts of the Old Teſtament, where 'tis us'd, and thoſe of the New, where the Expreſſion is borrowed, it muſt be interpreted by the Senſe and Occaſion of the Words it is join'd with: Which I will leave the Reader to conſult at his Leiſure, with this Aſſurance, that he will never find the Expreſſion relate to the State of the Dead, conſider'd in it ſelf, but only to the Deprivation of Life, and what belongs to that; to the Perſons diſappearing from among Mortals, and being, to this World, as if they had never been.

I requeſt the Reader's Patience, till I preſent him with but one more Specimen of Texts of Scripture, that have nothing to do with the Buſineſs in hand; and then I ſhall draw nearer to it. It is of thoſe Expreſſions of the *Dead's knowing nothing*, and *not praiſing God.* The former, *Eccles.* 9. 5. *The Dead know not any thing, neither have they any more Reward, for the Memory of them is forgotten.* And the latter, *Pſal.* 115. 17. *The Dead Praiſe not the Lord, neither any that go down to Silence; but we will bleſs the Lord*, &c. To which he adds that of *Hezekiah*'s Thankſgiving for his Life; *the Grave cannot praiſe thee, Death cannot celebrate thee*, Iſa. 38. 18. As to their *knowing nothing*, the Place ſhews plainly to what Subject that belongs; for it follows, *neither have they any Reward:* This underſtood, as *Eſtibius* would have it, deſtroys all hopes of a future Life; but 'tis not to be underſtood ſo, becauſe it follows again, *for the Memory of them is forgotten*; this muſt be confin'd to the preſent Life, unleſs *Eſtibuis* will ſuppoſe it to mean, that what

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what they did here is forgotten in the other World; and this limiting the Senſe of their *Reward*, does equally limit the Senſe, in which they are ſaid to *know nothing*. But if this will not ſatisfie him, let him read the very next Verſe, *As their Love and their Hatred, and their Envy is now periſhed; neither have they any more a Portion for ever, in any thing that is done under the Sun.* And then let him, if he can, bring it home to the Subject. But there is more ſtir about *the Dead not praiſing God*; that, it ſeems, deſerves *farther Thoughts* upon it. Mr. *Turner* had interpreted both theſe Paſſages to import, that the Duty of Praiſe (meaning ſuch as theirs was) cou'd be available only in this probationary Life; and that in theſe Expreſſions they had no Conſideration of the State after Death. Mr. *Vitanimiſt* objects to this, *It makes the Reaſon of praiſing God ceaſe, becauſe they cannot better their State and Condition; whereas God requires from Angels, in perfect Bliſs, eternal Praiſe.* Not ſo faſt, I beſeech you, the Reaſon of Praiſe does not ceaſe in another State, becauſe the Reaſon of praiſing him for what we receive in this, does ceaſe: Is it not fitting that part of the Creatures time in any State, ſhou'd be employ'd in praiſing his Creator for the Benefits conferr'd upon him in that State? Eſpe-

F.T.p.30.

Vin. of the Soul's ſep. Ex. p. 33.

Eſpecially if it be conſider'd that ſo vaſtly different in the Nature, and Employment of the Perſon, in the ſuppos'd States of this World and the next; that he may, with ſufficient Propriety of Speech, be ſaid to do nothing in one, that he does in the other. But to this he farther objects. *If Praiſe be a Duty in a State of Conjunction, it muſt be much more a Duty in a State of Separation; Praiſe being almoſt the ſole Buſineſs of Angels in Heaven.* But I know no Authority he has, to compare the ſeparate State of Souls with the angelic Order; the Scripture has told us that after the Reſurrection, but not before it, they ſhall be *equal to the Angels*; therefore it is no Abſurdity to ſuppoſe that in the intermediate State bleſſed Souls are not join'd with the angelic Quire; and yet nevertheleſs it may be almoſt the ſole Buſineſs of good Souls departed, as well as Angels, conſiſtently with what *David* ſays, to praiſe God; as is apparent from the Context on both ſides: It goes before, *The Heaven, even the Heavens are the Lord's; but the Earth hath he given to the Children of Men.* The *Earth* therefore is the Gift here inſiſted upon, for which God was to be prais'd by the Inhabitants of it; but as ſuch, and for this Benefit, *the Dead praiſe not the Lord*; nor lift up their Voices together in Pſalmody, for they are gone *down into Silence.*

lence. It follows, *But we*, [we who enjoy the Bleſſing, and are capable of performing the Duty conſequent upon it] *will bleſs the Lord, from this time forth for evermore*; will from hence forward, not ceaſe to praiſe him for it, ſo long as he continues the Bleſſing to us. And this was ſo plainly *Hezekiah*'s Caſe, in that his Form of Thankſgiving to God, for the Recovery of his Health, and the Addition of fifteen Years to his Life; that *Eſtibius* has my Leave to underſtand this Text as ſtrictly, and literally as he pleaſes; that the Dead [for ſuch a Favour] cannot praiſe God.

I hope my Reader is, by this time, perſuaded to ſet aſide all theſe Texts, and all of the like Nature that occur in *Eſtibius*'s *Second*, or any other of his *Thoughts*, as altogether foreign to the Buſineſs in hand. Poſſibly fewer Words would have prevail'd upon him to do this; and poſſible it is, he may not think any Anſwer to foreign Arguments, home to the purpoſe: But I have this to ſay for my ſelf, the Reader obſerves that moſt of theſe Texts, taken at firſt hearing, without any Examination, are on *Eſtibius*'s ſide; but that there are ſome *weak*, and others *wilful* enough to take them ſo, he may alſo obſerve, if he looks abroad: Poſſible therefore it is, notwithſtanding all that has been ſaid by others, that theſe

Papers may find ſome without *Defence*, and leave others without *Excuſe*; I am ſure *one* or the *other*, are like to be the moſt favourable Judges to *Eſtibius*'s Cauſe; and upon ſuch an Hearing, it muſt be confeſs'd theſe Texts, *foreign* as they are, may prove the moſt *material* Part of his Scripture-Proof.

2. There is another Set of Texts, which do indeed relate to the Subject ſo far, that they ſpeak of Human Soul; but then they leave the Point in Diſpute undecided; being, with as much Reaſon and Conſiſtency, interpretable on ours, as the contrary *Hypotheſis*. To this Head, we may reduce, without being particular, all thoſe Expreſſions which give the Soul *perſonal* Qualities, and Operations; ſuch as *Living*, *Sinning*, &c. for theſe muſt be underſtood by the ſame Figure [*Synecdoche Membri*] upon either Suppoſition. *Eſtibius* cannot properly include the Human Body, or any material Parts, in his Notion of Soul; for *Life* is a thing *immaterial*, tho' not an *immaterial Subſtance*: And why *this*, as well as *that*, ſuppos'd a Part of Man, may not, by a Mode of Speech, denote the whole Perſon he has not, nor ever will give a ſufficient Reaſon. Pag. 178. &c.

There is a particular Expreſſion in Scripture, which may be ſuppos'd to relate to the Subject; and, as *Eſtibius* thinks, is on his ſide of the Queſtion. *Gen.* 2. 7. *And the Lord God formed Man of the Duſt of the Ground, and breathed into his Noſtrils the Breath of Life, and Man became a living Soul.* Here is an account of the Origin both of his Body and Soul. That of the Soul literally taken, may indeed countenance a Notion, that the Soul is an Act of Omnipotence, upon inſenſible Matter; and ſo long as it is continu'd upon it, is properly ſtil'd a *Quality*, or *Power*. But this depends entirely upon the literal Acceptation of *Breath*, and that is againſt all Senſe and Reaſon, as I have already clearly prov'd, and need only remind the Reader, that if *Breath*, then *Breathing* alſo muſt be taken in a literal Senſe; and this would be juſt ſuch an Argument to prove that God has *Lungs* and *Bowels*, as his *Seeing* elſewhere proves that he has *material Eyes*. In ſhort, this Text does not give us the *Nature*, but only the *Origin* of Human Soul; that it was planted in organiz'd Duſt, by an Act of Omnipotence, and that *Act* expreſs'd by *Breathing* upon Matter already form'd; to denote a more immediate Emanation of the Soul from the divine Source and Origin of all Things: But is it not clear, that ſuch an Act might as truly, and intelligibly be perform'd, by God's creating, and infuſing an *immaterial Subſtance* into the Body of

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of Man, as by his communicating to it a bare *Power* of Life? And it is more remarkable, that *Moſes* does not in this Text declare what ſort of Creature Man is, in Diſtinction from others, but after what peculiar manner he was created: For the former he had already declared, when he ſaid, God created Man *in his own Image*, Gen 1. 27. which ſhall be conſider'd in its proper Place. I know there are ſome Interpreters, who, from this double Creation in the foremention'd Text, endeavour to eſtabliſh the Immortality of the Soul; but we need not depend upon their Authority, to reject that of *Eſtibius*: The plain Senſe of the Place gives him no Advantage; and that's a ſufficient Anſwer to an Objection as ſuch, and fully anſwers my purpoſe here.

Now ſuppoſing *Eſtibius* had, as he affirms he has, read over the Bible to find an immaterial Subſtance in Human Nature, but found it not; this Diſappointment cou'd not reaſonably give Riſe to his *Second Thoughts*: For that Book is ſilent as to many other Diſputes, which have ſome Relation to Religion, and yet neither Party can make an Argument of *that*; but the Appeal lies to the Nature of the Thing, and all other Conſiderations, which unaſſiſted Reaſon can ſuggeſt. But indeed the Scripture is not perfectly ſilent, as to this Controverſie, tho' *Eſtibius*

Eſtibius often forces it to ſpeak, where it is really ſilent: For,

3dly, We want not Scriptures which favour our Opinion; as being with more Clearneſs and Conſiſtency, interpreted upon *this* than the contrary Suppoſition. And here it may not be improper to take our firſt Proſpect from the Creation of Man. The Text I have already mention'd, *God created Man in his own Image, in the Image of God created he him*, Gen. 1. 27. From this Hiſtory it is obſervable, without critically enquiring into the meaning of theſe Words, that there is more than a gradual Difference, between the Principle of Life in Man, and that in Beaſt. *And God ſaid let the Waters bring forth abundantly, the moving Creature that hath Life, and Foul that may fly above the Earth, in the open Firmament of Heaven.* And again, *God ſaid, let the Earth bring forth the living Creature after his kind; Cattel and creeping Thing, and Beaſt of the Earth after his kind; and it was ſo*, Gen. 1. 20, & 24. Thus the Earth, at the Command of God, cou'd bring forth the Brutal Kind, as well as the Vegetative; but what part had it in the Formation of Man, beſides that of ſupplying Duſt? And what, beſides the immediate Hand of God, cou'd finiſh him that was to be made *in his own Image, and after his Likeneſs?* If this

Creation imply'd no more than giving him Life, or a more perfect Degree of it; then the Beaſt does alſo in ſome Degree bear the Image of God, which *Moſes*, it ſeems, ignorantly, and injudiciouſly made the diſtinguiſhing Part of Man's Creation: but if this Difference be any thing more than gradual, as it is more than probable *Moſes* thought it was, then it is paſt Diſpute, *Eſtibius*'s whole *Hypotheſis* is ruined. Let us farther examin a little into the meaning of this Expreſſion *in the Image, and after the Likeneſs of God*: In the firſt place this cannot relate to the Body of Man, nor any Qualities or Endowments of that, which was already created with the Maſs out of which it was taken, before God ſaid let us make Man in our own Image: Nor cou'd it be the forming of his Body out of the Duſt, but the breathing into him the Breath of Life, as it is in the other Text, that can relate to *this*. For the Body, conſider'd apart, comes much nearer to the Image of Brutes, than that of the Creator; nay, and I think, is exceeded, in every part, whether as uſeful or ornamental, by ſome of the Product of Earth and Water; who did not partake, acccording to this Hiſtory, of the Image of God. And therefore this Notion is altogether groundleſs, and inconſiſtent with the Hiſtory from which it is taken.

Others place it in the Dominion, which God gave to *Adam*, over the Brutes: But theſe we find are two things plainly diſtinguiſh'd in the Hiſtory; *And God ſaid let us make Man in our Image, after our Likeneſs, and let them have Dominion*, &c. Gen. 1. 26. And again, where this Dominion is not mention'd, but the *Image of God* is alledg'd as a Reaſon, which has no manner of Connexion with, or Relation to the Dominion he has over the Beaſts, it is ſaid, *Whoſo ſheddeth Man's Blood, by Man ſhall his Blood be ſhed; for in the Image of God made he Man.* And again, it is expreſly ſaid, *that God* created *Man in his own Image*, Gen. 1. 27. which ſhews, that altho' it was agreeable to the Divine Wiſdom to ſubſtitute him, as his *Vice-gerent*, who *bare his Image*; yet this was an external Prerogative; not his by Creation, but by a ſubſequent Gift.

We muſt therefore ſeek for a farther Reſemblance than this; and where can we hope to find it, if not in the Faculties and Endowments of our Soul? Here it is eaſie to diſcern the divine Image delineated, ſo far as it is imitable, both in his *vital* and *moral* Perfections. God has a perfect Knowledge of all Truth, and of himſelf the exhibitive Author of it: Man alſo does perfectly know many Truths, is a ſelf-conſcious Being, and can reach, and fix his Thoughts upon the divine Nature it ſelf. Again God has an abſolute Freedom of Choice, together with an inflexible Rectitude of Will: Man is not determin'd by ſecond Cauſes, and wherever his Will is corrupt, he becomes conſcious of Guilt, that is of acting againſt the Deſign of his Creation. Now if this Image is not utterly defac'd in the Ruins of Human Nature, but ſtill diſcernable on our Souls; it was doubtleſs much more viſibly there, at our Creation, before either Sin or Infirmity fell upon us. The Point in Queſtion then is, whether the Soul, as bearing the Image of God, ought, with more Clearneſs and Conſiſtency, to be eſteem'd a *finite ſpiritual Subſtance*, or only a *Power* inherent in Matter; for that it is not God himſelf that thinks in Human Body I have already prov'd; and indeed *that* would be much more than his *Image in Man*; or what the Hebrew Word for Likeneſs ſignifies, an *Adumbration*, that is, an imperfect Repreſentation of him. That God is a Spirit, I may take for granted, when the Appeal lies to Scripture; and that God may not create Subſtances immaterial, as well as material, no reaſon can be given for this, by him that grants the former. Now as we conceive God to be of a ſpiritual Nature, abſolutely perfect; ſo it is moſt agreeable to

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Reaſon to conceive his *Image* ſtamp'd upon a ſpiritual, tho' finite Creature; reſembling thoſe Attributes and Endowments, which characterize the original Spirit. For if he has conferr'd this Power on Matter, (tho' *conferring a Power*, does not come up to the Notion of a *Creation*; and yet *Moſes* tells us Man was *created* in God's *Image*) then he has created a certain part of Duſt in his *Image*; but it is not intelligible to me that Matter ſhou'd, in any *one* Modification, however refin'd, bear the *Image* of God, in that Senſe, which it does not in any *other*. If he thinks the Power of Life and Senſation, to be ſomething more than a Modification of Matter, I am ſtill at a Loſs to conceive how Matter ſhou'd be ſuſceptible of any Power, but by the various Modifications it is capable of. Beſides, granting Thought and Conſciouſneſs in the Divine Nature as a Spirit, and yet placing them as a Power in Human Body, is granting that both a Body and Spirit can think; which in reality deſtroys the Diſtinction between them: But if both Scripture and Reaſon confirm the Diſtinction, by aſſuring us that God is a Spirit; then, to maintain and keep up that Diſtinction, it is requiſite we aſſert thoſe Beings, which reſemble his ſpiritual Perfections, to be alſo of a ſpiritual Nature.

Thus it appears to me that *Moſes*'s Account of our Creation, is interpreted with much more Clearneſs and Conſiſtency, than we can ever expect to find it by the Comment of an *Eſtibius*. The Truth is, he can make nothing at all of this peculiar Creation, but a luxuriant Variety of Expreſſion in the Hiſtorian, which is confuted in every Sentence throughout the Hiſtory.

Next to the Creation, let us view the Redemption of Mankind; and try if that will give any Countenance to our Cauſe; tho' our Adverſary has already appeal'd to it, and rank'd it amongſt his grand Arguments, that the Redemption of whole Man *excludes* a double Nature in him; whereas I, on the other hand, preſume it will be found to *include* that double Nature, if there appears Ground from Scripture to build the Notion of a two-fold Redemption upon. St. *Paul* is ſpeaking of our Redemption, where he tells us, *ye are bought with a Price*, 1 Cor. 6. 20. and I think he makes a two-fold Redemption by his Inference, *Therefore glorifie God in your Body, and in your Spirit, which are God's*. Here the perſonal *ye* is divided into two Parts, *Body* and *Spirit*; and into two diſtinct Parts, each of which has its diſtinct Share, and Portion in the Duty of glorifying God; grounded upon

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upon this right of Purchaſe, by which the Property of both was in God.

Sanctification is a Conſequence of our Redemption, and this alſo the Apoſtle divides, when he prays *the very God of Peace to ſanctifie them wholly*; *and I pray your whole Spirit, and Soul, and Body be preſerved blameleſs, unto the coming of our Lord Jeſus Chriſt.* Here indeed are three Parts mention'd, to make the Man ὁλόκληρον, *entire*, and *perfect*; but in this the Apoſtle plainly alludes to the *Pithagoric* and *Platonic* Doctrine, which diſtinguiſh'd theſe three Parts in Man, by the very ſame words, ϖνεῦμα, ψυχὴ and σῶμα. Many of the Philoſophers, by this Diſtinction, underſtood two immaterial Subſtances, united to Human Body; one performing the plaſtic and inferior Powers of Senſe, the other the intellectual and ſuperior Operations of the Mind: But then others diſtinguiſh'd ψυχὴ and ϖνεῦμα only as different Faculties, or Operations, of the ſame Soul. There is no Neceſſity at all to intereſt the Apoſtle in the Controverſie between theſe two Opinions, for either being true, does equally ſerve his Purpoſe; and whether two different Subſtances, or only Faculties, they both needed, and each in ſome meaſure a different, Sanctification. But then I think the Apoſtle is not ſo unconcern'd in the Controverſie between theſe Philoſophers, and the Materialiſts. The Apoſtle knew the Tenour of Scripture, and which way it tended in all Diſputes, better than *Eſtibius* does; but had the Doctrine, *That Human Soul and Life are the ſame thing, been moſt conſonant to the whole Tenour of the Holy Scriptures*; and he, therefore, muſt have believ'd Man wholly mortal, it cannot be ſuppos'd that he wou'd then have borrow'd the Senſe, and the very Language of thoſe Heathens, who there, and in the whole Tenour of their Writings, do moſt induſtriouſly oppoſe that Doctrine. This wou'd have been to lead his Reader into an Error, as 'tis plain, upon *Eſtibius*'s *Suppoſition*, all his moſt learned Readers have been hitherto led into the Error by that, amongſt other Places of Scripture: Nay, it would have led him into an Error of ſuch Moment and Conſequence, as it cannot but be ſuppos'd the *Spirit* by which he wrote, was aware of. That the Controverſie is of Moment *Eſtibius* muſt not deny, ſo long as he looks upon *Second Thoughts* to be ſuch a momentous Performance: And indeed it cannot be indifferent to any Man, let his Proſpect be good or bad, whether he ſhall lie in a State of utter Inſenſibility, and *not being*, for ſo vaſt a Space of Time, as may extend from his Death to his Reſurrection. Beſides that the *Spirit* as perfectly foreſaw, as *Eſtibius* can relate,

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relate, the wicked Advantages which have been made of this Doctrine; and therefore, had the Doctrine been in it ſelf falſe, and erroneous, it wou'd have had no better a Foundation in Scripture, than the Purgatory, and Prayers for the Dead that are erected upon it: but I believe neither of them have ſo much Countenance from the whole Scripture, as this Doctrine has, from this one Text; otherwiſe the Apoſtle muſt be ſuppos'd to uſe, in his Prayer to God, a *pernicious*, as well as a *falſe* Diſtinction; which diſtinguiſhes the Caſe very much from that of the Sun's moving, and ſuch like Expreſſions, in which the Scripture-truth is reconcilable to an Expreſſion philoſophically falſe, but an uſual Phraſe of Speech; as we do not look upon it any Inconſiſtency in a *Copernican* to ſpeak, in the common Phraſe, of Things done *under the Sun*. But in the Caſe before us, it wou'd have been little leſs than an Inconſiſtency in St. *Paul*, (whoſe Character, in this particular, even before he had the Spirit of God, ſets him above that *pious Ignorance*, which *Eſtibius* is bold to charge upon the Primitive Fathers) To graft an heatheniſh and falſe Doctrine upon his, and in an Epiſtle ſent to *Theſſalonica*, the Metropolis of a Grecian Country, where it was ſure to be underſtood in the Senſe of the Grecian Philoſophers.

Thus we find our *Creation*, *Redemption*, and *Sanctification* all reſpect a Compound in Human Nature, and plainly diſtinguiſh the united Parts of it. As to the ſeparate Exiſtence of the Soul after Diſſolution, I have already ſhewn in this Chapter from the Parable of *Dives* and *Lazarus*, that there is ſufficient Ground to believe that; therefore I proceed to conſider,

Laſtly, The Glorification promis'd in Scripture to Human Nature, which gives no ſmall Encouragement to this Doctrine; not of the *ſeparate Exiſtence*, for they ſhall die no more, but of the *ſeparate Nature* of Human Soul. Pag. 184. *Eſtibius* had before obſerv'd, that *Salvation of Souls was mention'd but once in Scripture*, which gave me occaſion to obſerve that, what ſignifies the ſame thing, is often mention'd in Scripture; and if there be any of theſe Texts when the word Soul cannot fairly be interpreted Life, then there is a Salvation which cannot fairly be interpreted by *Eſtibius*: And this we have from the ſame learned Apoſtle, 1 Ep. to the *Corinthians* 5. 5. *to deliver ſuch an one unto Satan, for the Deſtruction of the* Fleſh, *that the* Spirit *may be ſaved, in the Day of the Lord Jeſus.* Here the Salvation of the *Spirit*, does not ſignify the Salvation of *Life* only, when properly underſtood; for it is oppos'd to the Deſtruction, or Mortification of the *Fleſh*; which is an Affliction put upon the preſent Life of the Perſon; and implies that thoſe Evils which he was to undergo by St. *Paul*'s Cenſure, and the Diſcipline of that Church, would tend to the Salvation of his *Spirit* (a Principle therefore diſtinct from his Body, and of more Value than either *that*, or his Life) in the Day of the Lord Jeſus. So that, in this Text, it is not the future Life that is oppos'd to this; but the *Spirit* is oppos'd to the *Fleſh*: Not again the *ſpiritual* Affection or Inclination as oppos'd to *carnal*; for the Perſon, as it appears by the Occaſion, did not walk after the Spirit; but the Spirit that was in him, tho' unregenerate, which is a Diſtinction of *Spirit* and *Body*, quite different from that of *Life* and *Body*; which latter (by the way) is a Diſtinction I never met with in Scripture, but the former very frequently. Its true the Scripture never ſpeaks of the *future* Salvation, or ſaving of our Souls, in Oppoſition to the *future* Salvation of our Bodies, for both ſhall be ſaved together; but it is ſufficient to warrant our Diſtinction, if it ſpeaks of the *future* Salvation of our Souls, in Oppoſition to the *preſent* Salvation, or Preſervation of our Bodies; for if the Soul was not *now*, in its Nature, a part of us diſtinct from our Bodies; neither cou'd it properly be diſtinguiſh'd *then*, from what the Body is *now*; becauſe it will be the ſame *then*, according to *Eſtibius*, as well as the Scripture, that it is *now.*

Theſe are ſome of the Texts which favour our Doctrine, and are, with much greater Reaſon, and better Conſiſtency, interpreted thus, than they can be by any Man that holds *Eſtibius*'s Doctrine with Submiſſion to Scripture. I might add many more to theſe, but I think it abundantly ſufficient that I have carry'd the View from the Creation of our Souls, through the Stages of their Probation, and Separation, to their Conſummation in Glory. And it will be needleſs to cite more Texts, in favour of this Doctrine, when I have prov'd in the

4th, And laſt Place, that we do not want important Expreſſions of Scripture, which cannot be underſtood, with any Conſiſtency, but upon Suppoſition of the immaterial Nature, and ſeparate Exiſtence of the Soul. I ſhall mention but one from the Old Teſtament, but that a very full Proof, *Eccleſ.* 12. 7. *Then ſhall the Duſt return to the Earth as it was; and the Spirit ſhall return unto God who gave it.* By this Text we ſhall be able to interpret another in this Book, *Chap.* 3. *ver.* 21. *Who knoweth the Spirit of Man that goeth upward, and the Spirit of the Beaſt that goeth downward to the Earth? Solomon* is, in this place, laying down the Premiſſes that lead to the *Epicure*'s Concluſion; and particularly to remove the Fears of another Life, he ſays in the Context, *All* [Man and Beaſt] *go unto one Place*; *all are of the Duſt*, *and all turn to Duſt again:* And then it follows, *Who knoweth*, &c. by which he muſt mean one of theſe two things; either no body knows, and there is not any, Difference between the end of Man and Beaſt; or, tho' there be a real Difference, yet who is able to find it out; in the one Senſe he perſonates the *Epicurean*, in the other he reflects upon his Ignorance. But take it in which Senſe you will, it is *Solomon*'s fix'd and final Judgment, that the Spirit of Man goeth upward; for this is one main Concluſion of his Work, *The Spirit* [of Man] *ſhall return to God that gave it.* And that the Spirit of Beaſt goeth downward [the contrary way] was in the other place taken for granted by both ſides. Now this is a Scripture that cannot be underſtood, with any Conſiſtency, but upon our Suppoſition. The Spirit of Man returning to God that gave it, cannot be only Life centring in God again; for why then does not the Spirit of Beaſt return the ſame way? For he has Life, I preſume, and Reaſon too *Eſtibius* preſumes; and if, as he more confidently affirms, Reaſon is a neceſſary conſequent of Life; then the Spirit of Beaſt, will as neceſſarily return to God that gave it, as the excluded Ray to the Sun. *Solomon* ſeems to be of *Eſtibius*'s Opinion, that a Power of Life in Matter ceaſes

Pag. 97.

Ibid.

ceaſes to be at Death; this may be his *Spirit of the Beaſt that goeth downward*; but that the Spirit of Man is only ſuch a Power as this, *Solomon*, if he writes conſiſtently, as flatly denies as any Adverſary *Eſtibius* has.

St. *Paul* tells us of himſelf, *I knew a Man in Chriſt, above fourteen Years ago (whether* in *the Body I cannot tell, or whether* out *of the Body I cannot tell; God knoweth,) ſuch an one caught up to the third Heaven; and I knew ſuch a Man (whether* in *the Body, or* out *of the Body I cannot tell; God knoweth,) how that he was caught up into Paradiſe, and heard unſpeakable Words, which it is not lawful for a Man to utter*, 2 Ep. to the *Corinth.* 2. *ver.* 2, 3, & 4. That this was no Viſion of St. *Paul*'s upon Earth, but a local Elevation and Rapture, is plain from ſeveral Circumſtances of the Relation; but this eſpecially, to our preſent purpoſe, that he knew not whether he was *in* the Body, or *out* of it; (for ſuch Viſions, we grant *Eſtibius*, were made without ſuch a Separation) this he ſays twice together, which as often proves the Poſſibility of *his*, that is *his Soul*'s exiſting out of the Body; nay, and in a State of Perception and Underſtanding; for he's poſitive he heard *unſpeakable Words, which it was not lawful for a Man to utter.* Which proves, beyond Contradiction, that it was poſſible for him to exiſt and perceive, in a State ſeparate from the Body; and that proves, as fully, that his Soul was no *Power* infus'd into his Body, but a diſtinct Subſtance; for no *Power* or *Property* can be ſaid to exiſt diſtinct from the Subject, but to be extinct in it. *Eſtibius* gives the *Power* of Life a peculiar *Exit*; he ſays it centers again in God, but what! cou'd St. *Paul*'s Life center again in God, and there hear and perceive? This is impoſſible, and contradictory to the Commentator's own literal Interpretation of thoſe Places, that ſpeak of the Dead *not being*. St. *Paul* is very ſolemn in his Doubt, whether he was then out of the Body or in it; an idle Scruple, if he did not believe both to be poſſible; and therefore I recommend his Example to *Eſtibius*'s Belief.

But this Interpretation is farther confirm'd by St. *Paul*'s Belief, that Death wou'd give him ſuch a Being out of the Body, as, for for any thing he knew, this Rapture did; which he plainly intimates in this Ep. *Chap.* 5. *ver.* 6, & 8. *Therefore we are alway confident, knowing that whilſt we are at home in the Body, we are abſent from the Lord*; and, after a Parentheſis, *we are confident, I ſay, and willing rather to be abſent from the Body, and to be preſent with the Lord.* His being abſent from the Lord, while he was in the Body, ſhews his Belief that he ſhould be preſent with him, when he went out of it; and his chuſing rather to abſent from the one, and be preſent with the other, ſhews his Confidence of being immediately tranſlated from one to the other: For had he dreamt of his not being, from the Time of his Death to his Reſurrection, his Reward wou'd have come never the ſooner for his ſooner quitting the Body; which yet is the very thing he deſir'd and expected: Beſides, when he ſhall come to be *preſent with the Lord*, after the Reſurrection, he ſhall not be then *abſent from the Body*, but return'd into it again; ſo that theſe two States are as plainly diſtinguiſh'd by him, as poſſibly the plain Senſe of Words can diſtinguiſh: And Dr. *Whitby* has well remark'd upon the Place, that whereas he calls this State being *with the Lord*; he ſays of the other, ſo ſhall we *ever be with the Lord*, 1 Theſſ. 4. 17.

This Promiſe of being with the Lord immediately after his Departure out of the Body, St. *Paul* doubtleſs had from the Lord; if not in the ſame Words, yet to the ſame Effect with the Promiſe he made to the penitent Thief, *This Day ſhalt thou be with me in Paradiſe*, Luke 23. 43. This is another Text, which cannot, with any Clearneſs and Conſiſtency, be interpreted but upon Suppoſition of the ſeparate Exiſtence of the Soul. In order to prove this, we muſt enquire what our Lord meant by *to Day*, and what by *Paradiſe*; and laſtly, what *by being with himſelf.* One thing I take for granted in this Explication; and that is, that our gracious Lord, in this ſignal Inſtance of his Pardon and Mercy, return'd his Anſwer to the Capacity of the Petitioner: That he ſpoke ſo as to be underſtood by him, in order to his preſent Conſolation, as well as ſucceeding Reward. This, I hope, *Eſtibius* will not deny me, becauſe if he anſwer'd in another Senſe, than the Thief either did, or cou'd underſtand his Anſwer, he ſpoke to deceive him. Our ſafeſt Method then to explain our Lord's Meaning, is to enquire what the Thief muſt underſtand by his Words, and firſt for *to Day*; that it cannot be connected thus, *I ſay unto thee to Day*, but, *I ſay unto thee, to Day ſhalt thou*, &c. all the Interpretations, and all the Readings I have met with agree; nor, I preſume, has *Eſtibius* met with any that do not; for he has not given it as an Anſwer in his Comment upon this Text in the following Chapter: But let us conſider it as an Anſwer to the Petition, *Lord, remember me when thou comeſt into thy Kingdom*, ver. 42. Whether he believ'd only in general, without knowing when our Lord ſhould come into his Kingdom, or had ſome diſtant Proſpect of it, this is certain, our Lord anſwers his *when*, with *to Day*; and ſo fixes the Time of his being with him in his Kingdom. Now how cou'd the Thief, under the Senſe of dying that Day, underſtand it otherwiſe than ſtrictly and literally? Had he been us'd to underſtand *to Day* in a larger Senſe, as it is ſometimes to be underſtood in Scripture, there is no Ground for that, from his former Life; but on the contrary, the familiar Expreſſion amongſt the *Jews* of good Men departed, היום יושב *to Day he ſhall inhabit*, that is, *Abraham*'s Boſom, (as Dr. *Whitby* has noted on the Place, and I need not farther prove) if ever he had heard of it, wou'd determin the Senſe of our Saviour; and if not, it cannot be ſuppos'd he took the Word otherwiſe than literally. But that the *Jews* underſtood היום *to Day* literally, in their ſaying, is evident, by conſidering, 2*dly*, What they meant by *Paradiſe*, which was plainly a State of Happineſs into which the Souls of pious Men were receiv'd immediately after their Departure hence. This *Grotius* has remark'd, and this Dr. *Whitby* has plainly ſhewn, from that ſaying of the *Chaldees*, *Seek Paradiſe the glorious Country of the Soul*; and from their uſual Wiſh to a dying Perſon, *Let his Soul be in Paradiſe*; and to mention no more, Dr. *Gregory* from *Theophilact* defines the word παράδεισος, according to the *Jewiſh*

Senſe of it, Ὃς ἐστι χωρίον πνευματικῆς ἀναπαύσεως, *Paradiſe is the Region of the Souls reſt.* Now I appeal to any Man that ever underſtood the true Senſe of an ancient Author, whether our Saviour could ſpeak of *Paradiſe*, to this *Jew*, with Clearneſs and Conſiſtency, in any other Senſe than this; which he cou'd not be ſo ignorant, as not to underſtand being the popular Senſe of the Word; and that which makes our Saviour's Uſe of it to him perfectly agreeable to the gracious Deſign of his Promiſe. And this will lead us laſtly to the plain Senſe of *being with Chriſt*; who, it is not to be diſputed, ſurviv'd his Body, in his Divine Nature; and that alone is ſufficient to clear the Caſe of the Thief; tho' his Reception into *Paradiſe*, does prove the ſame of the Human Soul of our bleſſed Lord.

To this purpoſe it is farther remarkable, that our Saviour did ſo far countenance this Opinion, wherever he met with it, that he defends his Enemies the *Scribes*, for this Opinion againſt their Adverſaries the *Sadducees*. The Place and the Occaſion is well known, *God is not a God of the Dead, but of the Living; for all live unto him*, Luke 20. 38. Mr. *Turner* upon this Place (ſuppoſing that the *Jews* knew nothing of the Chriſtian Reſurrection; and that, as

Vind. of the ſeparate Ex. *p.*18, *&c.* and farther Vind. *p.* 19, *&c.*

Dr. *Hammond* obſerves, they us'd the word ἀνάςασις only to denote the ſurviving of the Soul) proves, that then our Saviour determines directly for the Phariſaic Opinion; by declaring *Abraham*, *Iſaac*, and *Jacob*, and in them all the faithful departed, to be alive, when God appear'd, after their Death, to *Moſes* in the Buſh. With this Interpretation, the Caſe is ſo clearly reſolv'd in the Text, that I need only refer the Reader to it, and to obſerve that, immediately upon the Deciſion, *Certain of the Scribes anſwering ſaid, Maſter, thou haſt ſaid well*, ver. 39. which was an Approbation unſuitable to their Temper and Behaviour, who came at that very time *to lay hands on him*, ver. 19. but it was a full Vindication of them, againſt other Enemies the *Sadducees*; and therefore they applauded our Lord's Victory over theſe.

But ſuppoſing the *Sadducees* came prepar'd to object againſt the Reſurrection, as taught by our Saviour; yet his Proof of it includes alſo the ſeparate Exiſtence of the Soul. This is undeniable, if *Abraham*, *Iſaac*, and *Jacob*, the Inſtances he brings, were in that State of Separation. But *Eſtibius* has given them a peculiar, and antecedent Reſurrection; with what Reaſon I ſhall conſider in its place: I only deſire him to make a pertinent Argument of our

Saviour's, upon his Suppoſition. The *Sadducees* own a God, but deny a general Reſurrection; our Saviour, to confute them, inſtances in two or three peculiar Favourites of God, rais'd before the general Reſurrection. What's this to the *Sadducees* Objection againſt a general Reſurrection, or to the ſeven Brethren, that one Woman had married? According to this Account our Saviour ſilenc'd the *Sadducees*, without ſilencing their Objection; without giving the leaſt Proof that the Dead (in general, which was the Subject of their Diſpute) are rais'd; or making any Oppoſition, by his Inſtance of a Reſurrection, to theirs againſt it. Whereas the ſeparate Exiſtence of theſe deceas'd Perſons with God, ſtrongly infers and corroborates the Promiſe of the Reſurrection of their Bodies; and was peculiarly adapted to confute thoſe that deny'd Spirits. But our Saviour, as if he deſign'd to prevent the *Sadducees* from retreating to this very Refuge, ſubjoins an univerſal Reaſon, for *all live unto him*. More fully and pertinently I cannot imagine he cou'd have expreſs'd himſelf, had *Eſtibius* been one of the Objectors. This Tenent of the *Sadducees* is here declar'd to be an Anti-Chriſtian, as well as an Anti-Phariſaical Tenent, by him that cou'd not be partial on the *Phariſees* ſide: And may *Eſtibius* learn from hence,

that

that the Phariſaical Practice of *Prayers for the Dead*, will be no juſtifiable Reaſon, for his denying that they *live unto God.* And with this I leave him to interpret the Paſſage, or any Words of it, in *what Senſe* he pleaſes; but I hope I may oblige him to make *Senſe* of it.

I conclude my Proof from Scripture, with that other Determination of our bleſſed Lord, which, with *Eſtibius* and me, I cannot but think ought to put an end to this Controverſie. Matth. 10. 28. *And fear not them which kill the Body, but are not able to kill the Soul; but rather fear him which is able to deſtroy both Body and Soul in Hell.* Here *Eſtibius* will not deny that Chriſt makes a different Extent of Human and Divine Power; for this is the Motive he urges to the Fear of God, and againſt the Fear of Man: The Queſtion then is, wherein conſiſts this Difference? I anſwer, 1*ſt*, In the Nature and Duration of the Evil, which we are liable to from God and Man; the one can bring no greater nor longer continuing Evil upon us, than this World affords; the other can deliver us up to the bitter Pains of eternal Death, expreſs'd in the Text by *deſtroying in Hell.* And thus far alſo we are agreed, and this is all the Interpretation that *Eſtibius* can put upon the whole Paſſage; but to the Queſtion, wherein conſiſts this Difference? I muſt anſwer, 2*dly*, Not only in the Nature and Duration of the Effects of this Power; but alſo in the Objects of it. Man can only affect the Body; God can affect both Body and Soul. If Man is wholly mortal, it neceſſarily follows, that he who kills the Body kills the Soul alſo: But the Words of this Text are as expreſs, as if our Lord had ſaid, Man cannot kill the Soul; for to ſay he can kill the Body, and then put a Period to his Power; and immediately upon that to diſtinguiſh his Body from his Soul, by making them both ſubject to the Power of God; is, in all Senſe and Conſtruction, to ſay Man cannot kill the Soul. There is no Poſſibility of evading this, but by ſaying that by Soul here, is meant no more than Life; which Man can deſtroy at preſent, but cannot affect in the next World: But this is a pure Evaſion; for, 1*ſt*, Here's not only an Oppoſition of the next Life to this, but of Body and Soul in this Life; which wou'd be abſurd, if Man were only an enliven'd Body; whoſe Life is equally ſubject, with his Body, to Human Power: Therefore by Soul here, cannot be underſtood the preſent Life. Nor, 2*dly*, Can it be meant of a future Life; for in that reſpect neither does Man kill the Body, which he cannot hinder from partaking, when God ſhall raiſe it, of that Life.

Eſtibius therefore muſt make the Text ſay one of theſe two things, either Man can kill both Soul and Body, or he can kill neither. Thus far he muſt be ſaid to kill both Soul and Body, that he puts an end to both, till the Reſurrection; and thus far he can be ſaid to kill neither, that he cannot hinder God from reſtoring Life to the Body, upon the Reſurrection: But now both theſe are Contradictions to what the Text ſays; which, by ſubjecting the Body (at preſent, for in Hell it is only in the Power of God) to Human Power; but totally exempting the Soul from it, makes Man (as now he is) neither wholly mortal, nor wholly immortal.

This, *Eſtibius*, I take to be no weak Reaſoning; tho' I will not promiſe my ſelf it ſhall operate at all upon your Conſtitution; for if you do believe all to be Argument, that you have advanc'd as ſuch in this Book, I muſt ſay you are a plain Exception to your own Rule, *That a Man cannot believe what he will:* You may have the greateſt Opinion imaginable of your own Power and Abilities; and, with relation to the former part of the Text, we muſt allow you a larger Power, than the generality of Mankind; but remember ſtill what our Saviour ſays, that Man can do no more than *kill the Body.*

I have done with *Eſtibius* in this Chapter; but before I leave the Subject, it may not be improper to account for two Things, which poſſibly are Scruples remaining with the Reader: The firſt is, That *this Diſtinction between Soul and Body, and conſequent upon it, the Immortality of the Soul, is not ſo expreſly, nor fully deliver'd in Scripture, as the Importance of it to Religion, according to our Management of the Argument, ſeems to require.* The ſecond is, That *we have not ſo poſitive, nor ſo particular an Account of the intermediate State, as of the final State after Judgment; tho' the former, in ſome reſpect, more nearly concerns us, as it is at a leſs diſtance from us.*

To clear up the firſt of theſe, I have ſeveral Conſiderations to offer. 1*ſt*, If it appear that this Diſtinction between Soul and Body, is neceſſarily included in any one poſitive and expreſs Article of Religion, tho' it is not poſitively expreſs'd it ſelf; yet it is to be receiv'd as a part of that Article. The Reſurrection of the Body, in order to the Revivification of the ſame Perſon, is abundantly declared in Scripture; but when I have made it appear, which I ſhall do in the laſt Chapter, that the reſtoring of Life only, if that were poſſible, without a Soul to the Human Body, wou'd be no numerical Reſurrection (which fundamentally over-turns not only that, but the whole Doctrine of Rewards and Puniſhments) then he who is convinc'd, and I hope to convince any reaſonable Man, by this Argument, muſt give as full an Aſſent to the one as to the other Article; and whatever Teſtimony is brought to confirm the Reſurrection of the Body, does implicitly confirm the ſeparate Exiſtence of the Soul; which, as a part of the other, cannot want Scripture Proof, while that is ſo fully and frequently declar'd in Scripture.

2dly, It is not unuſual in Scripture, but very agreeable to the Deſign of it, for God to exerciſe the Induſtry of the Reader, by leaving many Conſequences to be drawn from thence, by his own Reaſon, aſſiſted by the *Holy Spirit*, which ſhall *guide* every ſincere Diſciple *into all Truth*; all that is neceſſary to his *Salvation* from fatal Errors, and from *the Wrath to come*, upon thoſe that fall into them. A Queſtion may ariſe upon this, how far ſuch conſequential Articles are neceſſary to be believed. I anſwer, thoſe that are neceſſarily connected with ſome other fundamental Articles, become neceſſary Articles to thoſe, and thoſe only, who can comprehend that Connexion. God Almighty, in the Goſpel, has graciouſly proportion'd the *Improvement* of our Faith, to the *Talent* of our Underſtanding; and no

Man ſhall be condemn'd for any, but wilful Ignorance; for whatever is ſinful, is ſo far wilful. We are told indeed of a Servant, who *knew not his Lord's Will*, and yet *did Things worthy of Stripes*; and accordingly was beaten with ſome, tho' *few Stripes*, Luke 12. 48. but this Ignorance of his was not abſolutely ſuch; but only comparatively to the greater Knowledge of the Paſtors of the Church; whom therefore the great Shepherd requir'd, upon higher Obligations, to be *faithful and wiſe Stewards*, ver. 42. And this ſhews how admirably the Goſpel is fitted to ſerve that univerſal Deſign of it, the Salvation of all Men: For whereas the Heathen Religion was calculated above the Underſtanding of the Vulgar, and beneath the Belief of wiſe Men; the Goſpel opens a rich Mine of Divine Truths to employ the ſtrongeſt, and yet has a Brightneſs and Simplicity diſcernable by the weakeſt Underſtanding. *To know the ture God, and Jeſus Chriſt whom he has ſent, is Life eternal*, Joh. 17.3. and I doubt not to ſome poor ignorant Creatures, who are never freed, all their Lives, from the groſſeſt Conceptions of the Deity; and who ſcarce underſtand one, of the many Articles included in this, the Miſſion of Jeſus Chriſt. And poſſibly the Condeſcention is yet greater to ſome Capacities; for St. *Paul* gives us this, as one

Deſcription of Faith, *To believe that God is, and that he is* [in general Terms] *a Rewarder of them that diligently ſeek him.* And therefore the Immortality of the Soul may be a true Chriſtian Doctrine, contain'd in the very Promiſe of a Reward; tho' it is not ſo deliver'd, as to become neceſſary for all Mankind to believe; but on the other hand, if it is deduc'd from Scripture by juſt Conſequences (and that, I think, is the leaſt that can be ſaid of the preceding Proof) theſe Conſequences will be found to preſs hard upon thoſe, whom God has enabled to ſee the length of them; for all that he has done, or perhaps can do, to make any Man *ſee*, is to give him *Eyes*, and create *Light*. But,

3dly It is not altogether unaccountable, why this Doctrine in particular, of the Immortality of the Soul, is not ſo expreſly, and obviouſly laid down in Scripture, as our Adverſaries challenge us to ſhew it; and this will appear to our Satisfaction, if we conſider the Perſons to whom the Scripture was immediately directed, and thoſe for whoſe Uſe it was farther deſign'd. The *lively Oracles* of the Old Teſtament belong'd to the *Jews*, and to them only; and neither our Lord, nor his Apoſtles, while he was upon Earth, preach'd to any other Nation; but by this time I may preſume

Acts 7. 38.
Rom. 3. 2.
— 9. 4.

preſume the Immortality, and ſeparate Exiſtence of the Soul, was an avowed Principle of the *Jews*, deny'd only by one Sect, and that, which is very remarkable, oppos'd in this very point by our Lord himſelf. The *Gentiles* to whom the Apoſtles preach'd afterward, are divided by St. *Paul* into *Greeks* and *Barbarians:* This was the conſtant Doctrine of the chiefeſt of the Greek Philoſophers, and the receiv'd Principle of the Vulgar; and as to the *Barbarians*, *Tully*, who well underſtood the Opinions of both, tells us, *Permanere Animos arbitramur conſenſu Nationum omnium.* Tuſc. l. 1. Now if I were to convince a Man of an Error, and my Proof proceeded upon the Suppoſition of ſome Principle belonging to us both; I ſhou'd think there was no Neceſſity, whatever Reaſon there might be, to controvert that Principle; which tho' it may be diſputable in it ſelf, is an *Axiom* between him and me. and thus a Man may make uſe of a falſe Principle, if it is his Adverſaries, and rightly infer from it; but this Practice is only for the ſake of Victory, or to give him a ſight of his Error; but if I hop'd to ſettle his Mind upon the Foundation of Truth, I ſhou'd think my ſelf oblig'd to build upon a true Principle; nay, I ſhould be neglectful of my Duty to him, if I endeavour'd to lead him into any one Truth, by countenancing any other Error, eſpecially an Error of Moment and Conſequence, in him. Is it then becoming the Character of our bleſſed Lord and his Apoſtles, to ſuppoſe this Principle (as I have ſhewn they ſuppoſe it in ſeveral of their Arguments) or ſo much as to countenance it, by adapting their Senſe, and their Expreſſions to ſuch a Belief; and ſo to ſupport, by their Authority, an Opinion which had its Foundation in Error, and wou'd afterwards have a very large Superſtructure in Wickedneſs? No! they were Reformers that knew exactly where to ſtop, and cou'd fix upon the very Line that bounded Truth; and therefore whatever Principles amongſt the Heathens they have left undemoliſh'd, either by their own Hands, or by their Scheme of Religion left behind them, no Man ſhou'd preſume to call them Heatheniſh ſtill; eſpecially whatever they have favour'd ſo much, as to build upon them: but he ought rather to conclude, that had they not been found ſtanding, they wou'd have been erected by the *Finiſher of our Faith.* Whatever *Eſtibius* may think, I am not aſham'd to ſuppoſe with him, that the Immortality of the Soul had its Birth from the natural and unaſſiſted Notions of Mens Minds; but this I can look upon as no Diſparagement to any Principle, that is afterward adopted into the Chriſtian *Syſtem.*

4thly, And *Laſtly*, Let it be conſider'd that the Scripture might very well take this for granted, as a Principle not only univerſally held, and underſtood by rational Men, but as *a Principle of natural Reaſon and Religion.* Nature will admit of no Religion, without Rewards and Puniſhments; Wiſdom never found ſuch a Diſtribution of theſe in this World, as is conſiſtent with tolerable Notions of God and Religion, and Reaſon can no otherwiſe ſupply this Defect, but by the Immortality of the Soul. And therefore if it be allow'd that Heathens had any *Law* of Religion, left *written upon their Hearts*, as the Apoſtle teſtifys they had, and cou'd *by Nature do the Things contained in the Law; their Conſciences alſo bearing witneſs, and their Thoughts, the mean while, accuſing, or elſe excuſing one another*; then the Immortality of the Soul, muſt have made a conſiderable Clauſe in this natural Law; without which it was impoſſible amongſt them, either for Providence to maintain its true Character, or Conſcience its Power. And yet this is the very Reaſon that *Eſtibius* gives, for his ſtiling it a *plain Heatheniſh Invention*; but here I appeal to the Judgment of ſober Men, whether he might not, for the very ſame Reaſon, and with as good a Face, have expos'd all the Principles and Duties of natural

Rom. 3. 14, 15.

Pag. 47.

tural Religion, under the Notion of *an Heatheniſh Invention*; nay, whether he has not implicitly done it, in fixing that Character upon the Foundation of them all.

But to leave *Eſtibius*, and return to our Subject; if the Immortality of the Soul is an eſſential Part of that natural Law, graven on the Hearts of Men by their Creator, and ſtill legible in the very Ruins of their Nature; there is no Reaſon to expect that the Goſpel ſhould be ſo full and frequent, in the delivering and inculcating of this Doctrine, as of the Reſurrection of the Body, which is purely Chriſtian. We are ſuppos'd to be Men, antecedently in Nature, to our being Chriſtians; and Faith may be ſaid to begin, where Reaſon ends: Not but that Chriſtianity lights us back to the very firſt Principles of natural Religion, and clears them from all the Rubbiſh, that Superſtition and Prophaneneſs had heap'd upon them; but this it does, by Conſequence only; as it gives us a more perfect Knowledge of God, and our ſelves; leaving us moſtly to infer Particulars by our own Reaſon: or where it does expreſly confirm moral Principles or Duties, yet they are not deliver'd as ſuch; they are confirm'd by a new Authority, and inforc'd by a new Sanction; and upon this Account the natural Reaſon of theſe Principles and Duties is not ſtrictly enquir'd into there. And it is farther remarkable that the Scripture is moſt expreſs in theſe Matters, where Mankind was moſt defective; the Unity of the Divine Nature, and the Worſhip of God in Spirit; the Love of Enemies, and Purity of Heart. Now as to the Immortality of the Soul, the Chriſtian Religion has fully cleared that from all the groſs Conceptions of *Elyſian* Fields, and the more abſurd and ſenſual Paradiſe of *Mahomet*; but it has left the Principle ſtanding as it was, tho' not without ſufficient Countenance and Encouragement given to it: And if this was a Principle of equal Extent, as to the Belief of it, with the Being of a God, the Scripture, I hope, may be allowed to ſuppoſe the one, as well as the other; and I have not obſerv'd that it has given more Teſtimony to the bare Exiſtence of God, than it has done to the Immortality of the Soul. It's one of *Eſtibius*'s ſhrewd Obſervations, that the Words Pag. 184. *immortal Souls*, never occur in Scripture; and *Salvation of Souls* but once: Juſt ſo I believe it happens, that the Words *immortal God*, are not to be found together in all the Scripture; and that *God is a Spirit*, it is but once that I know of, directly aſſerted; and that for the ſake Joh. 4. 24. of the ſpiritual Worſhip conſequent upon it. It were as eaſie to multiply ſuch Obſervations as theſe, as it it to find out the Tendency of them; for they are not ſo properly to be taken for Arguments upon the Queſtion in Diſpute, as for Reflexions on the Method and Deſign of the Holy Scriptures; that they ſhou'd leave Room for Cavil and Controverſie in Articles of ſuch Importance, by not expreſſing themſelves ſo fully upon them, as to be incapable of Miſ-interpretation. I can only ſay, I fear there will never be wanting a Handle, ſuch as it is, for Reflections of this Nature; for *Contumaciæ Deus nullum poſuit Remedium.* But to the Reader that ſearches the Scriptures only for Truth, and brings with him a docible Temper to receive it, by the means of ſuch Evidence as it is reaſonable for him to expect, and ſuch as a wiſe Man will depend upon, in any other Argument, I doubt not but the Immortality of the Soul, appears now in a ſufficient Light.

But there is another Thing to be accounted for, and that is, *Why we have not in Scripture ſo poſitive and particular an Account of the intermediate State, as of the final State after Judgment; tho' the former, in ſome reſpect, more nearly concerns us, as it is at a leſs Diſtance from us.* And here, after all that has been ſaid to the other Scruple, which may equally ſerve to clear up this, we need only obſerve briefly, 1*ſt*, That tho' the intermediate State has the Advantage of a nearer Proſpect to work upon Men; yet, in the main, the final State is the more effectual, and proper Motive to their Hopes and Fears, and their Actions deriving from thence: For that is an eternal State, and Eternity is the ſtrongeſt Motive that Omnipotence can offer, or Man is capable of receiving. We can ſhorten any other Proſpect, by fixing our Eye upon the End of it; but the boundleſs Proſpect of Eternity is our conſummate Happineſs or Miſery. And beſides this, the final State has the Advantage of a Re-union of Body and Soul; by which the Condition of it is made ſenſible, and nearly affecting to the weakeſt, and the moſt vicious, which is the greateſt Part of Mankind; who perphaps have but faint, if any Notions, of the Condition of a ſeparate Soul. Upon this account the Heathens *Elyſian Fields* were full of all the innocent Pleaſures, that virtuous Men are delighted with in this World; and their *infernal Regions* were ſtockt with Furies to laſh and ſcourge, in a literal Senſe, the vicious Inhabitants of them. This was a good Contrivance to make Impreſſions on the *Vulgar*; and wanted only an Authority to affect the *judicious*: But Heaven and Hell are Things, in themſelves, more affecting to every Capacity; and, as they ſtand reveal'd in the Goſpel, do as abſolutely command the Aſſent of the wiſeſt, as the moſt ignorant. No Wonder therefore, that the Wiſdom of God has made theſe the chief, and almoſt only Motives to Obedience. But as for thoſe who are not influenc'd by theſe, their Proſpect muſt be wholly confin'd to this Life, and terminate with it; and upon ſuch, a Revelation of the intermediate State wou'd have no Effect.

2*dly*, Let it be conſider'd that the intermediate State, is dependent upon the final State, as the final State is upon this; and therefore needed not be ſo particularly reveal'd. We ſometimes think it ſufficient to threaten a Villain with the *Gallows*, without urging his *Apprehenſion*, *Impriſonment*, *Arraignment*, or *Sentence*; and yet all theſe are pertinent Conſiderations in his Caſe; and accordingly the Sinner's *Apprehenſion* by Death, his *Arraignment* and *Sentence* at the general Judgment, are frequently inſiſted upon in Scripture. But we may obſerve in the other Caſe, that the Criminal's *Impriſonment* needs no particular Proof, as being included between his *Apprehenſion* and *Arraignment*; and this vindicates that Expreſſion of Scripture, *after Death comes the Judgment*, from any Denial of the intermediate State; eſpecially if it be conſider'd, that *Death* and *Judgment* have an immediate Connexion in the

Goſpel, as to their Influence upon each other; but the intermediate State is not, ſtrictly ſpeaking, the *Chriſtian Reward*. And yet,

3dly, This State is ſufficiently reveal'd in Scripture: *Being with Chriſt*, and others conſequently being abandon'd from his Preſence; and the *Spirit returning to God that gave it*, till he ſhall pleaſe to account with it, before Men and Angels, are Expreſſions that carry along with them ſufficient Matter, to fill a capable Underſtanding, with many large Contemplations. And indeed were there no one Expreſſion in Scripture, relating to this State; and we had only Reaſon to Judge it, from what the Scripture ſays of the Nature of our Soul, to be a State of *Expectation* of our final Doom; we might, methinks, be ſatisfy'd with this, which, ſince it is our chief Duty to *think* on *Death* and *Judgment*, wou'd be no mean Entertainment for our *intermediate Thoughts*. If a Conſciouſneſs of Guilt or Innocence, join'd with a certain Expectation of a righteous Judgment, be a Heaven or Hell upon Earth; we need not be at a loſs for the Heaven or Hell of a diſembody'd, and enlarg'd Spirit; whoſe Proſpect of either State will be more infallibly certain, and clear; whoſe Reflections muſt be ſtronger, and its Senſe of Good and Evil more exquiſite and poinant.

This is all I will preſume to ſay, or, I think, need be ſaid for any Chriſtian's Satisfaction, as to the reality of the intermediate State; and having added thus much concerning that, and the Principle upon which it is built, the Immortality of the Soul, to the Light we have from Scripture in this Controverſie, I hope this long Chapter has fully anſwer'd the Title of it.

CHAP. VII.

The Author of Second Thoughts, *his pretended Anſwer to Objections from Philoſophy, Reaſon, and Scripture examin'd, and the true Nature of Human Soul farther vindicated.*

THE luxuriant Author, fearing his *deſign'd little Treatiſe ſhou'd grow too voluminous*, pretends in this Chapter, only to anſwer thoſe of his Adverſary's Objections, *that urge moſt ſtrongly for their Opinion*: And if the Reader will take his Word for it, that thoſe, as he has recited them, are the *ſtrongeſt* of his Adverſary's Objections, he's half-converted before Pag. 240.

he hears them; and upon hearing, will preſently begin to wonder how a Cauſe ſo weak as the *Pſycomuthiſt*'s, cou'd laſt ſo many Ages, when the ſtrongeſt *Supports* of it, have really no Strength at all in them. But I who have perus'd this Chapter, without Deſign to take any thing upon *Eſtibius*'s Word, muſt declare that I have not met with one Objection, he has rais'd to himſelf, but what is either ſuch as I wou'd not have urg'd, or wou'd have urg'd farther. Of this latter ſort is the firſt he propoſes, *That which is immaterial is immortal; but the Soul of Man is immaterial*, Ergo. In this Objection he has prudently left out the Word *Subſtance*; and then all the Anſwer he gives to it here, will be good, *viz.* That *Forms* themſelves are immaterial, and yet mortal, and periſhable. In which Anſwer he ſuppoſes, and takes for granted one of theſe two Things; either firſt that the Soul of Man is not a *Subſtance*, but a *Form* properly ſo call'd; or, in the Language of the Schools, not a *ſubſtantial*, but an *accidental Form.* Or, ſecondly, he takes it for granted, that an *immaterial Subſtance* is equally periſhable, with an *immaterial Form*; tho' this is no otherwiſe *immaterial*, than as it is a Modification in Matter, which is not Matter it ſelf: But I preſume it enter'd not into *Eſtibius*'s Head,

Ibid.

Pag. 241.

to diſtinguiſh the different Senſes of *immaterial*; and no Man can anſwer an Objection, but in the *Senſe* he underſtands it. Now he and I muſt refer it to the Reader's Candor, whether he will grant him either of theſe modeſt Suppoſitions. It's true this is not his only Anſwer; for he refers us to his ſixth Chapter, where he has prov'd the Dependence of the Soul upon Matter, in *eſſe fieri, & operari*; but to ſend us backward and forward at this rate, may exerciſe our Patience, but is no Anſwer to our Query.

Of the other ſort, I mean ſuch Objections as I wou'd not have urg'd, are theſe that follow; *Knowledge by Dreams*; Ibid. *ſtrong Impreſſions on the Brain, Fancy, or Imagination*; Ibid. *foreſeeing, at Death, their State of future Happineſs or Miſery*, Pag. 242. *and the Souls comprehending of Univerſals, and abſtracted Notions.* Pag. 244. Theſe Objections I freely own, wherever *Eſtibius* met with them, have no Weight at all in them, with me; for if Matter be capable of Thought, I do not ſee why it may not be capable of performing all the particular, and moſt exalted Operations of it.

The next he raiſes is this, *It is impoſſible for Matter, tho' enliven'd, to perform Cogitation, or any reflex Actions as Man doth*; *Ergo*, he muſt *have a rational Soul.* Where obſerve the artful Dreſs; *for Matter tho' enliven'd:* If in the Notion of *Life* is included, as properly it ought to be, ſelf Conſciouſneſs; this, *tho' enliven'd*, makes the Objector give up the Cauſe, and let him recover it as well as he can. Well, but how does *Eſtibius* ſhew it poſſible for Matter to think, which I expected he wou'd do in Anſwer to this Objection? He tells us, *As for Cogitation or Thought, I never conceiv'd it to be a Ground or Foundation of Immateriality; but only a Demonſtration of Exiſtence*, &c. And again, *I never knew that he* [Des Cartes] *brought it as an Argument to prove a Soul, or ſpiritual Subſtance in Man.* Prin.Phil. p. 1. §. 8. Now the very *Sect.* immediately following that, in which *Des Cartes* lays down *Cogito ergo ſum*, is thus intituled, *Diſtinctionem inter Animam & Corpus, ſive inter Rem cogitantem, & Rem extenſam hinc agnoſci. Des Cartes* is dead, and therefore might ſafely be ſaid by *Anima* to underſtand no more than Life, *as it imports in three Languages, Hebrew, Greek, and Latin*; but that the Words *Rem cogitantem, & Rem extenſam*, are a little too ſtubborn to bend to this Interpretation. All this while is not *Eſtibius* a well appointed Champion for his Cauſe, to write 500 Pages againſt an Opinion, and yet has *never conceiv'd*, nor *ever known* the Foundation upon which the moſt conſiderable of his Adverſaries have built? But how cou'd he never know this, and yet be knowing enough to propoſe it as an Objection, *impoſſible for Matter to perform Cogitation?* The meaning muſt be, he never knew it before he met with this Objection; and then the Anſwer is to this purpoſe, *You aſſert it to be a thing impoſſible for Matter to think; and perhaps you wou'd have me ſhew how it is poſſible:* I anſwer, *The Objection is perfectly new to me; I never heard of it in all my Life before! Officio tuo ſatiſfeciſti doctiſſime reſpondens.*

In the next place he makes his Adverſaries object, but not prove, the Abſurdity of that Notion, that Soul is an Accident; and inſtead of an Anſwer makes a Digreſſion in Vindication of the Greek Fathers (as ignorant as all the Fathers were) againſt Mr. *Glanvill*; who objects to their Notion of the Soul as an *intellectual Fire*, that it Pag.247. deſtroys the Immortality. *If the Soul be Fire, or rather Light, if you pleaſe; how eaſily will it be blown out, when remov'd out of this Lanthorn of the Body, into open Air?* This was objected to thoſe that held the Immortality, and the numerical Exiſtence of the Soul, in a State of Separation; and how is it then an Anſwer to Mr. *Glanvill*? Or what Progreſs does it make in the Ibid. Subject, to aſſert confidently, that *Man* *periſhes like a Candle put out; vaniſhes away like a Vapour, and the Place thereof ſhall know him no more?* If *Eſtibius* will turn Advocate for thoſe few of the Fathers, who had this Notion; he muſt make it conſiſtent with the Immortality of the Soul, which was a Cauſe much dearer to them than the Notion was: Otherwiſe their *Memory* is little indebted to his *Apology*, while he defends their Opinion, by charging it with a Conſequence, which they themſelves did not foreſee, but did abhor.

His other Argument with Mr. *Glanvill*, whether Fire can have a plaſtic, or only a conſuming Power upon the Subject, I muſt wave, as altogether foreign to the Argument between him and me; and proceed to the next Objection he has put into the Mouth of his Adverſaries, which is the *Coextenſion of a Soul, if immaterial, with the Body; and conſequently, upon the Loſs of a Member, there muſt be a Loſs of part of the Soul.* Pag. 251. He anſwers, Thoſe who aſſert no immaterial Subſtance co-extended with Human Body, and eſpecially preſent with every part of it, he has already confuted, *Chap.* 5. and as to himſelf, he thinks it no Abſurdity that *Life cannot exert it ſelf in any Action, in a part that is cut off and deſtroy'd:* Very true, but is it any more abſurb that an immaterial Subſtance cannot act in the ſame Caſe?

And if it be an Objection againſt neither Party, what Service can it do either to anſwer it? But let us ſee whether more than this has not been long ſince made of the Notion: *Ariſtotle* I find arguing thus; Εἴπερ γὰρ ἔστιν ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν παντὶ τῷ αἰσθανομένῳ σώματι, ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ δύο εἶναι σώματα, εἰ σῶμα τὶ ἡ ψυχή. Τοῖς δὴ ἀριθμὸν λέγουσιν, DeAnima Lib.1.c.5. ἐν τῇ μῖα στιγμῇ πολλὰς στιγμᾶς, ἢ πᾶν σῶμα ψυχὴν ἔχειν, εἰ μὴ διαφέρον τις ἀριθμὸς ἐγγίνεται καὶ ἄλλος τις τῶν ὑπαρχουσων ἐν τῷ σώματι στιγμῶν. *If the Soul is co-extended with the Body, and ſenſitive in every part of it; then Man is compounded of two Bodies, if the Soul be Body; but thoſe that ſay the Soul is compounded of Parts, make many Points in one Point; or make every ſingle part of the Body to have a diſtinct* Soul; *unleſs there can be conceiv'd any Number of Parts in one and the ſame Subject, different from thoſe that are corporeal.* The Argument proceeds upon two Suppoſitions. 1*ſt*, That the Soul receives *Senſation* from every part of the Body. 2*dly*, That it receives this *Senſation* in one ſingle Point; not as Impreſſions are made upon a *continuous* Subſtance. Now if all the Qualities that a Body is capable of, are co-extended with that Body, and ſo conſequently the Diviſion of a white Body, for inſtance, divides alſo the Whiteneſs of it; then the Objection, with *Ariſtotle*'s Management, will bear hard upon *Eſtibius*;

and, as ſo manag'd, I leave him to anſwer it. If he is *ready*, as he ſays he is, *to anſwer any ſtronger Objection that can be urg'd againſt him from* Philoſophy, Ibid. I muſt rejoin, it is his *Strength*, and not his *Readineſs* that I diſpute.

His *Reaſon* (to which he reduces the next Set of Objections) is not unlike his *Philoſophy*. He objects to himſelf (and I wiſh he have well conſider'd the Objection) the Danger of *Atheiſm* and *Irreligion*, attending the Belief of his Pag. 253. Doctrine; to which he anſwers, *Whatever is grounded on Scripture, I know cannot lead to Atheiſm, or be irreligious.* But would not the Concluſion be as good, by a Tranſpoſition, *Whatever leads to Atheiſm and Irreligion, cannot be grounded on Scripture?* This therefore is an Anſwer that may have another in the Belly of it; for ſuppoſe a Man that is not ſatisfy'd with this Anſwer, but ſtill believes (as well he may) the *Tendency* of *Second Thoughts* to *Atheiſm* and *Irreligion*; and yet happens to be convinc'd by that ſeventh Chapter that the Doctrine *is found in Scripture*; what muſt this Man's Concluſion be with regard to the Divine Authority of Scripture? I Think it an Error of very dangerous Conſequence (to call it by no worſe Name) for any Man, imagining he has found an Opinion countenanced in Scripture, to overlook the Tendency of it; and this Anſwer looks too like ſomething of that nature. But he's willing to Pag.254. anſwer farther, *This Doctrine does not conclude that Man wholly periſhes, and ſhall never revive again.* If the Reader does not already believe it *does conclude that Man wholly periſhes,* I deſire him to ſuſpend his Judgment till he has perus'd the laſt Chapter of this Diſcourſe. In the mean time, to what he replies to the Encouragement his Doctrine gives to Wickedneſs, that Pag.255. *Time is no Meaſure for the Dead but the Living only*; and *if a Man were to ſleep ſeveral Years, and as ſoon as he awak'd, were ſure to be hanged; I do believe it wou'd afford him but little Comfort, to think he ſhou'd have ſo long a time to ſleep, before his Sentence were executed*; and again, Far. Th. p. 88. *There is no Meaſure of Time to the Dead, and a thouſand Years not ſo much as one Day.* I anſwer, if this proves any thing, it proves that there is not any real Difference of Torment (above a Minute, or at moſt a Day) to the wicked, according to his, and according to our Notion. I know Time is no Meaſure for the Dead, in his Senſe; but the Queſtion is not, what Perception they will have when dead; but, which State (of Torment or Inſenſibility) wou'd they chuſe while they are alive, to follow upon their Death; and I think it is a Determination of Nature it ſelf *præſtat non eſſe, quam miſerum eſſe:* But all this is oppoſing only a miſtaken metaphyſical Notion to Matter of Fact; wou'd not that Man he mentions chuſe rather to ſleep ſeveral Years, before his Execution, than be in Torment or Miſery all the while, and yet to be executed at laſt? and do not Men abuſe the diſtant Proſpect of Death, tho' it is as inevitable as Judgment? This he has been told already, and daily Experience will tell him as much. Far. Vind. p. 56.

I know the Conſideration of Judgment is alone abundantly ſufficient; or where it is not ſo, I am ſure nothing can be ſufficient: But this is no warrant for *Eſtibius* to make nothing of the intermediate State, unleſs, in a Diſpute about the Nature of that State, it is lawful for him to take it for granted there is no ſuch State; but if he may not be allow'd thus much, he may as well make nothing of the Rewards and Puniſhments of Virtue and Vice in the Preſent, as in the intermediate State; and indeed *Conſcience* is juſt ſuch another *Heatheniſh Invention*, as the *Soul*. The next Objection he draws from *The Authority of the Fathers,* Pag. 255. *the Novelty of his Doctrine, the Liturgy of the Church of* England, *and the* Athanaſian *Creed.* I muſt confeſs I ſhou'd never have made theſe Objections to *Eſtibius*, for a very good Reaſon; but the Reaſon is plain why he objected them to himſelf; his Reader by this time might have forgot that *as the Fathers had a great deal of Piety, ſo their Ignorance is equivalent* (that is, as great as their Piety; ſo that they cou'd not be far from natural Fools; for their Piety was ſo great as to carry all of them thro' many Difficulties, and ſome of them to Death) *and pardonable in nice Points of Religion.* Methinks it might become a Man that ſo often makes the Charge, once at leaſt to make it good, by a large Catalogue of their Errors; which it muſt be very eaſie to produce when the Authors are ſo very ignorant, and yet ſo very ſcripturient: But inſtead of this, *Eſtibius* is content to make two general Reflexions. *We find* (ſays he) *ſeveral of them embraced Error; eſpecially where the Caſe in queſtion ſeem'd very dubious.* That there were *Errors* amongſt them is doubtleſs, because there was *Oppoſition*; but that the embracing any particular Error, or many Errors, eſpecially in *dubious Queſtions*, thro' the Courſe of a Man's Life, ſhou'd fix upon him the general Character of Ignorance, is a little hard upon us; for at this rate all Mankind muſt be groſsly ignorant, *Eſtibius* only excepted; which is an Opinion I never met with before, out of *Bedlam.*

Pag. 256.

Bedlam. The next Reflexion is, *The Papiſts quote them for the abetting their Corruptions, and Innovations in their Church.* Ibid. A ſure Mark of their Ignorance this; becauſe the Papiſts quote Scripture too, for their Corruptions and Innovations; and ſo does *Eſtibius* for his: But he has read the Scripture all over, tho' as to the Opinion of the Fathers *in this Matter*, ſays he, *generally I do not pretend to know, becauſe I have read very few of them.* Pag. 255. How comes he then to preted to know that they were *generally ignorant*, can he diſcover their Ignorance, only by profeſſing his own; his own Ignorance of their Opinion, as to the very Matter in Diſpute? By this Method, I ſuppoſe, and not by reading his Works, he came to diſcover the Ignorance of *Athanaſius* in particular; and all the Reformers both of the Church of *England*, and all other reform'd Churches in *Chriſtendom*; amongſt whom there never was, I am perſuaded, the leaſt Controverſie about the Immortality of the Soul with the Romiſh Church. It muſt be confeſs'd this new way of anſwering, or rather denying Authorities, carries the Recommendation with it, of being the eaſieſt way that ever was yet found out; it prevents all the Tedioufneſs of Quotation, all the Nicety of comparing and reconciling Notions;

tions; and beſides, has this peculiar Advantage, that the more *ignorant* a Man is in himſelf, he may throw the Stone of *Ignorance* with leſs Reluctancy, and a better Grace.

There is another Article in this Objection, which is *Novelty*; and to remove the Imputation of that, he takes ſhelter in an Atheiſtic Paſſage of *Pliny*; (for ſuch is the Pag. 257. Expreſſion of *Mens fond Imaginations, and dreaming of I know not what Life after this*) and *Pliny*, he remarks, liv'd about *An. Dom.* 79. This I not only grant him, but farther, that he might have deriv'd his Opinion from as high as *Anaximander* at leaſt, who liv'd above 2000 Years before Chriſt; unleſs he muſt ſay of the *Græcians*, as he does of the Fathers, *I have read very few of them*; and yet this, with ſeveral other Authorities, did not hinder *Tully* from calling it an Article of univerſal Belief; for he knew that this is a Rule, which will eaſily admit of Exceptions, and ſtill continue a very true Rule; otherwiſe that there lay no Appeal in any Caſe, to the Senſe of Mankind.

The laſt Objection he anſwers from Reaſon is this; *It ſeems but a wild Notion to conceive a Man to beget a Soul; and it's highly improbable that a Being of that Perfection* Pag. 260. *as Man is, can propagate like other Species.*

Species. Its Conceptions of Religion, of an infinite Being, of a miſterious Trinity, being too lofty and noble Operations, to be perform'd by any other Thing, than an immaterial Spirit. This is all playing upon the Out-works of the Controverſie; but having ſo fully ſtated the Caſe already, I will not detain the Reader with any farther Reflexions upon it.

The laſt Head of Objections he propoſes to anſwer is taken from Scripture; and here, tho' he promiſes *to examin all thoſe Texts even from* Geneſis *to the* Revelation *of St.* John, *that ſeem to make againſt his Opinion*, yet he has examin'd but ſix of thoſe Texts I produc'd, under the two laſt Heads from Scripture, *viz.* thoſe that *countenance*, and thoſe that *neceſſarily ſuppoſe* the Immortality of the Soul. But as he had brought abundance of *foreign* and *indifferent* Texts for him, ſo he has been at the Pains to propoſe, and anſwer abundance of the like nature againſt him. I do not envy him the Glory of repelling ſuch Objections; and therefore ſhall paſs them by unmention'd, and conſider only what he has anſwer'd to thoſe, that materially urge againſt his Opinion. The firſt is that of *Eccleſiaſtes, Who knoweth the Spirit of a Man that goeth upward, and the Spirit of a Beaſt that goeth downward?* I have plainly prov'd that this Pag. 263.

Expreſſion of *Solomon*'s ought to be interpreted by that other, *Then ſhall the Spirit return to God that gave it*; and therefore ſuppoſing that he is there only *propoſing the Difficulty of Mens Apprehenſions*, as *Eſtibius* ſays; yet it's plain he does not deſign to leave his Reader in doubt, when he is ſo full and poſitive, in this very point, at the Concluſion of his Diſcourſe. Pag. 277.

Ibid. This Senſe indeed may have *nothing impious in it*; becauſe the Author, perhaps, only perſonates the impious Atheiſt; but even this Senſe plainly ſhews that, according to Piety and Truth, the Spirit of Man does go upward, and that of the Beaſt downward. He anſwers farther, That *our Senſe attributes a local Tranſition, not only of the Spirit of Man, but alſo of the like in Beaſts; and conſequently, a ſpiritual Subſtance, diſtinct from the Body of Beaſts, wou'd as much ſeparately exiſt, and paſs downward into ſome Place beneath, as that of Man upward; which I preſume no* Pſycomuthiſt *will aſſert.* He mention'd only *upward* and *downward*, which are oppoſite States; but the Quibble lies in the word *goeth*, which muſt neceſſarily imply ſome real exiſting Subſtance; but firſt granting this Neceſſity, it only proves that both ſurvive in different States, and whatever *Eſtibius* preſumes no *Pſycomuthiſt* will aſſert, I am ſure there's *nothing impious* *in this Senſe*; but how does the word *goeth* imply ſuch a Subſtance in Brute, as well as Man? I do not ſay that the word, of it ſelf, implies a ſubſtantial Spirit in Man; but I ſay it may be apply'd to ſuch a Spirit, and to the Brutes as only Life. That it may be ſo apply'd to Brutes *Eſtibius* muſt not deny; for what then will he make of the Soul of Man, in his Senſe *going* and *returning* to God, and at the ſame time having no Being at all? And that it may be apply'd to each, in a different Senſe, is evident, becauſe *Solomon* is not diſtinguiſhing, and oppoſing any *Actions* of either, or both of theſe Spirits; but only ſetting forth their different and oppoſite *State* and *Condition*: And as ſuch, Annihilation, if that be meant there of the Spirit of the Beaſt, is properly oppos'd to *going upwards*, or *returning to God*.

We muſt therefore conſider what he anſwers to this Text, *The Spirit returns to God that gave it.* This, he ſays, *ought to be explain'd as a Confirmation of his Opinion, that the ſame Power of reviving Man again, centers in the Almighty; for how otherwiſe can the Souls of the wicked and reprobate, if they were ſubſtantial Spirits, be ſaid to return to God, the Fountain of Holineſs and Purity?* Here his Play lies in the word *return*: Now if we conſider what the Pag. 279.

Acts 17. 28. Apoſtle tells us, that even here, *we live, and move, and have our being in God*; than which there cannot be expreſs'd or imagin'd a cloſer Conjunction; we muſt not interpret this *returning to God*, with regard to his Nature and Eſſence, for he is not ſo *far from us*; but only with regard to his more immediate Government, and our inlarg'd Capacity for the Knowledge, or Enjoyment of him. *Eſtibius* muſt not call it an Inconſiſtency with the Purity and Holineſs of the Divine Nature, for God to extend his Empire over the lewdeſt Devil that fell, as much as over the pureſt Angel: And as to the Inlargement of our Faculties, he muſt alſo grant, that the wicked at the Reſurrection, ſhall be enlightned with a more perfect Senſe of God's Government, and their own, now unavoidable Subjection to it. It is in this Senſe, they are ſaid, in Scripture, to *be fall'n into the Hands of God*; Heb. 10. 31. thoſe pure and righteous Hands from which they came; and is not this, with ſufficient Propriety of Speech, *returning to God?* It's true they do not return to God, ſo as to be happy in a more perfect Enjoyment of him; when we ſay they do, we ſhall make good *Eſtibius*'s Charge; but till then the Charge will ly only on his own falſe Paraphraſe of the word *return*. He quotes *Pool* for an Explication,

plication, which he vainly imagins was made to avoid this Difficulty; *Animæ omnes redeunt ad Deum; ut tradat bonorum Animas bonis Angelis, malorum Animas malis Angelis, remunerandas aut puniendas.* Now tho' theſe are not Mr. *Pool*'s Words, and this only one, amongſt many Interpretations, yet let us hear what *Eſtibius* ſays to it, 1ſt, *It ſeems to make God a miniſtring Spirit to his Angels, which I think both abſurd and impious.* Thus our Saviour ſpoke of the *Judge that delivered a Man to the Officer, and the Officer that caſt him into Priſon*; which I think *neither abſurd nor impious*; and yet, according to this Argument, the Judge was a *Miniſter to the Officer*, and the Officer to the Gaoler. He anſwers, 2*dly*, *It is the higheſt Derogation to that Almighty Pure Being, to receive wicked Souls ſo defiled with Wickedneſs and Sin, even but for a Moment, or the twinkling of an Eye; as it wou'd be to preſerve them until the Reſurrection, to be then adjudg'd.* The former Clauſe of the Objection is grounded upon the latter, and therefore we'll only examine this; why it wou'd be a Derogation to the Almighty Pure Being, to preſerve ſuch in Being *until the Reſurrection*, and be no ſuch Derogation, to preſerve them in being *after the Reſurrection*, no ſatisfactory Reaſon can ever be

Pag. 279.

St. Luke 12. 58.

Ibid.

be given; and therefore this Argument belongs properly to *Second Thoughts, concerning the Reſurrection:* Nay, I ſubmit it to the Reader whether it wou'd not be a yet higher Derogation to that Being, to revive, by an Act of Omnipotence, the Carcaſs of him, who at once commences a Creature, and a defil'd Sinner; who is then not *born*, but *created in Iniquity. Eſtibius* muſt never diſown, and I hope will never vindicate the Conſequence. But this Derogation is ſo plainly imputable to God, with equal Reaſon, for his *reſerving the Angels in Chains under Darkneſs*, who not only were, but continue *defil'd with Sin*; and indeed for his whole Revelation of Puniſhments, that the more I conſider it, the more ſuſpicious it grows; and I cannot but think I have as much Reaſon to conclude that *Eſtibius* does *Reſurrectionem verbis ponere, re tollere:* As *Tully* did againſt the *Epicurean* Gods, that they were but *verbal Gods.*

Jude 6.

The next Scripture I am oblig'd to vindicate is that of our Saviour; *Fear not them that can kill the Body, but are not able to kill the Soul; but rather fear him which is able to deſtroy both Soul and Body in Hell*, Matth. 10. 28. Upon this plain Text he makes four critical Remarks, which contain in them two Notions, the firſt that ψυχὴ here is to be tranſlated *Life*, becauſe it

Pag. 280.

it is ſo tranſlated, *ver.* 39. *He that findeth his Life, ſhall loſe it; and he that loſeth his Life, for my ſake, ſhall find it.* Not to inſiſt upon it, that if ψυχὴ has various Significations, it may be variouſly us'd in one and the ſame Chapter; let *Eſtibius* make what he will of it here, I have prov'd from the Text, that there is a part of Man which is not the Object of Human Power, and which therefore muſt ſurvive the Body; ſo that if ψυχὴ muſt be tranſlated *Life* in both places, becauſe ſo tranſlated in one; then the Senſe of the firſt is, That *Man may kill your Body, but cannot really and abſolutely deſtroy your Lives; which, tho'*, according to the ſecond Text, *You loſe in human Appearance, yet you do in reality, and to your great gain, find it in another World.* The only Queſtion then is, when this finding ſhall commence; not till the Reſurrection, ſays *Eſtibius*; then moſt eminently, ſay I, but in ſome Meaſure before then; becauſe if Man cou'd make Life ceaſe to be, until the Reſurrection, then ψυχὴ as well as ζῶμα muſt be, in ſome Senſe, nay, muſt be equally the Object of Human Power; which is impoſſible, if the Text be true.

His other Solution of this Paſſage is taken from St. *Luke*, *Be not afraid of them that kill the Body, and after that have no more that they can do;* but — *fear him which* *after he hath killed, hath Power to caſt into Hell*, Chap. 12. ver. 4, & 5. Now, ſays he, Pag. 282. *If St.* Matthew *had meant here Soul as a diſtinct ſpiritual Being, undoubtedly in ſo material a point, St.* Luke *wou'd have uſed the ſame Expreſſion; but he, making no Diſtinction, ſays only, after they have killed the Body, have no more that they can do.* I anſwer, 1*ſt*, St. *Luke* is ſo far the beſt Interpreter of St. *Matthew*, that he wrote after him; but this hinders not, ſince both were divinely inſpir'd, but that St. *Matthew* alſo may interpret St. *Luke*; for where the former Writer is more full than the latter (as it happens among the Evangeliſts, that the latter often rather epitomizes, than explains the former) then the latter is to be interpreted by the former. Thus St. *Luke*'s Hiſtory of *John the Baptiſt*, mentions only his Impriſonment by *Herod*, Chap. 3. ver. 19, 20. But St. *Matthew*, tho' he wrote firſt, is left to ſupply, to the Reader, his Death, and the Occaſion of it, *Matth.* 14. *ver.* 3, *&c.* And if this be both uſual, and very accountable, with the Evangeliſts, in relating *Matters of Fact*, we are ſufficiently inſtructed from hence, how to interpret the like Omiſſions in *Matters of Doctrine.* And then St. *Luke* may be ſuppos'd to relate, from our Saviour, only the general, but ſufficient Motive to the Fear of him, whoſe *Power* *can caſt into Hell*; which Human Power cannot do; and St. *Matthew*, beſides the *deſtruction in Hell* mention'd by him, is more particular in ſaying that *then* God can deſtroy *both Body and Soul*; whereas Man can only *kill the Body*, which includes an immediate ſurviving of the Soul. But

2*ly*, St. *Luke* is not ſo ſilent, in the diſtinction, as *Eſtibius* wou'd have him; he does more than oppoſe *this* to the *next Life*; he ſays Man *can kill the Body, and after that has no more that he can do.* This being written to thoſe that made the ſame diſtinction between Body and Soul, that we do, and who were to read alſo St. *Matthew*'s Goſpel, does plainly include and imply what St. *Matthew* expreſſes; and there is no neceſſity for ſupplying τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν μὴ δυναμένων ἀποκτεῖναι which yet is to be found in a very ancient Copy.

Bezæ quod fuerat, *Cantab.*

After this I know not what ſhift *Eſtibius* will betake himſelf to; even the Anſwer of a late Pamphleteer will not ſerve his turn; he confeſſes that St. *Matthew* does our buſineſs; but flatly and fairly denies his Authority, as inconſiſtent with that of St. *Luke*; who, as a Phiſician, was a better Philoſopher than to entertain ſuch a Notion of Human Soul. But neither will this Shelter defend him long; for it happens that there is a Paſſage in St. *Luke*, and in no other Evangeliſt, which is the next and too ſtrong an Objection for *Eſtibius. To day ſhalt thou be with me in Paradiſe.* Luke 23. 43. To this he anſwers 1*ſt.* by ſuppoſing our Lord ſpoke to the Soul only of the Thief, *Thou Soul of the Thief, for owning me, ſhalt this Day be with me in a ſtate of Bliſs; but, O Thief! thy Body ſhall go to Corruption, as other Bodies do. Now what a Speech muſt ſuch Men make for our Saviour?* &c. To this I return, firſt our Saviour's ſpeaking ſtrictly to the Soul of the Thief, is an idle ſuppoſition of the Author's own; for it was ſufficient matter of Conſolation to the Thief, then penitent and believing, that our Lord wou'd promiſe to make him that Day happy; without diſputing the manner how that Promiſe wou'd be made good. Secondly, the expreſſion to which, amongſt others, in all probability this of our Saviour alludes, *ſeek Paradiſe, the glorious Country,* may be turn'd into juſt ſuch another Speech; ſeek it *thou*; *thy Soul, not thy Body*; and yet this was reckon'd no Impropriety amongſt the *Jews*; or if it was really ſo, it was not our Lord's Meſſage to the World to correct the Jewiſh Stile. So that we can *lay aſide all nice triſling about the Soul* (for it is only *Eſtibius* that trifles about it) and yet need not quit our Explication. But he ſays, *to day*

Pag. 285.

Pag. 287.

day cou'd not mean ſtrictly *that Day*; being us'd for a longer ſpace of time, in ſeveral Places of Scripture. Admitting what is groundleſs, that this Thief, who may be ſuppos'd unacquainted with the Stile of Scripture, underſtood it for any time before the general Reſurrection; then ſays *Eſtibius*, *that the repenting Thief was ſhortly after with our Saviour in perfect Bliſs, perhaps aroſe from the Dead amongſt thoſe who aroſe at the Reſurrection, no good Chriſtian ought to doubt.* Pag. 288. This new Conceit of an extraordinary Reſurrection, is abſolutely neceſſary to make ſence of this, and ſeveral other Places of Scripture; and therefore, as neceſſity has no Law, ſo *Eſtibius* advances it againſt all the Laws both of Diſpute and Interpretation. To make the Scripture unintelligible and inconſiſtent, without the help of a Notion, never mention'd in Scripture, nor imagin'd by any Man then, or before living; but indeed contrary to the receiv'd Opinion, as appears from the Notion the *Jews* had of *Paradiſe*, as a place for the immediate Reception of the moſt peculiar Favourites of God; is only a Sanctuary for the laſt Extremity of an expiring Cauſe; and yet we find *Eſtibius* driven to it, at his firſt ſetting out in this Controverſy. Nay it is moreover (as he has been already told) con-

Mr. Turner's *farth. Vind. p.* 24.

contrary to the expreſs declaration of Scripture. St. *Paul* (a greater Saint than this Penitent cou'd be) aſſures us that, *As in* Adam *all die, even ſo in* Chriſt *ſhall all be made alive*; *every Man in his own order,* Chriſt *the firſt fruits, afterward they that are* Chriſt's *at his coming.* 1 Cor. 15. ch. 22 and 23. v. And throughout this Chapter as he accounts for the general Reſurrection, ſo he includes himſelf, and all thoſe primitive Saints that were *baptized for the Dead*, in his account of it; for the particle *We* in the 51. *v.* extends to thoſe who ſhall be alive at the ſecond Coming of our Lord *Jeſus*, and ſhall not undergo Death, but be *changed, at the laſt Trump*, which raiſes *the Dead incorruptible.* Nay farther, our Lord ſpoke, and ſpoke particularly, to greater Saints, at leaſt in St. *Paul*'s opinion, then he was, *I go to prepare a Place for you.* Joh. 14. 2. And *I will come again* (which muſt be interpreted of his ſecond Coming) *and receive you unto my ſelf.* v. 3. Now as to the Reſurrection of thoſe Saints which follow'd that of our Saviour, 1*ſt*, It is without the leaſt ground that *Eſtibius* ſuppoſes this penitent Thief to have been one of thoſe; and 2*dly*, He has as little reaſon to ſuppoſe that this was the final Reſurrection of thoſe Saints; the Text ſays [*Math.* 27. 53.] *They went into the Holy*

City and appear'd unto many; but we have no farther account of them, nor of any Tranſlation to Heaven; which yet was as requiſite for them, as for *Enoch* and *Elijah.* And 3*dly*, Suppoſe the Saints did ariſe, as ſome of the *Jews* believ'd, to be with Chriſt in Paradiſe (tho' that ſuppoſition is groundleſs too; and their being an Inſtance of the Power of Chriſt *to raiſe us alſo*, is a ſufficient Account of that Miracle) yet the Text ſays expreſly it was *after his Reſurrection*, and he being alſo ſtil'd the *firſt Fruits*, this plainly excludes all antecedent Reſurrection to his; and conſequently leaves *Abraham*, *Iſaac*, and *Jacob*, as dead indeed, at the appearance of God to *Moſes* in the Buſh, as they were before the Creation of *Adam.* But enough has been ſaid to explode this wild Notion.

In his next Anſwer, to that St. *Paul*, *to deliver ſuch an one to Satan, for the Deſtruction of the Fleſh, that the Spirit may be ſaved in the day of the Lord*, he calls it only *ſpiritual Mortification*; but ſays nothing to obviate the Diſtinction between Spirit and Body, which I have ſhewn to be contain'd in the Words; and therefore I paſs on to the

Laſt Objection he has rais'd, and I am concern'd to vindicate, *viz.* St. *Paul*'s Prayer. *I pray God your whole Spirit*, *Pag.* 291.

Spirit, Soul and Body, &c. 1 *Theſ.* 5. 23. The ſubſtance of his confus'd Anſwer to this Text is this, *Their Conjunction in one Sentence, does not inferr any material Difference in the things; becauſe ſuch a Conjunction in Words, without ſuch a Difference in Things, is uſual in Scripture; and becauſe the ſeveral Words are interpretable in this, as he has interpreted them in other places, to ſignify Life, Affections, Inclinations*, &c. Here are ſix Pages ſpent in explaining thoſe Words, and not one Syllable mention'd of the true ground of their Conjunction in this Place, of the Doctrine or Opinion they allude to, of the Perſons to whom they were ſpoken, or laſtly of the Senſe in which the *Theſſalonians* muſt needs underſtand them. Theſe methinks had been material Enquiries; but alas the reſolution of every one of them wou'd have ruin'd his Cauſe, as I have fully prov'd in my Explication; and therefore, like a prudent Gentleman, he drop'd them all together; and choſe to amuſe his Reader with foreign Matter, ſuch as this Remark on Dr. *Hammond*. *This learned and pious Gentleman, having imbibed from his Youth the Notion of an Immortal Spirit in Man, call'd Soul; was forc'd to recur to that Notion, to bring himſelf off, or elſe he cou'd not rightly have explain'd this Text, as to every particular of it, according* Pag. 294.

cording to the foundation, or Principles of that Doctrine he had been taught originally. That is to ſay, he cou'd not explain the Text according to that Principle, without recurring to that Principle. Tho' I have no great Opinion of *Eſtibius* as a *Divine*, yet I muſt confeſs he's almoſt qualify'd, as Qualifications have gone of late, to ſet up for an *Obſervator.*

But we muſt not overlook a Philoſophical Demonſtration wherever we meet with it, and here it is, in a Comment upon St. *Paul*; *When a Man lives, has Vigour, and all his Senſes, then* [according to us] *the Soul is properly Man*; *when Man dies, then* [ſay we] *the Body is properly Man*; *for all allow Man may properly be ſaid to live, and properly likewiſe be ſaid to die*; *ſo that living and dying, Man properly dies, and not dies*; which moves *Eſtibius*'s righteous Soul to that degree, that he crys out, *Apage tot vexatiſſima crepundia, & dignas Pueris nugas.* I hope this was deſign'd to be carry'd no farther; but let us for once try how far it will go; the Son of God liv'd upon Earth; was not the Divinity properly the Son of God? Yes: But then the Son of God died for us; cou'd the Divinity properly die? No. How then cou'd this Perſon Chriſt, be conſiſtently ſaid to live and die? by the Separation of Pag. 297.

the Divinity, together with Human Life or Soul, from his Body? Why! thus the Perſon of Man may be ſaid to die, by the Separation of his Soul from his Body; the inequality of the things compar'd, making no difference in this Caſe; becauſe both are alike ſuppos'd to be diſſolv'd: From which, and many other Conſequences already drawn, I have a right to demand thus much of my Adverſary, either that he will follow his Blow, or retract his giving of it. But I believe the *Socinians* will generouſly quit the Advantage; for they, I ſuppoſe, have form'd to themſelves ſome tolerable Notion of Perſonality, before they apply it in Diſpute; and if ſo, they cannot be ignorant of this, that tho', when we ſpeak of Life in general, it is the Soul only that lives, and therefore not the Body that properly ſpeaking can die; yet when we ſpeak of this Life, it is the Perſon, as reſulting from the *Union*, which both lives by that, and dies by the *Separation*. Thus the *Crepundia* turn upon *Eſtibius*; and belong to no Body elſe, as they are plac'd here; tho' having juſt done playing with them himſelf, he has kindly laid them at his Adverſary's Door.

CHAP. VIII.

The receiv'd Doctrine of the Soul of Man, by the reform'd Churches, not chargeable with the falſe Doctrines of Purgatory, Prayers for the Dead, or Invocation of Saints; in Anſwer to his Ninth Chapter.

E*Sſtibius* concludes the preceding Chapter with his *Hope that all unbiaſs'd, Orthodox Divines and others, will no longer inſiſt upon making the Scriptures to maintain, and juſtify ſuch an abſurd and erroneous Opinion of a ſpiritual Subſtance united to the Body of Man; whenas it has been the probable grounds of all theſe following Errors in Chriſtianity.* Pag. 298. This gave me ſome hopes to find an attempt, in this Chapter, not only to prove theſe Doctrines of the Church of *Rome* erroneous, but to charge them upon our Doctrine of the ſeparate Exiſtence of the Soul; but I find I am diſappointed of my Hope, as *Eſtibius* I ſuppoſe has by this time found himſelf ſeverely diſappointed of his, with regard to Orthodox Divines: He has laboriouſly inſiſted on the firſt Head, and left his Reader to ſupply the other; whereas cou'd he but have prov'd *this*, we ſhou'd never have fal'n out about *that.* To what purpoſe then does he apply himſelf to *unbiaſs'd orthodox Divines?* If he believes there are any ſuch in the World, they muſt be of the Reform'd Church; and is the Church of *England* to be exhorted to lay aſide Purgatory, Prayers for the Dead, and Invocation of Saints?

But to tell him freely my Sentiments of the Controverſy, as he has undertaken it, I never hope to ſee *Babylon* fall by the Hand of an *Eſtibius:* It ſhou'd be the laſt Argument I wou'd offer againſt *Purgatory*, that Heathens held a *Purgation*, and *Luſtration* not unlike it; for they held a God and a Providence too. Thus much is certain, if this Doctrine be true, all theirs which relate to the intermediate ſtate, are blown off at once; but I muſt put him in mind that, after this forcible manner, to cut the Knot, is no reflexion upon the Skill of thoſe that can untie it: And if it has been fairly unty'd let him not glory in his Diſcovery; He found the Truth ſhining bright, and it will receive no Advantage from his rough Hand.

Pag. 300, &c.

This I think will excuſe me from following him through his elaborate Confutation of theſe Romiſh Doctrines; for unleſs he cou'd have prov'd them to be natural and juſt Conſequences from the ſpiritual Nature of Human Soul, he might as eaſily have confuted the Divinity of our Saviour, from the Idolatry of that Church. But this Conſequence was much more eaſily ſuppos'd than prov'd; and therefore *Eſtibius* is content only with hinting, and pointing at it here and there; for indeed it was unreaſonable to expect any juſt proof from him; the Nature of the Thing wou'd not bear it. *Purgatory* and *Prayers for the Dead* turn upon this Queſtion, whether the ſtate of our Probation ends with our preſent Life: But what's this to the Queſtion, whether our Soul ſurvives the Body? What is it, I ſay, as to the one being any *probable Ground* of the other? For thus far I ſee they are connected, that whenever the State of our Exiſtence ends, the State of our Probation muſt end with it; and on the other hand, ſo long as we are in Being, we may alſo be under Probation, ſuppoſing no Revelation to the contrary; but this Connexion on our part, amounts no higher, than to a bare poſſibility; and therefore can do the *Romaniſt* no manner of Service, ſo long as we confine him to Topics of Probability and Certainty. But ſee how far *Eſtibius* can improve a Notion; this *bare Poſſibility* is with him a *probable Ground*, and that *probable Ground* is, I ſuppoſe, one of his *Demonſtrations.*

Invocation of Saints, is juſt ſuch an other Superſtructure on the Immortality of the Soul; as if the Queſtion were not whether the departed Saints have a mediatory Power, but whether they are exiſtent-Beings. I muſt joyn with him where he ſays, *If this* Pag. 328. *my Doctrine of Human Soul can obtain Belief amongſt the wiſeſt ſort of them*, [the Romaniſts] *it muſt be a demonſtrative Conviction of their Error; and if ſome do, tho' but few, I will not repent of my pains, that I have endeavour'd to convert a Sinner from the Error of his Ways*, &c. Here's the pious Motive that brought forth theſe *ſecond Thoughts*; and 'tis pity they came not ſooner out: They wou'd have done Knights-Service to the *Quaker*, that went to *Rome* to convert the Pope; and I am apt to think he wou'd not have refus'd the aſſiſtance of theſe Thoughts, for this Reaſon in the firſt place, that they make a *dead Letter* of the Scripture; and next that he's beſt qualify'd to comprehend the Author's Notion, and to explain the Parallel between *Human Soul* and the *Sun Beams*, by his own *Light within.* 'Tis very poſſible I muſt confeſs, that ſome of the wiſer ſort of the *Romaniſts* may incline to *Eſtibius*'s ſide of the Queſtion; but theſe I fear, of all the reſt, are fartheſt from being *converted from the Error of their Ways*; or if they ſhou'd leave that corrupt Church, wou'd ſtill, I doubt, have their Religion to ſeek.

But as the Papiſts on the one hand uſe, ſays *Eſtibius*, and abuſe, ſay I, the Immortality of the Soul, to maintain *Purgatory*, and *unlawful Prayers* and *Invocations*; ſo it ſeems there are ſome others that from thence conclude, *The Souls of Men dying paſs immediately to Heaven or Hell.* Pag. 332. If by Heaven and Hell here is meant the conſummate, and unalterable State of Mankind in another World, I know not whoſe Opinion this is, nor to what purpoſe he confutes it. All this is making himſelf a perfect *Don Quixot* in Diſpute; 'tis encountring a Windmill, and that only one in his own head; and yet this ſeems to be his Senſe in that expreſſion, *the Soul immediately enjoys Salvation or Damnation.* Ibid. But if by Heaven and Hell he means the ſame place in the Univerſe, where they ſhall after the Reſurrection enjoy their laſt recompence, this may be the Opinion of ſome of the reform'd Writers, but then this does not render *uſeleſs the Day of Judgement*; for ſtill even this may be *a place wherein the*

Souls of the juſt and wicked enjoy an imperfect ſtate of Bliſs or initial Happineſs or Torment, as he expreſſes it; but this is a diſtinct Opinion he propoſes to confute; and therefore the other Romantic Notion of the intermediate State, is what in this Place he does moſt heroically ſubdue.

But let us conſider what he objects to the Opinion of initial Happineſs or Miſery in the intermediate State; he tells us *this Opinion ſeems to be more conſonant to the Principles of the Chriſtian Religion, than that of the Roman Catholicks*; and the Reform'd are beholden for ſuch a Character to a ſtander-by; but this he cannot yet admit of, becauſe *we muſt feign a third place of Torments, as well as Joy; and what will this differ from a Purgatory?* As much, I anſwer, as *Purgation and Torment* differ, which, to borrow your own Words, differ in their *ſole, primary, and genuine ſignifications both in Hebrew, Greek and Latine*. And is there no difference, think you, in the Things, as well as the Words; in a ſtate of Miſery which ſhall end in Heaven, and that which ſhall end in Hell? But it ſeems *we have not found out a Place for the Torment of the Wicked, tho' we have Paradiſe for the Reception of Good Souls*. This may be call'd an half-Objection, which grants one part of the

Pag. 329.

Pag. 330.

Ibid.

Queſtion to confute another, but unluckily grants that part, which neceſſarily ſuppoſes the whole; for if the ſurviving Souls of good Men are happy in *Paradiſe*, the Wicked are undoubtedly miſerable ſome where; and this is all I deſire *Eſtibius* to grant me. But he farther urges, this *Paradiſe* cannot be a place of initial Happineſs only; *for where our Saviour was after Death, ſure muſt be a perfect, and compleat State of Happineſs; ſo that, if the Thief were with him, he muſt alſo be in the ſame State too.* Ibid. So that the Thief muſt be equally happy with our Saviour, becauſe in *Paradiſe* as well as he; and indeed all Men, in the ſame *Meridian*, muſt according to this Notion, be equally happy or miſerable; or however the Thief muſt be as happy as Heaven cou'd make him, if he was with our Saviour; but this is an Argument truly fitted *to cozen a Ruſtic Underſtanding*, which may perhaps conceive Happineſs appendant to a Place; and as ſuch, I ſay as he did, *I like it well*; but then I muſt not believe that *Eſtibius* ever entertain'd, for his own uſe, ſuch a groſs Notion of Happineſs, as to ſuppoſe it relative to any thing External; he knows it conſiſts in the Conformity of the Object to the Faculty; and I hope he is not inſenſible that the more immediate Preſence of God himſelf may become, to ſome

Faculties, the moſt exquiſite Miſery. So that queſtionleſs, if God pleaſes, the ſame place may be that of *Initial*, and alſo that of *Conſummate* Happineſs.

This is all that deſerves our Notice in this Chapter, till we come to *the Opinion of Ghoſts, or Perſons walking after they are dead*; but *Eſtibius*, by his management of this Argument, has prevented us here, from entering into the merits of it. He tells us, *if ever the Caſe did happen in this World, as I much doubt, I do poſitively aver it is miraculous, as well as done by a Supernatural Power.* This doubt, if the Author is conſiſtent, muſt not extend to thoſe Saints, who after our Saviour's Reſurrection appear'd unto many; but only to the time in which, as we ſay generally ſpeaking, Miracles have ceas'd: And when he is able to demonſtrate that the Merits of this Cauſe depend upon ſuch Apparitions, I ſhall examine more nicely, than I have yet thought it worth my while to do, into the Hiſtory of them. In the interim, it is a remarkable reaſon he gives why there cannot be ſuppos'd ſuch Apparitions, that *God can without the expence of a Miracle, by very little and inconſiderable Means, worked on by ſecond Cauſes, find out and diſcover the greateſt and moſt villainous Intrigues*, &c. which Reaſon

Pag. 339.

Ibid.

Pag. 340.

is good, if it be good at all, againſt all the ſignal and awakening Notices of Providence; which have been the Obſervation of the ſober part of Mankind, in all Ages and Countries——— But I fear *Eſtibius* will ſlight the Objection.

The remainder of this Chapter is ſpent in confuting the Peripatetick Notion of *Forms in General*, and particularly the *Subſtantial Form*; which title they gave to the Soul of Man. It wou'd be unpardonable in me to follow him, in theſe *inquiſitive Enquiries*, as he's pleas'd to term them; for the moſt that can be made of this learned piece of Work is this, *Form is an improper Term for a Subſtance*. Which Important Propoſition, far be it from me to weaken; or detract from the great Author, and Diſcoverer of it. Pag. 349.

CHAP. IX.

Reflexions on his Ninth Chapter, intitul'd a brief Hiſtory of Human Soul.

THE Deſign of this Hiſtory, as the Author declares at his Entrance upon it, is *to ſhew us how this Doctrine* [of the Immortality of the Soul] *was deliver'd from thoſe Heathen Philoſophers, to the Chriſtian Church*; *and how continued and ſupported for ſelf Intereſt and ſecular Advantage*: Pag. 352. And it muſt be confeſs'd, cou'd it be made out in fact, that we had the Notion only from Heathens, and maintain it only for Gain; it wou'd be no ſmall Prejudice, to a wiſe and good Chriſtian, againſt this Doctrine. Thus far therefore *Eſtibius* deſigns well and conſiſtently; but, as it uſually happens that his Deſign is the leaſt part of his Performance, ſo here we have above Fifty, out of Sixty odd Pages, ſpent in ſhewing us how the Heathen Philoſophers came by it themſelves; and upon what precarious Grounds they maintain'd it. All this Learned Pains therefore,

fore might juſtly be ſlighted, and *ſet aſide*, as it is really *beſide* the Queſtion; only it may deſerve a Reflexion or two, becauſe many Learned Men have endeavour'd to propagate an Opinion, that the moſt ancient Theology was firſt borrow'd from the Scriptures, or the Schools of the Patriarchs, tho' afterwards chang'd and mutilated, according to the Opinion and Fancy of thoſe *Sages*, through whoſe Hands it came down to us; and becauſe it ſtill appears by their works, that the chief of their Notions were not maintain'd upon ſuch precarious Grounds; and upon that account it wou'd ſeem ſtrange, if they deliver'd nothing ſolid upon an Argument of ſuch moment to Mankind, and which had ſo large a ſhare in their Compoſitions.

As to the firſt Enquiry, from whence the Philoſophers had this Notion, *Eſtibius* derives it to them immediately from the *Ægyptians*, and to theſe from the Writings of *Moſes*, pry'd into, but miſtaken by the *Ægyptian Prieſts*. Pag. 356. It's true we cannot depend much upon this account, becauſe the Author of it has very flatly contradicted himſelf in the Relation. He pretends in one place to have *given us the rational Grounds, how the Ægyptian Prieſts became, in all probability, the firſt Founders of that Notion of an immortal* Pag. 360.

tal Soul in Man; and in the very next Page, the *Chaldeans* are made the firſt Founders of it; and afterwards the *Ægyptians* are *a ſecond ſort of Philoſophers, who by reaſon of their vicinity to* Chaldea, *might be inſtructed in the ſame Principles*, &c. Tho' he thinks it more likely they might have it from the Writings of *Moſes*; however they were not the firſt Founders of it amongſt the Heathens; becauſe the *Chaldeans*, as he confeſſes, were *antiquiſſimum Doctorum Genus*; and he has not pretended to date the Original of it amongſt them. *Pag.*361. Pag. 365.

But becauſe I am paſt wondring at ſuch paſſages as this; let us take it for granted that he means the *Chaldeans* and *Ægyptians* were the two oldeſt Nations that held this Doctrine, and that *Thales* firſt brought it from them into *Greece*: But then his Hiſtory is falſe; for, as he has been already told, it is to be met with in ſeveral Places of *Homer*, who liv'd above 300 Years before *Thales*; and the ſame Learned Perſon has farther ſhewn, that it was the Opinion of all Nations, by a very full and particular Proof, which I ſhall neither pretend to tranſcribe nor improve, but referr the Reader to it. And indeed we may be fully aſſur'd *Pag.* 366. *Dr.* Nichols's *Con. with a* Theiſt, p. *laſt* p. 220. Ibid. p. 222.

aſſur'd of the truth of this, ſince *Tully*, who apears to be moſt exactly and thoroughly skill'd, in all the Philoſophy and Religion before his time, tells us, as I have already cited the Paſſage, *permanere Animos arbitramur, conſenſu Nationum omnium.* Thus remarkably introduc'd *ut Deos eſſe natura opinamur, qualeſque ſunt Ratione cognoſcimus*; *ſic*, *&c.* And this conſiſtently with what he ſays in the ſame Book, *Animum cum Corpore extingui ſunt qui cenſent, quales ſunt Epicurei.* But to any Man, that is the leaſt vers'd in the Opinions of the Ancients, it cannot be doubted that this Opinion extended as far as the Belief of a God; and I am ſure there were more various and ridiculous Notions, of the Nature and Being of God, than there was of the Nature and Duration of the Soul. And therefore as all thoſe whimſical Notions that Mr. *Stanley* has hiſtorically collected in his Lives of the Philoſophers, and *Eſtibius* has tranſcrib'd from him and urg'd as Objections to the Immortality of the Soul, might be far outnumber'd by a like Collection of Opinions concerning God, ſo they wou'd, for that Reaſon, more ſtrongly urge againſt the Argument, in both Caſes, ſo much and ſo deſervedly inſiſted upon, from the Conſent of all Nations to the Being of a God. But to a Man that better conſiders

Tuſc. *qu.* *l.* 1.

things, this Variety of Notions, is ſo far from proving the thing it ſelf to be an Invention of ſome particular Men, and not the univerſal Dictate of Reaſon; that that it is a very ſtrong preſumption to the contrary. That Nations ſo vaſtly different in every thing elſe which they believe and practiſe, ſhould yet agree, in the main, in two or three Fundamentals of Religion, is too unaccountable, as an Human Invention, to be ſuppos'd morally poſſible: Nor can it be ſuppos'd with any probability, that the *Ægyptians* in particular, communicated this Notion to the *Pythagoreans* and *Platoniſts*, and yet communicated nothing elſe of their Religion; eſpecially if they did learn it, not as a Doctrine agreeable to their own Reaſon (which *Eſtibius* muſt ſay, or he ſays nothing to the purpoſe; but gives his Adverſary a conſiderable Advantage) but only hiſtorically, and as it made a part of the *Ægyptian* Theology. Nor again can it reaſonably be imagin'd that the Philoſophers gave Religion to the Vulgar; they might correct and refine upon the receiv'd Religion, but neither cou'd their Notions reach any that were undiſciplin'd in their Arts of Diſpute. It is poſſible indeed that an univerſal Monarch may force an external Conformity to any Religion; but none of the great Monarchies extended ſo far as the Immortality of the Soul; they did not bring it in by Conqueſt, but found it whereever they conquer'd: And beſides, as to matters of Belief, the general Sence of Mankind lies under no Reſtraints of Human Power; nor cou'd ever be eſtabliſh'd by it. Laſtly, If any Opinion that has prevail'd ſo univerſally, be only traditionary, then that is highly unreaſonable to ſuppoſe, it muſt have been handed down from before the diſperſion of Mankind, from the firſt Family upon Earth; and let *Eſtibius* make his beſt of that conceſſion. Theſe I take to be convincing Reaſons againſt any pretended Hiſtory of Human Soul from Heathens, to make it their Invention; and till *Eſtibius* has confuted this Account of it, I muſt believe he can as eaſily draw up from the Materials they have afforded him, a true Hiſtory of the Creation.

But what if we ſhou'd grant our Hiſtorian, that there was no ſuch Notion generally entertain'd before *Thales*; and moreover that he with *Pythagoras*, *Socrates* and *Plato* had it from the *Ægyptians*; whence had the *Ægyptians* the Notion? He anſwers, *from peruſing the Writings of* Moſes, *where it is obſervable that the Word Soul is extraordinarily frequently uſed by him, in his Laws he gives the Jews; of which the* Ægyptians *might, and unqueſtionably did* Pag. 356. *con-*

conceive a very odd and erroneous Notion. That they might conceive an erroneous Notion, of the true Senſe and Intent of *Moſes*'s Law in general, may be allow'd; but that they ſhou'd miſtake him in an Article which equally concern'd themſelves, and which they adopted into their own Religion, is an unreaſonable *Poſtulatum* of *Eſtibus*'s, when we reflect that *Moſes* was *Learned in all the Wiſdom of the* Ægyptians, *and was mighty in Words and in Deeds.* Did *Moſes* then deſign to lead the *Ægyptian* Prieſts into this Error, or was he incapable of expreſſing himſelf, in an Article of Natural Religion, to their Capacity? I think his Character above either ſuppoſition; and as he had his Education amongſt them, and was choſen by God to ſpeak in his Name to them, I cannot ſuppoſe they were ſuch Strangers to his Language, as to miſtake him in Words *extraordinarily frequently us'd* by him; nay and to ingraft this miſtaken Notion into the Body of their Religion, from the Words of one who, with his whole Sect, *was an abomination unto them.* But that which makes the Wonder ſtill greater, is that the *Hebrews* ſhou'd concur exactly with the *Ægyptians*, in ſo groſſly miſtaking *Moſes*; for I have prov'd Ch. 6th, that this Notion was, even proverbially, entertain'd amongſt them, and Dr. *Nichols* has ſuperſeded all farther Proof from their own ancient Writers. But there is one Argument that may be more powerful upon *Eſtibius* than all theſe; for he himſelf has given it its due weight: He has quoted the Words of *Eſdras* 2 Book, Ch. 14. v. 35. *For after Death ſhall the Judgment come, when we ſhall live again, and then ſhall the Names of the Righteous be manifeſt*, &c. And ſuppoſing, without any Reaſon, that this excluded the ſeparate Life of the Soul, he adds, *which Quotations being from the* Apocrypha, *I would have my Reader take notice that I cite them, not for Arguments of Divine Authority, but rather as Hiſtorical, to ſhew the common Opinion of the* Jews *at that time*, &c. I need not now ſhew that this however, will not come near the Author's deſign; but on the other hand, I refer him to *Wiſdom* Ch. 3. v. 1, 2, 3, 4. *But the Souls of the Righteous are in the Hand of God, and there ſhall no Torment touch them; in the ſight of the Unwiſe they ſeemed to die, and their departure is taken for Miſery, and their going from us to be utter Deſtruction, but they are in Peace: For tho' they be puniſhed in the ſight of Men, yet is their hope full of Immortality.* I deſire him to conſider this Paſſage, as an Hiſtorical account of the Wiſdom, ſo eſteem'd, amongſt the *Jews*: And let him not think

Pag. 235.

Pag. 105.

Pag. 280. to get through his Loop-hole, *I paſs it by until the* Apocrypha *be proved Canonical*; for I inſiſt upon it no otherwiſe than as he himſelf had done before, upon a Quotation that makes nothing at all to his purpoſe. But I muſt not expect he will ſubmit to the plaineſt Senſe of the *Apocrypha*, who is not aſham'd to contradict ſacred and prophane Hiſtory in one Breath; *The generality of the* Jews, *nay I may ſay univerſally were of Opinion that Man wou'd die and never live again*; what is this, but to aſſert a Matter of Fact, either *againſt*, or *without* his Knowledge? and either is bad enough. We ſee then, if his own Hiſtory be true, the probable Ground of this Doctrine, which in ſhort is this; the *Church of England* had it from the *Church of Rome*, that Church from the *Primitive Fathers*, they from the *Philoſophers*, thoſe from the *Ægyptians*, and the *Ægyptians* from *Moſes*. Sec. Th. pag. 359.

The next thing we are to conſider, is the *Reaſon* upon which the Philoſophers aſſerted and maintain'd this Doctrine; which *Eſtibius* calls precarious. And that they did aſſert it upon many precarious Reaſons, I muſt not deny; for they affectedly differ'd from each other in their Reaſoning about moſt things; and *Tully* confeſſes upon this *Occaſion*, *Rationem illi ſententiæ ſuæ non fere reddebant, niſi quid erat numeris aut deſcriptionibus explicandum.* Tuſc. qu. lib. 1. But tho' they differ'd in their Diſcriptions, which made the greateſt part of their Diſcourſes; yet it is very remarkable they all aſſign'd one Reaſon, which as I take it is *the* Reaſon from the conſideration of the Nature of the Soul; It is the αὐτοκίνετον or ſelf-moving Power in the Soul. This *Eſtibius* relates was the chief Tenent of *Thales, who firſt gave that Attribute of a ſelf-movent Principle and Immortality to the Soul*; Pag. 367. and after him *Pythagoras* call'd it *a ſelf-moving Number, which is Mind*: Pag. 370. Next he reckons this amongſt the Opinions of *Socrates, That the Soul of Man is immortal; for what is always moveable is immortal*; Pag. 381. and *Plato*, the laſt he mentions, ſays, *The Soul of Man is immortal, a Subſtance having, within it ſelf, a power to move it ſelf, and other things.* Pag. 391. Thus far Mr. *Stanly* has inform'd him right, and I know not what need be added, unleſs that *Cicero* himſelf, who had ſo well digeſted all the Opinions of the Ancients, lays down this as his grand Proof from *Plato*. *Quod ſemper movetur æternum eſt: Quod autem motum aſſert alicui, quodque ipſum agatur aliunde, quando finem* Tuſc. qu. li. 1.

habet motus, vivendi habeat neceſſe eſt. Solum igitur quod ſeipſum movet, quia nunquam deſeritur a ſe, nunquam ſe moveri quidem deſinit; quinetiam cæteris quæ moventur, hic fons, hoc principium eſt movendi, &c. Now whence cou'd proceed this uninterrupted Chain of Reaſoning? And how came the ſame Argument to be in all their Mouths, who differ'd ſo much in moſt Arguments, but from the ſame true obſervation of the paſſive Nature of corruptible Matter? And this is the very Argument which I have proſecuted at large in the firſt part; and thither I muſt refer *Eſtibius* who *cannot conceive why a Thing being ſelf-movent, muſt therefore be immortal; there ſeems* (he means only to himſelf) *no natural Inference or Connexion between the one and the other.* Pag.368.

The Reader muſt now be left to judge what *Eſtibius* has gain'd, by detaining us thus long from what ſhou'd have been the Subject of this Chapter, which is the Introduction of this Doctrine into the Chriſtian Church, and the Reaſon of it's continuance there. All the account he has given of the firſt is, that the Primitive Fathers were generally *Platoniſts*, inſomuch that St. Auguſtine *confeſſes, That the Books of the Philoſophers were very uſeful to him, to facilitate his Underſtanding of* Pag.386.

ſome Orthodox Truths; and upon this ſingle Reaſon he doubts not to make it a pure Principle of *Platoniſm*. *Platoniſm* was undoubtedly the receiv'd Philoſophy of thoſe Times; and even St. *Paul* himſelf is not aſham'd, as we have ſeen, to make uſe of the *Platonic* Notion of the Soul: And what then? Did he learn it at *Tarſus*, and corrupt Chriſtianity with it? No, he had *the Spirit of God*, but the Primitive Fathers were poor ignorant, illiterate Creatures; and indeed conſidering how heartily they renounc'd their Heatheniſh Principles, thoſe of them that were born Heathens; and how unlikely it is thoſe who were born Chriſtians ſhou'd take their Religious Principles from thence; and withall that their chief Buſineſs was to diſpute againſt the Heathen Religion, and how zealouſly and ſucceſsfully they appear'd in that Cauſe, nothing but an Ignorance next to Infatuation, cou'd have ſuffer'd them univerſally to eſpouſe an Heatheniſh Doctrine, purely as ſuch. And yet it is plain not only the Fathers eſpous'd it, but the Vulgar alſo, and indeed the whole Body of Chriſtians muſt be *Platoniz'd* to account for *Eſtibius*'s Notion. It is reaſonable to ſuppoſe, *Athanaſius* wou'd not have explain'd the Doctrine of the Trinity by this, had it not been a known and receiv'd Doctrine among Chriſtians;

for to introduce it by ſuch a Method, wou'd have been only to explain one obſcure Thing by another. And thus *Methodius* ſpeaks to it, not as a Queſtion in diſpute, but by way of Explanation of a receiv'd Doctrine. Ἄνθρωπος λέγεται κατὰ φύσιν ἀληθέστατα, οὔτε ψυχὴ χωρὶς σώματος, οὔτε αὖ πάλιν σῶμα χωρὶς ψυχῆς ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐκ συστάσεως ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, εἰς μίαν τὴν καλοῦ μορφὴν συντεθέν. *Man, according to his Nature, can properly be call'd neither a Soul without a Body, nor a Body without a Soul; but the Reſult of a Compoſition of Soul and Body in one Form.* And which is farther remarkable, when ſcarce any Fundamental of Chriſtianity ſtood unſhaken, through the Three firſt Centuries we read but of one deſpicable Number of *Arabian* Chriſtians, who, as *Euſibius* tells us, were infected with this Hereſy, but confuted by *Origen. They affirm'd*, as Dr. *Cave* ſays, *that at Death both Body and Soul did expire together, and were reſolv'd into the ſame State of Corruption; and that at the Reſurrection they ſhould revive and riſe together to eternal Life. For this purpoſe a general Synod of thoſe parts was called, and* Origen *deſired to be preſent at it; who manag'd the Cauſe with ſuch weighty Arguments, ſuch unanſwerable and clear Conviction,*

Method. apud *Phot. Cod.* 224.

Hiſt. L. 6. Ch. 30.

Life of Origin.

viction, that the adverſe Party threw down their Weapons, and relinquiſhed the Cauſe which they maintained before. This *Synod* was held about the Year 245, and it may be obſerv'd that a general *Synod* thought the Philoſophical *Origen* (who at their Choice had ſo ſucceſsfully maintain'd the Divinity of our Bleſſed Saviour, and converted the Heretick *Beroſus* that oppos'd it) to be a fit Champion in this, and indeed all the moſt conſiderable Chriſtian Controverſies of his Time. Which fully proves, that not only the Primitive Fathers, but the whole Primitive Church maintain'd this Doctrine; and it muſt be confeſs'd *Eſtibius* has undertaken a very noble Army of Adverſaries.

However the Fathers were the chief Patrons of this Doctrine, and the Conduit-Pipes that conveigh'd it entire to us; and *hinc illæ lachrymæ*; here is the true Reaſon why *Eſtibius* has ſtrew'd thoſe contemptible Characters of them ſo thick thro' his Book. Here therefore it might be proper to vindicate their Learning and Underſtanding from thoſe groſs and rude Aſperſions; but this Work is done to my Hands, by all the Hiſtorians of theirs, and all ſucceeding Times; particularly by Dr. *Cave* in their ſeveral Lives, and in the Introduction to his *Apoſtolici*, he proves it *an Advantage that exceedingly contributed to the Triumph* Pag. 12, &c.

of Chriſtianity, the ſingular Learning of many who became Champions to defend it. For tho' the Goſpel at its firſt ſetting out, was left to its own naked Strength; and Men of the moſt unpoliſh'd Breeding made Choice of to conveigh it to the World, that it might not ſeem to be an human Artifice; yet after the miraculous Power began to ceaſe, it pleas'd the Divine Providence to raiſe up, in its Defence, Men of the moſt profound Abilities and Learning, for the firſt five Centuries. They were, as he ſays, *exquiſitely skill'd in Arithmetick, Geometry, Aſtronomy, Logick, Phyſick, Rhetorick, and indeed what not?* I deſire *Eſtibius*, the next time he writes, to be particular in his Characters of *Irenæus, Juſtin Martyr, Athenagoras, Theophilus, Arnobius, Origen, Gregory Nazianzen*, and *Chryſoſtom.* It's true his Objection was made before by *Celſus, Porphyry*, and *Julian*; and therefore it may be proper for his Uſe, to tranſcribe St. *Jerom*'s Anſwer to it. *Diſcant ergo*, Celſus, Porphyrius, Julianus, *rabidi adverſus Chriſtum Canes, diſcant eorum Sectatores, qui putant Eccleſiam nullos Philoſophos & Eloquentes, nullos habuiſſe Doctores, quanti & quales viri eam fundaverint, extruxerint, & ornaverint; & deſinant fidem noſtram ruſticæ tantum ſimplicitatis arguere, ſuamque potius imperitiam agnoſcant.* And with this I leave

S. *Hieron.*præf. de ſcrip. Eccl.

leave him to reflect upon the Character, which he has ſo induſtriouſly, and ſo frequently given us of the Primitive Fathers; how far it is from Truth, and how near a-kin to the moſt inveterate Enmitys that ever appear'd againſt the Chriſtian Cauſe.

If we are not to be impos'd upon by *Eſtibius* in things at that diſtance of Time, he can expect but little Succeſs in his laſt Undertaking; which was to ſhew the Continuance of this Opinion in the Church, *for Intereſt and Gain*. It's notorious what uſe the Church of *Rome* has made of this Doctrine; but ſuppoſing no ſuch uſe had been made of it, wou'd the Doctrine have ſunk? Muſt it neceſſarily have fail'd in the time of Pope *Gregory the Great*, had not he commanded *Prayers for the Dead*, and ſet up *Purgatory*? Muſt it needs have been drop'd at that juncture of time, when it had ſtood the Teſt of all the pureſt Ages of the Church? I muſt confeſs this Suppoſition is of a Piece with many in the Book, and can be exceeded for Extravagance, by nothing but what the Author farther aſſerts, *That the Conteſt for Power and Grandeur in the Romiſh Church, was the true Grounds of ſtrenuouſly maintaining this Opinion about the ſpiritual Soul of Man, united to his Body, and ſubſiſting after it in a ſeparate State.* According

Pag. 409.

Pag. 411.

cording to this account, who wou'd expect to meet with this Opinion among Chriſtians till the ſixth Century? but why may not he be allow'd to call that a *Ground*, which is only a *Superſtructure*, as well as to make a *Superſtructure* of his own, without any *Ground* at all?

But methinks this Hiſtory of his is a little lame, or rather ends where it ſhou'd have begun; for here's no Reaſon given why the reform'd Churches, and eſpecially the Church of *England*, ſo univerſally own and teach *Pſycomuthiſm*. But what wou'd you have a Man do? Impoſſibilities? It's poſſible to perſuade ſome Gentlemen that the Primitive Fathers were a parcel of Fools, when an Author cannot ſo well ſay Religion is in ſuch Hands at this time of Day; and again 'tis plain, that with us neither Prieſt nor Church, get any thing by the ſurviving of Mens Souls; and, beſides Folly and Knavery, there can be no other Cauſe of an Error ſo groſs, and ſo derogatory to true Chriſtianity.

Wherefore I expect, *Eſtibius*, you will bethink your ſelf of ſome other Topicks, if you are reſolv'd to proceed in your Deſign, beſides *Philoſophy*, *Reaſon*, *Scripture*, and *Hiſtory*; for all theſe make ſo apparently againſt your Poſition, that I hope very few Proſelytes, in an inquiſitive Age, will be made by ſuch Arguments, tho' you ſhou'd be able to *compaſs Sea and Land* to gain them. This is all the Advice I pretend to give you; for as to a *Retractation*, I am ſenſible you have ſet your ſelf ſo far above Reproof, or Conviction from others, that it muſt be left at laſt to God and your own Conſcience.

CHAP. X.

Concluſion, being a Summary Confutation of his whole Hypotheſis, *from what has been prov'd, and ſome farther Conſiderations.*

Having, in the foregoing Chapters, thoroughly examin'd all the Premiſſes in *ſecond Thoughts*, which have any ſeeming tendency to the Author's Concluſion; I ſhall not tranſgreſs the Rules of Diſpute, to take notice of his laſt Chapter, which he calls *the Summary of the whole, or Concluſion:* We can expect nothing of Argument new under this Title; and if what we have met with already will but ill bear Repetition, I am ſenſible it's too late to engage afreſh either in the ſame, or in foreign

Matter. But not to be too much behind hand with my Author, I ſhall here preſent to the Reader's view, a ſummary Confutation of the whole *Eſtibian* Hypotheſis; by reminding him, in part, of what has been urg'd already; and adding ſome farther Conſiderations, which have not yet fall'n in with my Method.

In order to this, we need not ſpend Words in ſtating the Controverſy between us. Our Notion and Tenent is ſufficiently known; and *Eſtibius*, perhaps has made ſome farther explication, but has added nothing to Mr. *Blount*'s Notion; or rather, that of the *Arabian* Heretics (for I don't find Mr. *Blount* own'd any Reſurrection) in the third Century, of which we have given an account. For Explication, he defines the Soul of Man, in general, to be *a* Pag. 90. *Breath originally infus'd by God into inſenſible Matter, by which it lives and exerts Senſe and Reaſon.* This properly is only a Definition of *Adam*'s Soul, and therefore he adds, to conclude the reſt of Mankind, that *God made the* Pag. 100. *Subject* [our Bodies] *capable at the beginning, and gave it a Power to produce its like; that is, living Creatures to produce living Creatures, and conveigh original Life in the vehicle of ſeminal Matter, from Generation to Generation.* And again, *the Soul* *is only a Power inherent in generated Matter, which depends on it, and periſhes with it.* Pag. 298. Theſe Expreſſions contain the Subſtance of his Notion, which the Author propoſes, and accordingly we ſhall now conſider as a Poſition grounded on Reaſon, and as a Doctrine of Religion.

I. Therefore I aſſert, That this Notion of Human Soul can have no manner of pretenſion to *reaſonable Grounds*; as being both *unintelligible*, and *abſurd*.

1ſt, It is an unintellibible Notion, I mean not as to the *Senſe*, but the *Truth* of it. *A Power inherent in Matter* we can underſtand; but then at the ſame time we conceive Matter naturally ſuſceptible of that Power, that is to ſay, we conceive a Capacity in *firſt* Matter, of all the ſubordinate Powers belonging to it: Now I preſume *Eſtibius* will not aſſert the Power of ſpontaneous Motion, as naturally belonging to *firſt* Matter, for fear of a long train of Abſurdities, already drawn out *Part.* 1. §. 4, 5, 7. and if this is abſur'd, the other is unintelligible; for here is a Power that has no Foundation in the Nature of the Subject; but as it were forcibly grafted upon it by an Omnipotent hand, after a manner to us altogether unconceivable; and much leſs is it poſſible for us to underſtand how this Subject ſhou'd afterwards exert this Power, nay and exert it of it ſelf, in the Courſe of ſecond Cauſes, without any natural connexion between the *Subject* and the *Power*. *Eſtibius* explodes the Solution by Natural Inſtinct, becauſe *it gives us not the leaſt Light to comprehend any Philoſophical Truth*; but I wou'd fain know wherein his own Notion differs from this; unleſs that Inſtinct ſuppoſes God perpetually to direct material Beings to their End; but this ſuppoſes him to have given the Body of Man a Power to direct it ſelf, which I am ſure is the more unaccountable of the two. And tho' the Patrons of this Notion are very ready, for a known Reaſon, to condemn *Ariſtotle* as an unintelligible Writer; yet they themſelves we find, upon Occaſion can ſolve the moſt noble *Phænomenon* in the Sublunary World, by an *occult Quality*. Pag. 98.

And if it be unintelligible how this Power was originally communicated to the Human Body, we are ſtill more in the Dark when we endeavour to explain how it was recommunicated by *Adam*, and every ſucceeding Father, in the propagation of Human Race. For, ſuppoſing now that God had actually lodg'd this unaccountable Power in *Adam*'s Body, yet for that Body to communicate the ſame Power, with ſeminal Matter, is, to ſay no worſe of it, beyond all Imagination. A Power to communicate Life, muſt be ſomething more than a Power to live; the latter only recurs to Omnipotent Power, which may act beyond our Conception; but the former places an unintelligible Power in ſecond Cauſes, and makes Matter naturally to communicate a Quality, which does not naturally belong unto it.

Eſtibius may anſwer, or rather object to this, that it's equally unconceivable how the Soul, or any thing immaterial, can move a Body. This, I confeſs, is true in ſome Senſe, but ſtill there is a wide Difference between the Unintelligibleneſs of the one, and the other Notion. Motion communicated to Matter by an immaterial Agent, is unintelligible in the *Manner* of it; but that a Body ſhou'd move it ſelf, is unintelligible not only in the *Manner* of being perform'd, but that it ſhou'd ever *be perform'd*. In one Caſe we can demonſtrate that ſomething immaterial mov'd Matter originally, *vide Part* 1. *Sect.* 3. And if we cou'd as clearly prove that Matter, with or without Spirit, mov'd it ſelf originally (which it's impoſſible we ſhou'd, becauſe they are two Parts of a Contradiction) then the Difficulty of Conception wou'd be equal on both ſides; but here we find nothing at all intelligible in order to convince us; whereas in the other caſe, we find nothing unintelligible, but what, in many caſes, we are forc'd to ſubmit to other Evidence which ſufficiently proves the thing. *Eſtibius* often ridicules our ſaying the *Soul properly ſees, hears, &c.* but I am ſure he does not mend the matter; for ſince the Body has naturally no Conſciouſneſs or Perception, he muſt ſay, *the Life ſees, the Life hears, &c.* This I'm ſure is not leſs ridiculous, if we may laugh at a thing when we cannot yet tell what to make of it.

2dly, This Notion is not only unintelligible, but highly irrational and abſurd; nay, we may pronounce it impoſſible, if we have prov'd that phyſically extended Subſtance, is in its Nature ſo utterly incapable of *Thought*, that no Power can ſuper-add that Quality to it, *Part* 1. *Sect* 7, *&* 8. The grand *Atheiſtick* Objection againſt a Creation, is that *Axiom* of theirs, *ex nihilo nihil fit.* Now tho' they both miſtake the Senſe and the Application of this *Axiom* (for every thing is eminently in God, and this is only ſpoken of ſecond Cauſes and Effects) yet they themſelves are really guilty of the Abſurdity they pretend to charge upon their Adverſaries: For to produce *Life, Senſe*, and *Reaſon*, which are unqueſtionable Realities, out of *ſtupid* and *inſenſible* Matter, out of meer *Magnitudes*, *Figures*, *Sites*, and *Motions*, is, in the ordinary Courſe, and therefore in a proper ſenſe, to fetch *ſomething out of nothing*. Mr. *Lock* may avoid this, by recurring to the Power of God; but *Eſtibius* has had the Misfortune to drop that, after the Creation of *Adam*; and to derive the reſt of Mankind, from a *Power in generated Matter*; and therefore he muſt ſtand and fall in this Notion, with the *Democritic* and *Epicurean* Atheiſts. And tho' with them he may find better Philoſophy, he will meet with more abſurd Atheiſm, than with thoſe that philoſophiz'd in the way of *real Qualities*, generable and corruptible in Matter, of which Number they made *Life* and *Underſtanding*; and cou'd thus account for the Production of it, without a Contradiction, which the *Atomic* Philoſophy could not.

But the Abſurdity of this Notion is farther obvious, even to ordinary Obſervation. Spontaneous Motion is an Ingredient, according to *Eſtibius*, of Life; now we may eaſily obſerve that neither has the whole Body ſpontaneous Motion in it, nor have any of its moſt agil and refind Parts: It fares with our beſt Spirits, as with other Bodies in Motion, they are retarded, and grow ſluggiſh by external Reſiſtance; and where ever Motion can be diminiſh'd, in that

Subject it may be deſtroy'd; but the Power of ſpontaneous Motion can neither be diminiſh'd nor deſtroy'd, by phyſical Cauſes, however it may appear to be ſo in Human Body. For if we ſuppoſe the Soul to act immediately, only upon the ſpirituous and ſubtle Parts of the Body, we muſt grant it neceſſary, that theſe be duly qualify'd to communicate Motion to the groſſer Parts, becauſe they do that mechanically; and this is a ſufficient Reaſon why our ſpontaneous Motion is obſtructed in its Operation, and alſo why this Obſtruction does finally reach every part of the Body: But on the other hand, this proves that a *vital Flame*, in a literal Senſe, is as great an Abſurdity, as to make all Fire alive. Nor is it reaſonable to avoid this, by ſaying thoſe Parts of the Body in which Life conſiſts, can never be depriv'd of their Motion, but by Death; for beſides that this is only to retreat from one Abſurdity to another, this *continu'd* Motion comes never the nearer the Idea of *ſpontaneous* Motion, nor accounts at all for it.

But ſtill the *Communication* of Life is a more groſs Abſurdity, than the *Original* of it. Do theſe ſelf-moving Particles, in which the Life of the Parent conſiſts, branch out into the Offspring? If ſo, all Mankind was, properly and ſtrictly ſpeaking, in *Adam*, as the part is in the whole; and here's an eaſie

Account, if 'twere but probable, of the Fall of Man. Or do theſe Particles communicate to others their Faculty of ſpontaneous Motion? We do not find that a Body commences ſelf-moving, from any Impulſe; but on the contrary, that the moſt active Parts of our Body may be laid aſleep, and the moſt rapid Motion of our Spirits ceaſe. In ſhort, it is impoſſible that the *Will* to move the Body, ſhould be lodg'd in the Body it ſelf; and the *Gremium Materiæ*, *Matter's Lap*, which *Eſtibius* ſomewhere talks of, is as incapable of receiving it, as Matter's *Br——h*.

Laſtly, he is not more abſurd in making Man wholly mortal, than he is in denying that he makes him ſo. He ſays, *Mortality properly relates to a periſhing Subſtance, which by its returning to Corruption, returns to its primitive Matter, and generates another, as all Bodies do; but Life or Soul cannot be properly ſaid to be mortal or corruptible, but it truly returns to God that gave it*, &c. But tell me, ſo long as your Name is *Eſtibius*, how Life can, in any other Senſe, or more properly, be ſaid to *return to God*, than any other Accident belonging to the Carcaſs, which yet returns to Corruption, *& eris mihi magnus Apollo*. Pag. 209.

II. I come now to conſider this Notion of Human Soul as a *Doctrine of Religion*; and tho' *Eſtibius* has confin'd the Diſpute to the Chriſtian Religion, and calls every other Argument *an Heatheniſh Invention*; yet I ſhall, in the firſt place, propoſe ſome Conſiderations from natural Religion, which will, I hope, be of Weight with thoſe that truly underſtand Religion, and the general Foundations of it.

We have more than once mention'd the Immortality of the Soul, as believ'd by all Nations, in ſuch a Senſe, that an *Exception* cannot be urg'd as an *Objection* to this Rule. We are now to conſider this as an Objection againſt *Eſtibius*. And here, as a good Teſtimony ought always to have Weight with a wiſe Man, ſo of all other Teſtimony, that of the wiſeſt and far greateſt part of Mankind, in all Ages, concurring without the Poſſibility of Concert or Contrivance, in the Belief of any Principle, is the ſtrongeſt and moſt convincing. It is like a Quality diffus'd thro' a whole Species of Beings, which cou'd come only from the immediate Hand of the Creator. Thus *Tully*, upon this Argument, lays it down as an *Axiom, Omni in re concenſio omnium Gentium, Lex Naturæ putanda eſt.* And proving that this was the univerſal

Tuſc. qu. lib. 1.

verſal Opinion of the moſt ancient Nations in Hiſtory, *ab omni antiquitate*, adds, *quæ quo propius aberat ab Ortu, & Divina Progenie, hoc melius fortaſſe quæ erant vera cernebat.* Ibid. And *Seneca, Cum de animarum Æternitate diſſerimus, non leve momentum apud nos habet conſenſus omnium, aut timentium inferos, aut colentium.* Ep. 117. And therefore, in the Opinion of theſe wiſe Men, nothing leſs than Demonſtration indeed can embolden a conſiderate Man, to ſet himſelf againſt the general Senſe of Mankind.

But this Argument will be more cogent, if we examin into the Grounds of this Opinion, and the reaſons, if we can aſſign any, why it became univerſal. Theſe two I think are conſiderable; 1*ſt*, The natural Appetite and Expectation of Mankind; and, 2*dly*, The Adminiſtration of Providence in this World.

1*ſt*, I have proved, *Part* 1. *Sect.* 13. that the proper and adequate Happineſs of Human Nature, to which by a neceſſary Impulſe it ever aſpires, muſt be of eternal Duration; and that without the Addition of Eternity, we are made to be miſerable ſo long as we have our Being. This therefore may properly be aſſign'd as a Reaſon why the Belief of the thing became univerſal, becauſe the Appetite and Expectation of it is ſo; for Mankind having entertain'd the Notion of a Deity, cou'd not believe themſelves conducted hither, as into *Plato*'s Den, only to be amuz'd a while, with the Shew of meer fantaſtical and imaginary Happineſs; but they believ'd every Faculty had its true End and Deſign, and every Appetite its proper Gratification; and accordingly they all aim'd, tho' by different Methods, at a *ſummum bonum* of Human Nature, which I can look upon no otherwiſe, thro' all their various Opinions concerning it, than as the rude Delineation, and imperfect Remainders of *eternal Life* in their Minds. Now I believe it will never be made conſiſtent with the Notion of a wiſe and beneficent Creator, to ſuppoſe, while the natural Appetites of all other Animals have their proper Gratification, that Man ſhou'd be utterly diſappointed in the ſupreme Appetite of his Nature; and be caſt, immediately upon finiſhing his *Span* of Life, into that dark State, for which he has the ſtrongeſt, and for ever and unconquerable Dread and Averſion: And laſtly, that this Proſpect ſhou'd be the more ſevere Lot, of the wiſeſt and beſt of Mankind; who have the greateſt *Deſire*, and the greateſt *Reaſon* to deſire *Immortality*.

Now this I take to be one good Reaſon for the Propagation of ſuch a Belief, that it is perfectly ſuitable to the natural Notions of God and our ſelves; and I think it is no inſignificant Reaſon for the Truth and Reality of what was thus propagated and believ'd; for otherwiſe God, from whom they had the *Law*, of natural Religion, *written on their Hearts*, muſt be ſuppos'd to permit the general Obedience of Mankind to that Law, to proceed upon a falſe Principle; and not only ſo, but to give them a Law without any Motive that cou'd ever ſtand the Teſt of their Reaſon, for nothing beſides Immortality can; and therefore he who made this neceſſary and eſſential to the Obedience he requir'd of them, did not make Man *wholly mortal*.

From which Conſideration it is clear to me, that the Doctrine which *Eſtibius* wou'd propagate, utterly deſtroys the very Foundation of natural Religion. I muſt confeſs he ſeems to intimate a Conceſſion of this, when he calls all the Heathen Notions of future Rewards and Puniſhment a *pure Invention*: But ſo long as I believe there was really ſuch a thing as natural Religion; I muſt look upon this new-vampt Notion of Human Soul, to be a meer *Chymera*.

2dly, Another Reaſon for the Propagation of this Belief, may very probably be grounded on the Adminiſtration of Providence in the World. This is the only Reaſon *Eſtibius* gives for the *Invention*; and he often confeſſes, that without the Suppoſition of another State, they cou'd not ſolve the Appearances of Providence in this. But can he really believe this to be a Reaſon for his ſide of the Queſtion? To prove it an *Invention*, he has given a Reaſon which proves it to be none, unleſs by *Invention* here, he means *a Dictate of right Reaſon*; then we are agreed, but then he confutes his own *Theſis*. And indeed, to ſuppoſe Mankind endu'd with a Notion of God, but left perplex'd in the Maze of his Providence, without any Proſpect or Poſſibility of extricating themſelves, by any Succours of Reaſon, is to ſuppoſe that they have done better by themſelves, than God intended to do by them; for the general Expectation of Immortality, is undoubtedly preferable to Mortality, and we plainly find that the Principle gave them Tranquillity and Security, and gave Riſe to their beſt and greateſt Actions. But if God did make this Proviſion for them, and deſign'd it ſhou'd be their Principle of Action, it is highly reaſonable to ſuppoſe it a true Principle; for tho' Immortality is more fully reveal'd ſince, yet it is not credible that God ſhou'd lay a Neceſſity upon Mankind to recur to a Solution, which in Fact was falſe; or otherwiſe leave them to a rational Disbelief of his Providence.

It may be objected, that this proves their Suppoſition of a future State to be well grounded; but the ſeparate Exiſtence of the Soul may ſtill be a Fiction of their own, and their Expectation of a future State be made good by the Reſurrection. In Anſwer to which, I own that the future State in general, is firſt and immediately prov'd by this Argument; but then I ſay, by Conſequence, the ſeparate Exiſtence of the Soul is prov'd alſo; for ſince it had not pleas'd God to reveal to them the Reſurrection of the Body, they cou'd no poſſible way underſtand, how their Expectation cou'd be anſwer'd, but by the ſurviving of the Soul: for Reaſon cou'd never lead them ſo much as to conjecture the Reſurrection or Revivification of the Body; but ſeveral Reaſons might, and did ſuggeſt to them that the Soul, being the Principle of Life, with a ſelf-active Power inherent in it, might not become liable to Corruption, or be extinct upon its Departure from the Body. And this, according to their Notion, ſufficiently preſerv'd the Perſonality in both States; for as they lodg'd the Conſciouſneſs of Guilt or Innocence entirely in the Soul, ſo the Soul became, in their Account, the proper Object of Retribution.

And as this is a plain Account of the Propogation of ſuch a Belief over the Heathen World, ſo I doubt not it will appear that Chriſtianity builds upon it, and that the

Reſurrection of the ſame Body, cannot anſwer the Deſign of the Goſpel without it. This muſt be granted, if, after all that has been urg'd from Scripture, *Chap.* 6. the Reſurrection, according to *Eſtibius*, cannot be in order to the reviving of the ſame Perſon, but the Creation of another diſtinct Perſon.

And this will appear very plain, when we have once a right Notion of *Perſon*, of *Creation*, and *Revivification* of Man. 1*ſt*, Perſon may be defin'd, *the individual Subſiſtency of a rational Nature.* Thus it is diſtinguiſh'd from *Hypoſtaſis*, which is the *individual Subſiſtency of every thing in general*; and thus it is plain it muſt be my intellectual and rational Nature, whether from a Principle of Life or Soul, and not my Body (which lies under a perpetual Flux, of Accretion and Diminution) that makes me the *ſame Perſon* I was twenty Years ago, *viz.* I am the ſame ſelf-conſcious Being I was then, tho' I have undergone many Alterations, not only in my Body, but in my rational Faculty too, as to the manner of exerting it. This I apprehend to be the true Notion of the *Perſon* of Man in general; tho' there is ſomething more meant by it, when we conſider him as being in this State: Here the *Perſonality* may be ſaid to reſult from the Union of his Soul or Life, with his Body; and in this Senſe, the *Perſon* is alſo ſaid to die; but tho' the *Perſon* may be thus call'd a reſult from both, yet the *Perſonality* muſt determin only in one: That is to ſay it muſt be either his Soul thinking after ſuch a particular manner, by the uſe of ſuch particular Organs; or elſe it muſt be the Body only, ſo peculiarly modify'd, as to diſtinguiſh the Thoughts of one Man, from thoſe of another. But then this is not the Adequate, tho' it is the uſual Notion of *Perſon*; for ſtill the *Perſonality* may be preſerv'd, if the Self-conſciouſneſs is ſo, in the ſeparation of Life or Soul from the Body. The difference between theſe two Notions is only this, the one places Perſonality in the *ſame Self-conſciouſneſs*, the other more reſtrainedly, and indeed more improperly, in the *ſame manner of being Self-conſcious*. 2*ly*, By the *Creation* of this Perſon of Man, muſt be underſtood, according to the *Moſaic* Hiſtory, the breathing or infuſing Soul or Life into his Body; for Man is ſaid to be made at ſome diſtance of time from the *Creation* of the Earth, out of which his Body was taken; but the præexiſting Parts of his Body, hinder not this ſubſequent Act, from being properly call'd *his Creation*; becauſe that, in which his Perſonality conſiſts, was then *made out of nothing*. Therefore 3*dly*, By reviving the ſame Man, muſt be underſtood the re-infuſion of the ſame Life or Soul into that ſame Body; I mention the *ſame Body*, as an Article of reveal'd Religion; for, according to the Senſe I have given of *Perſon*, I do not think the *ſame Body* requiſite, in order to make the *ſame Perſon* live again; but only to make him the ſame Perſon, under *ſome* of the *ſame Circumſtances* he was in, when alive before, (which I think rationally accounts for the deſign of the Reſurrection) becauſe I am perſuaded he will continue the ſame ſelf-conſcious Being, when ſtrip'd of his Body. However *Eſtibius* muſt grant that the ſame Life or Soul, is abſolutely requiſite to make up the *ſame* Perſon; who will be the *ſame* after the Reſurrection, notwithſtanding his Cœleſtial Body, as much as he is now the *ſame*, thro' all the gradual Changes of his preſent Body.

From hence we may eaſily collect what ſort of a Reſurrection, I do not ſay *Eſtibius*, but his Hypotheſis makes; it plainly makes a re-creation, and that cannot be of the *ſame Perſon*. For, in Order to have the *ſame Perſon* live in any two different States, I maintain it abſolutely neceſſary, that he continue the *ſame* ſelf-conſcious Being, thro' the intermediate State, whatever it be, which leads him from one to the other. For what was his firſt Creation more than *enlivening* his Body? And what is his ſecond leſs than *reviving* of it? But now the *ſame Action* repeated, does not bring back into Being the *ſame Perſon*, who in any point of Time or Duration, had quite loſt his Being: For Life, according to this Notion, is only an *accident* to the Body in which it is; but it is demonſtrative, or rather ſelf-evident, that *Accidens non migrat de Subjecto in Subjectum*; and if the ſame Life which is in my Body, cannot poſſibly be communicated to any other Body; then neither can it be recommunicated to my own when loſt, tho' but for a Moment; for, in that Moment, it muſt exiſt without it's Subject, which is impoſſible an Accident ſhou'd do. This is plain in all parallel Caſes; a white Body for inſtance turn'd to any other Colour, can never regain the ſame *Numerical* Whiteneſs, tho' we ſuppoſe every particle of it to be exactly diſpos'd as it was before; but only a Colour of the ſame *ſpecies* or *kind*, but now a *Specific* Reſurrection, is indeed no Reſurrection at all; ſuppoſing the numerical Body that is now enliven'd do then revive, it may re-aſſume the Title of Man, and ſo the ſame *kind* of Being is reſtor'd, but it is not the ſame *Peter* or *John* reviv'd, nor can any individual be reſtor'd from not being, without a Contradiction.

Eſtibius ſeems to have been ſomewhat aware of this Conſequence, when he talks of *Life centring in God*, and ſo returning to Man; but this, as I have ſaid, is only an unintelligible piece of Cant, if he wou'd have it to *return to God*, in any other ſenſe than all extinct Accidents do; which indeed is in no Senſe at all; for how, or in what proper Senſe that which *centers in nothing*, can *center in him* whoſe eſſential Character is *I am*, *Eſtibius* will never ſatisfy the World; and therefore having ſo often inculcated the *not being*, and the *ceaſing to be* of Human Soul, he muſt confeſs that the *centring again in God* are meer Words, which carry no Senſe or Idea with them, and much leſs are they explanatory of the Author's Senſe.

It is certain all Life was originally in God; but let *Eſtibius* ſhew me what difference there is between his Intermediate State, and that preceding the Creation; or between the Life *return'd to God*, and that which was *never communicated* by him; and then let him prove that *reviving* of Man, is not a *new Creation*; or elſe let him make a *new Creation* conſiſtent with the *identical* and *individual* Nature of the Perſon; and when he has done that, I ſhall crave leave to withdraw this Article; but till then, let him quote as much as he pleaſes out of Scripture, I muſt charge upon him the moſt pernicious ſort of Deiſm, that which denies all future Rewards and Puniſhments. And tho' he ſhou'd reply, that theſe are only ſubtle Metaphyſical Notions, of *Perſon*, *Identity*, &c. Yet I muſt continue the Charge; for are they true? If ſo, the Miſchief is ſurely there; this only ſhews it lies the deeper, and there is no Miſchief lies ſo deep, but ſome will dive into it.

But truly I think the Conſequence does not lie ſo far beyond the common reach; it requires no great depth of Reaſon for a Man to be altogether unconcern'd for his Body while it lies in the Grave; and the caſe is much the ſame, as to the reviving of it; for it is not *I* that carry guilt with me into the other World; *my* Sins are blotted out, with *my* Being; *I* am neither concern'd in that Action of God Almighty upon my Body, whereby he will revive it, nor can he make thoſe new-liv'd Particles remember that they liv'd in a former World, if annihilation of Life intervenes; for in that State of new Being they can remember no farther backward, than that Being extends: Or if he ſhou'd impreſs upon them all their former Guilt, it is not *I* that remember the Fact, but a new Perſon, puniſh'd with the Remembrance of what *I* did; *I my ſelf* being no more concern'd with his Remembrance, than he with my Fact. For I am conſcious that if once a full period is put to my Life, and the Scene of it ever become a perfect Blank, *this* Life can no more be reſtor'd to my Body, or the Scene of it really appear again, becauſe it is rais'd an Human Body, than if it were rais'd the Body of a Beaſt, and enliven'd; in which there might be all the Particles of *my* Body, and yet not I *my ſelf*; and thus it is in the former caſe; there is nothing more of me, beſides the Particles of my Body, the reſt is all the Workmanſhip of God. Now I appeal to any Man, that does but underſtand what he properly means by *himſelf*, whether this is not the true State of the Caſe.

Eſtibius ſomewhere expreſſes a great veneration for *Lucretius*, inſomuch that he thinks an Immaterial Subſtance too wild a Notion for him to have entertain'd. *Lucretius*, we know, declares for Man being *wholly Mortal*; but then he declares it with a little better Conſiſtency than his Admirer: It was indeed too wild, as well as too religious a Notion, for him, that the ſame Man, once *wholly dead*, cou'd poſſibly revive. No, he plainly ſaw, and boldly maintain'd the Conſequence; and therefore, taking Advantage, as is ſuppos'd of the *Stoic*'s παλιγγενεσία, which is the very ſame Notion *Eſtibius* has grafted on the Chriſtian Religion, he has theſe remarkable Lines.

Nec, ſi materian noſtram conlegerit ætas,
Poſt obitum, rurſumque redegerit,
ut ſita nunc eſt :
Atque iterum Nobis *fuerint data*
Lumina vitæ,
Pertineat quicquam tamen ad nos *id quoque*
factum,
Interrupta ſemel cum ſit retinentia Noſtri.
Et nunc nil ad nos, *de* nobis *attinet, ante*
Qui fuimus ; nec jam de illis nos *afficit angor,*
Quos de materia noſtra nova proferat Ætas.

De rerum Natura Lib. 3.

Engliſh'd by Mr. *Creech.*

Nay, grant the ſcatter'd Aſhes of our Urn
Be joyn'd again, and Life and Senſe return ;
Yet how can that concern Us, *when 'tis done,*
Since all the Memory of paſt Life is gone ?
Now we ne'er joy, nor grieve, to think what
we
Were heretofore, nor what thoſe things will
be,
Which fram'd from Us, *the following Age*
ſhall ſee.

Now if the ſame Perſon that reads *Second Thoughts*, ſhou'd read *Lucretius* too, as 'tis not improbable he may, and is convinc'd by the former, I am very apt to think he will clap together *Eſtibius*'s *Principle*, and *Lucretius*'s Conſequence; for a Man is not ſetled till Principles and Conſequences agree, and his Notions lie quiet, and conſiſtently in his Mind; but we ſee *Lucretius* is not willing, and I am confident *Eſtibius* is not able to part theſe two.

And now I need not dwell upon the horrid Conſequences, that attend this Notion, when made Chriſtian. It makes God create, in the future State, ſinners *as ſuch*; who receive their *polluted* Souls immediately from his *pure* Hands; and having once taken away their Being, according to this Doctrine, he creates them on purpoſe to be miſerable. And therefore once more I call upon *Eſtibius*, either to quit the Premiſſes, or ſtand by the Concluſion; and I hope he will deal fairly, in this important Controverſy, with himſelf and the World; for it is a Subject, upon which ſo long as he is free to publiſh his *Thoughts*, he cannot expect to keep ſecret his *Deſign*.

THE END.

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